

SARVĀRTHA SIDDHI OF ŚRĪ VEDĀNTADEŚIKA

A Study

By

Late Dr **V.N. SESHADRI ACHARYA**

(of Oppiliappan Sannidhi)

Formerly of Annamalai University

Editors

Dr V.K.S.N. RAGHAVAN

and


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
SRI VISISHTADVAITA RESEARCH CENTRE

Madras

1993



Lord Oppiliappan and Goddess Bhoomi Devi



लक्ष्मीनेत्रोत्पलश्रीसततपरिचयादेश संवर्धमानो

नाभीनालीकरिङ्गन्मधुकरपटलीदत्तहस्तावलम्बः ।

अस्माकं सम्पदोद्यानविरलतुलसीदामसञ्जातभूमा

कालिन्दीकान्तिहारी कलयतु वपुषः कालिमा कैटभारेः ॥

(Tattvamuktākālāpa sloka 1)

“May this dark complexion of the body of the Enemy of Kaiṭabha (Lord Viṣṇu) ensure multitudes of riches for us. This complexion flourishes by virtue of its constant acquaintance with the charm of the dark lily-like eyes of Goddess Lakṣmī, gets a helping hand from the clusters of bees hovering over the lotus-navel (of Lord Viṣṇu), has its intensity augmented by the heavy garlands of Tulasi and robs the Kālindī (river Yamuna) of its splendour”.

This volume is dedicated to



Vangipuram Navanitam
Sri U.Ve. KRISHNAMACHARYA SWAMI
(Navanitam Swami)
(Father and Acharya of the Author)

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INTRODUCTION

Dr. V. N. Seshadri Acharya, a scion of a highly learned family, devoted to the propagation of Sanskrit and Vaishnavite philosophy over the past one century was, by profession, a professor of Sanskrit in Annamalai University for about three decades. The world of Vaishnavism has known of the distinct contribution made towards our religion by his father Sri Navanitam Swami, and by his elder brother Sri V. N. Sriramadesikacharya.

For his own part, Dr. Seshadriacharya has written a monumental work on the *Sarvārthasiddhi* of Sri Desika. It is the commentary on his verse work, the *Tattvamuktākālāpa*. Praised by pandits, this polemic work is, however, hardly studied or expounded, because of its erudition and intricate dialectics. It is such a work that the author took up for deep research and has presented an academic thesis on diverse systems and Sri Desika's defence of Visishtadvaita against them. The book consistently summarises the paths of Bhakti and Śaraṇāgati as issuing from the Visishtadvaita concept of the Jiva Iswara relationship.

We were fortunate to secure the services of two competent scholars to edit this book so as to make it of usefulness to students of Indian Philosophy. Dr. V. K. S. N. Raghavan (Dept. of Vaishnavism) and Dr. S. Padmanabhan (Dept. of Sanskrit) of the University of Madras have done an admirable job, diligently and enthusiastically. They have made the book more meaningful and more relevant by editorial touches on

the style and presentation. To these editors, we express our heartiest thanks.

Dr. V. Varadachariar, a leading authority in the field of Visishtadvaita philosophy, was kind enough to provide a foreword to the book. As readers go through it, they would find this to be a unique foreword. It is an essay on Indian Philosophy, to serve as a preliminary outline to enable a reader to follow the contents of the thesis and also the author's original contribution on the subject. The readers should then become quite familiar with the abstruse concepts of the different schools of thought and appreciate the worth of this publication.

Sri Visishtadvaita Research Centre has great pleasure in, and feels proud of, bringing out this volume in its programme of useful publications.

We wish to record our sincere thanks to The Dr. G. Srinivasamurti Foundation, Adyar, Madras for evincing interest to publish a book on Visishtadvaita Philosophy and rendering financial assistance for this publication. Our thanks are also due to Sri C. Ramaswami (author's brother-in-law), Madras who took special interest in the early release of the book and to M/s. Sundaram Charities, Madras for their financial assistance. In fine, we thank M/s. *Avvai Achukoodam*, Madras-13, for the neat printing and fine execution of this book.

S. V. S. RAGHAVAN

President

**Sri Visishtadvaita Research Centre
Madras-18**

PREFACE

दूषण्यादौ तार्किकाग्रेसरत्नं
स्पष्टं श्रीमद्वेङ्कटेशस्य सूत्रैः ।
अन्यालभ्या चातुरी पद्यगुम्भे
सर्वज्ञत्वं तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापे ॥

The *Saptatiratnamālikā* (45)
of Prativādibhayaṅkaram Aṇṇan

Our father, the late Dr. V. N. Seshadri Acharya, a Siromani and M.A, pursued philosophical research as his lifebreath tenaciously for years even while in failing health with a weak heart, he having mastered Vedānta Śāstra after his study of *granthacatuṣṭaya* (the four masterworks to be studied by every Vaishnavite) under his father and Acharya, Sri Navanitam Swami who is our Acharya too.

Having served a few years in schools and from 1940 in the Annamalai University, propagation of Sanskrit was his zealous goal. Piously disposed and spending all the waking moments, so to say, in useful work, his tongue constantly used to revel in revolving sweet verses of the Azhwars, Kurattazhvan, Bhattar or Desika with an inner mental delectation. He wished only to spend his retired life in a silent environment at his native place rendering services to Lord Oppiliappan like his own father teaching Sanskrit and Sastras to yearning students coming forward to him.

While he was working on this project on the *Sarvārthasiddhi*, he received encouragement and helpful suggestions from several scholars of that time, such as Sri A. V. Gopalacharya, Advocate, Trichy, Panditaraja Sri D. T. Tatachariar of Tirupati, Rao Sahib Professor M. R. Rajagopala Iyengar and Professor R. Ramanujachariar.

We are very much indebted to Dr. V. Varadachariar for his admirable Foreword.

May the Lord be pleased with what little service has thus been done at His Feet.

॥ सर्वार्थसिद्धिः सदा भवतु सर्वेषाम् ॥

Madras

V. N. Vedanta Desikan
V. N. Srinivasa Desikan
V. N. Venkatanathan

FOREWORD

Dr. V. Varadachary

French Institute of Indology

Pondicherry

Since the early times man inhabited earth, he noticed the surroundings, learnt about them and began making use of them for his own purpose. All men are not of the same kind. They differ from each other, in thought, word and deed. They display not only differences but variations and gradations. When more than one among them get together and give expression to their observations and the usefulness of things, they exhibit, such marked inclinations that very often, there is no agreement or unanimity in their views. It is in this manner man began to adopt reason as a means to argue with others on topics concerning their welfare and well-being. There is no means to find out whether men had any concept of soul or its destiny. The word God was not used by them but they believed in some super-human power which controlled them and their activities.

As years rolled by, inquiries started as to their own way of living and the miseries which afflicted them from time to time. They turned to a few pious men who were then near them and got advice and counsel on the concept of soul and the need to realise its nature. Filled with knowledge, feeling and ability to convey them to others they realised that the souls are animate. The bodies of human beings and non-human beings are made of matter which is inert and dull but

gives the feeling of being animated. This must be due to the soul's presence within the body.

Many of such concepts and theories are found in the *Vedas* which are the oldest literature in the world. Especially, the *Upaniṣads* deal with them. The treatment of these matters is not in a particular order and is generally found in more than one *Upaniṣad*. At this distant modern period, it is impossible to indicate whether these theories were pre-Vedic. Indian tradition however admits the *Vedas* as the most ancient literature, and beginningless and eternal. It is implicitly authoritative by not being the composition of any person. There are of course exceptions even among sections of Indians which hold that the *Veda* is the composition of God and therefore valid. Modern scholars are of a different view taking it to contain many parts which were composed by different authors called seers (*mantra-draṣṭārah*) at different periods.

Apart from the seers who are mentioned in the *Vedas* as visualisers of the *mantras*, there were many spiritually eminent sages who dived into the nature of reality and found the solutions, in the *Vedas*, for many problems which man has to face but from which he has to bear sufferings. Hopes were also shown to men but they were not final.

It is in the light of these general observations that we find the beginnings of systematic and reflective processes to know the mysteries of life. The findings were many and mutually disparate. Canons of interpretation of the Vedic passages were evolved. *Prima facie* views and settlements of the issues required a well-arranged procedure. More than one system arose to

accommodate all these. The adherents of the Vedic tradition devoted themselves to the recitation of the Vedic passages. Formulae were framed to find their use in performing the rituals in honour of deities who were many but were propitiated not all at a time but on occasions when the performers chose to worship them to gain particular ends.

Notwithstanding the abiding religious fervour which permeated the entire society, sufferings, trials and tribulations assailed people who were then helpless without any one to give them succour. It is at this period that Jainism and Buddhism arose. Neither of the founders of these two religions left behind them any written record as to what they preached. The Jains were realists and the Buddhists idealists. While attempting to stress on the need to avoid misery, they had to warn their followers of the danger of indulging in the performance of acts which bound them to attachment for the world. This was interpreted by their followers as refraining from doing the rituals and rejecting the authority of the *Vedas*.

This tirade did cause unrest among the traditionalists who began to condemn the tenets and practices of the followers of these two religions. The arguments and counter-arguments on both sides found their recordings in literature.

About the beginning of the Christian era, there was the rise of the systems of thought which came to be called *darśanas*. The tenets of each *darśana* assumed the form of *sūtras*, laconic in form, demanding, in the subsequent periods, expositions of them in works called *Vār-tika*, *Ṭikā* and *Bhāṣya*. The *darśanas* got classified under

two groups called Nāstika and Āstika. The Nāstika denies and Āstika affirms. What is denied or affirmed cannot be guessed at the present day. It could be the other world (*paraloka*) or God or authority of the *Vedas*. The sense of the world beyond or God did not find favour, for maintaining in the early periods, this division among the systems. Finally admission of the authority of the *Vedas* and rejection of it helped in identifying the systems as belonging to the Āstika or Nāstika fold.

In the light of this trait, the Nāstika systems are counted as three in number, namely Materialism (Cārvaka), Jainism and Buddhism. All these denied the concepts of soul and God as held by the followers of the *Vedas*. The Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta were taken to be included within the Āstika fold.

Things, which are held to exist in the world, are to be declared as existent permanently or non-eternally only with the help of *pramāṇas*, which are the instruments of valid knowledge. All the schools of thought admit the *pramāṇas*, though there might be disagreement on their number. The objects to be known with the aid of the *pramāṇas* are held, by the different schools, as externally real, non-eternal, phenomenal and empirically real. There is no unanimous opinion regarding the nature of soul, the knower. God is denied to exist in some and as omniscient controller in others.

The materialists deny the existence of things which are beyond the reach of our eyes. The Jains, who are realists, adopt Anekāntavāda on the ground that nothing could be declared to have a particular trait. The works written by the Jain authors take the place of the

Vedas in their system. The Buddhists are grouped under two main heads as Hīnayāna (lower path) and Mahāyāna (great path). The former includes Vaibhāṣikas maintaining reality of the world which has momentary existence, and Sautrāntikas to whom world's existence is to be known only through inference. The Yogācāra school, one of the Mahāyāna class, is idealistic, holding the world as existing only in the form of knowledge. The other school of the Mahāyāna is called Nihilism, denying total existence of the world and holding void (*śūnya*) as the reality. All these deny soul and God.

The Buddhists, in particular, became formidable opponents of the Āstika Darśanas. Nāgārjuna (200 AD), Aśaṅga (400 AD), Vasubandhu (400 AD) Dīnāga (400 AD) and Dharmakīrti (650 AD) were the most powerful writers on Buddhism. Their incisive arguments with logical acumen and devastating reasoning were hard to meet and required, in the Āstika camp, scholars skilled in advancing original and scathing attacks. Dharmakīrti, in particular, was a hard nut to crack.

About the beginning of the Christian era, the doctrines of each of the Āstika Darśanas were codified in the *Nyāyasūtras*, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, the *Yogasūtras*, the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* and the *Brahmasūtras* by Akṣapāda, Kaṇāda, Patañjali, Jaimini and Vyāsa (identified with Bādarāyaṇa) respectively. The *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvara-kṛṣṇa (250 AD) is the earliest work now available on the Sāṅkhya system. The *Sāṅkhyasūtras* of Kapila are held to be of later period and therefore the early non-Sāṅkhya writers did not attach validity to them. These were commented upon by accredited scholars from time to time but these *sūtras* do not teach the principles

frequently to the views of other authorities mentioning their names. These *sūtras* came into being at a time when Jainism and Buddhism were holding sway much to the detriment of the practices of the followers of Vedic religion. This system developed theories which preached the *Vedas* as intrinsically valid and impersonal in character. Eagerness to maintain them made this system uphold the Vedic *mantras* as supremely important investing them with the power to grant the rewards for those who performed the rituals. Gods were denied complete existence, their place having been taken by the *mantras*.

Śabarasvāmin's (200 AD) *Bhāṣya* on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* was commented on by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (600 AD) and Prabhākara (650 AD) after whose names two schools of Mīmāṃsā arose as Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara. The scathing and relentless attack on the Buddhistic doctrines are contained in the *Ślokaṇvṛtika* of Kumārila. He is virtually the beginner for the collapse of Buddhism in India, which had to find its escape to Tibet. Śālikanātha (700 AD), Pārthasārathi Miśra (1050 AD) and many other eminent writers enriched this system by their valuable treatises.

The Jñānakāṇḍa of the *Vedas* is represented by the *Upaniṣads* which are counted as 108 in number. They are attached to the *R̥gveda*, *Suklayajurveda*, *Kṛṣṇayajurveda*, *Sāmaveda* and *Atharvaveda*. The system based on these is called Vedānta. The *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Brahmasūtras* (also called as *Vedāntasūtras*) are also the basis for this system. These *sūtras* were composed by Bādarāyaṇa who is also known as Vyāsa. Bodhāyana, Brahmanandin and others are the names of ancient

writers of works on this system, but their works have not come down to us.

The passages in the *Upaniṣads* do not offer anything like a systematic exposition of a single doctrine or body of doctrines which could be taken to represent particular concepts of Vedānta. The major *Upaniṣads* contain the views of many sages who were authorities on some of the different doctrines. The Vedānta school looks upon all the principal *Upaniṣads*, to whichever *Veda* they are attached, as conveying the basic theories on which the system is built later.

Reality of the world, of the souls, and their inter-relation, unreal nature of the world and selves, difference between Brahman, the Ultimate Reality on the one hand and souls and matter on the other, non-difference between them, and Brahman's sole existence to the utter exclusion of souls and matter are found treated in the *Upaniṣads*. All these could not be admitted to form part of any single system of Vedāntic thought. The only redeeming feature is the admission by all schools of Vedānta of Brahman which has attributes according to some schools, and which has none of them according to others. The schools of Vedānta which arose later are based on one or the other of the concepts mentioned above, but they could not reconcile all the passages to lend support to the cardinal doctrines of their own school. This at once is the basis for the rise of schools with the names Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita, Śuddhādvaita, Bhedābheda and others.

In order to maintain their theories, the protagonists of the schools, classified the passages mainly as monistic and dualistic. The school of Advaita claims

undisputed authority for the monistic passage, relegating the others as having secondary validity. The dualists do the same in the reverse way. There is no mention in the *Upaniṣads* of this division of the passages. It must be admitted that this division is only at the human level. However, eminent and learned he be, no man can know Brahman as it is. Futility of man's quest is best revealed here. This division had to be made to maintain the central concept of the various schools.

Chronologically, Śaṅkara is the earliest Vedāntin to write commentaries on the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Brahmasūtras*. Earlier attempts were made to explain these texts but the records of such endeavour are lost. While Kumārila Bhaṭṭa gave a deadly blow to the Buddhistic anti-Vedic theories, Śaṅkara crushed the nihilistic theory of Buddhism. Idealism of the Buddhists found room in Śaṅkara's system in which Brahman assumed the place of knowledge. Brahman is without attributes and is the only reality. The world of animates and inanimates has only phenomenal existence and while dividing existence thus into absolute and phenomenal, Śaṅkara paved the way for living a virtuous life leading finally to absolutism.

The relation between Brahman and the world is difference-cum-non-difference according to Bhartṛ-prapañca and other pre-Śaṅkara writers. Brahman transforms into the world. This concept was revived by Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa who flourished after Śaṅkara. The former held *avidyā* (nescience) as a limiting adjunct because of which Brahman becomes many in the form of the world and Brahman alone

remains with the disappearance of these adjuncts. Yādavaprakāśa, who is held to have been the first Vedānta preceptor for Rāmānuja, maintained the difference-cum-non-difference as natural to Brahman. The world is only a transformation of Brahman on account of Śakti.

Following the treatment of Vedānta by early writers like Bodhāyana, Ṭaṅka and others, inspired by the *Nyāyatattva* of Nāthamuni, and indebted to the *Siddhitraya* of Yāmuna, Rāmānuja laid the foundations of a system called later as Viśiṣṭādvaita. The concepts were all old, some traceable to the Tamil compositions of the Ālvārs, but they received a refined treatment at the hands of Rāmānuja. The central doctrines developed by him are: Brahman has attributes and is identical with Śrīman Nārāyaṇa, world and souls are real, the relation between Brahman on the one hand and the world of animate and inanimate objects on the other is that between soul and body, Brahman is only one having the world as its attribute, thus giving the name Viśiṣṭādvaita to the school, and Bhakti and Prapatti are means of getting liberation from bondage. His works are: 1. *Vedārthasaṅgraha*, 2. *Śrībhāṣya*, 3. *Vedāntasāra*, 4. *Vedāntadīpa*, 5. *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 6. *Gadyatraya* (comprising *Saraṇāgatigadya*, *Śrīraṅga-gadya* and *Śrī Vaikuṇṭhagadya*) and 7. *Nityagrantha*. Later writers like Parāśarabhaṭṭa, (1100 AD), Periyavāccān Pillai (C 1200AD), Vātsya Varadācārya (C 1250 A.D.) Pillailokācārya (C 1350 AD), Vedāntadesika (1268-1369 AD), Maṇavālamāmuni (1400 A.D) and a host of writers contributed to keep the system intact by commenting upon the treatises of earlier writers and writing independent works.

The Dvaita school of Madhva, Dvaitādvaita school of Nimbārka (C 200AD). Śuddhādvaita system of Vallabhācārya (1473-1531 AD), are the later systems of Vedānta all upholding the admission of a personal God in the form of Viṣṇu. Vaiṣṇavism, as a religious creed, enters into these schools as also Rāmānujas, and has been the main basis for the upkeep of the theistic tendencies intertwined with the philosophical tenets.

Apart from writing commentaries and sub-commentaries on the works of previous writers and independent treatises, some writers wrote works giving treatment to systems of thought which they followed and also others. In the writing of the works of this kind, they adopted different modes.

One of the kinds is to treat the system of thought in a graded manner. They are arranged in a particular order and are shown to represent a better stand than the one treated before it. The system which the author upholds as the best comes at the end indicating that it represents the most perfect kind. The earliest work is the *Ātmatattvaviveka* of Udayana (C. 1050 AD). The systems of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Buddhism, Sāṅkhya and others are shown to be inferior to that which follows it in the order of treatment and the Nyāya system is shown to be the most perfect. The *Saṅkṣepaśārīraka* of Sarvajñātman (900 AD) discusses the merits of the theories Ārambhavāda, Pariṇāmavāda and Vivartavāda deserving greater importance—deserving a better status—in the order of succession. Mādhava's *Sarva-darśanasāṅgraha* (C. 1400 AD) treats the tenets of sixteen systems beginning with that of Cārvāka and ending

with the Advaita school. The *Prasthānabheda* of Madhusūdanasarasvatī (C. 1600 AD) is similar to the work of Sarvajñātman.

The second kind of writing is represented in the works devoted to recasting or rewriting the already available texts on some system by weeding out what the authors considered as defective. Such texts were adopted by introducing changes in the concepts which they found necessary to take up as works representing their system. There are four works of this kind. The first is the *Nyāyatattva* of Nāthamuni, which is not extant and the citations from which are found in the works of Vedāntadesika. This work is a recast of the Nyāya system to suit the needs of the Vaiṣṇava-siddhānta. The second work is *Seṣvaramīmāṃsā* of Vedāntadesika. This work, which is available only incompletely, demonstrates that the Pūrvamīmāṃsā system was originally intended to develop the theistic tendencies from the ritualistic point of view. The commentators on the *Sūtras* of Jaimini are shown to have missed this point and developed a non-theistic character for the system. The third work is the *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, which gives a refined presentation of the Nyāya system of Akṣapāda. The fourth work is the *Nyāyasiddhāntajana* which presents the metaphysical categories of the Vaiśeṣika system as acceptable in the Vedic background. God and soul get a refreshing treatment in this work.

A third kind of work intends to attack the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism with relentless logic in order to uphold the supreme position for Advaita among the systems of thought. Śrīharṣa's (C. 1100 AD) *Khaṇḍana-*

khaṇḍakhāḍya, Ānandajñāna's (1200 AD) *Tarkasaṅgraha*, and Citsukha's (1250 AD) *Tattvapradīpikā* represent this kind. The *Śatadūṣaṇi* of Vedāntadesika is intended to destabilise the citadel of Advaita.

The fourth and last kind is represented by works, which, to a general extent, are encyclopaedic but intended to establish the system which the author follows as the more valid and therefore acceptable. The works are written with a clear logical approach. The *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita (750 AD) with the commentary *Pañcikā* of Kamalaśīla (C. 770 AD) upholds Buddhism as the best philosophical system among the various schools of thought which are shown to be baseless.

Other works which are of a general kind and which treat the concepts of many systems of thought are:

the *Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha* attributed to Śaṅkara, the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* of Haribhadrasūri, (C. 1200 AD), the *Sarvamataṣaṅgraha* of unknown authorship, the *Mānameyodaya* of Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa (C. 1600 AD), and the *Mānameyodayarahasyaśloka-vārtika* of Lakṣmīpuram Śrīnivāsa-cārya (first half of this century).

To this kind belong two works of Vedāntadesika. They are the *Paramatabhaṅga* and the *Tattvamuktākālāpa*. In the former which contains 24 sections, all the schools of philosophy and religion which were in vogue during the period of the author are subjected to severe criticism and the Viśiṣṭādvaita system is established as the logically stable. This is written in Maṇipravāla (Sanskrit words mixed up with Tamil expressions). The other work which contains more than 500 *śloka*s distri-

buted among five sections, is a marvellous production of a more mature genius. No major theory on Śāstras especially, Nyāya and Vedānta is left out. Here is the treatment to the tenets dealt with by the different schools. The unusually large number of citations from sources unknown to most of us together with remarks and criticisms is staggering. It is really doubtful whether any scholar could master the contents of this work. To this kind also belongs the *Pramāṇanayatattvālokāṇḥ* *kāra* of Vādidēvasūri (1115 AD) a Jain writer, with his own commentary *Syādvādaratnākara* upon it. This contains the names of many writers of the different schools whose works have not come down to us.

A study of this work of Dr V. N. Seshadri Acharya would be fruitful when it is undertaken in the light of the foregoing account of the Indian systems of thought. The author had the initial advantage of being the son of the celebrated scholar, Sri Navanitam Krishnama-charya Svamin. In this background, he attained scholarship at home and also at the Raja's College, Tiruvaiyāru where the foundations for Śāstraic learning were laid by the reputed scholars like Madurantakam Veeraraghavacharya Svamin. He had Vedāntic learning to the full from his illustrious father. Studious by nature he had the advantage of close association with erudite scholars at the Annamalai University, where he worked in the Sanskrit Department. It is then nothing surprising, if he managed successfully to study the important works on *śāstras* especially, Nyāya and Vedānta.

The work does not contain any indication to suggest that he chose to reproduce the passages from source-books *verbatim*. In fact, the treatment of the

matter is original, though the materials were taken by him from the source and subjected to a critical examination. He has made judicious use of the texts of the Ācāryas, Rāmānuja and Vedāntadesika. Among the works of ancient writers, mention must be made of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* with *Pañcikā*, works of Udayana and Śrīdhara, those of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Pārthasārathimīśra and Śālikānātha, Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, the *Advaitasiddhi*, the *Iṣṭasiddhi* and the *Tattvapradīpikā*. Recent writers like Anantālvān of Mysore, Parakāla Svāmin of Mysore, and Uttamūr Veeraraghavacharya are to be mentioned here, whose contributions have helped the author very much to shape his views and present them in a creditable manner. Yet, it is essential to state that the author was much indebted, for the treatment of the matters in his thesis, to Vedāntadesika's *Tattvamuktākālāpa* with *Sarvārthasiddhi*. All the same, the author deserves much credit for his original approach to the topics he had taken up for treatment and presenting them in the most apt manner.

The work is divided into five chapters bearing the names Buddhism, Sāṅkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita. Advaita and Buddhism have received a very elaborate treatment.

Buddhism is treated in four sub-sections each one devoted to the treatment of the doctrines of each of the four schools offering a critical study of them and finally rejecting them. Momentariness, idealism and nihilism knock at the basis of realism on which most other systems of thought are based with the exception of the Advaita school which too does not tolerate nihilism. These concepts are shown to be fanciful and merely

imaginary. Momentary feature cannot be totally denied, for flame in a lamp, cloud, flood and others which are ever-changing, could not otherwise be explained. This does not suggest that non-momentary entities do not exist. Recognition is shown to prove that stability is at the basis of the worldly things. To deny perceptibility to the objects and maintain that they are only to be inferred is to deny recollection also which is formed on the basis of impressions formed on the strength of previous experience. It is proved ably by the author that identification of objects with their cognitions is dangerous, as continued rise of cognitions on the basis of impressions could not be explained. Impressions also could not rise without a substratum to rest on. Kumārilabhaṭṭa's seasoned arguments are well summarised. While refuting the nihilistic doctrine, the author has well explained the meaning of words *tuccha* and *mithyā*. Concept of the word *saṃvṛtisatya* is subjected to a critical reasoning explaining the meaninglessness nature of the formation of this word as the Buddhists do. Incidentally, empirical reality (*vyāvahārika-satya*) of the Advaita school is shown to serve no purpose. Nihilism and Advaitism are shown to be not much different from each other. The worth of the author's treatment of this section is heightened by his citations from an ancient Buddhist work, the *Tattva-saṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita.

The second section is devoted to a study of the doctrines of the Sāṅkhya system, which was the earliest school to stress on the aspect of consciousness of the soul and keep matter and its evolutes distinct from the former. The traits of soul, matter and the concept of *mokṣa* of the former are critically examined. The

Sāṅkhya system's attempt to employ inference to prove the *tattvas* is criticised and is shown to go against the proofs available from the *śruti* for the same. The Vedāntic school of Rāmānuja is shown to offer a better explanation and exposition of the evolution of each product from its cause belonging to matter, showing the wrong path taken up by the Sāṅkhya system. *Prakṛti* is shown to evolve under the control of God. Incidentally, the author discusses cosmology on the basis of the *Upaniṣads*. The author's treatment in this section bears the influence of his study of the *Sarvārthasiddhi*, the commentary on the *Tattvamuktākalāpa*. Treatment of the Sāṅkhya principles is elaborate as it should be, being very near to the Vedāntic doctrines.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories and doctrines are then taken up for study. In the main, the author's treatment is confined to: 1. Atomic theory, 2. Parts and whole, 3. Criticisms of Satkāryavāda and concept of soul. The atomic theory is intended to show that the world when destroyed would leave behind numberless atoms, which are eternal. The whole theory of the atoms and the production of the dyad and triad from atoms are metaphysical. Mere reason cannot prove anything and if at all it does, it must stop at a stage and cannot proceed further without explaining that stage. The defence put by the Nyāya writers is proved to be shallow and does not merit serious consideration. Seven reasons are said to have been offered by the Nyāya school to maintain that the parts are different from the whole. Vedāntadeśika is shown to have offered a fitting rejoinder, proving the hollowness of the Nyāya theory. Brushing aside all possible objections which the Nyāya school puts forth in defence of its theory,

it is shown by the author that this concept of parts and whole is buried with Ārambhavāda, which also is baseless. Treatment of this matter is rather elaborate. In this sequel, the Viśiṣṭādvaitins put forward their own theory of *satkāryavāda*. With great care, the author enumerates four reasons for dismissing the concept of the universal (*jāti*) which the Nyāya school upholds. Sound treatment is given to the nature and function of the sense organs admitted in the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita, rejecting the Nyāya theory on them. Refutation of the Nyāya concept of soul leads the author to offer a brief estimate of the Viśiṣṭādvaita theory of soul in bondage and final release.

The author's treatment of the Advaita system is more elaborate than that of others. He has wisely and cautiously made use of the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdanasarasvatī for presenting the Advaita doctrines. The *Laghucandrikā*, a commentary on this work by Brahmānanda is made use of for explaining the passages in the *Advaitasiddhi*. While controverting the concepts of the Advaitin, the author advances arguments which are based on a critical study of the *Śrībhāṣya* with the *Śrutaparakāśikā*, and the *Adhikaraṇasārāvalī* of Vedānta-deśika.

Treatment, which the author offers for certain fundamental doctrines of Advaita is based on the works of other schools like the *Śloka-vārtika* of Kumārila-bhaṭṭa and the *Prakaraṇapañcikā* of Śālikanātha.

It is hard to pick out, from among the topics dealt with here, any one or two as most outstanding, as all are equally well presented with clarity and precision.

• Among the numerous topics, the following have been

dealt with elaborately, with a wealth of arguments to demonstrate the standpoint of Viśiṣṭādvaita:

1. Brahman has no attributes
2. Nature of nescience
3. Anirvacanīyakhyāti
4. Akhaṇḍārthavāda and
5. Illusory nature of the world

The author discusses the difference between the connotations of the passages in the *Upaniṣads* which speak of Brahman as *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa*. There is no room for ambiguity in the author's explanation of the canons of interpretation (Nyāyas) adopted in these passages. Similar is the treatment given to the study of the nature of nescience and *anirvacanīyakhyāti*.

The Upaniṣadic passages like '*tattoamasi*' and '*satyam jñānam anantam brahma*' are cited by the Advaita school to prove identity of Brahman and *jīva*, and Brahman as having no attributes. Secondary denotative power (*lakṣaṇā*) and the principle of grammatical coordination (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) are worked upon by them to maintain their *Siddhānta* in the light of the imports of these passages. The second passage contains the words *satyam*, *jñānam*, *anantam* and *brahma*, all of which are explained to have only one sense namely Brahman. The other words do not have any sense to convey except that which is excluded from "not — that", *satya* means that which is different from *asatya*. Thus there is no meaning for each word which is a part (*khaṇḍa*) of the whole passage. In support of their view, the Advaitin brings in the concept of indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpapratyakṣa*). The

author explains the concept of this perception and concludes in favour of admitting the Viśiṣṭādvaita views. The *akhaṇḍārthavāda* gets a lucid treatment leading to its refutation. The passage of the *Upaniṣad*, "*brahmaiva bhavati*" is treated in a scholarly way by citing the passages from the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (3.1) and the *sūtras* from the Dyubhāvādhikaraṇa of the *Brahma-sūtras*. Sufficient justice is done for the interpretation of the word *eva* in the sense of like.

The author takes up then the study of the Viśiṣṭādvaita system. The concepts and theories of Buddhism, Sāṅkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita have been subjected to a critical study. They were refuted and in the process of refutation, the Viśiṣṭādvaita approach has been indicated with reference to them.

At the outset, the interpretation of the passages of the *Upaniṣads* is taken up. All the diverse kind of passages which the Advaita school took up for study and upheld the authority for monistic passages are shown to be of utmost validity only for the system of Rāmānuja who reconciles them with the help of passages treated as *ghaṭaka* arranging the diverse passages in a manner to show that there is no contradiction between one kind of passage and another.

The body-soul relation (*śarīra-śarīribhāva*) between the world of selves and matter and Brahman on the other offers a satisfactory and accommodating explanation, where *abheda-*, *bheda-* and *ghaṭaka-śrutis* find a harmonious import to convey Brahman as both the material and instrumental cause of the world. Creation and destruction means change in the material cause. Brahman, with the animate and inanimate

objects, undergoes change. Change takes place in the inanimate part.

Sadvidyā is interpreted by the author to prove that it favours Viśiṣṭādvaita tenets. If gold is the material cause and the effects of it are chain, bangles etc, it does not mean the chain and other products made of gold are unreal. How do we speak of the chain, bangles, ring? We say that there is a golden chain, golden bangle and golden ring. If these are unreal, how could the use of the word gold be justified. Are we not distinguishing them from the silver chain, silver ring and others? It is evident, that the material cause continues to exist with the effects — bangles, chain and others. *Sadvidyā* is thus in favour of Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrine.

If God has created the world, and is the primary agent for every occurrence, how is that he allows people to suffer? To this, the Viśiṣṭādvaita school gives the following answer. If Brahman is the inner and sole controller of worldly occurrences, it does not mean that the selves became active like the inanimate things such as machines do under the control of a human agent. The soul must have agency to act as it likes. What then is the role played by God? Attempts are made by the souls to achieve something good or bad. The initial stage is marked by the soul getting active in its attempt to get at its pursuit. This endeavour is purely due to the result of the deeds done by the soul previously. God does not interfere with this work. He permits the soul to continue the work at the next stage. He rewards the soul with benefits at the third and further stages, if the pursuit of the soul is good or gives punishment, if it is bad. Then the author takes up a brief discussion

on the five forms of God, *Para*, *Vyūha*, *Vibhava*, *Antar-yāmin* and *Arcā*.

A doctoral thesis should not be expected to contain a detailed account of all the topics relating to each system. Closely following *verbatim* the authoritative texts, the author has made a very good contribution with his remarks, critically examining the information contained in the source-books. The topics that are abstruse are made intelligible using a simple and easy flowing way of writing. A reader, sympathetic to appreciate writings of this kind, is sure to have a clear understanding in these arguments.

This work, which the author submitted as his thesis for his Ph.D. Degree of the Annamalai University is a deserving addition to the Viśiṣṭādvaita literature.

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
- AD *Ananda Dāyini* — Commentary on the *Sarvārtha-siddhi* of *Tattvamuktākālāpa* of Śrī Vedānta Deśika, Pub: University of Mysore, Oriental Research Institute Publication Sanskrit Series, Mysore 1938, 1940, 1954.
- AS *Adhikaraṇasārāvali* of Śrī Vedānta Deśika, Pub: K. Lakshminarasimhacharya, Madras, 1940.
- AS/
ASB *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī with the commentary *Brahmānandīya*, Nirṇayasagar Press, Bombay, 1917. (in Ch. V only)
- AP *Advaitaparibhāṣā* [Vedānta Paribhāṣā] of Dharmarājadhvarindra. Calcutta University Press, Calcutta, 1930.
- AV-JYV *Anantālpān's Vādāvali* — *Jñānayāthārthya-vāda*. Vedāntavādāvali Series No. 6, Bangalore, 1898.
- BG *Śrī Bhagavad Gītā* with the commentary of Śrī Rāmānuja and Śrī Vedānta Deśika, Ed. & Pub: Uttamūr T. Veeraraghavacharya, Madras, 1972.
- BS *Brahma-sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa, with the *Śribhāṣya*, *Vedāntadīpa*, and *Vedāntasāra* of Śrī Rāmānuja in two volumes. Śrī Venkateswara Press, Madras 1936.
- Bṛ. Up. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (with 120 Upaniṣads). Nirṇaya sāgar Press, Bombay, 1948.
- CS *Citsukhī* (*Tattvapradīpikā*) of Citsukhācārya. Nirṇaya-sagar press, Bombay, 1884.

* With regard to those books for which correct editions could not be traced, only the expansion of the abbreviation is given.

- Chā. Up. *Chāndogyopaniṣad* with the commentary of Śrī Raṅgarāmānuja, Ed. by Uttamūr T. Veeraraghavacharya, Madras, 1973.
- DŚ *Dayāsataka* of Śrī Vedānta Deśika — “*Stotras* of Śrī Deśika,” Pub. Śrī Vedānta Deśika Sampradāya Sabhā, Bombay, 1964.
- GS *Gaḍhārthasaṅgraha* — Commentary on the Śrūta-prakāśikā — of Śrī Raṅganātha Parakāla Yatindra Svāmi of Mysore. Pub: Parakāla Mutt, Mysore, 1959.
- HB *Hetubindu* of Dharmakīrti, Gaekwad Oriental Series 113, Baroda, 1949.
- IS *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman, Gaekwad Oriental Series 65, Baroda, 1933.
- Kauṣīt. *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* with the commentary of Śrī Raṅgarāmānuja. “*Kenādyupaniṣadbhāṣya*” Pub. Uttamūr T. Veeraraghavacharya, Madras, 1972.
- Kaṭha Up. *Kāthopaniṣad* with the commentary of Śrī Raṅgarāmānuja. “*Kenādyupaniṣadbhāṣya*” Pub: Uttamūr T. Veeraraghavacharya, Madras, 1972.
- KV *Kiraṇāvali* of Udayana, Beneras Sanskrit Series 9, Beneras, 1919.
- Mu *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* with the commentary of Śrī Raṅgarāmānuja. “*Kenādyupaniṣadbhāṣya*” Pub: Uttamūr T. Veeraraghavacharya Madras, 1972.
- NB *Nyāya-sūtra Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, Beneras, 1925.
- NR *Nyāyaratnākara*, Commentary by Pārthasārathi Miśra on the *Ślokanvārtika* of Kumarila Bhaṭṭa, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, Beneras, 1898-99.
- NK *Nyāyakandalī*, Commentary by Śrīdhara on the *Prasastapāda bhāṣya* of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, 1895.
- NKL *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayana, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, Beneras, 1911.

- NM *Nyāyamañjari* of Jayantabhaṭṭa, Kashi Sanskrit Series 106, Beneras, 1936.
- NMM *Nayamayūkhamālikā* of Appayyadīkṣita, Pub: Viśiṣṭādvaita Vaijayanti Series, Kumbakonam, 1940.
- NS *Nyāyasiddhāñjana* of Śrī Vedāntadeśika, Ed. & Pub. P.B. Annangaracharya Swami, Kanchipuram, 1940.
- NV *Nyāyavārttika*
- PB *Paramārtha-bhūṣaṇa* of Uttamūr T. Veeraraghavacharya, Ed. & Pub. by the author, Madras, 1959.
- PPNV *Prakaraṇapañcikā — Nayavithi* of Śālikanātha Miśra, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, Beneras, 1903.
- P *Parimala* — Commentary by Appayya Dīkṣita on the *Vedāntakalpataru* of Amalānanda, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1917.
- SM *Siddhānta-muktāvali* of Viśvanātha Pañcānana, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1927.
- SP *Śrutaparakāśikā* — Commentary by Śrī Sudarśanasūri on the *Śrībhāṣya* (*Catuḥsūtri*) Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1916.
- SB *Śrībhāṣya* [with *Vedāntadīpa* and *Vedāntasāra*], Śrī Venkateswara Press, Madras, 1936.
- SDS *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* of Mādhavācārya, Poona Oriental Sanskrit Series, Poona, 1924.
- Śās. D. *Śāstradīpikā* of Pārthasārathi Miśra, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1915.
- SV *Śloka-vārtika* of Kumarilabhaṭṭa, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series 11, Beneras, 1898-99.
- SK *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa with *Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra, Vidyā Vilāsa Press, Beneras, 1918.
- SR *Stotraratna* of Yāmunācārya, Ed. Swami Adidevananda, Śrī Ramakrishna Math, Madras, 1950.
- STK *Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī*: see *Sāṅkhyakārikā*
- Śve. Up. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* with the commentary of Śrī Raṅgarāmānuja. Ed. & Pub. Uttamūr T. Veeraraghavacharya, Madras, 1972.

- SRS *Śrīraṅgarājastava* of Śrī Parāśarabhaṭṭa with Tamil commentary by P. B. Annangaracharya Swami, Kanchipuram, 1913-1914.
- SS *Sarvārthasiddhi*, an auto-commentary by Śrī Vedānta-deśika on the *Tattvamuktākālāpa*, Ed. & Pub. P. B. Annangaracharya Swami, Kanchipuram, 1941.
- SŚ *San̄kṣeṣaśārīraka* of Sarvajñātmamuni, Vidya Vilasa Press, Bencaras, 1924-25.
- Śaṅ. B *Brahma-sūtrabhāṣya* of Śrī Śaṅkara
- Subāla Up. *Subālopaniṣad* with the commentary of Śrī Raṅga-rāmānuja "Kenādyupaniṣadbhāṣya" Pub: Uttamūr T. Veeraraghavacharya, Madras, 1972.
- Tait. Up. *Taittiriyaopaniṣad* with the commentary of Śrī Raṅga-rāmānuja Taittiriya-Aitareya-Chāndogyopaniṣad-Bhāṣya Pub: Uttamūr T. Veeraraghavacharya, Madras, 1973.
- TS *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita with the commentary, *Pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla, Gackwad Oriental Series 30-31, Baroda, 1926.
- TSP *Tattvasaṅgraha-Pañjikā*: see *Tattvasaṅgraha*
- TMK *Tattvamuktākālāpa* of Śrī Vedānta Deśika. see *Sarvārthasiddhi*
- Tai. Āra. (TĀ) *Taittiriya Aranyaka*, Pub: Sarada Vilasa Press, Kumbakonam, 1916-1919.
- TV *Taittiriyaopaniṣad-bhāṣyavārttika* of Sureśvara, Ed. R. Balasubramanian, Madras University Philosophical Series 20, 1974.
- VB Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* on the *Nyāyasūtra*: See NB
- VD *Viṣṇudharma*
- VGA *Viṣvagunādarśacampū* of Veṅkaṭādhvari, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1899.
- VP *Śrī Viṣṇupurāṇa* with the commentary of Śrī Viṣṇu-citta, Ed. & Pub. P. B. Annangaracharya Swami, Kanchipuram, 1972.
- VS *Vedāntasāra* of Śrī Rāmānuja: see *Śrībhāṣya*



श्रीमान् वेङ्कटनाथार्यः कवितार्किक केसरी ।
वेदान्ताचार्य वर्यो मे संनिधत्तां सदा हृदि ॥

INTRODUCTION

Hindu thought, in the ultimate analysis, is Vedānta philosophy. The philosophy of the Vedānta has been variously interpreted, and of the divergent modes of interpretation, *Advaita*, *Viśiṣṭādvaita* and *Dvaita* are the important systems. Though every one of these could legitimately claim to be a faithful representation of the Upaniṣadic thought, and though mighty intellects like Vācaspati Miśra, Veṅkaṭanātha, Jayatīrtha and others have sought, with considerable skill, to justify the claims of their respective system to be the true expression of Vedāntic thought, there is a widespread opinion among many in India and abroad that Vedānta is Advaita. Many circumstances are responsible for this notion. Among others there is the accident of Western orientalists coming into contact first with the Śaṅkara school of Vedānta and popularising it among the Western thinkers. Though there were authentic, and faithful, expositions of Vedānta doctrine, they were only tardily recognised. The Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja and the Dvaita of Madhva have not secured the attention they deserve. They have suffered considerable neglect. The wealth of philosophical literature of these schools remains unexplored and thus not available to the public. What may happen to a system of philosophy, if its literature remains inaccessible to all but a few, can be imagined from the fate that has overtaken the

systems of *Bhedābheda*vāda of Bhāskara and Yādava-prakāśa which were once the powerful schools of Vedānta, judging from the care taken by Sudarsana-sūri to refer at the end of some *adhikaraṇas* in his commentary on the *Śrībhāṣya* to the views of the Bhedābheda-vāda.

The author therefore feels that it is a duty cast on serious students of Indian thought to present an authentic version of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy. The attempt must at once be constructive and critical—a critical account of rival theories and a lucid presentation of its main doctrines. In this he has mainly followed the line of the *Sarvārthasiddhi* — the commentary on the *Tattvamuktākalāpa*. Both the text and commentary are the works of the polymath poet-logician, Veṅkaṭanātha, otherwise known as Vedānta-desika (1268-1369 A.D.), the greatest thinker after Rāmānuja.

In his concluding remarks, in the *Tattvamuktākalāpa*, Veṅkaṭanātha has drawn attention to some of the salient features of the Viśiṣṭādvaita which constitute its special merit. In this system, nothing in the universe apprehended uniformly by one and all, is denied an existence, as is done by the Advaitin and the Buddhist, using the analogy of the snake in a mistaken rope and of objects seen in our dream-visions respectively. Nor does it (the system of Viśiṣṭādvaita) fail to take advantage of the simpler among given hypotheses in respect of things whose existence needs proof only by the testimony of inference. To quote an example: the view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that the atom — the final limit of the small size — which is proved by inference to be one-sixth part of the particle

seen in the passage of the sun's rays from the roof, is not acceptable to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, the reason being simplicity in holding the visible particle itself above referred to, as the final limit of small size.

Atheism could find no place in the system of Viśiṣṭādvaita. In matters that could be decided only by *sāstra*, that is *Veda*, the underlying meanings of which could be ascertained only with the help of *Upabr̥mhaṇa-s* like *smṛti*, *itihāsa*, *purāṇa* etc., and reasoning that would refrain itself when it is about to go against the *Veda*, the *Veda* is held as the supreme testimony. Having these as his fundamental tenets, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin proceeds to argue, to arrive at decisions and to scrutinise the arguments of others.

But the Mīmāṃsaka, taking no notice of innumerable and unequivocal Vedic statements and interpreting some of them in his own way to suit his own purpose, declines to accept the existence of an almighty God. The power and privilege of giving the fruits of the deeds — meritorious or otherwise, are attributed to those deeds themselves. Thus, despite his upholding the *Veda* as the supreme authority, the Mīmāṃsaka proved himself a worse atheist. Such flaws and blemishes (as found in the views of Mīmāṃsaka) cannot be found in the system of Viśiṣṭādvaita propagated by Nāthamuni (950 A.D.), supported by a number of treatises by Yāmuna (1000 A.D.), and well-preserved and elaborated by Rāmānuja (1017-1137 A.D.):

*dr̥ṣṭe'pahnuty-abhāvāt anumiti-viśaye lāghavasyānapāyāt,
sāstreṇaivāvaseye vihati-virahite nāstikatva-prahāṇāt;
nāthopajñāṁ pravṛttāṁ bahubhir upacitāṁ yāmuneya-
prabandhaiḥ, trātāṁ samyag yatindrair idam-akhila-tamaḥ-
karśanaṁ darśanaṁ naḥ.'*

“The logical subtlety, metaphysical profundity, poetic genius, unrivalled skill in debating and presenting arguments, devotional earnestness, and uncommon mastery of poetics and dialectics” — a rare combination of these, that could scarcely be found anywhere else, is Veṅkaṭanātha.

Veṅkaṭanātha (1268-1369 A.D.), on his part did his best to establish the Viśiṣṭādvaita system with his numerous works, (i) the *Tattvamuktākalāpa*, with the *Sarvārthasiddhi* a commentary thereon, to serve as an armour to defend the Darśana against the charges that may be levelled against the system, and (ii) the *Śata-dūṣaṇī*—a tool to criticise the Advaita,* being chief among them. Such debates can never end; the last word has not been said; but the author of the *Sarvārthasiddhi* has anticipated quite a large number of criticisms that Rāmānuja's system will have to answer; and he has answered them consistent with the state of philosophy in his time. Such an intellectual discussion alone can keep the flame of philosophical quest ever burning. The language and the spirit of the thesis will have to be understood in this background.

In expounding this work the author wanted to consult the *Ānandadāyini* (a lucid and exhaustive commentary on the *Sarvārthasiddhi*) which was being printed and published by the University of Mysore; but the later portions of the above commentary were not published by then, and hence the author had to consult the later chapters of the *Ānandadāyini* only in the manuscript form.

While describing the various arguments advanced by Veṅkaṭanātha, the author has explained in detail

the relevant technical terms and the Vedic and other *pramāṇa-s*, and has also introduced each system with a concise account of its tenets. The concluding chapter seeks to present a succinct account of the Viśiṣṭādvaita system, the path it suggests for deliverance, and the philosophy of life it embodies. The following are some of the principal topics dealt with in this book:

1. Buddhist's view of momentariness of all things and the theory that the substratum is no more than an aggregation of qualities.
2. Sautrāntika's representation: things being imperceptible are inferred by their forms imprinted in the cognitions.
3. The Yogācāra's theory of the phenomenality of the world.
4. Mādhyamika's Śūnyavāda.
5. Satkāryavāda of the Sāṅkhya and of the Viśiṣṭādvaita.
6. Sāṅkhya's reliance upon inference.
7. The Sāṅkhya conception of evolution of the universe from Prakṛti.
8. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of evolution of the universe from atoms.
9. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of the whole and parts as different entities.
10. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of the soul and its liberation.
11. The Advaitia doctrine of non-dualism.

12. Principles of *Apaccheda*, *Upakrama* or *Utsargāpavāda* as applicable in the context of *Saguṇa-śruti* and *Nirguṇa-śruti*.

13. Appearance of indefinable object during the illusions.

14. Prābhākara's and Viśiṣṭādvaita's explanation of illusion.

15. Advaitins' view on indeterminate cognition.

16. Viśiṣṭādvaitin's conception of *tattva*, *hita* and *puruṣārtha*.

17. Brahman as being both the material and the efficient cause of the universe.

18. The relation between Brahman and the universe is similar to the body-soul relation.

19. The means of liberation.

20. The state of liberation.

NOTES

1. *Tattvamuktākālāpa*, V. 133:

दृष्टेऽपह्नुयन्मावादनुमितिषिष्ये लाघवस्यानपायात्
शास्त्रेणैवावसेये विहतिविरहिते नास्तिकत्वप्रहाणात् ।
नाथोपज्ञम्प्रवृत्तं बहुभिरुपचितं यामुनेयप्रबन्धैः
त्रातं सम्यग्यतीन्द्रैरिदमखिलतमः कर्शनं दर्शनं नः ॥

2. *Saptatiratnamālikā*, 48:

सर्वार्थसिद्धिः शतदृषणी च द्वे खेटशस्त्रे कथकाग्रगणाम् ।
आद्येन तत्र क्रियते स्वरक्षा प्रत्यर्थिमङ्गः क्रियते परेण ॥

BUDDHISM

2.1.1 *General Principles of Buddhism*

The four schools of Buddhism, namely, Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika, in spite of many differences in their principles, have some agreement in their viewpoints: (1) all entities are impermanent, transitory and in a continuous state of change; (2) apart from the flow of cognitions, there is no soul or *ātman* as the seat of cognition or consciousness. Unlike the two latter Buddhists, the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika hold both mental and physical entities as real and existing. The Vaibhāṣika contends that all external objects are real and apprehensible by perceptions generated by the sense organs. Space and *nirvāṇa* are, according to him, eternal; matter and mind which is not an entity distinct from the so-called soul or *ātman*, are impermanent and momentary. For the reason that some entities are held as permanent and non-momentary, the Vaibhāṣika is condemned even as a non-Buddhist by his colleagues who uphold the momentariness of all existing entities.

2.1.2 *Atomic Theory of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika*

The Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika maintain the theory of atomism as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does. Apart

from the five kinds of special atoms which constitute the five sense organs, there are four kinds of atoms — those of earth with colour, taste, smell and hard touch; those of water with colour, taste, cohesion (*sneha*) and touch; those of light with colour and hot touch. and those of air with the nature of touch and motion; Ether is not recognized as an element, like the earth and the other three. The aggregation of those similar atoms results in the formation of the phenomenal objects, like the mountain, the ocean, fire and cyclone respectively, which are denominated as “aggregate of elements” (*bhūta-saṅghāta*). From the elements (*bhūta*), the bodies (*bhautika*) like our physical body (*śarīra*), the senses (*indriyāṇi*), the pot and others are generated. There is no ‘whole’, distinct from the aggregate of the component parts; hence there is no colour in the ‘whole’ distinct from that of the parts. It is the colour of the parts which makes the ‘whole’ visible. All the so-called qualities like colour, smell, touch, etc., that exist in the parts appear to exist in a seeming ‘whole’ also which by itself has no separate existence apart from the parts. The existence of variegated colour (*citra-rūpa*) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika’s conception, for example, in a cloth that consists of yarns of six different colours is disproved by the Buddhists saying that “if it is variegated, it cannot be one also. If it is held as one, then it ceases to be variegated. To say that it is one and at the same time variegated also is an amusing novelty.”¹

2.1.3 *The Buddhistic View of the Identity of Substratum and Attribute is Untenable*

The contention of the Buddhist — that apart from and underneath such phenomenal sensations as colour,

shape, size etc., which we experience, when we see a jar, a cloth and the like, there is no substratum or thing-in-itself which possesses these so-called attributes — is not tenable. To use Western phraseology, the Buddhist is a phenomenalist, one who holds the doctrine that phenomena like colour, shape, etc., are the only objects of knowledge and that there is no such thing as noumenon or thing-in-itself or substratum devoid of all phenomenal attributes. The opponents of the Buddhists attempt to disprove this contention with the following question. The cognition that recognizes that 'I now touch the same thing which I saw yesterday,' evidently proves the difference between the attributes and their substratum (*dharma* and *dharmi*). Here the function of the two sense organs — the eye and the sense of touch — are both in relation to a particular thing. That cannot be either colour or touch since both of them cannot be comprehended by a single sense organ. This recognition presupposes a thing, (i) distinct from these objects and the two different sense organs, and, (ii) capable of comprehending all these different objects, in consequence, of which, that thing is regarded as a separate entity named '*ātman*' or soul — an eternal one.'

2.1.4 *Three Corner Stones of Buddhism*

As a matter of fact Buddhism (of those other than the Vaibhāṣika) is based on three corner stones — nothing is permanent, nothing has any self or inner substratum, and *nirvāṇa* is tranquility.' According to Yamakami "these three principles are the fundamental tenets of Buddhism which distinguish it from all other religious systems in the history of the world. According to the Buddhist there is no being, but

there is only becoming. All individual objects are unstable, and ephemeral. Everything, be it a person, a thing or God, is therefore merely an aggregation of component elements. Further in all individuals, without any exception, the relation of their component parts is eternally changing and is never the same even for the two consecutive moments. Putting together implies becoming, becoming means becoming different, and becoming different cannot arise without a dissolution — a passing away which must inevitably and finally be complete.

2.1.5 *Momentariness of Things Explained*

The Buddhists illustrate their doctrine as follows: the body of any sentient being grows or diminishes during a given period of time. The growth is due to taking foods that are conducive to its growth. If a being fasts a day or two, the diminution in the body is remarkably visible. Hence it is clear that the body of every sentient being either grows or emaciates as the case may be; only such variations in size are invisible and inscrutable since the variations are very small. Growth or emaciation occurs only in small degrees. When we observe a tank during a period of rain, we may not notice any increase in the volume of water. But after sometime, the rise of the water level is clearly visible. In the same way, due to the evaporation of the water in the summer when the Sun shines with scorching rays, water gradually diminishes, and this we are able to recognise only after a good amount of water has gone out by evaporation. If we take away just a teaspoonful of water from a tub containing a large volume, say, 10 gallons of water, the diminution in volume is not noticeable. But if one or two gallons of

water are removed from the tub, it becomes noticeable. The movement of the sun, the moon or the stars is not apparent except when the distance is appreciably large. If we take away some sand from one sandy spot, the difference is not apparent. It is only when the amount is appreciable that the difference is obvious.

Thus all things, the Buddhist says, irrespective of their being sentient or non-sentient, undergo a change which, because it is often of a trifling magnitude, is not always perceptible. As Rhys Davids points out, a change ultimately results in the death of the beings. For this reason, the Buddhists are often denominated as '*vaināśikas*'. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the atoms which are the ultimate units are not capable of further division and hence eternal. But dyads (*dvyanuka*) produced by the combination of two atoms may undergo destruction and be reduced to atoms which are eternal entities. So they are often called '*ardha-vaināśika*'. Though the colour and the touch of an object are cognizable by different sense organs, it does not disprove our theory, say the Buddhists, for they could be cognized in different phases of the same thing, and consequently there is no impropriety in the cognition 'I touch what I saw yesterday'. When the thing is not in an aggregate state, its so-called parts are cognizable by different sense organs and when they are in an aggregate condition, the thing becomes cognizable by more sense organs than one.

2.1.6 *An Entity Could only be Momentary; the So-called Eternals are Nothing but Non-existents*

The Buddhists invariably hold that all the existing things in the universe are momentary in the sense

that everything exists just for a moment and then perishes giving room to another, which resembles the previous one but is not the same. They say that there is nothing eternal (as contended by other schools of thought). Ether (*ākāśa*) cannot be eternal as held by some, nor is it even an entity since it has no "power of effecting a thing" (*kurvad-rūpatva*). It will be a case analogous to that of a barren woman's son. "That form of a thing which perishes after its production is called 'moment' (*kṣaṇa*) and the thing which has this form is called 'momentary' (*kṣaṇika*)."

2.1.7 *Substratum and Attribute are not Mutually Distinct*

In fact, *svarūpa* and *svabhāva* are not two different things for the Buddhist canon. This so-called difference is only a wrong assumption as when we speak of the "body of the stone-image" (*śilā-putrakasya śarīra*). If ether and such other things are regarded as not created and hence eternal, they must be regarded as being "non-existent"; and if they are regarded as 'existent' they must be momentary and they cannot escape being momentary. If momentariness be ruled out, so should existence also be ruled out. When things perform a fruitful act, they do it either successively or simultaneously. A jar is never perceived at one and the same time as having wine, water and another liquid. It could do so only successively. The jar containing water is cognized as such and we can, in that case, say that the jar performs two functions simultaneously, *viz.* bringing about its cognition and having water. Also the potter who makes a jar, a plate and a third object performs these acts only successively. No third kind of activity is possible. When such activities of the two types, namely, successive or simultaneous are ruled

out in the so-called eternal things, like ether, space, time, etc., its probable existence (*sattva*) also is precluded.'

2.1.8 *Recognition Could not Disprove Momentariness of Things*

Thus the momentariness of all things is established by the Buddhists. It can be better explained by two instances, namely, the cloud and the flame of a lamp. The above two, in spite of their being produced and destroyed the next moment itself, show no perceptible evidence of such difference between their states at two successive moments. Our inability to detect any difference in each of the above-mentioned cases, cannot however establish the permanence of things. The reasons adduced by the Buddhists for this view are as follows:

1. An entity which is momentary like the cloud and the flame and whichever is not momentary is not a real entity — like the mare's nest or the son of a barren woman.

2. Recognition or recollective perception which is held as an argument against the Buddhists' theory of momentariness will not serve the purpose of the opponents of Buddhism. The recognition that this is the same jar as existed at previous moments, which is imagined to establish the identity of the thing now cognized with the one that existed at previous moments, does not really establish the identity. If it did, a similar recognition in respect of the flame, of successive masses of a flood, of the hair that grows in the place of what was previously cut, would also establish

their identity. And this position would be acceptable to no school of thought. On the face of it, it would be absurd.

Moreover the recognition suggested as a proof to establish the permanence (or non-momentariness) of things cannot be valid knowledge, since it cognizes in a thing the contact of the past and the present, which is an impossibility. The term 'that' in the recognition 'this is that' (*so'yam*) denotes its contact with the present. The absurdity of this cognition is obvious. How can a thing be both of the past and of the present, and be perceptible as such? Do the contacts of the past and of the present with the thing synchronize at a time, or do they occur at different times? The former is obviously impossible. How can the present co-exist with the past? It cannot co-exist in the same way as the present cannot co-exist with the future. If they could be held as co-existing, all the three would be synchronous, so much so the statement that recognition or recollective perception is a valid argument for establishing the long life of a thing on the ground that it cognizes the identity of a thing of the present with the same of the past. This argument is a contradiction in terms, and cannot at all be true. If the latter alternative, namely, that the contact of the past and the present in a thing is possible at different times, is accepted, then those different instances also can have the contact with the thing at other times and so on *ad infinitum*. Hence recognition is nothing but an illusion and consequently it cannot establish the permanence of things as adduced by the opponents of Buddhism.

Moreover, if recognition is held as a perception which can comprehend a thing only if it exists at that time, how can a perception of a particular object come into being if there is no contact of the object and the sense organ at the time of perception? Thus perception cognizes only the qualities and their substratum existing at that time. Never does it cognize what previously existed but does not exist at the time of perception. In these circumstances, how can recognition cognize the contact of the past with the thing which does not at present exist in the same substratum? Perception comprehends not what existed at a previous time or what would exist at sometime in future, but only what could be comprehended as existing at the time of perception. Non-existence both in the past and in the future constitutes the momentariness of things.' So the validity of recognition is frustrated because of perception not requiring the impression (*samskāra*) as auxiliary for its coming into being. Hence recognition is nothing but an illusion just like the illusion that sees silver in nacre. In our every day life, we see things of many kinds and often do we feel reminded of a similar thing seen by us in the past. By a defect which makes us unaware of the difference existing between what we saw before and what is now before us, either an impression 'thisness' is superimposed on formerly seen or the 'sameness' on the thing before us. In either case it is an illusion.

2.1.9 *Two Types of Destruction of Buddhistic Conception*

According to Buddhists the total extinction (*dhvaṃsa*) of entities is of two types — tangible (*sthūla*) and intangible (*sūkṣma*). If a pot is broken with a bludgeon it is reduced to pieces and hence it appears

to be extinct. Since that state prevents the pot from being cognized as existing and it is the cause of the cognition that the pot is no more, the extinction (*dhvaṃsa*) is conceived as a negative entity, by the followers of some school of thought. This tangible type of extinction is otherwise called '*pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha*'. The second type of extinction — the intangible one called '*apratisaṅkhyānirodha*' on account of its being different from the former type, can be proved to exist only by reasoning. All entities exist only for a moment and their extinction in the succeeding moment is proved by the instance of flames, hair, nails etc. As a matter of fact, extinction of the above two varieties is only void (*tuccha*) like ether-lotus.'

2.1.10 *Refutation of the Buddhistic Views*

Let us examine these views of the Buddhists one after another.

The argument — that when a thing is not in an aggregate state, its so-called parts are cognizable by different sense organs and when they are in an aggregate condition the thing becomes cognizable by more senses than one — is untenable. For in that case, it is questioned, as to whether the product of the union different from the parts or is it identical with them? If the former, there is no possibility of recognition, for recognition takes place only in the case of an object already perceived. When it is again perceived by the same or different sense organ just prior to the moment of recollection and if the result of union is held by the Buddhists as identical with the component parts, the whole and parts being perceptible by different sense organs, there is no question of occurrence of recollec-

tion. How can A recognize a thing which was perceived earlier, not by A, but by B?

If the result of the conglomeration is considered different from the parts, we may ask whether the difference is real or not. The reality of difference is impossible to any Buddhist. Moreover it is better to postulate a substance (*dravya*) as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds, a jar for instance, instead of regarding it as a mere conglomeration (*saṅghāta*), or postulate an attribute namely conjunction (*saṃyoga*) distinct from its substratum, that is, the parts. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin holds that a cloth is nothing but a specialised combination of parts and that there is no separate entity called a 'whole' distinct from the parts (*avayavātirikta-avayavi*). The contact there is by conjunction (*saṃyoga*) of an attribute existing in the substratum, like yarns. When the yarns are so arranged as to be called a 'cloth', the yarns acquire a new state (*avasthā*) than the former one (*tantutvāvasthā-prahāṇena paṭatvāvasthā-prāptiḥ*). The yarns are no longer recognised as yarns as in a loose state but are considered to have been transformed into a new state, namely, that of being a cloth. But this is not tenable to the Buddhists as they deny the existence of two such distinct entities as substratum and attribute.

If the conglomeration is held unreal, it cannot produce any real effects (*artha-kriyā-kāritvābhāva*). Nor could the conglomeration (*saṅghāta*) be defined as the 'things themselves with no inter-space among them' (*nirantara-svarūpa-saṅghāta*) for in that case the individual parts cannot be comprehended by two sense organs. Without the cognition of those things, the

absence of inter-space too cannot be comprehended. Moreover the absence of inter-space (*nairantarya*) being a non-entity, how could it have the efficiency of causing effects (*artha-kriyā-kāritva*) such as recognition (*pratyabhijñā*)? To uphold the absence of inter-space as an entity would result in the Buddhist's accepting an attribute as distinct from the substance against their tenets.'

An explanation of the cognition referred to before, namely, 'I touch what I saw 'yesterday', by pointing out a similar recognition 'I see what I smelt yesterday' (*ghrātameva paśyāmi*), where the inference of a substance by its fragrance precedes the ocular perception would mean that the perception by the sense of touch has inference as its pre-requisite. This is however, impossible, for an inference presupposes 'invariable concomitance' of probans and probandum (*hetu-sādhyaor-vyāpti-grahaḥ*) such as, 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire', without which no inference could take place, and the apprehension of invariable concomitance could be got only when the probans and probandum are found to coexist in a substratum like the mountain in the illustration "the mountain has fire because there is smoke in it." The Buddhist, having denied a thing called substratum for colour, touch etc., is at a loss to explain '*vyāpti*' and what follows from it, namely inference (*anumiti*).

The statement of some Buddhists that air is of the nature of touch (*sparsa-svabhāvo vāyuh*), while fire is of the nature of touch and colour (*sparsa-rūpa-svabhāvam tejah*), water is of the nature of touch, colour and taste (*sparsa-rūpa-rasa-svabhāvam jalam*) and earth is of the

nature of touch, colour, taste and smell (*sparsa-rūpa-rasa-gandha-svabhāva prthivī*) and that therefore one could be cognized by more than one sense organ — is absurd. By splitting the word '*svabhāva*' — '*svaśca asau bhāvaś ca*'—it means 'the thing in itself', then one thing cannot be of more than one nature. How can one thing be more than a thing? If the same word is split into '*svasya bhāvaḥ*', then it means an attribute existing in a substratum and this would be unacceptable to Buddhists who deny the existence of attributes as distinct from their substratum. To deny a substratum on the ground of non-apprehension of distinction between colour and jar, for instance, is against the experience of all, since everyone's experience is, 'a jar has a colour' and never 'a jar is colour'.

2.1.11 *The Criticism of Uddyotakara and Others*

Śāntarakṣita subjects the views of Uddyotakara and Bhāvivikta, to criticism. The following is the substance of the contention of the latter which is adversely criticised by Śāntarakṣita. The substratum alone is cognized without its colour; a crystal placed beside a china-rose is seen and recognized even without its white colour; cranes flying in the sky after sunset are recognized without their colour being observed; a person who has covered his body with dress is recognized even without his complexion being perceived. Therefore, it is a universal cognition that makes one say 'it is the blue colour of the lily'. If the colour and its substratum were identical, one would instead feel 'the colour is the lily'. It is just like the cognition 'it is the horse of Caitra'. 'The lily's blue' is a cognition which proves that the lily and its colour are different from each

other and not identical. When we hear a man say 'moon' and 'stars', we understand that there is only one moon and that there are many stars. We say 'it is earth' and 'there are colour, touch, taste and smell' and the earth being one, is spoken of in the singular and its qualities which are many are spoken of in plural. In the following verses there, Śāntarakṣita evidently sums up his opponents' arguments before refuting them.'

2.1.12 *Refutation of Śāntarakṣita on the Above Contention*

But these arguments of Uddyotakara and others are refuted by Śāntarakṣita. If a crystal placed near a china-rose is seen with red colour which does not belong to it, it is an illusion. It is obvious that the crystal does not exist as white but as red in colour. Anyhow the so-called substratum alone is not cognized but it is cognized along with some colour; and this colour is identical with the crystal.

Śāntarakṣita says that the usages above referred to like 'the colour of the lily' cannot establish the point that the attribute and the substratum are different. Such usages depend upon only the freak and fancy of the speaker. What does one mean by saying 'there are six categories' and 'it is a group of six' (*ṣaṭ padārthāḥ santi* and *ṣaṇṇām padārthānām vargaḥ*)? Do you accept the existence of 'being' (*sattva*) in all the six categories? If it is accepted, then by what relation does 'being' (*sattva*) exist in all those six categories? For obvious reasons, the relation can be neither conjunction (*sam-yoga*) for conjunction could exist only between two substances, nor inherence (*samavāya*) nor any other relation.¹⁰

2.1.13. *Refutation of Śāntarakṣita's Criticism*

But Śāntarakṣita's arguments cannot stand the test of scrutiny; for the above two verbal usages can be explained without the violation of any canons of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika 'being' (*sattva*) denoted by the word '*santi*' which means only 'the existence at a time' (*kāla-sambandha*) and it is why there is no such usage as 'there is the horn of the hare' (*śaśa-śṛṅgo'sti*) since hare's horn does not exist at any time. '*Varga*' in the usage '*ṣaṇṇām padārthānām vargaḥ*' means 'assemblage or collection which being a quality can be referred to be distinct from its substratum.

2.1.14 *Substratum and Attribute Could not be Identical*

Moreover sometimes we feel as if we have a full view of a thing when it is near us, and when it is removed to a distance away from us, we feel we do not have a full view of the same thing. What do the statements 'full view' and 'not a full view' mean? In both the cases, we have the cognition of the thing without any doubt. The difference lies in our having cognized a greater number of attributes of the thing when it was nearer than when it was farther. Unless a substratum, distinct from its attributes, is held to exist, it would be impossible to explain the difference in the degree of cognition described above which is the experience of all scholars. Completeness and incompleteness of view cannot be explained on the basis of the cognition of a greater number of things and lesser number of things respectively, for in that case, a jar, a cloth and a few other things, all placed together cannot at all be cognized by one. Obviously such is not the case. Further a conch which was cognized as white in

colour, when the observer was not affected by jaundice, is recognized as a conch even by a jaundiced person. The Buddhist might assert in such a context that the conch with whiteness was different from the same in yellow colour. If that be the case, how can one explain the recollection of that is not at all affected by the disease which affects the eyesight to such an extent as to make it perceive a white object as if it were yellow in colour? The recollection is only with regard to the conch and that cannot be dismissed as an illusion.

How could doubt (*saṁśaya*) and illusion (*viparyaya*) be explained if the substratum were identical with its attributes? When the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) is cognized with some attributes and some others among the attributes are not cognized, doubt or illusion prevails. When the substratum is either fully known or fully unknown, no doubt or illusion occurs. Only partial knowledge of the substratum causes it. If the substratum is held as devoid of attributes, how could doubt and illusion be explained as arising from partial knowledge of the substratum?¹¹

Nor could the desire for knowledge be explained except on the basis of the possibility of this partial knowledge. There can be no desire at all for an object that is completely unknown to us or for one that is completely known to us.¹²

2.1.15 *Another Objection by Buddhists*

The Buddhist questions this contention as follows. If the attributes are admitted to exist in a substratum,

the substratum, the Buddhist contends, should render some help or bestow some power upon its attributes, even as a mother does to her baby. Thus when we accept a substratum (*dharmi*), the power of benefiting its attributes (*dharma*) should also be accepted along with its attributes. The power and help are themselves attributes, which are not identical with the substratum, according to non-Buddhists, and they, therefore would need the same help and the same power of rendering that help. Thus the criticism of Buddhists would land in infinite regress (*anavasthā*). To avoid this, the Buddhist says that the substratum should be held identical with all its attributes. But there is difficulty in holding this view. For, when a substratum is apprehended, it is taken for granted that it is done so along with all its attributes; since the substratum and its attributes are identical, it would mean that the substratum is comprehended with its attributes. Then how could there be partial comprehension? Thus the Buddhist is not in a position to explain partial comprehension.

2.1.16 *Viśiṣṭādvaitin's Criticism*

The unsoundness of the Buddhistic argument is proved also in the following manner. When a jar is produced there are a number of causes for the attributes totally different from the causes of the substratum. The causality is generally ascertained by a study of both positive and negative instances (*anvaya-vyatireka*). So the substratum and its attributes are proved to have a good number of causes not common to them and consequently they could not be identical even as a jar and a cloth are not.

Nor do the help and the power of helping its attributes determine the relation between substratum and attributes. It is testimonies like perception that determine the relation. If perception and other such testimonies are not admitted to be the determining factors, it would be impossible to maintain that any particular thing is in a state of flux or constant change or becoming.

The theory that attributes and substratum are not identical finds its support in the following experiences. The attributes, colour, taste, smell, touch etc., are recognized by different sense organs and at different times. So also partial and full comprehension can be explained on the view that attributes are different from the substratum.

2.1.17 *Unless the Mutual Distinction is Conceded, Buddhist Could not Hold Inference as a Testimony*

Dharmakīrti, a celebrated Buddhist writer, holds, like many of his predecessors that inference is a testimony of great validity on the strength of which the Buddhist could establish the momentary nature of the the universe and many other doctrines of Buddhism as well." There are no two opinions regarding the fact that the invariable concomitance of probans and probandum (*hetu-sādhya-vyāpti*) is indispensable for the emergence of inference and that *vyāpti-jñāna* can be acquired by the apprehension of invariable co-existence of probans and probandum.

To the question that unless the relation of attribute and substratum is conceded to exist, how can the co-existence of a probans and probandum in a sub-

stratum be apprehended, the Buddhist gives the following answer. Probans and probandum are both equally only imaginary. In fact inference also has no value as the ultimate reality. It has value in as much as it cannot be contradicted by other types of testimony. Hence the substratum-attribute relation (*adhārādheya-bhāva*) cannot be proved.

2.1.18. *Buddhist Criticism of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin*

The substratum-attribute relation is a common target of attack for all the schools of Buddhism, whatever differences they may have among themselves. This is how they seek to prove that there could not be any relation such as substratum-attribute. Does an attribute have another attribute of its own or is it held by the opponents of Buddhists to be devoid of any attribute? In the latter case, it would cease to be understood by a word. The opponents of Buddhists say that a word can denote an object only if it is in possession of a denotative attribute (*śakyatāvachchedaka*) since it is the bone of contention of all the advocates of '*dharma-dharmibhāva*' that all words and cognitions have a thing as their object provided it is in possession of a characteristic attribute. If a second *dharma* is conceded to exist, then let us ask again whether or not the second *dharma* possesses a characteristic of its own for the above reason. Thus the same type of questioning would lead to what is called infinite regress (*anavasthā*). Thus it would become inevitable, the Buddhist says, even for the Viśiṣṭādvaitin to denounce '*dharma-dharmibhāva*' on the ground of the above difficulties of the nature of Scylla and Charybdis.

2.1.19. *Refutation to the Above Criticism*

The Buddhists' arguments outlined above are refuted by Veṅkaṭanātha in the following way. The word 'go' denotes a cow through the '*gotva*' the generic attribute which serves as a denotative attribute (*śakya-tāvacchedaka*). In other words, the term 'go' (cow) has the denotative power (*abhidhā-śakti*) in all cows having the attribute '*gotva*' in them as the determinant (*pravṛtti-nimitta*) of the word 'go'. As '*gotva*' — the determinant attribute is common to all cows, so does the denotative function (*abhidhā-śakti*) is common to all cows. But in denoting the genus '*gotva*' by the same word, no determinant attribute (*pravṛtti-nimitta*) of '*gotva*', such as '*gotvatva*' is required for there is no need for such a word which is only required in such instances as '*ghaṭa*' 'go' etc. In the case of a cow, it is the '*gotva*' that distinguishes it from beings other than the cow. But '*gotva*' needs nothing to distinguish itself from others since it is capable of distinguishing itself as well as its substratum from others. In the case of 'white' (*śukla*), for example, when it denotes 'white colour', it has 'whiteness' (*śuklatva*) as its attribute, but it has no attribute when it denotes whiteness. As in the case of a cow, whiteness distinguishes white colour from other colours and distinguishes itself from blackness etc. and is not in need of 'whitenessness' (*śuklatvatva*) which would in that manner lead only to *ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*). Even Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concedes '*gotva*' '*śuklatva*' etc. but denies '*gotvatva*' etc. as distinct entities and those attributes, like '*gotvatva*' are nothing but an attribute that is conceded as existing as an attribute 'not existing in others than a cow and existing in all cows.'¹⁴

2.2.20. *Buddhist's Another Objection*

Another objection might be raised as follows: In cases in which attributes are denoted prominently as substantives (*viśeṣyataya*) as in the statement, 'there is whiteness in the cow' (*gavi śauklyam asti*), there is the genus 'ghaṭatva in a jar' (*ghaṭe ghaṭatvam asti*) they require an attribute to get themselves distinguished from others. For there is a general and well-accepted conception that an attribute distinguishes its substantive from others (*viśeṣaṇam viśeṣyam itarebhyo vyāvartayati*). If these attributes do not have an attribute in themselves, they must cease to be considered substantives (*viśeṣya*). If, on the other hand, they do have any attribute such as 'śuklatvatva' then it is a case of *ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*).

2.1.21. *Veṅkaṭanātha's Refutation of the Charge*

This objection is met with in the following manner. It is unnecessary to contend that a substantive can be distinguished only by an attribute. In the above cases, even a substratum like cow, jar etc., can distinguish its attribute used as substantive (*viśeṣya*). The white colour in a cow can be distinguished by a substratum namely cow. The genus 'gotva' can be distinguished from 'aśvatva' etc., by its substratum namely 'go'.¹⁵

2.1.22. *Buddhist Points out Two Other Fallacies*

The Buddhist tries to refute the theory of '*dharma-dharmibhāva*' in the following way. The attributes and their substrata are only things of fancy, in the imagination of some scholars and *dharma-dharmibhāva* is only a mare's nest. He asks as to whether the qualities such as colour etc. reside, so to say, in a substratum which

possesses those qualities or in a substratum which does not possess them. The latter alternative is patently impossible because of its self-contradictory nature (*vyāghāta*). How can an attribute exist in a thing which is devoid of that quality? Also the former alternative cannot stand the test of scrutiny for it involves the fallacy of a thing being made its own substratum (*ātmāśraya-doṣaḥ*).¹⁶ The *ātmāśraya doṣa* or the fallacy of a thing being considered its own possessor or container is explained as follows: a substratum with an attribute is a composite trio — the attribute, the substratum and the relation that exists between the two. That any one of the above three cannot be a 'whole' (*viśiṣṭa*) is obvious. But the related two — the attribute and the substratum — are the 'whole'. Thus the attribute also is included in the whole. Then according to the second alternative, the attribute also becomes the substratum of the self-same attribute, just like the substratum. Then the attribute must be different from its own self for the substratum-attribute relation can be found only in two things that are absolutely different from each other. Hence on account of the impossibility of the existence of an attribute in a substratum, there is no such thing as *dharma-dharmi* — *bhāva*.

2.1.23. *The Two Fallacies Rejected*

Veṅkaṭanātha questions this logic on the following grounds. Neither do we say that a '*dharma*' rests in a substratum that is devoid of the same *dharma*, nor do we say that the *dharma* exists in a substratum that is in possession of the same *dharma*. But we only say that the *dharma* exists in a thing which in fact possesses that *dharma*. It does not mean that at the time of comprehension of the *dharma* in that thing, the same *dharma* is

being comprehended as an attribute to the same thing, as determinant of a substantive (*dharmitāvachchedaka*). The absurdity of the two alternatives posed by the Buddhist is evident. There is no general and inviolable rule (*niyama*) such as whatever rests such as colour, touch etc, in a thing like the ground with the attribute jar, must rest in that attribute, namely, jar also, for the colour, touch etc., found in the ground having a jar on it are not comprehended in the jar also.¹⁷

Hence the two defects of reasoning pointed out by the Buddhist — *vyāghāta* in the former case and *ātmāśraya* in the latter, are not to be heaped on the head of the advocate of *dharma-dharmibhāva*. On the other hand the tables can be turned against the Buddhist who denies that relation (*dharma-dharmibhāva*) by cutting down the two horns of the dilemma, namely, (1) do the qualities reside in a substratum which possesses those qualities or (2) in a substratum which does not possess them, but at the same time, uses the two members of the syllogism, namely *udāharāṇa* and *upanaya* in support of their canons. Cannot these arguments be put forth regarding their *udāharāṇa* which presents in the reason (*hetu*) the possession of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) a *dharma*, and *upanaya* which states in '*pakṣa*' the existence of the reason (*hetu*) possessing the invariable concomitance of probandum (*sādhya*)?

With regard to the Buddhist theory of momentariness of all existing things, Venkṭanātha's observation is as follows. It is not proper to arrive at a conclusion that whatever is an entity, is, for that reason, momentary because of a few instances like flame, cloud, flood,

hair and nail (growing after being cut) etc. In these instances there are certain factors to disprove the identity of those things comprehended by a cognition of illusive nature and there is no reason to question the validity of those disproving agencies. In those instances the difference in their respective productive causes clearly proves the difference in their respective effects. But in the case of a jar, cloth etc., there is nothing to support the theory of different jars at different moments since there is no difference in their respective productive causes. On the other hand, there is the argument based on recollective perception (*pratyabhijñā*) to establish the permanence of the jar and the like. It is not erroneous or invalid knowledge since it does not cognize two opposing or contradictory characteristics as stated by the Buddhists. The Buddhists also hold the individual characteristic of a thing (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) is one and singular.

2.1.24. Causal Efficiency

The Sautrāntika postulates that whichever has the efficiency of effecting a thing (*kurvad-rūpatva*) is a real being (*sat*) and that it is momentary. When a seed has such causal efficiency, it is said to be potent (*kurvad-rūpa*) and when it is inefficient, it is said to be impotent (*akurvad-rūpa*). The same seed which is found to have no causal efficiency in the past and the future moments but has efficiency in the present, cannot be one and the same thing possessing two contradictory qualities namely efficiency and inefficiency. Against this view of the Sautrāntika, it might be urged that causal efficiency may exist in a thing without the effect being produced and this is confirmed by the fact that the seed in the granary is regarded as the cause of the

sprout though the sprout is not immediately produced. But this objection to the Sautrāntika view is based upon a misconception. In ordinary parlance, a remote possible cause is said to possess causal efficiency. But this is just a popular conception and cannot be made the basis of a philosophical inquiry. In reality, however, the cause of the sprout is the peculiar seed-entity that immediately and invariably produces the sprout. The seed in the granary is loosely regarded as the cause of the sprout only in view of a remote possibility. So there is no room for confusion between a real cause which is immediately and invariably attended with an effect and a remote possible cause which can be regarded as a cause only by courtesy. Thus a seed which appears as permanent, is not really so. The seed in the granary and the seed effecting a sprout are absolutely different from each other though they both belong to one and the same flux.

2.1.25. *Udayana's Criticism of 'Causal Efficiency'*

Udayana while proving the futility of holding a peculiar '*dharma*' with the name "causal efficiency" (*kurvad-rūpatva*) observes thus: There is no necessity to hold all things as momentary merely on the basis of the causal efficiency which is a product of the Buddhist's imagination. Production and non-production of sprout by the seed depend absolutely upon the accompaniment and the absence of auxiliaries, respectively. If this view is accepted, then there will be no necessity to conceive things as fluxional and constantly changing. The same seed which in the absence of auxiliaries, like water, suitable place etc, is found to be impotent, becomes potent the moment it is associated with them. It is true that two mutually opposing

qualities cannot co-exist in a substratum at one and the same time, but they can do so at different times. Heat and cold do not prevail in a thing simultaneously but we see them in the same thing at different times. Hence there is no inconsistency in seeds having efficiency and inefficiency to two contradictory qualities at different moments.'⁶

Here the Buddhist puts the following questions: Does the so-called permanent cause develop its causal efficiency on its own account, without requiring any external help? Or is the same (permanent cause) in need of auxiliary causes for the generation of the causal efficiency? In the former case, the Buddhist asks another question. Is that causal efficiency so developed in the permanent cause without external help, identical with the past nature of the permanent cause or distinct from that nature? If the permanent cause is conceived to be capable of developing such a causal efficiency in and by itself, then the auxiliaries are absolutely of no use and hence their co-existence with the principal cause is unnecessary and futile. And if that causal efficiency is held identical with the nature of the permanent cause, then the permanent cause must have been producing the effects even in the previous moments. If it is contended to be distinct from that past nature, and is held to be manifested or generated only at the moment when the effect like sprout is being produced, then this contention corresponds with that of the Buddhist and there is no need for postulating the existence of permanent things.

The absurdity of the Buddhist's arguments will be evident from the following explanation. We do not

conceive any '*dharma*' like the causal efficiency of the Buddhist generated or manifested in a permanent principal cause. Hence there is no room for such questions. It is the collection of causes — the principal and the auxiliaries — that produces the effect and not a single cause. In respect of an effect some are said to be principal and others auxiliaries. The absence of impediments (*pratibandhakābhāva*) which is also necessary for the generation of effect is included in the group of auxiliaries. No one can deny that in the collocation of causes, some play a prominent role while many others have less importance, in spite of all the causes being indispensable in producing an effect. The chief mason cannot raise a tower without the assistance of the subordinate workers; a king cannot administer his kingdom without a cabinet of ministers; nor can a commander-in-chief hope to win a battle without the help of the warriors of different cadres. Such assistance rendered by the auxiliary persons does not in any way lessen the importance of the chief. In fact there is no special characteristic feature which could be denominated as 'causal efficiency' (*kurvadrūpatva*) to produce an effect, in the cause either momentary or permanent. So it is unnecessary to hold that all things are momentary. Momentariness is, of course obvious in the cases of the cloud, the flame, the hair, the nail, etc. and we do not deny it. But to contend that all things are momentary on the analogy of a few things like the cloud, the flame etc. is far from convincing and unreasonable.

2.1.26. *Recollective Perception Could Establish Longer Life of Things*

Recollective perception or recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) establishes the jar and the other things as non-momentary and as existing in the past, the present and the future as well. There is nothing to disprove the validity of this recollective perception. It cannot be split up into two — experience (*anubhava*) and remembrance (*smṛti*) since the oneness of this can be much better observed in the recollective perception of the type 'I do see the same thing' (*tam evāham paśyāmi*) than in the recollective perception of the type 'this is the same jar' (*sa evāyam ghaṭaḥ*). As the impression (*samskāra*) is capable of bringing any object to recollection (*smṛti*) irrespective of the fact whether it exists or not at the time of its recollection, the same impression together with the sense organ which is in contact with the object causes a recollective perception (*pratyabhijñā-pratyakṣa*).

The Buddhist argues that since the contact of the past and the present in a thing is an impossibility, the recollective perception 'it is the same' (*so'yam*) cannot but be an illusion. So by reason of recollective perception, a longer life of things cannot be proved. This argument is met by Veṅkaṭanātha with the following logic. When things remaining at different places are collected together at one place, we call the collection a mass. In this case the things are said to have mutual contact between one another at different places. Such a situation should be visualized in time as in space. Why should we concede this privilege to space but deny it to time? A day is measured by the time between the rising of the sun in the east and the setting of it in the west. (In these days of scientific advancement, a second is measured by the movement of the smaller

hand in a watch from one division to the next. A minute is measured in a similar manner.) The small limiting adjuncts cannot have the contact of the bigger unit of time, namely, the day. But the bigger limiting adjunct, the day can have contact with the smaller adjuncts. For example, with regard to the noon, the forenoon belongs to the past and the afternoon belongs to the future. Here the noon cannot have the contact either of the forenoon or of the afternoon. What prevents the Sun, on the other hand, from having the contact of both the forenoon and the afternoon? Just in the same manner, a jar can have the contact of yesterday and tomorrow which are respectively the past and the future from the point of view of anything other than the jar in question. The past, the present and the future cannot live together in a thing; but the thing which has comparatively a longer life, can have the contact of the past, the present and the future. A jar which exists as an entity for a month, has the contact of whole period of the month. In that period of a month, there is no past, present or future with regard to the jar concerned, as it has the whole month for its life. If in that period, the reference to the above three states of time is made, it is only with reference to some object other than that jar. If even within that period, the reference to the past, the present and the future is inadmissible, solely on the ground of their opposing nature, the Buddhist's reference to a moment as the past with regard to the successive moment or to a later moment, as the future with regard to the former moment, must also be dismissed as inappropriate for the same reason, namely, of the opposite states of pastness and futurity existing in the same moment."

The objection of the Buddhist — if recognition is held to be of the nature of perception, how could it cognize a thing of the past — may be answered in the following way. A perception which comprehends the existence or otherwise of a thing of the present, does not and cannot deny its former or future existence. It can deny only its non-existence at the time of its perception.¹⁰

How then could a perception that does not require impression (*samskāra*) as its auxiliary cause, frustrates the validity of a recollective perception? The cognition 'this' (*idam*) has as its object the thing of the present time, while the cognition 'this is the same' (*tad idam*) has as its object a thing that has the contact of both the past and the present. Though in the latter case the word 'that' (*tat*) meaning the contact of the past with a thing cannot refer to a perception for the reason that the eye has no contact with the thing of the past, it cannot also be a remembrance; for 'this is the same' (*tad idam*) being a single cognition cannot be a remembrance (*smṛti*) and at the same time an experience because they are contradictory by their very nature. It is purely a perception caused by the sense organ of the eye, in association with the impression of the same thing in contact with the past. In this connection, Rāmānuja writes in his *Vedāntadīpa*, the commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra* "*anu-smṛteś ca*" (2-2-24) — "Recognition is a single perception which cognizes a thing that has existence in the past and in the present as well. It has only one object that has the contact of the past and the present. That the knowledge of 'that' (*tat*) is a remembrance because the object that has the contact of the past could not have the contact

of the eye at the time of its perception as 'this' (*idam*) and the knowledge of 'this' is a perception — is untenable for the above cognition 'this is that' (*tad idam*) cognizes oneness and the identity of a thing. To a person whose sense organ is in contact with the object, and that contact is associated with impression caused by the experience (*anubhava*) of the same thing in the past, such a recognition is possible. The collocation of causes (*sāmagrī* or *kāraṇa-samudāya*) is inferred to by the positive and negative instances of generation and the absence of its effect (*kāryotpatty-anvaya-vyatireka*). It is impossible for a Buddhist to explain such a recognition by the analogy of flames etc. since he denies a permanent entity which could comprehend the oneness of two things — one existing in the past and another at the present."

The contention of the Buddhist in regard to '*dhvaṁsa*', the posterior negation is as unconvincing as any other. The difference between '*dhvaṁsa*' and '*tuccha*' like the hare's horn etc. cannot be denied. '*Dhvaṁsa*' can occur only when its counter-entity ceases to exist. '*Dhvaṁsa*' is comprehended when a thing is destroyed. But '*tuccha*' is never in need of any cause for its coming into being. The stand of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin is as follows: a mass of clay or gold undergoes a number of changes. When it remains as a clay or gold, the antecedent negation (*prāgabhāva*) of a jar or a jewel, is said to prevail there. When a jar is broken with a bludgeon, then the same clay is said to have acquired another state which is contrary to the previous one. In any case, '*dhvaṁsa*' can never deserve to be considered the same as '*tuccha*'.

2.2. *Sautrāntika's Representation*

Among the four schools of Buddhist thinkers — Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika, the Sautrāntika holds that external objects like pot and cloth are real but that they cannot be directly perceived by the senses. According to him their existence is only to be inferred by the cognition which bears their 'form' or 'likeness'. The process of generation of a perception is described in the following way. There are a few prerequisites of every cognition — *ālambana-pratyaya*, *samanantara-pratyaya*, *sahakāri-pratyaya* and *adhipati-pratyaya*. The moment the sense organ, namely, the eye, gets the contact of an object, the reflection of that object falls upon the mind; in other words, the object presents its form or likeness to the mind, as a china-rose gives its form to a crystal placed nearby. The mind according to the Buddhist is not a distinct entity from the soul and in this respect the Buddhist agrees with the Jains. The mind or soul with the form so received is called 'cognition'. Because it is luminous, it does not require any other cognition for its apprehension, and thus it cognizes its own self together with the form of the external object.

The apprehension of the form leads to the inference of the existence of the external object. Unless the existence of the external object is admitted, how could there be a form in the cognition and its apprehension? The mind's power of receiving an image from external objects is stated by the Sautrāntika to be cognition. As per the preamble of all Buddhists, all things are momentary and the thing that existed in the former moment is the cause of the thing existing in the succeeding moment. The mind or the soul of

the former moment which has the power of receiving an image from the external things causes another mind or soul very similar to the former one to come into being at the succeeding moment. This series of momentary cognitions cannot be traced to any starting point and hence it is considered "beginningless" (*anādi*). Such cognitions are of two types — one in the form of 'I' and the other in the form of 'this'. The first type of cognition called '*ālaya-vijñāna*' is spontaneous and hence it needs no cause for its own generation. With no variation in shape, the series of cognitions goes on perpetually. The other type of cognition is occasional as it depends upon its causes for its coming into being. The diversity of causes is the reason for the diversity of effects namely the series of '*pravṛtti-vijñāna*'. Unlike *ālaya-vijñāna*, the latter (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*) series has various forms as the objects are of various types. In the *ālaya-vijñāna* series (which plays the role of soul) as its substratum, the *pravṛtti-vijñāna* series is effected by the maturation of sub-conscious impressions. As a breeze causes agitation in still water, and ripples and waves follow, so does the *pravṛtti-vijñāna* series begin to prevail as the outcome of the awakened sub-conscious impressions, when the required causes are present.

1. *Ālambana-pratyaya* relates to the objects which are the causes of the cognitions which in the absence of those objects cannot come into being.

2. *Samanantara-pratyaya* is a cognition that enables the succeeding cognition to receive the form of the external objects.

3. *Sahakāri-pratyaya* refers to light etc. which are responsible in making the cognition distinct with regard to its object. The absence of light disables a person from having a clear apprehension of an object placed in darkness.

4. *Adhipati-pratyaya* refers to the sense organs. It is the sense organs that make the objects present their forms (which are contended by the scholars of other doctrines to be perceptible) to the cognition in the succeeding moment.

As the external objects present their forms to the cognition, so do the internal objects like pleasure, pain and hatred; thus they too become inferable.

2.2.1. *The Nature of Ālaya- and Pravṛtti-Vijñāna*

Like the individual impressions in the series of *ālaya-vijñānas*, the individual ones in *pravṛtti-vijñāna* series are momentary but the former is a case of perpetual generation while the latter is one of occasional generation. It is a general rule that any former cognition, whether it is *ālaya-vijñāna* or *pravṛtti-vijñāna*, gives its succeeding cognition the form it itself has. For the generation of a *pravṛtti-vijñāna*, the *ālaya-vijñāna* has nothing to do; but it is the contact of sense organs with the external or internal objects that generates *pravṛtti-vijñāna*. *Pravṛtti-vijñāna* has *ālaya-vijñāna* as its substratum and makes it (*ālaya-vijñāna*) act according to the information in the form of *pravṛtti-vijñāna* that is brought to it. Except the fact that both of them are held as momentary, the Sautrāntika's explanation of both the *vijñānas* resemble the view of Viśiṣṭādvaitin with regard to the cognition and its seat, the soul.

2.2.2. *An Objection against the Sautrāntika's View and Its Reply*

To this, an objection may be raised as follows: as the object is contended to cease to exist just at the time of its cognition because of its momentariness nothing can be an object of a cognition. To this Sautrāntika gives the following answer: a thing need not exist at the time of its cognition. To be an object of a cognition means to be the cause of its cognition. As we contend that whichever thing that becomes a cause of its cognition by handing its form to the cognition that follows it, the objects of the succeeding moment can be the object of the same cognition. The eye cannot be the object of the cognition though the cognition is effected by that sense organ namely, the eye, since it does not leave an impression of its form on the cognition."

2.2.3. *Sautrāntika's Explanation of Perception and Inference*

To another objection how a jar and such other external things could be said to be perceptible, if they are held as inferable by the perception of 'likeness' in a cognition, the Sautrāntika answers in the following way: if a thing presents its form directly to the cognition and not through a medium of cognition it is a case of perception. If the presentation of 'likeness' or 'form' is made through a medium of cognition as in the case of fire, the cognition of which is brought about by the cognition of smoke, it is a case of inference. Buddhists hold that inference is as valid as perception. If the objects are identical with the cognition as the Yogācāra holds, then a cognition being self-luminous apprehends its own self as well as its objects. If

so, what could be the distinguishing feature that differentiates an inference from perception?

2.2.4. *Vaibhāṣika's Criticism of Sautrāntika's Contention*

The Vaibhāṣika is grouped with the Sautrāntika because both of them maintain the reality of external things. Consequently they are called "*sarva-astivādins*". The Vaibhāṣika, however, takes objection to the contention of the Sautrāntika in point of presentation of a 'form' by the external thing to the mind, on the following grounds. An inference can take place only, when the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) of its major and middle term (*sādhya* and *hetu*) are remembered. If perceptibility is denied to external things, how could the invariable concomitance be apprehended between a major and a middle term? Invariable concomitance is a relation apprehended by the frequent observation (*bhūyo-darśana*) of invariable co-existence (*niyata-sāhacarya*) of major and middle terms. The remembrance of the above relation is brought about by the awakening of the sub-conscious impression (*samskāra*) by the sight of one of the two relatives, namely, the major or the middle term, and then inference follows. Thus the inference is entirely based upon the series of perceptive cognitions otherwise called *bhūyo-darśana*. If perceptibility is totally denied to external things, it would be absolutely impossible to have an inference of anything."

2.2.5. *Rāmānuja's Criticism*

Rāmānuja criticises the Sautrāntika doctrine on the following grounds: if things are contended to be momentary, the external things would cease to exist in the moment of the presentation of form to the

mind. In the absence of a thing, how can its form alone survive to be presented to the mind? Moreover a reflection can take place on a smooth surface only if the thing exists at the moment of its presentation "

2.2.6. *Yogācāra's Criticism of Sautrāntika's View*

Śrīdhara in his *Nyāya-kandali* presents the following criticism made by the Yogācāra. What do the cognitions which received the form of the external thing, apprehend? Is it the form of external object or its own form or both the forms? The third alternative is impossible since the cognition 'this is blue' and the like apprehends only one form. Nor is the first alternative a sound one; for at the time of its apprehension the external object having disappeared cannot have its form apprehended by a cognition of later origin. The external object cannot allow its inseparable form to survive or outlive it. At the moment when the contact of the sense organ with the external object prevails, the cognition is not born and hence it can have no form.

2.2.7. *Sautrāntika's Reply*

The Sautrāntika meets such criticisms in the following way. If the object and its cognition do not exist at one and the same time, there is no inconsistency in the presentation of the form of an external object to the mind. The cognizability or the perceptibility of an object is to impart its form to the mind or cognition (both being identical). Moreover, the objects (which are denied perceptibility) must be held to have various forms. They cannot be held as being without any form of their own, for in that case it

would be difficult to explain the variety in the cognitions.”

2.2.8. *Veṅkaṭanātha's Criticism*

Veṅkaṭanātha reviews this contention and criticises it in the following way. Is the form which is imparted to the mind identical with the external object or is it an attribute of the same (external object) or is it distinct from both of them? The first alternative is untenable for the form which is contended to be identical with the external object, perishes at the moment when the cognition is held to come into being on account of the momentariness of the external object. Nor is the second alternative possible; according to the Buddhist, there is no attribute as distinct from a thing or substratum (*dharma-dharminṇor abhedāt*). Even to those who uphold two distinct entities as attribute and substratum, the transfer of such an attribute as ‘form’ or ‘like-ness’ from one substratum to another is not agreeable. Unless this form is contended to have its life extended at least to one succeeding moment in violation of the Buddhistic theory no such explanation of the presentation theory can hold water. Nor is the third one plausible; for in that case, the form being held as distinct from the object cannot have anything to do with the object.”

2.2.9. *Sautrāntika's Reply*

The Sautrāntika tries to establish his theory of representationism with the help of an example. Our face is not seen with our eyes despite its nearness; still we see the likeness of our face in a mirror to which the face imparts its form. Similarly the likeness of an object is apprehended while the object has imparted its form to a cognition.

2.2.10. *Veṅkaṭanātha's Criticism*

The unsoundness of the above argument is obvious. It passes one's understanding how the reflection of a perished object could fall upon a thing and how it could be apprehended by a cognition with self-luminosity." According to the Buddhist doctrine of the momentariness of all things, it would be absolutely impossible to present the form by a thing of one moment to something of another moment. The given analogy can serve some purpose only if the receiving mind has a physical constitution capable of receiving the form so presented. Moreover such presentation would be possible only if the objects have some colour in their form. But in the case of touch, smell, taste, etc. where there is no colour how could their forms be imprinted on the mind? The Sautrāntika might argue that ether which has no colour, and is hence considered by their opponents to be beyond our perception is still perceived to have its reflection in water. This contention too is untenable. Though some hold ether as beyond our perception, there are many scholars who hold the same to be perceptible on the authority of apprehensions like 'there flies a bird'. According to those scholars who deny the perceptibility of ether, it is not the reflection of the ether in water but some other things on which blackness, etc. are superimposed. It is these other things and not the ether which have their reflection in water. An imperceptible thing cannot have any reflection of its own and much less can it have perceptibility. One's own face is not imperceptible to all like ether. Hence nothing that lacks a physical form of its own can be in a position to give a form to some other thing or to receive a form from it, external or internal.

2.2.11. *Presentation of Form or Superimposition Is Impossible*

Nor does some modification of the Sautrāntika's view serve any purpose. The presentation of a form to the cognition, it is said by the Sautrāntika, does not mean actual presentation but superimposition. In other words, the cognition appears to have the superimposed forms of external objects. But the unsoundness of this contention is obvious. If the perception of external objects is denied, how can an object cause the superimposition of its form on another? Superimposition is possible only in the case of perceptible things — one object as the basis and another as the superimposed. Unless both — the basis and superimposed — happen to be perceivable, superimposition of one on another would be absolutely impossible. To avoid this difficulty, if both are contended to be perceivable, it would be for the Sautrāntika a complete departure from his own theory of imperceptibility of external things.

2.2.12. *Perceptibility of External Things having been Denied, No Impression could be Effected*

The above arguments nullify the following contention also. It might be argued by the Sautrāntika that although external things are imperceptible, there are their forms in the state of sub-conscious impressions (*vāsanā*) and those forms can be superimposed on cognitions. This attempt of the Sautrāntika is entirely due to forgetfulness of his fundamental principles. If all things are contended to be imperceptible, how can there be sub-conscious impressions? Are not sub-conscious impressions the product of apprehensions (*anubhava*)? Sub-conscious impressions are formed in the

mind by the apprehensions of things. If things are denied perceptibility there is no possibility of apprehensions and the generation of sub-conscious impressions by those apprehensions. As such is the case, how can superimposition take place on the basis of sub-conscious impressions? If the Sautrāntika thinks that the generation of sub-conscious impressions is possible even independently of external objects and their apprehensions, he would be throwing overboard his fundamental doctrine of the reality of external objects and becomes identical with the Yogācāra.⁹ In inference, objects are not and cannot be the causes, as some of the objects may belong to the past and some to the future. There are no two opinions even among the followers of different doctrines with regard to the fact that things belonging to the past and future as well as of the present are its (inference's) objects.¹⁰ Such being the case, how can the objects of inference be in a position to impart their forms to the inference of the succeeding moment? So the Sautrāntika's contention that the cognizability (*grāhyatva*) of an object is nothing but its (object's) ability to impart its form to a cognition, cannot be sustained.

2.2.13. *Analogy of Lime and Turmeric or Magnet and Iron could Serve No Purpose*

Some others of the Sautrāntika school maintain the following view. They say that in fact neither the cognition nor the object has any form of its own; when lime and turmeric are mixed together, a new colour which is entirely different from that of lime and of turmeric emerge from their combination. In the same way, they say, that a form arises from the union of cognition and the object.¹⁰ This view also cannot stand

scrutiny. In the analogy cited by them both lime and turmeric have a physical form of their own and occupy a distinct place of their own; but in the present case, some objects alone may have a physical form and a place for their occupation, while the other entity concerned in the apprehension namely the cognition has not a form or a place to occupy, owing to its being not a concrete object but an abstract apprehension. How, then, can a form be effected by the combination of the object and its cognition? Moreover, a cognition takes place even though the object is placed not in close proximity or even if the object existed long before the appearance of the cognition or is going to exist in the future. In all these cases, there is no possibility of cognition getting the form of an object of the past or future.

Nor does the following view of some others of the same school appear sound. A piece of iron assumes a change in its form in the presence of a magnet; so also the sun-stone (*sūrya-kānta-śilā*) and the moon-stone (*candra-kānta-śilā*) are believed to undergo a change in the presence of the sun and the moon respectively. In a similar manner, they say that by the presence of the cognition and the object a peculiar form is generated.

Here also a great incongruity between the instances on the one hand and the cognition and object on the other is not taken into account by the followers of the Sautrāntika school. In all the above instances, the sun and the moon, the iron and the magnet have all physical forms and none of them is an abstract thing without a physical form. Cognition, on the other hand, is purely abstract and some of the objects too

happen to be abstract ones. Hence, from these instances, nothing can be established with regard to the cognition, as the Sautrāntika hopes to.

The Sautrāntika denying the perceptibility of external things, finds some difficulty in explaining illusions. In the illusion of rope-snake, nacre-silver, etc. according to his theory, the rope, nacre etc. could present their form to the cognition and there could be only the valid cognitions of rope, nacre etc. as there are no snake, silver and the like to present their form to cause illusions of snake, silver etc. and this is absolutely against the common experience of all. To explain this, the Sautrāntika contends that superimpositions can take place even without a basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and in the case of the illusion of rope-snake, the rope, the basis of illusion is not apprehended but snake alone is brought into remembrance by the sub-conscious impressions (*vāsanā* or *saṃskāra*) and the form of the cognition is 'this is a snake'. Such superimposition without a substrate is found in the case of "*keśaṇḍraka*" ("*keśaṇḍraka* is the appearance of a bright woolly mass when the closed eye is pressed with the fingertip"). In such superimpositions we do not apprehend any base either at the time of superimposition nor at the time of their sublation.

In reply to the Sautrāntika, the following objection is raised: The remembrance of silver by the sub-conscious impressions in the form of 'this is silver' is impossible. The part, 'this', of the above cognition cannot be remembrance as that was not apprehended already and whatever has not been already apprehended, cannot be an object of remembrance. If it had

been already apprehended, instead of 'this' 'that' must be part of the remembrance.

2.3. *The System of the Yogācāra*

The Yogācāra denies even the existence of external things. He argues as follows. In dreams we apprehend all sorts of strange objects but externally there are no objects in reality corresponding to them. So also mental cognitions are alone real, and there is no justification for postulating external objects corresponding to them. It must be admitted that all cognitions that we have in our dreams do not have any real objects outside corresponding to them. We may see in our dreams people who died long long ago, converse with them and have all kinds of dealings with them. Though we definitely know even in our dreams that they are dead, still we do not hesitate to have dealings with them. Sometimes we dream of cutting our own heads with our own hands and of dying thereby. Sometimes objects of a distant past and of distant places are seen to be in a close proximity to us; some objects that never existed seem to have an existence during our dream state. In all these dream cognitions, no one can deny the absence of reality of their objects even at the time of dreams." In the same manner even the cognitions of our waking state do not have objects that have reality. There is no difference between the cognitions of dreams and those of the waking state, as they both have only unreal objects. Moreover the cognition of silver in a nacre and of snake in a rope are instances to prove that cognitions can have unreal things as their objects. As a matter of fact, cognitions apprehend their objects as if the objects were distinct from the cognitions and as existing externally. Hence

the Yogācāra is called '*Ātma-khyāti-vādin*'. If the so-called external objects, he says, are spoken of as being real, it is due to their having only the empirical reality (*samvrti-satyatā*).

2.3.1. *Objects are Not Distinct from their Cognitions*

There are many things that appear to be distinct from internal cognitions and to ascribe unreality to all those things may seem strange and improper; still, it is impossible, says the Yogācāra, to prove the reality of those things that appear to be external. Let us examine what the general conception of the external things must mean. What is it that becomes the object of perception? Is it the internal cognition itself or the external thing? If the former is the case, then the contention of the Yogācāra would appear sound. If, on the other hand, it is the latter case, the non-luminous thing cannot be conceived as self-luminous. The explanation that even non-luminous objects can become luminous through the medium of a cognition, is untenable; for in that case it is superfluous to assume the existence of external objects in addition to their cognition. The cognition alone will answer their purpose." There are no two opinions with regard to cognition as it has the approval of both the schools, namely, those who accept the existence of external objects apart from their cognition and those who do not accept them as existing at all. Cognition cannot be dispensed with, for it is the only means that governs all dealing in the world. On the other hand, the so-called external objects can be dispensed with as unreal as cognitions alone can serve their purpose as in the case of the objects seen in dreams."

2.3.2 *External Things Could Neither be Eternal Nor Non-eternal*

If cognition is denied as existing, one cannot be cognisant of things in the universe as it is the only means by which all dealings in the universe can be conducted. If the so-called external objects are conceived to exist, then there arises the question whether they are products having an origin or eternal which have no origin nor end. A product cannot but be evanescent; that which is not produced cannot be even a 'being' (like the son of a barren woman or the sky-flower). The so-called external objects cannot have the contact of the sense organs for the generation of their cognitions for the following reasons. Those objects cannot be the 'wholes' having atoms as their constituent parts since the contact of the eye or the sense of touch cannot be with the entire form of the whole. Nor can it be in a part of the 'whole' as it is incapable of causing a cognition of the 'whole' in consequence of which the verbal usage like 'this is a jar', referring to a 'whole' becomes impossible. Nor can the parts be objects of the cognitions as they (that is, the atoms) are held as being beyond human apprehension. In the doctrine of the Buddhists the 'whole' is composed of atoms which though individually invisible, become visible like a mass of hair wherein the individual hair is not perceivable.

2.3.3. *One and the Same Cognition Appears as Three Different Entities — Apprehension, Apprehended and Apprehender*

As a matter of fact, there is neither a separate apprehender nor even a separate apprehended object.

One and the same apprehension appears in three forms as apprehender, apprehension and apprehended. The self-luminous apprehension in which the objects are inseparably associated, proves their identity — cognition and its objects, as clay and the products made out of it are held identical on account of their inseparable association."

Like a lamp which illumines other objects and hence becomes known, prior to its objects, a cognition becomes known before its objects." Besides a cognition must have a form of its own since a cognition without a form is beyond our apprehension. If external objects are denied an existence, cognitions must have forms of their own and those forms must be different from one another, otherwise there would be nothing that could distinguish one cognition from another. It is the form of blue in a cognition that distinguishes it from a cognition that has the form of yellow.

2.3.4. *Criticism of Sautrāntika's Contention*

Against this view of Yogācāra denying the reality of external objects, the Sautrāntika says that the cognitions have no form of their own but receive it from the objects as a crystal receives the red colour from the china-rose placed nearby. The Yogācāra replies that this contention is unsound for obvious reasons. Granting that external objects give their forms to the cognition, how can a cognition be proved to exist with no form of its own to receive the form of the external object? It is an undisputed truth that the existence of of a thing under discussion should be proved by positive and negative instances (*anvayena vyatirekenā ca*). The Sautrāntika cannot show a cognition without a

form in the absence of an external object. In the case of the crystal and the china-rose each of them has its own form independently before the superimposition of the red colour in the crystal.¹⁶

It is unnecessary and against the common experience of men to hold two forms — one that of the external object and another presented by it to the cognition. It will suffice if it is held that the cognition apprehends its own form as it is self-luminous. It is futile to hold another form and its possessor namely the external.¹⁷ A cognition is by nature formless and indeterminate and in consequence of such a nature, it is as pure as crystal and appears as if it were tarnished by various forms of psychical dispositions (*vāsanāḥ*) effected by past cognitions. These various psychical dispositions cause cognitions and these dispositions become responsible for the illusions which apprehend the false distinction between the objects and their cognitions (*grāhya-grāhakayoḥbheda-bhramah*). The series of cognitions and the series of psychical dispositions have the relation of cause and effect by the law of seed and bud (*bīja-aṅkura-nyāya*). When these psychical dispositions alone answer the purpose of variety in cognitions, it is unnecessary to hold the existence of external objects and the presentation of their forms to the succeeding cognitions.

2.3.5. Conclusion of Yogācāra Doctrine

Moreover, dream-cognitions, the illusory cognition of snake in a rope, remembrance of things of the past, take place even in the absence of objects and this fact is conceded even by those scholars who hold an opposite view. Hence cognitions need not invariably

require objects that have real existence. To say that these forms arise neither by the cognitions nor by the objects but by the relation that exists between the objects and its cognition (*viṣaya-viṣayi-bhāva-sam-bandha*) may be branded as unsound altogether. If the object and its cognition are found not to be in possession of any form of their own, how is it possible to conceive the generation of a form to be caused by the relation of the object and its cognition? Hence like dream cognition and remembrance of the past events, cognitions even in our waking state may with reason be conceived as cognition of objects that have no real existence.

2.3.6. *Criticism of Yogācāra Doctrine*

The contention of the Yogācāra is untenable. The unreality of things seen in dreams is realised by the dreamer himself soon after he is awake, by the superseding cognitions. He says — “All the objects that I have seen in my dream have — none of them — any reality’. A dream is personal. Never do two people have the same dream; on the other hand in our every day life, we see many things and those things are apprehended alike by all in their recollection, recognition, etc. which are exactly like one another. To invalidate all these invariably similar cognitions of all people is far from convincing. It is our invariable experience that things which we see in our dreams are mostly those we have already seen, though they are really situated at the same or totally different place and time. Even some of the impressions that we had acquired in our former births become awakened and so we have strange visions in our dreams. Thus the cognition of dreams is nothing but recollections which do not require the presence of

their objects within the range of the sense organ. It is only the perception in the waking state that requires the presence of its objects at the time of its coming into being. The cognition of snake in a rope is explained in various ways by scholars of different schools. Snake and rope have their own existence elsewhere and neither of them is absolutely unreal. But the Yogācāra having denied the real existence of all external things, cannot give a satisfactory answer with the help of sub-conscious impressions."

2.3.7. *Reasons having been Held Unreal, could Establish Nothing*

Moreover, the Yogācāra who advocates the unreality of the universe cannot establish anything, much less cognitions having no corresponding objects. The reasons (*hetavaḥ*) put forth to prove their contentions being themselves unreal, according to their theory, how can they establish anything?"

2.3.8. *Psychical Dispositions could Not be Effected*

Nor can their contention of sub-conscious dispositions be sustained. If everything is held as momentary, as per the Buddhistic preamble, how can the mind receive any disposition? Disposition (*vāsanā*) can take place only if both the giver and the receiver of the impression exist at one and the same time. In the case of incense, glowing charcoal and the article of perfume have contact and hence the incense is generated and not otherwise. The cognition of the previous moment cannot give anything to another that is going to take birth only at the next moment.¹⁰ Even if two cognitions are contended to coexist, there will be no transit of impression from one to another, as they both remain

mutually unrelated. How could there be a column of smoke if agallochum or myrrh (*agaru*) and burning charcoal remain without contact?" As a matter of fact, impressions will be produced only if both the things happen to have a physical form of their own and parts." The smell of a fragrant flower does not come without an external object as is contended by the Yogācāra. Since the breeze carries some invisibly small particles from things that are fragrant, we become capable of enjoying the fragrance of things in our close proximity. Cognitions having no physical form or parts of their own cannot be transported to produce impressions (*vāsanā*). That is why the fragrance that has no physical form is not contended to be borne by the breeze. Fragrance together with its substrata like pollen is taken by the breeze to the perceiver. Moreover, transference of *vāsanā* from one to another is possible only if both of them are held to be non-momentary and permanent. Such difficulties do not creep in the doctrines which maintain souls or spirits as distinct from cognition because they (souls) are held as eternal. By the apprehension (*anubhava*) impressions are generated in the eternal souls and they will remain for a short or a long period in accordance with the manner of their being generated until they become wiped out due to long duration of time by death, by poignant hellish tortures or by the pangs experienced by womenfolk at the time of the delivery of a child."

2.3.9. *Summing up Yogācāra Contention*

The Yogācāra's contention may be summed up as follows: things may be considered as permanent only if, at all times, present, past and future, they remain the same without undergoing any change or assuming

a new feature. If it suffers any alteration or acquires a new feature or peculiarity which did not exist before, it cannot be maintained as permanent. To the Buddhists, there is no distinction between the attribute (*dharma*) and the thing possessing that attribute (*dharmi*). The attribute and the thing which is supposed by the scholars of other doctrines as having that attribute are one and the same. So if a new change or attribute or feature occurs in the thing, it is a new thing, the old thing having ceased to exist.

The substratum and the impressions which are both one and the same and not different entities perish every instant and cause a new substratum with its impressions to arise at the next instant. There will be a close similarity between the cognition of the substratum at one moment and that of the cognition at the next moment. It is this similarity between the cognitions that is called *vāsanā*. The relation between the giver of *vāsanā* and the receiver of *vāsanā* is nothing but the relation of cause and effect, that is, of an entity existing before and the entity that arises from it after it has perished. To illustrate his view of one *vāsanā* creating another *vāsanā* at its death, the Yogācāra gives the following instance from nature. If the flower of pomegranate (*bīja-pūraka*) is sprinkled with the paste of red-lac, it produces a fruit which resembles the flower (its cause) with its red colour.

2.3.10. Kumārila's Criticism of the Above Contention

Against this explanation of the Yogācāra, Kumārila advances the following arguments : how can an entity be the cause of the birth of a positive entity at the time of its death? The entity called the cause exists

only for one moment. How can it, within that one moment, cause the birth of another positive entity? Causality does not consist in the mere existence of a thing at a moment previous to the coming into existence of an effect. If so, when a cow existed at a moment previous to the birth of a horse in the place, the cow would have to be called the cause of the horse which is the effect. This would be absurd. Causality is apprehended by 'frequent observation' (*bhūyo-darśana*) of the invariable presence of a thing at a moment previous to the birth of another thing. When things are considered to be momentary, as by the Buddhists, how could there be frequent observation of one thing causing another thing?

Further the Yogācāra cannot explain the similarity (*sārūpya*) that is perceived between cause and effect. The similarity of two things is due to the perception of their possession of common features. If according to the Yogācāra, the apprehender, the apprehension and the apprehended are momentary, how could similarity (*sārūpya*) be perceived?

The Yogācāra may say — 'It is true that a jar cannot generate a cloth, a cow or a horse, as these belong to different classes, but a momentary cognition can generate something belonging to the same class.' In reply to this, it may be asked of the Yogācāra: 'a cognition and an impression belong to two different classes. How then, can a cognition create an impression and that impression in its turn create a cognition?' The Yogācāra might reply that the impression is nothing but cognition and that the two belong to the same class. Then the question remains unanswered as to how one

series of cognitions could give rise to a different series of cognitions?

The example of the citron flower serves no purpose to the Yogācāra; the small parts of the flower containing the particles of red lac transform into fruit as the fruit is only another state of the flower. Hence there is nothing unnatural or unconvincing in it. But in the case of cognitions which have no parts due to their being incorporeal such explanation on the analogy of citron flower-fruit with the parts of red lac does not serve the purpose as the analogy is inapt.

2.3.11. *Momentariness of Things could Not be Established*

It is an invariable experience of all to have cognitions like 'it is known to me' or 'I know it'. In either cognition the function of knowledge requires an object and that object like blue, white etc. cannot be internal but external. If there is no external object, blue or white, the difference in moments and the difference in the series of cognitions cannot be explained; for if these differences are held by the Yogācāra as cognizable then that cognition and its object (the difference) must be identical as per the contention of the Yogācāra; and this identity frustrates the difference of the moments among themselves. In that case, theory of momentariness of things which depends upon *kṣaṇa-bheda*, the very life-blood of Buddhistic doctrine cannot be proved. If *kṣaṇa-bheda* is incognizable, then that itself becomes unproven and hence the momentariness of things cannot be established."

The Yogācāra denies the existence of three different entities namely cognition, its object and the cogni-

zer. So he says though all the three appear to be mutually distinct, by the cognitions like 'I know a jar,' in fact they are identical since their appearance as distinct entities is only due to illusion."

The Yogācāra has to answer the following question: having contended that the cognition and its objects are identical, does he maintain the mutual distinction of two things each having attributes that never co-exist? If he does not, then there would be no '*kṣaṇa-bheda*' much against the contention of Buddhists. If the mutual distinction of those two things is conceded, then how could there be an identity of seven colours with their cognition?

Moreover, if the Yogācāra contends the identity of the cognition and its objects, he has to answer the following objection — A cognition, for instance, apprehends all the seven colours of, say, the rainbow — namely blue, red, yellow and the like. All scholars agree in holding that a single cognition can apprehend all the seven colours as objects, although these different colours cannot co-exist at the same time in the same thing. But the Yogācāra goes further and maintains that these so-called external objects, are identical with the cognition which apprehends them. He has the difficulty of explaining how such attributes as blue, red etc. which cannot co-exist in the same thing at the same time and which are mutually opposed to each other can be identical with a single cognition? To contend that this is possible on the analogy of these varied and different colours which are called external objects being apprehended by a single cognition is absurd; when these mutually different colours which cannot co-exist are

apprehended, we are aware that there is no sublation of this cognition by another valid cognition. Hence the common and invariable cognition apprehending different colours cannot be invalidated. Nor are there two opinions regarding the non-identity of blue, yellow, white etc. and their non-coexistence at one and the same instance; but there is no incompatibility in a cognition's having non-co-existing colours as its objects.⁴

Further when the Yogācāra speaks of blue, yellow and the like as forms of cognition, what does he mean? Does he hold that these colours are identical with the cognition or that they are attributes of the cognition? If he considers them identical, since in his doctrine external objects are unreal, the cognition which is identical with them would be likewise unreal. Similarly when the nacre-silver is apprehended, since it is identical, according to him, with the cognition and since the cognition is real, the unreal nacre-silver should be considered real. The Yogācāra's position would then be the same as that of the Mādhyamika.⁵

If on the other hand, the Yogācāra considers blue, yellow and the like as attributes of the cognition, he will have to give up the view that there is no distinction between the substratum and its attributes and that they are one and the same.

2.4. *The School of Mādhyamika*

2.4.1. *Nothing in the Universe could be Real*

The Mādhyamika school of Buddhists bears kinship with the school of nihilists of Western philosophy, in denying the real existence of everything seen within

and around us. The Mādhyamikas are also of great interest to the student of the history of Indian philosophy as, in many ways, they were the forerunners of the Śāṅkara school of Advaitins who took over some of their views while rejecting others.

The Mādhyamikas deny the reality of everything in the universe. Even consciousness or intellect (*caitanya*) which alone the Yogācāra maintains as real is regarded by them as unreal. Nothing comes into existence nor perishes. Births and deaths of beings and things that appear to be taking place, are merely phenomena due to the transformation of the five primary elements and they are effected by certain causes and conditions. The seeds of plants which are supposed to put forth buds fail to do so, if they happen to be affected by the thundering clouds, by being smelt by mice or roasted in the fire. These are the conditions which are unfavourable to the budding of seeds. A non-existing thing cannot come into being, argues the Mādhyamika, as the hair on the back of the tortoise or a child of a barren woman or a flower in the sky. The sight of birth and death of things cannot establish their absolute reality. If so, all of us may be deemed seers and there would be no necessity at all for special training prescribed for the development of mind by *Yogaśāstra* for the perception of reality.

As a matter of fact, the nature of all things in the universe is the same as that of illusory things, mirage, visions in our dreams etc. Moreover, worldly life is conceived by one and all to be very painful — for which reason different means are prescribed for the total emancipation of souls by different schools of thought.

Worldly life should be considered as painful; hence we are urged to pursue thought and action which could emancipate us from wordly ties. Like other schools of Buddhism the Mādhyamika holds that things are momentary. They are otherwise called '*sva-lakṣaṇa*' since they are cognised only in the interest of their forms and they have no attributes as distinct from themselves.

2.4.2. *Things could Not But be Void*

Moreover, the Mādhyamika argues that if a thing, say, the sky, is held as a being or existent (*sat*), then it would cease to be in need of the collection of causes (*kārya-janaka-sāmagrī*) which could bring about the effect. If the same is contended as 'not a being or non-existent (*asat*)' then as in the case of the sky-flower and the like, there is no need of any cause for its production. Nor can a thing be contended to be as both 'being and non-being' (*sadasat*) or 'neither being nor non-being' (*na sat, nāpi asat*) as these are mutually contradictory and cannot, therefore, co-exist. Inasmuch as all these four alternatives are denied as being impossible of proving in all things, it is just and reasonable to hold everything as void (*śūnya*).⁴

2.4.3. *Close Relation of Advaitism with the Doctrine of Mādhyamika*

All things in the world are in fact only the products of our imagination, and our dealings with them are as illusory as the dealings that we have with the objects of our dream visions. It is *saṃvṛti* which causes delusions, illusions or hallucinations, and in spite of possessing this marvellous power, '*saṃvṛti*' also is as unreal as other things. The reader would remember that in the

system of Advaita, the same *saṃvṛti* bears a different name 'avidyā' and the definitions and descriptions given to 'saṃvṛti' are equally applicable to *avidyā* also. In fact, it is the Buddhist's 'saṃvṛti' that must have inspired the Advaitin to conceive of a strange thing, give it the name 'avidyā' and in support of his contention to interpret in the light of *avidyā*, even Vedic text in which the words *māyā*, *avidyā* etc. occur. There is however, one important point in Advaita doctrine which differentiates it from Mādhyamika thought. While Advaitin holds that everything other than Brahman is unreal and the appearance of thing as existing is due to the superimposition on the basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*), namely, Brahman which alone is real as per his contention, Mādhyamika finds no purpose in holding even that Brahman as real to serve as basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for the superimposition and maintains that no cognition requires a basis. The Mādhyamika asks: 'What harm would arise if Brahman also is denied reality?' It may be pointed out in this connection that the realist puts a similar question: 'If the object of our vision is held as false, if the perceiver also shares the same fate namely of being considered false, and if the defect (that is held as responsible for the existence of this diverse world) is no better than others in respect of reality, why does the Advaitin not arrive at the conclusion that the basis (Brahman on which according to the Advaitin all illusions are supposed to take place) is also unreal?' Such a question cannot be helped from arising in the minds of scholars.⁵⁰

2.4.4. *Refutation of the Mādhyamika View*

Veṅkaṭanātha examines the Mādhyamika's contention by asking the question: Having presented

the above argument, does the Mādhyamika uphold the reality of his own statements and his scriptures? If they are held as real, then it would contradict his own contention that everything in the world is unreal. If the Mādhyamika denies the reality even of his own arguments, his scriptures etc. in conformity with his contention, then his arguments cannot establish the unreality of anything, and thus his purpose becomes defeated. While putting forth this argument, Veṅkaṭanātha reminds us of an old Greek analogy. A Theban made a general declaration that all Thebans were liars. Since the man who made this sweeping denunciation was himself a Theban, he must also be a liar, and his statement about all Thebans must therefore be considered false. By holding that worldly objects are real only in view of their being products of *samvṛti*, any argument or criticism put forth by the Mādhyamika as *samvṛti-satya* (as that too is contended) can neither establish anything nor disprove the contention of his opponents.

If both these opposite views, namely, the views of the realist and those of the Mādhyamika are held as unreal, how are we to decide which of them is valid? It is argued that the doctrine of the Mādhyamika which seeks to prove the void of the universe, must be posterior (*para*) as it requires for refutation the *prima facie* arguments postulating the reality of the universe, and that because of its being posterior, it could not be sublated by other arguments.

It may also be argued by those who are opposed to the Mādhyamika that there is another view which is later (*para*) than theirs, namely, that there is no such thing as 'void' which does not come under any of the

four possibilities (*catuṣkoṭi-vinirmukta*) and that all things in the world belong to one or the other of these four alternatives. Since this view is later than that of the Mādhyamika, it can sublate or overthrow the contention of the Mādhyamika.

The Mādhyamika also states: A thing cannot be called 'existent' (*sat*) unless it exists at all times, in all places under all circumstances. If it does not so exist, it would lose its very nature (*svabhāva*). This Mādhyamika argument is not correct. The nature of existence of a thing depends upon the place and time of its existence. A jar may exist at a place called 'x' while it does not exist at another place called 'y'. So also, before a jar is made, it did not exist, and after it is made, it exists until it is broken.

2.4.5. *Are Characteristics and Qualities Mutually Different?*

The Mādhyamika makes an unwarranted distinction between the characteristics (*svabhāva*) of a thing and qualities like shortness or longness, smallness or bigness which are relative terms depending on something else, and argues that these relative terms (like shortness and longness, smallness and bigness) which require another for comparison cannot be characteristics of an object (*svabhāva*), and that the characteristics of a thing do not require another object for comparison. He points out to the example the void of the sky-flower which is its characteristic and does not depend on anything else. He holds that the same quality could not be a characteristic and at the same time expressed by relative terms.

2.4.6. *Refutation of the Above View*

This contention of the Mādhyamika is not correct. It is not possible to maintain certain attributes as 'characteristics' and others as qualities expressible by relative terms, and that these two are opposed to each other. Some attributes are characteristics that do not require comparison with other objects, while others are also characteristics which require comparison and are expressed by relative terms. Since these attributes are actually possessed by the object, they are to be taken as granted, and arguments cannot deny what they are.

2.4.7. *What do the Words 'Tuccha,' 'Mithyā' etc. Mean?*

Another argument of the Mādhyamika may be stated as follows: Do '*tuccha*' '*alika*' '*mithyā*,' and such other words denote something or not? The denial of denotation is not possible for Viśiṣṭādvaitin for he uses these words freely. If they have the denotative power (*abhidhā-sakti*), do they denote 'being' (*sat*) or 'non-being' (*asat*)? If the former is the case the realist agrees with the Mādhyamika who contends the whole universe as *tuccha* (void) for it would come to mean that '*sat*' is '*tuccha*' (void). In the latter case, that is, where *tuccha* and such other words denote 'non-being' (*asat*) alone, the same words may denote 'being' (*sat*) also as they do 'non-beings' by the rule 'whatever is denoted by a word is *tuccha*' (non-entity). This argument is based on a wrong and unsustainable assumption, *viz*, the universe is void (*tuccha*). Unless and until the void of the universe is proved, no such rule as above referred to (whatever is denoted by a word is *tuccha*) can be taken into account for discussion, and arguments based on such assumption cannot serve any purpose. In fact

these words *tuccha*, *alika*, *mithyā*, etc. are used by thinkers of various schools to denote something that exists somewhere but superimposed in a place where it does not exist. A flower found in a plant or creeper is superimposed in the sky, with a definite knowledge of the absence of the flower in the sky; a son born to a mother is superimposed in a woman whom the speaker definitely knows as barren. Such superimpositions are very common when the speaker wants to substantiate his assertion of some impossible proposition or contention. For example, to prove the impossibility of winning the love of a courtesan, a poet says that one can win the love of a courtesan only by wearing a garland of sky-flowers (*veśyām vaśayet khasrajām vahan*). In all such cases, both the things — the flower and the sky — are individually and separately real but the relation spoken of as existing between them is false. But in the doctrine of the Mādhyamika, the relation as well as the two individual things is unreal. Moreover, according to the Mādhyamika, the existence of a thing is denied even where there is no substratum or *adhiṣṭhāna* on which its existence is denied, because in his doctrine, the *adhiṣṭhāna* itself has no reality. This denial of the existence of a thing even where there is no substratum, is strange and is against the universal experience. When we use negative sentences like 'there is no hare's horn' (*śaśa-śṛṅgam nāsti*) and 'there is no son of a barren woman' (*vandhyā-suto nāsti*), although the negation appears on the surface, we really mean 'in a hare, there is no horn' (*śaśe śṛṅgo nāsti*) and 'to a barren woman there is no son' (*vandhyāyāḥ suto nāsti*). The substratum 'the hare' and 'the barren woman' are always in the mind, and there is no such thing as denial of the existence of a thing where there is no substra-

tum.⁵¹ Thus the words like *tuccha*, *alika* and *mithyā* are used in sentences to convey the idea that something does not exist in a certain substratum which exists.⁵²

2.4.8. The Buddhistic Term 'Samvṛti-satya' cannot Convey Any Idea

Veṅkaṭanātha questions the appropriateness of the formation of the compound word '*saṃvṛti-satya*' as the two words in the compound '*saṃvṛti*' and '*satya*' mean the opposite of each other. The formation of the compound '*saṃvṛtisatya*' could be only according to the rule either of *karmadhāraya* or of the *tatpuruṣa*. In a *karmadhāraya* compound, the two component words are in apposition with each other, that is, they refer to the same object which is looked at from two different angles. When we say 'William the Conqueror', we refer to the same person. The person bearing the name 'William' and the man who conquered are one and the same person. The two words are in apposition with each other and can co-exist as they denote two different but not inconsistent attributes. In the *karmadhāraya* compound word '*nilaghaṭaḥ*' (the black jar), there are two words '*nila*' the black thing and '*ghaṭaḥ*' the thing which has the characteristics of a jar referring to one and the same object in which two different but not inconsistent attributes co-exist. This is what English grammarians call appositional use, and Sanskritists call '*sāmānādhikaranyam*'. Now Veṅkaṭanātha asks the Mādhyamika 'Is *saṃvṛti-satya* a *karmadhāraya* compound'? If so, '*saṃvṛti*' means 'unreal' and '*satya*' means 'real'. The compound would mean 'the real which is unreal' which would be absurd. If a thing is *satya* or

real it cannot be '*saṃvṛti*' (unreal). If the object is unreal (*saṃvṛti*), it cannot be '*satya*' or real."

If '*saṃvṛti-satya*' is not a *karmadhāraya* compound, Veṅkaṭanātha asks the Mādhyamika, 'Is it a *tatpuruṣa* compound?' In a *tatpuruṣa* compound, the two component words express the ideas of the second object as belonging to the meaning of the word which is the first component of the compound. For example when we say '*rājapuruṣaḥ*' the king's servant, the compound brings out the idea that the servant belongs to the king. If it is said that *saṃvṛtisatya* is a *tatpuruṣa* compound, it would mean 'the reality that belongs to the unreality' which is also absurd.

Or does the Mādhyamika mean by '*saṃvṛti-satya*' something unreal by nature which has its own unreality concealed by '*saṃvṛti*' and so it appears as real. Then it is a case of illusion (*anyathā-khyāti*) and not 'a cognition with no real object' (*asat-khyāti*).⁵⁴

It might be stated in passing that the same objection holds good for the compound word '*vyāvahārika-satya*' used by the Advaitin.

2.4.9. *The Advaitin's Term 'Vyāvahārika-satya' also is Meaningless*

The argument of the Advaitin that even non-entities appear real as if they were enveloped by the word (*śabda-jñānānupātī vastu-sūnyo vikalpaḥ*). For example, a conch appears to be enveloped by yellow colour to a person whose eyes are affected by jaundice. The word '*vyāvahārika-satya*' means a thing that appears to be existing solely owing to verbal usage and other types of dealings in the affairs of everyday life.

This word is quite inappropriate. The things in the world which are contended to be empirical reals (*vyāvahārika-satyāni*) are apprehended either by perception or by inference, and they do not owe their existence merely to the words. On the other hand even phenomenal things, like skyflower etc. may come under the purview according to the above given explanation of the word '*vyāvahārika-satya*' and hence there can be nothing that can be reckoned as 'phenomenally real' (*prātibhāsika-satya*) a third variety in the enumeration of reals by the Advaitin.⁵⁴

So far the criticism levelled against the use of the words, '*saṃvṛti satya*' and '*vyāvahārika-satya*'.

2.4.10. *Asat-khyāti and Anirvacanīya-khyāti Could Serve No Purpose*

Moreover, in both the doctrines — Buddhism and Advaita — it must be admitted that things which are 'real not absolutely' do appear as 'absolutely real'. Otherwise we could have no dealings in our everyday life in this world. Such being the case, illusion (*anyathā-khyāti*) cannot be dispensed with and consequently it becomes evident that no purpose will be served by the Mādhyamika's postulating a cognition where there is no real object (*asat-khyāti*) and by the Advaitin's postulating an inexplicable form of cognition (*anirvacanīya-khyāti*).⁵⁵

Samvṛti cannot be explained as a physical defect causing diverse illusions like some other defects *kāca-kāṃbla* which are admitted by rival thinkers also.

2.4.11 Similarity in the Views of the Mādhyamika and the Advaitin

In this way the arguments of realists disprove *avidyā* and *māyā* of Advaitin's conception. As a matter of fact, the Buddhists' *saṃvṛti* was accepted by the Advaitin with a mere change in the name. *Samvṛti* of the Buddhists and *avidyā* of the Advaitins conceived as being of a peculiar nature in order to suit their (Buddhist and Advaitin) own theories namely to prove that the world is unreal cannot get the approval of impartial thinkers and hence they are unsustainable.

The Mādhyamika did not accept the authority of the *śruti* and had no scruples in denying the need for a real basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for unreality. Hence he denied the existence of Brahman and was an atheist. The Advaitin, on the other hand, insisted on faith in the *śruti* and as the *śruti* declared in unmistakable terms the real existence of Brahman, it maintains that Brahman is the only real and that the world is illusory (*brahma satyam, jagan-mithyā*). Thus while accepting the Buddhists' doctrine of the illusoriness of the world, the Advaitin rejects the Buddhist's atheistic denial of Brahman.

NOTES

1. citraṃ ced ekatā na syād ekam cet citratā katham, ekam tacca citraṃ cetyetat citrataraṃ mahat—*N.M.M.* p. 177

2. anayā ca pratyabhijñayā vibhinna-viṣaya-vilakṣaṇaḥ vibhinna-viṣayagrāhakendriyādi-vilakṣaṇaśca jñātā kaścit abhyupagantavyaḥ ata iyaṃ pratyabhijñā rūpādyatiriktam tadāśrayabhūtaṃ vastu prakāśayati, idam rūpa-sparśavad iti. *S.S.* p. 3

3. sarvaṁ anityaṁ, sarvaṁ anātmam, nirvāṇaṁ śāntam

4. utpādānāntarasthāyi svarūpaṁ yacca vastunaḥ, taducyate kṣaṇaḥ, so'sti yasya tat kṣaṇikaṁ matam—*T.S.* 388

5. ghaṭo madhūdakādīn krameṇa āharan svajñāno-dakāharaṇe ca yaugapadyena kurvan pratyakṣeṇaiva paric-chidyate. tatra yān kārya-bhedān krameṇa āharad samupa-labhyate ghaṭaḥ, kulālo vā śarāvodañcanādīnna tadaiva tān yaugapadyena janayitum samarthaḥ. ghaṭo vā sva-visaya-jñānādīn yaugapadyena janayan upalabhyate, na tadaiva tān krameneti pratyakṣāvasitaṁ etat sarvam. tena tṛptiyasya abhāvāt krama-yaugapadyābhyām artha-kriyā vyāptā. sa ca sthīreṣu bhāveṣu svavyāpakanivṛttān nivartamānā tallak-ṣaṇaṁ sattvaṁ nivartayatiti—*T.S.P.* p. 144

6. etadeva ca kṣaṇikatvaṁ vastūnāṁ yad apūrvot-taratvam

7. pradhvaṁsasya tu nairātmyāt nāstyanantara-bhāvitā na bhūtvā bhāvayogaśca gaganendīvarādivat — *T.S.* 378

8. na ca nairantaryarūpābhāvasyaiva ubhayendriya-vedyatā; tathāpi ubhayor-nirūpkeyor agraṇe ubhaya-nairantaryasyāpi grahaṇāsambhavāt vastutastasya tuccha-tayā pratyabhijnārūpārthakriyākāritvaṁ na yuktaṁ; anyathā tad ādāya sadharmakatva-prasaṅga iti. *A.D.* I, pp. 33-34

9. nanūpādāna-samparke dṛśyate sphaṭikopalaḥ tad-rūpagrahaṇe' pycvam balākādiśca dṛśyate, kañcukāntarite puṁsi tad-rūpādy-agatāvapi puruṣe pratyayo dṛṣṭo rakte vāsasi vastra-dhīḥ rūpādi indriyādibhya ekāntena vibhidyate tena tasya vyavacchedāt caitrādeśca turaṅgamaḥ kṣityādi-rūpa-gandhāderatyantaṁ vā vibhidyate ekāneka-vaco-bhedāt candra-nakṣatra-bhedavat — *T.S.* 557-560

10. tathā hi bhinnam naivānyaiḥ ṣaṇṇām astitvam iṣyate, teṣāṁ dharmāśca naivaikaḥ kaścīd artho'bhyupagam-yate. ṣaḍete dharmināḥ proktā dharmas-tebhyo'tirekināḥ, iṣṭā

eveti cetko'yaṃ sambandhas-tasya tairmataḥ. dravyeṣu niyamād yuktā na saṃyogo na cāparaḥ, samavāyo'sti nānyaś-ca sambandho'ṅgikṛtaḥ paraiḥ — *T.S.* 572-575

11. adhiṣṭhānasya kārtsnyena bhāne'bhāne ca na bhramah, bhatābhāta-kṛti-bhidā katham nir-dharmake bhavet — *S.S.* p. 8

12. jijnāsā ca na atyantānupalabdhe, adarśanāt, na ca niśśeṣāvidite, vedyābhāvāt. atas-tad-viṣaye viditāviditā-kāratvam siddham — *Ibid.* p. 8

13. pakṣa-dharmas-tadaṃśena vyāpto hetustridhaiva saḥ, avinābhāva-niyamāt hetvābhāsās-tato'pare. *H.B.*

14. gotvatvam hi gavetarāvṛttitve sati nikhila-go-vṛttitva-rūpameva; na tu vilakṣaṇo dharmah. *S. M.*

15. dharmena dharmī saviśeṣah, dharminā ca dharmah saviśeṣah — *S. P.*

16. tac-chūnye tasya vṛttiḥ katham iva ghaṭate tad-viśiṣṭe tu vṛtttau svādhāratva-prasaṅgas tathā iha na guṇo nāpi dharmīti — *T.M.K.* 10

17. na vayaṃ tacchūnye tad-viśiṣṭe vā tasya vṛttim brūmah; api tu vastutastad-viśiṣṭe viśeṣye ... yatra yad vartate, tasya katham tac-chūnyatvam? na ca tad-vati vartamānasya tasmin api vṛttir iti niyamah. ghaṭavati bhūtale vartamānānām guṇādinām ghaṭe'pi vṛtter adṛṣṭeḥ. *S.S.* p. 10

18. na hi karaṇākaraṇayoḥ taj-jātiyasya sataḥ sahakāri-lābhālābhau tantram iti abhyupagame kṣaṇikatva-siddhiḥ. tathā eka-vyaktau api avirodhāt. tad vā tādr̥g vā iti na kaścid viśeṣa iti nyāyāt. tataḥ tau anādṛtya vijātiyam aprāmāṇikam eva abhyupeyam. *N. K.* p. 77

19. tathāpi kāla-dvayam parasparābhāva-nāntariyakam (parasparābhāva-vyāptam) tadātmakam vā katham ekatra syād iti cet—na; kāla-dvayasya anyonyasmin abhāve'pi tad-ubhaya-sambandhini vastuni abhāvābhāvāt. *S.S.* p. 33

20. tat-kālāsattvam-eva hyapanayati sato vartamānatva-bodhaḥ. *T.M.K.* 27

21. pratyabhijñānam hi nāma atīta-vartamāna kāla-varty-eka-vastu-viśayam ekam pratyakṣa-jñānam, tasya kāla-dvaya-sambandha-viśiṣṭam eva vastu viśayaḥ, na ca tad ity-amśaḥ smaraṇam, idam-ityamśaśca grahaṇam, atīta kāla-sambandhini indriya-samprayogābhāvād-iti vācyam; tad-idam iti sāmānādhikaraṇyena grahaṇasya ekatva-sphuraṇāt. pūrva-kālā-nubhava-janīta-saṃskāra-sahakṛtendriya-samprayoga-yuktasya puruṣasya tathā grahaṇam upapadyate eva. anvaya-vyatirekādhīnam hi sarvatra sāmāgrī-parikalpanam. *V.D.* II, p. 100

22. na jñānakāle anavasthānam arthasya jñāna-viśayatva-hetuḥ. jñānotpatti-hetutvam-eva hi jñāna-viśayatvaṃ na ca etāvata cakṣurādeḥ jñāna-viśayatva-prasaṅgaḥ; svākāra-samarpaṇena jñāna-hetor-eva jñāna-viśayatvābhyupagamāt. *S.B.* p. 96

23. vijñeyānumeyatva-vāde prātyakṣikasya kasyacid-api arthasyābhāvena vyāpti-saṃvedana-sthānābhāvena anumāna-pravṛtṭy-anupapattiḥ, sakala-lokānubhava-virodhaśca. *S.D.S.*, p. 43

24. jñāne nīlādyākāra upalabhyate, sa vinaṣṭasya asato arthasya ākāro bhavitum na arhati. adṛṣṭatvāt. na khalu dharmiṇi vinaṣṭe tad-dharmasya arthāntare saṅkramaṇam dṛṣṭam. *V.S.* II, p. 97

25. jñāna-vaicitrya-siddhyartham arthamapi nīlapītādivicitram eva kalpayanti, na nirākāram. yad-eva cākārārpaṇa-kṣamam hetutvam tadeva arthasya hetutvam iti na grāhya-lakṣaṇāyogaḥ, yathāhuḥ — bhinna-kālam katham grāhyam-iti ced grāhyatām viduḥ / hetutvam-eva tadyuktam jñānākārārpaṇa-kṣamam // *S.V.* p. 283

26. ayam āśayaḥ — yo'yam arthena buddhau ākāraḥ samarpyate, sa kim arthasya svarūpam, uta dharmāḥ, ubhayātirikto vā? na ādyaḥ, kṣaṇa-dhvaṃsinaḥ kṣaṇāntara-varti-saṅkramaṇāyogāt; anyathā sthira-vāda-prasaṅgāt; arthasya ca sākṣāt pratyakṣtvāpatter anumaya-pariśeṣā-bhāvāt ca; na dvitīyaḥ, dharma-dharmi-bhāvanabhyupagamat; tad-abhyupagaṇṭṭṇām api dharmasya dharmi-prahāṇena anyatra praveśa-dṛṣṭeḥ; kṣaṇikatva-sthiratava-vikalpena dattottaratvāt ca; ata eva na tṛtīyaḥ, arthasya tena sambandhābhāvāt, asaṃbaddhasya ca anyatra sañcārayitum aśakyatvāt, S. S. p. 200

27. svākāro'rthaiḥ sva-buddhau nihita iti ca na ādhāra hānādyayogāt, svacche chāyā parasmin na ca bhavati na ca syād asau rūpa-śūnye. T.M.K. 252
yathā atyāsannam api mukhaṃ svayaṃ aṅgīyamāṇam darpaṇa-sannidhānena tatra samarpitacchāyam tatratyam eva gṛhyate, tathā arthākāro api svacche-buddhi-pratiphali-taḥ chāyātmā gṛhyate, S. S. p. 200. na hi naṣṭasya kvacit chāyāpattir dṛṣṭā, na ca vartamānasyāpi vartīyamāṇe. Ibid.

28. svākāro'rthaiḥ svabuddhau nihita iti ca nādhāra hānādyayogāt svacche chāyā parasmin na ca bhavati na ca syād asau rūpa-śūnye. T.M.K. 252

29. kim ca yatra anumānādau arthasya na buddhi-hetutvam, tatra svākāra-samārpaṇakṣama-hetutvāyogāt grāhyatvābhāvaḥ prasajyeta. S.S. p. 201

30. buddhirarthaśca vastuto nir-ākārau; tathāpi cūrṇa-haridrā-yogaja-rāga-nyāyena sita-raktādir ākāraḥ tadā utpanno gṛhyate iti. Ibid. p. 201.

31. svāpnādipratyayā hi yathā avagamya-māna-bāhyār-thābhāvāt deśāntara-kālāntara-vartinām ca sannihita-deśa-kālatayā pratibhāsa-sambhavāt kvacit kadācid api asaṃbhavatām svaśiraś-cchedādinām svapne pratibhāsāt avaśyaṃ svātmānam eva bahirvad gṛhṇanti iti ataḥ tat

sāmānyāt jāgrad-jñānānam api svāmśa-paryavasāyitvāt mith-yātvam iti. *Śās. D.* p. 51

32. arthasya bāhyākāratve tasya jaḍasya grāhyatva-siddhaye grāhakam jñānam āṅgikartavyam iti. na hi kṛpte-naiva (jñānena) upapattau vinā pramāṇena akṛpta-kalpanam yuktam iti. *N.R.* p. 271

33. api ca anubhava-mātreṇa sādharmaṇātmano jñāna-sya jāyamānasya yo'yaṁ prati-viṣayam pakṣapātaḥ — stambhajñānam, ghaṭajñānam, paṭajñānam iti, nāsau jñānagata-viśeṣamantareṇa upapadyate iti avaśyaṁ viṣaya-sārūpyam jñānasya āṅgikartavyam. āṅgikṛte ca tasmin viṣayākārasya jñānenaiva avaruddhatvāt apārthike bāhyārtha-sadbhāva-kalpanā. *San.B.* p. 544

34. na anyo anubhāvyo buddhyā asti tasya na anubhavo aparāḥ/ grāhya-grāhaka-vaidhuryāt svayaṁ saiva prakāśate// *Śās.D.* p. 55

35. na hi aghṛītaṁ prakāśakam prakāśyam prakāśayati, tad āhuḥ — “apratyakṣopalambhasya nārtha-dṛṣṭiḥ prasid-dhyati” — *N.R.* p. 276

36. arthe jñānam hi sākāram, nirākāram tad-atyaye nityānumeya-bāhyārtha-vādi jñānam kva dṛṣṭavān arthena rajyamānam hi nirākāram nisargataḥ jñānam na khalu paśyāmo lākṣayā sphaṭikam yathā.

N.M. p. 106

37. ākārasya, ākāravato bāhya-arthasya ca abhyupaga-mo nirarthakaḥ jñānenaiva upapatteḥ

38. niranvaya-vināśinām jñānānam anuvartamāna-sthirākāra-virahāt vāsanā ca dur-upapādā. vinaṣṭena pūrva-jñānena anutpannam uttara-jñānam katham vāsyate. ato jñāna-vaicitryam artha-vaicitrya-kṛtam eva.

39. sarveśam ca jñānānam artha-śūnyatve bhavadbhiḥ sādhyo'pyartha na siddhyati; nirālambanānumānasyāpi artha-śūnyatvāt. *S.B.* II. p. 102

40. kṣaṇikeṣu ca citteṣu vināśe ca nir-anvaye / vāsyā-vāsakayoś-caivam asāhityān na vāsanā// pūrva-kṣaṇair-anutpanno vāsyate nottaraḥ kṣaṇaḥ / uttaraṇa vinaṣṭatvān-na ca pūrvasya vāsanā. *S.V.* p. 261

41. na hi yugapad avidyamānayor ekena itarasya vāsanā sambhavati sahabhuvam eva aṅgārāgarudhūmādī-nām vāsyā-vāsakabhāva-darśanāt. *N.R.* p. 261

42. sāvayavānām svarūpeṇa satāmeva vāsyā-vāsaka-bhāvaḥ; yathā dhūmāvayavānām sūkṣmānām aṅgāre, campakāvayavānām ca taile saṅkrāntirīti. *Ibid.* p. 262

43. prāyaṇāt naraka-kleśāt prasūti-vyasanād api,
cirātivr̥ttāḥ prāgjanmabhedā na smṛti-gocarāḥ.
Samvit-siddhi

44. jñānakārādhikam hi prathitam idam iti śveta-pītā-di bāhyam, tādātmye tasya sādhye saha-mati-niyamādi anyathaiva atra siddham. *T.M.K.* 245

45. avibhāgo'pi buddhyātma-viparyāsita-darśanaiḥ/
grāhya-grāhaka-samvitti-bhedavān iva lakṣyate//

46. śveta-pītādi bāhyam-iti vadataśca ayam bhāvaḥ: buddhi-bodhyayor-abhedam bruvatā viruddhadharma-adhyāśena bhedaḥ kaścīd angīkṛto na vā? na ced, dattam-eva uttaram kṣaṇa-bhedādy-asiddhi-prasaṅga iti, angīkṛtaś-ced-śveta-pītādy-anekākāra-grāhiṇi ekatra jñāne katham mitho viruddha-śvetapītādi tādātmya-sambhavaḥ? mitho viruddhayor eka-buddhi-viśayatvavad eka-buddhy-ākāra-tvam-api aviruddham-iti cet, na; darśana-adarśanābhyām viśeṣāt. ekatva-virodhaḥ ekadā ekāśrayatva-virodhaśca śveta-pītāder dṛṣṭaḥ; na tu eka-dhī-viśayatva-virodhaḥ. *S.S.* p. 192

47. satyāsatyayos-tādātmya-ayogāt ... mithyābhūta-bodhya-tādātmyāt buddherapi mithyātve mādhyamikamanīṣi-tasiddhiḥ. satyabhūta-buddhi-tādātmyāt bodhyasyāpi satyatve khara-śṅgāder api satyatvāpātaḥ. *Ibid.* p. 194

48. na sataḥ kāraṇāpekṣā vyomāderiva yujyate
kāryasya sambhavi hetuḥ khapuṣpāderivāsataḥ
49. catuṣkoṭi-vinirmuktaṁ tattvaṁ tattvavidō viduḥ
buddhyā vivicyamānānām svabhāvo nāvadhāryate
ato nirabhilapyāste nis-svabhāvāśca darsitāḥ.
50. dr̥ṣyaṁ mithyā dr̥ṣṭi-kartāpi mithyā
doṣo mithyaiveti yā dhīr amiṣām
sādhiṣṭhānāmśe'pi kiṁ neti cintā
sādhiṣṭhānām-panḍitānām-udeti. *V.G.A.* p. 272
51. śaśaśṛṅgaṁ nāsti iti ca śase śṛṅgaṁ nāsti ityarthāḥ.
52. tucchālikādi-śabdāḥ kvacana sati param kvāpi-
asattve pravṛttaḥ, vandhyā-putrādi-śabdaiḥ bhajati ca
samatām vidhyalikādivādaḥ. *T.M.K.* 243
- kvacid anyatra vidyamāne hi padārthe kevalam kiñcin-
niṣṭhābhāva-pratiyogitvā-pekṣayā tuccha-śabdāḥ alika-
mithyānṛtādi-śabdāś ca svābhāvādhikarānādhyaśtopādhikāḥ;
na tu nirupadhi-niśedham-apekṣya pravartante. *S.S.* p. 189
53. saṁvṛterna tu satyatvaṁ satya-bhedaḥ kuto
nvayam
satyaṁ cet saṁvṛtiḥ keyaṁ mṛṣā cet satyatā katham.
Ibid. p. 190
54. atha vastuto asatyam eva asatyatva-saṁvṛtyā
satyatvena bhāsamānam saṁvṛti-satyam-iti ucyeta,, tathā
sati viśeṣāgraha-nibandhanā iyaṁ anyathā-khyātireva kakṣi-
kṛtā iti na kvacidapi khyātyantara-kalpanāvakāśaḥ. *Ibid.*
p. 190
55. atha śabdajnānānupāti-vastu-śūnyo vikalpa iti
nyāyāt. vyavahārajanya-vikalpa-kalpitaṁ vyāvahārika-
satyamiti manvīthāḥ tadapi na, ... asataḥ prātītika-satyasya
ca vyāvahārika-satyatvā-nabhyupagamāt. *Ibid.* pp. 190-1
56. api cedam-apāramārthikam satyam pāramārthika
satyatayā bhātiti āṅgikāryam; anyathā pravṛtṭyanupa-
patṭh. tathā ca anyathākhyātyanapanayāt kiṁ khyāty-
antareṇa iti. *Ibid.* p. 191

THE SYSTEM OF SĀṆKHYA

The theist Sāṅkhya system (*Seṣvara-sāṅkhya-darśanam*) propounded in the *Mahābhārata* is totally different from the athiestic classical Sāṅkhya system (*nirīśvara-sāṅkhya-darśanam*) of which Sage Kapila is believed to be the originator. Īśvara-Kṛṣṇa states about himself to be the disciple of Pāñcasikha who was a disciple of Āsuri, the disciple of Sage Kapila. Vācaspatimisra's commentary on Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhyakārikā* is an elaborate treatise of the above system and is referred to by all antagonists whenever the Sāṅkhya philosophy is taken for criticism.

3.1. *Enumeration of Tattvas*

The *tattvas* in the Sāṅkhya philosophy are enumerated as 25. They are: (1) the primordial entity (*prakṛti*), (2) the great principle (*mahat*), (3) the cosmic egoism (*ahaṅkāra*), (4) *manas*, (5-9) organs of knowledge, (10-14) organs of action, (15-19) five subtle essences (*pañca tan-mātras*), (20-24) five gross elements, and (25) *puruṣa*.

3.2. *Evolution of Tattvas*

The primordial entity (*prakṛti*) is also called as *mūla-prakṛti* since it is the first thing which assumes transformation in its form and is not a transformation

of anything else (*avikṛti*). It is transformed into the great principle (*mahat*) otherwise called 'the cosmic intellect' (*buddhi*). The great principle (*mahat*) is transformed into *ahaṅkāra*. *Ahaṅkāra* is transformed into the eleven sense organs and five subtle essences of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell (*pañca-tanmātras*) which are in turn transformed into the five gross elements of ether, air, light, water and earth. With souls (*puruṣas*) the total *tattvas* are counted in the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy as twentyfive.

The primordial entity (*prakṛti*), according to the *Sāṅkhya* is composed of the three *guṇas*—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. These three constitute *prakṛti* and though they are called as *guṇas*, they are really only substances and not qualities of a substratum. The *Sāṅkhya* view with regard to *prakṛti* is that *prakṛti* is a triad of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. In other words, *prakṛti* is nothing but a unity in diversity, a composite entity made up of the three *guṇas*. As a rope is made up of three or more strings, so is the *prakṛti* made up of the above three *guṇas*. Because they are less prominent than *puruṣa*, they are called *guṇa* which means 'less prominent' (*apradhāna*). Or, the word '*guṇa*' may mean a rope. As a rope ties or binds a person so does *prakṛti*, the *puruṣas* who are bound by the rope of *prakṛti*, within the cycle of births and deaths. Moreover, substance as *prakṛti* is, it possesses qualities (*guṇas*) like conjunction (*sam-yoga*) disjunction (*vibhāga*) etc. as other substances do and hence it cannot be a quality (*guṇa*).

3.3. *Satkāryavāda of the Sāṅkhya and the Vedāntin*

The doctrine of "the pre-existence of an effect in its material cause" (*satkāryavāda*) is a main theme of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. Though the Vedāntins—the

Advaitins and the Viśiṣṭādvaitins — are generally regarded as advocates of “the theory of the pre-existence of an effect in its material cause,” along with the Sāṅkhya, their explanations of the above theory is very different. Whereas the contention of the Sāṅkhya is that an effect pre-exists in its material cause as latent and becomes manifest by the operations of the efficient causes, the Advaitin’s explanation of the above theory goes to say that the material cause transforms itself into an effect and that though it (such transformation or *pariṇāma*) is unreal, it is a pre-condition of the theory of the appearance of the unreal universe in a real substratum namely Brahman (*vivartavāda*). The Viśiṣṭādvaitin postulates that an effect is a later state of the material cause — clay or yarn, as the material cause is reduced to the state of an effect — jar or cloth. The former state, namely, clay or yarn is called causal state (*kāraṇāvasthā*) and the later state, namely, jar or cloth is called effectual state (*kāryāvasthā*).

3.4. *Puruṣa as Conceived by the Sāṅkhya*

According to the Sāṅkhya, the *puruṣa* or individual self is wholly inactive. It is present by the side of *prakṛti* and believes that it is active by the erroneous assumption of *prakṛti*’s activities as its own. Liberation of *puruṣa* or his *mokṣa* consists in this erroneous impression disappearing. Though eternal and ever active, *prakṛti* is not always creating; it is alternatively in the phases of creation and dissolution (*srṣṭi* and *pralaya*). If it were all the time creating, *puruṣas* never get liberated. Hence just a cook who prepares the various articles of food and then retires for rest, *prakṛti* undertakes the creative activity for the liberation of *puruṣas* and then takes rest, as it were.¹

3.5. *Prakṛti Alone can Function*

Though non-sentient and therefore incapable of doing anything with a motive or purpose either for itself or others, Nature or *prakṛti* does not need, it is argued, a controlling agent, an omniscient and all-wise soul such as is postulated by the Viśiṣṭādvaitin. Does not, it is asked, non-sentient milk flow from the udder of a cow for the growth of the calf? Similarly it is concluded that it is possible for *prakṛti* which is non-sentient to operate for the emancipation of the souls.⁴ The contention that the flow of milk is not spontaneous but is due to the will of God, the controller of the universe, does not stand the test of reason. If God causes milk to be made in the udder of the cow, it must be either for the calf's sake or for His own. Indeed, we see all sentient beings are active either for their own selfish ends or for serving others. God cannot be an exception to this rule. On the same analogy, the creation of the universe by God must be for His own sake or for that of finite souls. Obviously it cannot be to meet His own selfish ends, since He is admittedly one who has no desire of any kind, having at His disposal everything that might be needed; nor can it be out of compassion for other sentient beings; for they had no bodies before creation and hence could have no pain or pleasure, for bestowing which God would be required to take interest. For compassion emerges only when a being is in distress. The sentient beings have no body before creation and therefore no pain; and they are not in need of any compassionate treatment from any one. Moreover God who is maintained as being gracious should have created the universe as perfectly happy with not a trace of pain. But

quite opposite is the actual situation. If on the other hand, the pain is ascribed to the various acts committed by one in past births, then God is reduced unimportant, for the pain could be explained as the result of the acts themselves. If God is unable to exert any control over the *karma* of the *jīva*, He cannot control pain and sentient beings would be destined to suffer pain.' But *prakṛti* working under the control of no sentient being or power and at the same time being non-sentient also, can have no interest in itself nor can it evince any useless pity on other beings. Hence *prakṛti* is not to be complained against. Like all other non-sentient things, *prakṛti* happens to serve the purpose of others. In the instance earlier referred to, the non-sentient milk flows for the growth of the calf and in an exactly similar manner *prakṛti* functions for the emancipation of souls that are suffering from pain caught up in the cycle of birth and death. Even as people engage themselves in efforts to achieve some desired objects, the unmanifest *prakṛti* too acts. *Prakṛti* manifests itself to the soul as distinct from its own modifications like sound, touch etc. Just as a person acts to achieve something he aspires for, so does *prakṛti* also manifest itself for the emancipation of souls.

3.6. *Salvation of Purusa as Conceived by the Sāṅkhya*

Prakṛti will desist from its functions only when it makes itself manifest to the souls, just as a dancing girl will desist from dancing when she has completed her performance.' But *prakṛti* does not expect any recompense from the soul which is benefited by its exhibition of the distinction of the soul from its modifications, like a servant who is loyally devoted to her

master from whom she expects nothing as a reward for her faithful service.' *Prakṛti* does not expect anything in return from the soul which is devoid of the three *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*). A housewife of feminine modesty who conceals herself even from the sun and thus does not want herself to be seen by others, *prakṛti* is too modest to appear again before the soul. In a sense *prakṛti* is much more modest and bashful than an ideal housewife and she is not seen again by the same soul.'

3.7. *Review of the Sāṅkhya Salvation*

All this seems like idyllic poetry or romance. Coming down to the prosaic world of realistic thinking, we are obliged to ask the Sāṅkhya the following question. If according to the Sāṅkhya theory the soul is devoid of any activity or transformation, how can it be held as being bound or emancipated? Bondage is possible only to a being that can be affected by *karma* and troubles arising therefrom. *Puruṣa* being held by the Sāṅkhyas as pure and free of all karmic ties must be incapable of migration and emancipation. Is not this doctrine of the Sāṅkhya self-contradictory?

3.8. *A Detailed Exposition of the Sāṅkhya View*

To this question the Sāṅkhya answers in the following way. In fact the soul is not bound nor is it capable of migration or emancipation. It is only *prakṛti* which undergoes modifications. But the modifications are erroneously ascribed to the soul in the same way as the victory which is actually won by the participating soldiers in the war is ascribed to the king who may really be far from the battlefield. So

it must be understood that the experience of pleasure and pain belongs to *prakṛti*. If such attributes as the experience of pleasure and pain are ascribed to the soul, it is only due to our non-comprehension of the distinction between *prakṛti* and the soul, and the erroneous assumption of the soul experiencing what really *prakṛti* enjoys.¹ The *Sāṅkhya* states that *śruti*, *smṛti*, *itihāsa* and *purāṇa* which are held as authorities for proving the existence of a thing that is not contradicted by any reliable *pramāṇa* deal with the evolution of the cosmos from *prakṛti* and that the term *prakṣti* used in these scriptures does not mean '*adrṣṭa*' as the Naiyāyika argues.² According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika '*adrṣṭa*' denotes the twin quality — *dharma* and *adharma* — which is produced in souls as the effect of sinful and meritorious deeds and this remains in the souls till it disappears in due course by the experience of pain or pleasure as the case may be in the same birth or in the succeeding births. It serves as the auxiliary cause of the universe in God's creation. In reply to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the *Sāṅkhya* says that the scriptures and authoritative works invariably use the word *prakṛti* to denote a non-sentient thing in its primordial state, for while there is no difficulty of interpretation in taking its primary meaning, there is no warrant to go in for its secondary meaning in the sense of *adrṣṭa*.

3.9. *Sāṅkhya Relies on Inference and Not on Scriptures*

The *Sāṅkhya* tries to prove the existence of *prakṛti* through inference and not on the authority of scriptural statements. The modifications of *prakṛti* are found to possess the qualities generated from their own material cause, namely *prakṛti*. It is an obvious

fact that a cloth has the same colour, etc. possessed by its material cause, the yarn. So '*mahat*' and further modifications possess the three *guṇas* of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, and they must have been generated by a material cause, namely, *avyakta*, the unmanifest (*prakṛti*) possessing these three *guṇas*.

3.10. Analysis of His Statement "*Kāryam Kāraṇa-guṇātmakam*"

By the above argument, the Sāṅkhya tries to prove the identity of effect with the attributes of the cause. He holds that '*kāryam* is *kāraṇa-guṇātmakam*', that is: a cloth is all white and it is due to its identity with the yarn which is all white. But an attribute like whiteness and its substratum (cloth) cannot be identical since it is against universal experience. What does '*kāryam kāraṇa-guṇātmakam*' mean? It cannot mean that the effect is identical with the quality of its cause. A cloth cannot be identical with the white colour of the yarn.

While explaining verse 14 in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, Vācaspatimiśra writes— "This is the idea. An effect is found identical with the quality of yarn. So *mahat* and its effects which are nothing but pleasure, pain and unconsciousness, must be identical with the pleasure, pain and unconsciousness which prevail in the cause. Thus the cause of the *mahat* and its effects may be inferred to exist as the collection of pleasure, pain and unconsciousness."⁹

What does the expression *kāraṇaguṇātmaka* mean? The identity of an effect like cloth and the quality of its cause, namely the colour of yarn could not have

been meant, according to the commentator, for it is impossible for the effect, say, cloth, which is a substrate, to be identical with the colour which is an attribute of its material cause, namely, yarn. If this were possible even long before the production of cloth, the cloth might be said to exist because the colour of the yarn which is identified with it does exist. The cognition 'the cloth is white' is considered by some to mean the identity of the cloth and its colour. But no reasonable person could accept the identity of the cloth and the colour of the yarn.¹⁴

It may be argued that by '*kāryam kāraṇa-guṇāt-makam*' Vācaspati Miśra means that we do not perceive the cloth apart from the yarns; this along with the identity of the cloth and its whiteness posited in the cognition 'the cloth is white' inevitably leads to the identity of all the three namely cloth, yarn and whiteness. But this is untenable: for, if the colour and its substratum are said to be identical, what about the touch and other qualities present in the same substratum? And if all the qualities are held identical with their substratum, then colour, smell, taste, touch, etc. being identical could be apprehended by one and the same sense organ. Nor are the two words '*śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*' (cloth is white') synonymous (*pariāya*); if they were, they must be interchangeable which would, however, be absurd. Nor does it mean that the qualities in the effect are due to the same qualities existing in the cause. If it were so, it would amount to abandoning the Sāṅkhya doctrine that the effect is merely the modification of the material cause. It would mean that the Sāṅkhya accepts the Nyāya view of the difference between cause and effect as two different entities

and of the whole from the parts. Nor can it be contended that the effects have the qualities similar to those found in the cause. What does this statement mean? Does it mean that the effect simply has some of the qualities found in its cause, or does it mean that it has all the qualities found in the cause or, thirdly, that it has some particular qualities that are found in the cause? If similarity in regard to some qualities is meant then it is a case of '*siddha-sādhana*' a vain effort to prove a fact already well-known and consequently undisputed. If similarity in all respects is meant, then there would be nothing to distinguish the effect from its cause. Nor can it be said that there are always some or many resemblances between the cause and the effect. There are instances in which the effect has no resemblance at all to its cause. The scorpion arises as an effect out of a heap of dung which is its cause and there is no resemblance at all between them. None of these three alternatives is satisfactory. Hence the dictum '*kāryam kāraṇaguṇātmakam*' is unacceptable.

3.11. *Reasons to Prove the Existence of Unmanifest*

For the purpose of proving the existence of an unmanifested entity as the cause of all things, the Sāṅkhya adduces the following reasons: — (i) Because of the finite nature of specific objects, (ii) because of homogeneity, (iii) because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause, (iv) because of separation between cause and its product, and (v) because of the merging of the whole world (of effects), we have to infer the unmanifest as the cause.¹¹

3.12. *Consideration of the Above Reasons*

The first reason means 'because of their being limited'. Specified objects like cloth or pot met with in nature which are limited in size are always found to have a cause. Whatever object is limited in size must have a cause. Therefore *mahat* and the like which are limited in size must have been evolved from a cause. This inference is fallacious, for all things of limited size do not have a cause; for instance the *puruṣa* or soul is limited in size. It is admitted that the soul does not arise as an effect from a cause. The soul experiencing the pleasures and pains associated for the time being with a limited body has to be thought of as limited also. But even in Sāṅkhya it is maintained that the soul is eternal and has no cause.

The Sāṅkhya has also to explain, on what authority the *tattvas* like *mahat* and those that follow it are accepted by him as true. Is it by inference or by the authority of the scriptures? If by the former, none of the arguments advanced therefor is free from fallacy. Take the following argument of Sāṅkhya — *cit-śakti* or pure consciousness requires some medium through which it could proceed and illumine objects, even as a lamp placed in a close space like a jar could stream out only through a hole or aperture therein; otherwise *cit-śakti* cannot illumine objects. This medium can be no other than *mahat*. It cannot be the external senses, for even in their absence — as in the blind and in the deaf, cognitions arise; it cannot be *manas* the internal organ for even in its absence as in sleep dream-cognitions arise; it cannot be the *tattva* called egoity (*ahaṅkāra*), for in its absence as in deep sleep (*susupti*) effort such as breathing in and breathing out is noticed. Thus the

Sāṅkhya contends that we are driven to accept the one indispensable medium that persists in all the states and that it is the '*mahat*'. Since according to the Sāṅkhya doctrine, all things that are limited in size must have a cause, he contends that *mahat* which is limited in size must have a cause. He argues that this cause is none other than *avyakta* which is unlimited. This '*avyakta*' cannot be proved to be limited as there is no testimony to prove it. Moreover, if that unmanifest — *avyakta* — was also held limited, it would point to a cause and so there would be infinite regress — *anavasthā*. So the Sāṅkhya argues that effects — such as *mahat* the existence of which is proved by the various functions they perform — point to an unmanifest entity which is not limited either by time or space and which is the ultimate cause of the entire physical universe.

3.13. *Inference cannot Establish the Existence of Avyakta, Mahat etc.*

The futility of the above argument is brought out by Veṅkaṭanātha. It was argued by the Sāṅkhya that when the external senses do not function, we still get knowledge with the help of *manas*, that when *manas* is inactive during sleep, dream-cognitions arise through *ahaṅkāra* and when *ahaṅkāra* itself is quiescent there is effort of the nature of respiration as a result of *mahat*. Hence though these accessories do not function on different occasions, *cit-śakti* functions with the help of *mahat*. This does not follow, says Veṅkaṭanātha, because all these could be explained simply on the basis of impressions (*saṁskāra*). To say that *manas* should be considered as established because it leads to volition is unconvincing, because

impressions could as well be the cause of volition, even as *vyāpti-jñāna* is considered the cause of inference.

Mahat need not be postulated to account for exhaling and inhaling, because these could be accounted for by '*adr̥ṣṭa*' which according to the Naiyāyika is associated with the *ātman* or soul. Even as the external air blows, *prāṇa* or vital breath functions on account of *adr̥ṣṭa*. Thus there is no convincing proof for the existence of *mahat*. When its very existence is called in question, to argue that as it is limited, it must point to an unlimited entity as its cause is to commit the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddhi*.

Again why should it be assumed that *mahat* is limited? If it is on the ground that it successfully functions in respect of the body which is limited, it must be pointed out that those who maintain that the *ātman* or individual self is all-pervasive (*vibhu*) still admit that its function is restricted to the body with which it is associated for the time being. Even so *mahat* may be unlimited. That it functions only in respect of the body which is limited is no proof of its being also limited.

The Sāṅkhyan threefold division of *antaḥkaraṇa* as mind (*manas*), 'I' principle (*ahaṅkāra*) and will (*saṅkalpa*) is entirely of their own imagination, for the scripture says "*kāmaḥ saṅkalpaḥ śraddhā etat sarvaṃ mana ēva.*" All these functions take place only in the mind (*manas*). Although the above text means the co ordination of all *kāma*, *saṅkalpa* etc. with *manas*, it should not be thought that *kāma*, *saṅkalpa* and the like are identical with the mind. It only means that these are the

functions of the mind. The primary meaning of the sentence being obviously inappropriate in the context, the secondary meaning has to be taken as meant. When it is said 'ghee is life' (*āyurghṛtam*) the sentence should not be taken as meaning that ghee and the life are identical. The secondary meaning of ghee, that is, the effect of taking ghee prolongs life, should be taken. As different functions of a contrary nature are accepted by the Sāṅkhya in 'mahat' itself, it is unnecessary to accept 'mahat' and 'ahaṅkāra' in addition to 'manas' simply for the reason of different functions.

Nor is it proper to say that observation, volition and egotism are the respective functions of external organs (*bāhyendriyāṇi*), mind (*manas*) and 'I', principle (*ahaṅkāra*); for it is better to ascribe all these functions to the eyeball (*akṣi-golaka*) etc. Although the Viśiṣṭādvaitin too accepts 'mahat' as the earliest evolution of the unmanifest (*avyakta*), he denies that 'mahat' is an independent instrument of cognition like the sense-organs and that it is the substratum of certain functions or operations.

The Sāṅkhya says that the five external organs which perceive objects are capable only of undifferentiated apprehensions (*nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*) and they postulate on this account the following functions to three different *tattvas*: external organs (*bāhyendriyāṇi*), mind (*manas*), and the 'I' principle (*ahaṅkāra*): undifferentiated apprehension to the senses, volition (*saṅkalpa*) to the mind (*manas*), and egotism (*abhimāna*) to the 'I' principle (*ahaṅkāra*). But there is no authority for this distribution of functions among these three *tattvas*. *Mahat* alone may be conceived of as performing all these three functions with the necessary auxiliaries.

3.14. *Scriptures Alone are Capable of Proving Prakṛti and its Modifications*

If 'mahat' and other evolutes are said to be proved by *sāstra* instead of by inference, as the *Sāṅkhya* maintains, then these evolutes of *prakṛti* can be proved by the self-same authority, namely, the *sāstra*, to be produced either directly or indirectly from *prakṛti* itself. Thus there remains nothing to be proved through reasoning. For example, if smoke is perceived by the senses themselves as emerging from fire, why should one seek the aid of inference to prove the presence of fire? When the smoke and the fire are both perceived directly and at the same time by the senses, there is no meaning in resorting to inference of fire from smoke. If a cause and its effect become cognizable at the same time by one and the same testimony, then the effect and its cause cease to have the power of proving each other as in the case of fire and smoke seen together.¹²

3.15. *Prakṛti is Not All-pervasive*

Since the *smṛti* says, "there is a region beyond 'tamas' the unmanifest or 'avyakta,'" the unmanifest does not extend so far and should be considered as having limits to its size or dimension. The *smṛti* text '*tamasah parastāt mṛtyum bhinatti*' means that a person by reaching the region above the highest unmanifest, escapes from the clutches of worldly life. The text '*tadanantam asaṅkhyātapramāṇam ca*' which apparently contradicts the former statement, really means to affirm that the unmanifest is very large and not that it is all-pervasive.

3.16 *The Reason of Homogeneity Cannot Prove Unmanifest*

Then the second argument of the *Sāṅkhya* is that since '*mahat*' is constituted of pleasure, pain and unconsciousness (*sukha-duḥka-moharūpaḥ*) it must have a cause of the same nature. In a jar or a jewel, we find qualities similar to those found in the clay or gold. Even so, since the effects consist of pleasure, pain or unconsciousness (*sukha-duḥka-moha*) they must point to a cause which is constituted of '*sattva*' '*rajas*' and '*tamas*'.

The universal relation, 'whatever is commonly present in things, must be their cause,' is obviously indefensible. For example, white colour or generic attributes such as '*gotva*' are found in many things; but on that account we do not regard whiteness or '*gotva*' as the cause of any effect. If these were regarded as causes, then the attributes common to manifested entities and the unmanifest would be the causes of the unmanifest as well as of the manifested. Moreover it would result in multiplying the '*tatvas*' and in making the unmanifest a product instead of the ultimate cause.¹³

Nor can the above statement mean that the subject under discussion namely '*mahat*' has for its cause something which is found to be common to the cause and the effect, because it is a product like a jar, tub, etc.; for what exists in common between cause and effect, nay, between clay and its products is either clayness or clay. It cannot be the former, because clayness is surely not the cause of pots etc. Nor can it be clay because when the effect namely pot appears, clay, as such, has ceased to exist.¹⁴

Nor does the word '*samanvayāt*' means because it has a material cause possessing a nature similar to that possessed by the product? In that case, if similarity is in all respects, then there will be no diversity in nature at all; if similarity in some respects alone is meant, since a jar is similar to yarns on account of both happening to be '*dravya*', no one would admit that they have a common material cause. Should the general statement be restated as follows — 'Whatever product is similar to some others in possessing the same attributes, then they must have a common material cause', the manifest and the unmanifest both described as '*triguṇam aviveki viśayaḥ sāmānyam acetanam prasava-dharmi*' must have one and the same material cause. Thus the unmanifest would cease to be productive.

The generalization (*vyāpti*) might be corrected as follows: whichever product is similar to some other product in point of possessing the same attributes must have a common material cause. This would exclude '*prakṛti*', because '*prakṛti*' is not a product. But the argument fails. Take for example, two jars; they may be similar, but do not have a common material cause; because the mass of clay used in making one jar is different from that used in the other. Should it be said that the two masses possess the common generic genus namely clayness (*mṛttva*), then let us take the case of scorpions. One is produced from the mother scorpion, while another is from the cowdung which in its decaying state produces scorpion.

Thus the reason '*samanvayāt*' does not serve the purpose of the Sāṅkhya.

The Sāṅkhya contends that the universe is evolved from a single material cause called '*prakṛti*' the unmanifest which is the aggregate of the three '*guṇas*' '*sattva*', '*rajas*' and '*tamas*' the causes respectively of happiness, grief and unconsciousness (*sukha-duḥkha-moha*). In our everyday life we find ourselves happy, unhappy or gloomy due to our contact with something or other. Those things must consist of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* as the case may be, and they must have been derived from their own material causes which consist of those '*guṇas*'.

This contention cannot stand the test. For if the three '*guṇas*' are held as causes of happiness, grief and unconsciousness, why do they not cause them at all times, since the three '*guṇas*' are always present there? If the dominance of one or the other of these *guṇas* is held responsible, then the upsurge or dominance itself must be attributed to their respective causes namely the upsurge or the dominance of three *guṇas* and in this way we are landed in an infinite regress.¹⁵

The statement of the Sāṅkhya that the universe is evolved from a single material cause, *prakṛti* which is an aggregate of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*—is itself self-contradictory for the three '*guṇas*' which are distinct from one another produce the universe with their own respective natures even as threads of different colours produce a single multi-coloured cloth. Surely the multi-coloured cloth must be said to have a multiplicity of causes. Even so the universe of the Sāṅkhyas with various aspects of *sukha*, *duḥkha* and *moha* must be deemed to have a threefold cause and

not a single *prakṛti*. Consequently the *tattvas* cannot be limited to twenty-five as the *Sāṅkhya* maintains.

Besides, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are themselves considered by the *Sāṅkhya* to be twofold, one accounting for similar evolutions and the other for dissimilar evolutions; and in consequence the statement that the universe is the product of one and single material cause becomes more untenable.

3.17. The Reason That the Evolution is due to the Efficiency of the Cause also Cannot be Proved

Let us now examine the next reason '*saktiḥ pravr̥tteś ca*'. According to the *Sāṅkhya* the power (*śakti*) of evolving an effect lies in the material cause and this power is nothing but the effect itself being present in the latent state in the cause like oil in the sesame seed. In other words 'the great principle (*mahat*) and others point to the unmanifest as their material cause, one wherein these products lie in a latent form. Thus the 'I-principle' (*ahaṅkāra*) is not totally distinct from the 'great principle' (*mahat*) from which it is evolved; likewise the subtle elements (*tan-mātras*) are not distinct from their cause 'I-principle' (*ahaṅkāra*) and so on. Thus the unmanifest can be inferred from its effect the great principle (*mahat*).

Vācaspati-misra says in support of this *Sāṅkhya* view that just as oil is present in the sesame seed and squeezed out of the seed, *mahat* is evolved from *prakṛti*. But the illustration does not serve the purpose. Sesame contains something in addition to the oil whereas according to the *Sāṅkhya* there is nothing else in *prakṛti* besides *mahat*.

In other words the latent oil in the sesame seed has for its substratum something else besides the oil contained in the sesame. The *Sāṅkhya* does not consider *prakṛti* or *avyakta* as the substratum of 'mahat'. If he should admit that there is a substratum in *prakṛti* which contains 'mahat', he would have to consider this substrate which is different from 'mahat' as another *tattva*. The number of *tattvas* would then be more than twentyfive. So the illustration of the sesame seed fails in its purpose.

3.18. *The Reason that There are Emergence and Mergence of an Effect from and in its Cause is Scrutinised*

Another argument of the *Sāṅkhya* to support the view that the existence of *prakṛti* is arrived at by inference may be described as follows — Every effect proceeds from a cause and later merges or dissolves into its cause. The expression '*kāraṇa-kārya-vibhāgāt*' is interpreted as follows:— Just as a tortoise contracts its limbs and outstretches them according to its will, effects not explicitly perceptible in their material causes are brought to light. A jar is brought out from a lump of clay. When it is clay, the jar is concealed in it; but when a jar is made, it becomes distinct from the mass of clay. The gross elements (*bhūtas*) are manifested from subtle elements (*tan-mātras*) which themselves are manifested from the 'I-principle' (*ahankāra*). But at the time of dissolution the product in the shape of a jar or a crown of gold merges into its cause in the shape of clay or gold and thereby disappears, that is, becomes unmanifested. Thus also, when the earth and other substances merge into their primary elements, they render these latter unmanifest in so far as the forms of those substances themselves are concerned.

When the primary elements (*tan-mātras*) merge into the 'I-principle', they render these latter unmanifest in so far as their own form is concerned. When the 'I-principle' (*ahaṅkāra*) merges into the great principle (*mahat*), it renders the latter unmanifest in so far as its own form is concerned and finally when the great principle (*mahat*) merges into its cause *prakṛti*, it renders this latter unmanifest. In as much as there is no merging of *prakṛti* itself into anything else, it is eternally unmanifest, pure and simple. From all this it follows that in as much as there is 'distinction' between and also 'merging' of the already existing product in the cause, there must be the unmanifest as the cause.*

The above explanation may hold good only if the unmanifest is proved to exist. If the help of inference is sought to prove it, it can, as already stated, not only establish *prakṛti*, but it may go on establishing the causes of *prakṛti* and their own causes, resulting in infinite regress. Or it may stop with the great principle (*mahat*) and cease to establish *prakṛti*. What is there to warrant that the inference should go only upto *prakṛti* and not beyond it?

If, on the other hand, the Sāṅkhya would accept the existence of *prakṛti* on the authority of scriptures even as the Viśiṣṭādvaitin does, there would be no need at all to resort to inference to prove it. If the Sāṅkhya fails in his attempt to prove the existence of *prakṛti*, the reasoning becomes fallacious as there is no substratum (*āśrayāsiddhi*).

* Gaṅgānātha Jha's translation of the *Sāṅkhya Tattva Kaumudī*.

3.19. *All Products do Not Merge in Their Respective Material Causes*

Observing some products coming into existence by separating from the material causes and later merging into their respective material causes, the *Sāṅkhya* infers the existence of *Prakṛti* as the material cause of the universe; it emerges from *prakṛti* and enters into it at the time of dissolution. Against this, Veṅkaṭa-nātha says that there is no general rule that all products invariably separate from and merge into their respective material causes. True, a jar which is evolved from some portion of clay is separated from a mass of clay, and when broken it again becomes clay. This is not the case with a cloth; for it is not evolved from a single yarn. Again a jar is a portion of a lump of clay, its material cause while a cloth is not only not a portion of its material cause, but also the material cause namely the yarn is a part of its product — the cloth.'"

3.20. *The Universe is Not a Product of a Single Material Cause*

Nor does the view of the *Sāṅkhya* that various products are evolved from a single cause (*vaiśvarūpyāt* — that he mentions) appear correct, because the universality of the general rule fails in the case of a cloth evolved from a large number of yarns and in the case of the universe which, he himself says, is effected by the aggregate of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.

3.21. *Some Products do Not Merge in Their Material Causes*

The separation and merging of a product take place only in the material cause of the same product,

says the Sāṅkhya.* This is too sweeping a generalization and is not invariably true. *E.g.* when for the performance of a sacrifice, fire is generated by churning the 'arāṇi' wood with a wooden pestle, it cannot be said that fire which is a substance belonging to the category of 'tejas' is not separated or produced from its material cause namely 'tejas', but from wood which is a substance belonging to the category of the earth (*prthivī*). Wood is only the instrumental cause of fire and not its material cause for it is not 'tejas'. So also smoke emerges from fire which is not its material cause, for fire is 'tejas' and smoke is not of the same material as 'tejas'.¹

3.22. *Inference could Prove not only Prakṛti but also Other Causes*

Thus, if the existence of the unmanifest (*avyakta*) is sought to be proved by inference as the material cause of the universe, then an auxiliary cause (*śahakārikāraṇa*) of the universe also might be proved by some such inference as this:² Wherever an effect is proved, there should be one or more auxiliary causes (*nimittakāraṇa*) in addition to the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*). The universe is an effect or product; therefore it should have auxiliary causes. This process of inference would lead to the postulation of any number of material and instrumental causes. The number of 'tattvas' would then be not twenty-five but almost innumerable. If, to avoid this, the Sāṅkhya were to say that only one cause, namely, the material cause need

* *vide* 'karaṇa-kārya-vibhāgat avibhāgat' in the verse beginning with 'bhedānām parimāṇāt'.

be inferred, his critic might ask 'Why not infer only the instrumental cause? Why should you restrict the inference to the material cause alone? Is it not arbitrary?' Further, separation and merging of a product from and into the material cause, can only prove the distinction of cause and product and not their identity, as the Sāṅkhya says. Thus their argument commits the fallacy of '*arthāntara*', that is, the proving of something not meant to be established.¹⁹ That auxiliary cause cannot be the unmanifest, for that auxiliary cause cannot be similar to its product in point of possessing similar attributes. On the other hand, the auxiliary causes are definitely dissimilar to their respective products.

3.23. *Tortoise Cannot be an Instance to Prakṛti*

Nor does the instance of a tortoise contracting and expanding its limbs serve the purpose. For, due to contraction, the limbs of the tortoise become concealed and not seen, that is, they are not manifest. When they expand, they become visible and are manifest. The relation involved is not one of material cause and effect but drawing in or pushing out of the tortoise's limbs. The limbs do not perish at the time of contraction, nor do they come into existence at the time of expansion. Hence this cannot be a valid analogy to illustrate the evolution of *mahat* from *avyakta* (*prakṛti*).²⁰

Thus the Sāṅkhya cannot prove the existence of the unmanifest (*prakṛti*) and the great principle (*mahat*) by inference. On the other hand, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin upholds the authority of the *Vedas* except in cases where it contradicts the testimony of perception

as in the case "when it is said in the *Veda* that the sacrificial post is the sun (*ādityo yūpaḥ*).” This statement is not borne out by perception as the identity of the sacrificial post with the sun is contradicted by perception. So here we give up the apparent meaning and resort to a figurative interpretation.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin accepts the existence of the above two — *prakṛti* and *mahat* — on the basis of Vedic statements which unequivocally declare *prakṛti* and its changes. If we depend on the *Vedas* for the purpose of conclusively proving the existence of *prakṛti* and its evolutions, we must be prepared to accept the nature of *prakṛti* etc. as described in the *Vedas*.

3.24. Inference cannot Prove Tanmātras and Organs of Knowledge and Organs of Actions

The subtle elements (*tanmātras*) too cannot be proved to exist by inference from their operations, as the Sāṅkhya tries in vain in respect of *mahat* and *ahaṅkāra*. There is no warrant or need for positing two separate set of *tattva* — the subtle elements (*tanmātras*) which possess unmanifested sound, touch, colour, taste or smell, and gross elements (*bhūtāni*) which possess manifested sound, etc. With the aid of a single set of elements, it is possible to explain all facts on the basis of different phases (*sūkṣmāvasthā* and *sthūlāvasthā*). In the subtle state (*sūkṣmāvasthā*) the sensations of sound etc. are unmanifest and in the gross state (*sthūlāvasthā*) they become pronounced or fully manifested.

Nor is it possible to prove the existence of the organs of knowledge and organs of action (*jñānendriya* and *karmendriya*) without the help of the Vedic state-

ments; for the parts where those organs are — said in the *Vedas* to exist may well be considered as performing the functions of the organs (*indriyas*) with the help of auxiliary factors. Or we may even say that they may be 'bhūtāni' as the logician asserts and not considered to partake the nature of the 'I-principle' (*ahaṅkāra*) as the Sāṅkhya says."

3.25. *The View of Sāṅkhya and Naiyāyika on Kāla*

Logicians can turn the table against the Sāṅkhya in respect of their conception of time. Vācaspati Miśra in the course of his commentary on the *Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī* (verse 33) says that it is unnecessary to admit a distinct entity called Time as the Naiyāyika does, for instead of treating Time as one, it can be said to figure in different names — past, present and future — through the medium of different limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*) allowing the adjuncts themselves to serve the purpose fulfilled by Time."

The Naiyāyika might reply to the Sāṅkhya as follows: If you reject Time as one of the *tattvas* on these grounds, you might as well reject also the unmanifest (*avyakta*) for fear of increasing the number of *tattvas* and proceed to explain the purpose for positing unmanifest with the help of auxiliary factors and without the unmanifest."


The arguments of *Śrīkarabhāṣya* of the Śaivas that there are 36 *tattvas*, can be refuted in the same way if they are sought to be proved only through the strength of reason. If they are based on the *Śaiva-āgamas* which have not got the support of the *Vedas*, it is obvious that they are no better than houses built on sand.

The seemingly inconsistent statement regarding the position of the Infinite — the supreme Being — in the series of *tattvas* (some say the Infinite is the twenty-sixth *tattva* while others fix the same as the twenty-seventh *tattva*)¹⁴ is due to the way of counting *tattvas*. If *mahat* is counted as the first *tattva* then the infinite Being becomes the twenty-seventh *tattva*, but if *akṣara* or *tamas* is taken as the first *tattva*, then He is the twenty-seventh.

3.26. *The Process of the Evolution of Prakṛti, according to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin*

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin describes the process of the evolution of *prakṛti*, entirely relying on Vedic statements. According to him, *prakṛti* is the substratum of the three *guṇas* — *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*—and not their aggregate as the Sāṅkhya maintains. *Prakṛti* produces the threefold *mahat* — *sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa mahat*. If '*sattva*' in *prakṛti* rises up and dominates over the other two qualities, '*sāttvika-mahat*' is evolved. If the '*rajas*' dominates, then '*rājasa-mahat*' is evolved, and likewise '*tāmasa-mahat*' is evolved when '*tamas*' in *prakṛti* is in excess. These three types of *mahat* produce in their turn the three forms of *ahañkāras* — *sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa* respectively. The *sāttvikāhañkāra* produces eleven organs (five sense organs, five organs of action and the mind — *manas*). The *tāmasāhañkāra* produces the five subtle elements (*pañca-tanmātras*) and the five gross elements (*pañca-bhūtas*) as shown in the scheme below. The *rājasāhañkāra* otherwise known as '*aijasa*' does not cause anything but plays the part of a benefactor to its two comrades, namely the *sāttvikāhañkāra* and *tāmasāhañkāra* in the process of evolution of their products.


The scheme of evolution according to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin is presented below:



But the Śaivas and the Advaitins contend that the three *ahaṅkāras* — *sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*, produce the sense organs (*jñānendriyas*), the organs of action (*karmendriyas*) and the five subtle elements (*pañca-tanmātras*) respectively. Veṅkaṭanātha refutes this on the ground that on matters beyond our comprehension, we have entirely to depend upon Vedic statements and with reference to the evolution of sense organs, etc., we cannot help accepting the process of evolution as stated in the *Vedas* and such *smṛtis* as are recognized as being faithful to the *Vedas*.

3.27. Sāṅkhyan Contention on the Process of Evolution of Prakṛti

According to the Sāṅkhya, the following is the process of evolution of *Prakṛti*:



According to the Sāṅkhya scheme, the subtle elements (*tanmātras*) are evolved directly and simultaneously from the *tāmasāhaṅkāra*. Apparently this has the support of the *Vedas* and *Smṛtis*. For example, *Subālopaniṣad* says: the subtle elements merge in *tāmasāhaṅkāra*,³ otherwise known as *bhūtādi*. If these five subtle elements were not the direct products of *bhūtādi*, they could not merge in it, since an effect can merge only in its material cause. The subtle elements evolve the gross elements (*pañcabhūtas*) as follows:

(a) From the primary element of 'sound' (*śabda-tanmātra*) proceeds Ether (*ākāśa*) having sound as its characteristic property;

(b) from the primary element of touch (*sparsa-tanmātra*) as combined with that of sound (*śabda-tanmātra*) is evolved Air (*vāyu*) with sound and touch as its characteristic properties;

(c) from the primary element of colour (*rūpa-tanmātra*) combined with those of sound and touch (*śabda-tanmātra* and *sparsa-tanmātra*) arises Fire with sound, touch and colour as its characteristic properties;

(d) from the primary element of taste (*rasa-tanmātra*) combined with those of sound, touch and colour arises Water with sound, touch, colour and taste as its characteristic properties; and,

(e) from the primary element of odour (*gandha-tanmātra*) combined with those of sound, touch, colour and taste arises Earth with sound, touch, colour taste and odour as its characteristic properties.”

Again the Vedic statement ‘*aṣṭau prakṛtayaḥ ṣoḍaśā vikārāḥ*’ seems to support the Sāṅkhya view in this regard. Further according to the Sāṅkhya, there are only eight *tattvas* that are causes producing evolutes and they are: the unmanifest (*avyakta*), the great principle (*mahat*), the I-principle (*ahankāra*) and the the five subtle elements (*pañca tanmātrāṇi*) and the remaining sixteen *tattvas* are only products and do not produce anything as their effects. But in the Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrine the process of evolution culminates in earth (*prthivī*) which is the only *tattva* that can be called a product. Thus the number of *tattvas* that produce evolutes is twelve: *prakṛti*, *mahat*, *ahankāra*, five elements and four gross elements (excluding earth). The Vedic statement ‘*aṣṭau prakṛtayaḥ, ṣoḍaśā vikārāḥ*’ seems to be favourable to the Sāṅkhya.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin contends that the Vedic text supports his own view, and argues that since in dissolution the effect merges in its cause and the latter in its

cause — and the latter in its cause — and so on serially, all effects up to *śabda-tanmātras* merge in the opposite order in which they have been evolved. Since *śabda-tanmātra* contains within itself all other *tanmātras* and it merges in its cause *bhūtādi*, it is appropriate to talk of '*tanmātrāṇi bhūtādau liyante*' 'subtle elements merge in *bhūtādi*'. The Vedic statement in question does not mean the direct absorption of all *tanmātras* in *tāmasāhaṅkāra* itself but in their ultimate absorption.

3.28. *Viśiṣṭādvaitin's Contention has Vedic Support*

Since the dissolution is the reverse of evolution it would be evident from the scheme that eventually all other *tanmātras* and all the *bhūtas* merging serially are held *śabda-tanmātra* which is to be absorbed in *bhūtādi*.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin further points out that the *Subālopaniṣad* text '*tanmātrāṇi bhūtādau liyante*' cannot mean direct absorption of all *tanmātras* simultaneously in *bhūtādi* any more than the statement of the same text, '*ākāśād-vāyuh*' asserts the creation of air directly from ether. According to him air (*vāyu*) comes into being only from *spārśa-tanmātra*. Hence these statements do not declare the exact order of evolution and absorption. Otherwise, how can the order "the ether merges into the sense organs and the sense organs merge into the subtle elements" be explained even by Sāṅkhya? Ether (*ākāśa*) not being evolved from subtle elements, how, he asks, can they be said to merge therein? Moreover the expression *tanmātrāṇi* in plural number in the text does not mean all the subtle elements, but has to be interpreted in the light of the context '*aditiḥ pāsān*' where the plurality of '*pāsā*' is untenable.

Some Vedic statements require for their elucidation certain supplementary statements from the *smṛtis*. When the Vedic statements are not in unison with a large number of *smṛtis*, they are to be interpreted in a way that is agreeable to *smṛti* version.

The following verses from the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* support the Viśiṣṭādvaitic interpretation:

*bhūtādistu vikurvāṇaḥ śabdatanmātrakaṁ tataḥ
sasarja śabdatanmātram ākāśaṁ śabda-lakṣaṇam.*

*ākāśaśca vikurvāṇaḥ sparśamātram sasarj ha
balavān abhavad vāyustasya sparśo guṇo mataḥ
tato vāyurvikurvāṇo rūpamātram sasarja ha — etc.*

The *Pāñcarātra-saṁhitā* says in the same context:

*śabda-tanmātr am abhavat taccākāśam ajījanat
sparśa-mātram tathākāśāt tasmādvāyur ajāyata
rūpa-mātram-abhūd vāyostasmādnirajāyata
rasa-mātram tu jajñe'gñestasmād āpaḥ prajajñire
gandha-tanmātram adbhyo'pi gandha-mātrāt
tathā mahi.*

The above two texts whose authority no *āstika-vādin* questions are to be held on a par with the *Vedas* whose doctrine they faithfully interpret.

Nor do the statements in the *Subālopaniṣad* support the Sāṅkhya theory of evolution and involution, for it talks of earth merging in water (*prthivī apsu pralīyate*). But the gross element of earth cannot on the Sāṅkhya theory be absorbed in water, as it is not the material cause of the former. Further this conflicts with his statement that earth is absorbed in

gandha-tanmātra and not in water. But the Viśiṣṭādvaitin can easily resolve the difficulty by stating that the earth is absorbed in water by first being merged in *gandha-tanmātra* and from that in water. But this solution is not open to the Sāṅkhya, because in his theory *gandha-tanmātra* is absorbed along with other subtle elements directly in *bhūtādi - tāmasā-haikāra*. Further in the Sāṅkhya view, earth has no connection with water.

Statements like 'air from ether' (*ākāśād-vāyuh*) are also not in accordance with the Sāṅkhya theory. The gross element, air is not evolved from ether. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin can explain it as follows:— Ether does not directly evolve into air, but only through *sparsa-tanmātra*.

The Sāṅkhya again cannot explain the statement "ether in sense organs, and the latter in subtle elements" (*ākāśaḥ indriyeṣu, indriyāṇi tanmātreṣu*) in accordance with his theory; for ether is not absorbed in the sense organs.

The course of dissolution as set forth in the texts of the *Subālopaniṣad* can be interpreted by the Viśiṣṭādvaitin as follows. The *Subālopaniṣad* says: *prthivī apsu praliyate, ūpastejasi liyante tejo vayau liyate mīsur ākāśe liyate, ākāśa indriyeṣu, indriyāṇi tanmātreṣu, tanmātrāṇi bhūtādau liyante, bhūtādirmahati liyate, mahān avyakte liyate, avyaktam akṣare liyate, akṣaram tamasi liyate, tamaḥ pare deve eka-bhavati.*" It is significant that the predicate, 'liyate' (absorbed) is used in all sentences except two, namely '*ākāśam indriyeṣu*' and '*indriyāṇi tanmātreṣu*'. By the process of supply from a preceding sentence (*anuṣaṅga*) we may take the

predicate *liyante* just previously referred to and take it as meaning that ether is absorbed in the sense organs and the latter in '*tanmātras*'. Such a process of supplying predicate from the previous sentences (*anuṣaṅga*) is, however, not admissible here, since the predicate is used in all the succeeding sentences also. A little thought would indicate that the predicate '*liyante*' is not intended to be applied to the two cases and it has been left out on purpose. The fact is that in the two cases no absorption is meant but only contact. While in a sense it is true that the all-pervasive ether is ever in contact with the sense-organs, the contact of ether with the sense organs at the time of dissolution is different from the contact with the sense organs before dissolution. Mind and other sense organs are stated to derive some nourishment (*āpyāyana*) from earth and other gross elements. In the course of dissolution, all gross elements up to air having been absorbed along with those parts that strengthen the sense organs, are to be merged in ether with which they remain indistinguishable. Thus it is this ether wherein the four gross elements have merged that can have the contact of all the sense organs. Only this contact is referred to in the statement '*ākāśa indriyeṣu*'. Since ether and the sense organs are the evolutes of 'I-principle' (*ahaṅkāra*), to speak of their merger is to say that they merge in the I-principle (*ahaṅkāra*). For this, ether should merge in *śabda-tanmātra*. Hence the contact of the sense organs with *śabda-tanmātra* is indicated as the next step in the text '*indriyāṇi tanmātreṣu*'. All the four gross elements and their *tanmātras* merge in ether which in its turn merges in *śabda-tanmātra*. When the latter is absorbed in the I-principle (*bhūtādi*), the use

of the plural in '*tanmātreṣu*' is justified because *śabda-tanmātra* holds in itself the other *tanmātras* which have merged therein. The sense organs get the contact of *śabda-tanmātra* and then all of them merge into the *bhūtādi*. The term '*bhūtādi*' is used here to mean '*ahaṅkāra*'; otherwise the statement would appear absurd as the sense organs being evolved from '*sāttvikāhaṅkāra*' cannot merge in *bhūtādi* (*tīmasāhaṅkāra*). If the word is taken in the general sense, then *śabda-tanmātra* is absorbed in *tāmasāhaṅkāra*, whereas the sense organs merge into *sāttvikāhaṅkāra*. Because sound, touch etc. are in a subtle state in the *tanmātras*, they are called subtle elements, and because sound and others are being experienced in the gross elements on account of their being present in larger quantity, they are called gross elements. The meaning of 'subtle elements' can better be understood by a comparison. '*Kalala*' is the name given to milk when it is just reaching the state of curd, and when it has almost lost its sweetness and is tasting somewhat sour. The subtle elements can be compared with the milk in *kalala* state and the gross elements can be compared with curd.

3.29. *Prakṛti Must be Under the Control of the Supreme Being*

A sentient being enters upon activity either for its own self or for others. *Prakṛti* being non-sentient cannot evolve the universe, unless it is prompted by a powerful sentient being. Intelligent entities other than the supreme Being are incapable of controlling *prakṛti* since they are wholly ignorant of *prakṛti*. Hence the controlling personality must be an omniscient being, called '*Īśvara*'. This is the argument put forward by

those who uphold the theory that *prakṛti* is controlled by a subreme Being.

The Sāṅkhya would object to the above criticism in the following way. *Prakṛti*, the insentient acts even without any control by a sentient being, just as milk flows down the udder of a cow for the nourishment of its calf. Why could *prakṛti* not act for the emancipation of souls without control by a sentient being? The postulation of the existence of a controlling sentient entity is both unnecessary and absurd; for as pointed out earlier, a sentient entity functions either for selfish ends or out of compassion for others. But both these are improbable in the case of God who is said to be omnipresent and all-perfect. *Prakṛti* on the other hand, says the Sāṅkhya, is non-sentient and acts of its own accord without any selfish purpose or out of compassion for others.

We shall now examine the Sāṅkhya position. Their contention that there is no necessity for a sentient controller over insentient *prakṛti*, conflicts with the Vedic and *Smṛti* statements which proclaim the omnipresence of Brahman in the words, '*yasya pṛthivī sarīram, yasya āpaḥ sarīram*' and

*'yat-kiñcit-srjyate yena bhūtaṁ sthāvara-jaṅgamam
tasya srjyasya sambhūtau tatsarvaṁ vai harestanuḥ.*

Such statements unequivocally declare that Brahman has everything in the universe — both sentient and non-sentient — as its body which is being controlled and guided by itself, viz. Brahman. In consequence of this kind of body — soul relation between Brahman and the universe, Brahman is often referred to as

'*viśvātmā*', '*viśvarūpa*' etc. The universe is the body and Brahman is the soul. The word '*antaryāmi*' that is very often repeated here, as a result of which this section of the *Upaniṣad* has acquired the name '*antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa*' means that Brahman being within the body, directs and controls each and every being (*antaḥ praviśya niyantā*). This being the case with the universe, the explanation of the Sāṅkhya by giving the analogy of milk flowing from the udder of the cow, is not acceptable to those who believe in the supreme authority of the *Vedas*. The sayings like '*yaḥ pṛthivyām tiṣṭhan, yo apsu tiṣṭhan*' emphasise the presence of Brahman in all entities and in milk as well. The milk, therefore, does not flow from the udder, of its own accord, but the flowing process is dependent on the inclination of the cow to feed its calf. The cow can, if it so desires, withhold its milk, as we know only too well.

It is the omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent Brahman that causes the conversion of the cow's food into milk and not 'nature' as is supposed by the Sāṅkhya. The same power does not turn the same articles of food into milk, if taken by bullocks. The rain-water fallen at different places assumes different colours and tastes and other properties and is given different names, according to the omnipresent power. Vedic statements such as '*tad aikṣata bahu syām prajāyeya*' disclose not only that He is present in all things of the universe, but that His will is responsible for the changes that take place in all those things.

By employing the analogy of a lame person sitting on the shoulders of a blind man and directing him in the proper path, the Sāṅkhya seeks to explain the

evolution of the universe as being solely caused by *prakṛti* helped by the mere presence of the soul. The inappropriateness of this analogy is obvious. The lame person does not idly sit upon the blind man's shoulders as the soul in the Sāṅkhya system is supposed to. Practically he is the person responsible for reaching their destination and the part played by the blind man is of less importance. Moreover they are both sentient beings and it is possible for both of them to lead and to be led. The lame man is able to see the way; to know the ups, downs, turns, bridges, wells and walls; to warn, to advise and direct the blind man; and the latter is able to understand and follow the instructions. But the soul according to Sāṅkhya is supposed to be almost inert. Thus the very analogy quoted by the Sāṅkhya is in conflict with their stand.

The analogy of iron being attracted by a magnet, cited by the Sāṅkhya to explain that *prakṛti* assumes various forms and changes by the mere presence of the soul is also inapt. For *prakṛti* being omnipresent has the presence and contact of omnipresent souls forever and everywhere, and consequently there should be either a perpetual evolution of *prakṛti* or eternal emancipation of all souls, as they are flawless and comparable to the lotus-leaf which does not get wet by the drops of water.

Further the evolution of the universe cannot be caused by the mere presence of the soul near *prakṛti*. By the soul, the Sāṅkhya means the intellect. He states that the soul is liable to make mistakes and that the soul wrongly believes that the changes and movements of *prakṛti* are its own. What could be the cause for such mistakes? The mere existence of *prakṛti* could

not be held as the cause of the mistakes and illusions of the soul; for since *prakṛti* always exists, even the liberated soul would then become liable to have these illusions. Nor can the changes in *prakṛti* be the causes; for these changes are themselves ascribed to such mistakes. Also the same soul which was earlier described as free from any action, change or defect is now supposed to be under bondage and later is said to get emancipation. To speak of such conditions with reference to the soul of his conception is absurd. Denying '*saṁsāra*' to souls, the Sāṅkhya yet speaks of its liberation. He repeatedly says '*prati-puruṣa-vimokṣārtham*', '*puruṣa-vimokṣa-nimittam*', '*puruṣasya vimokṣārtham*' etc. The cycle of birth and death and liberation are described with reference to the soul in the *Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī* (verses 58-61) where the interesting comparison of *prakṛti* to a dancing girl is also made. In verse 62, it is said that the souls do not suffer bondage or become emancipated; nor do they migrate; it is *prakṛti* alone that suffers bondage and gets release:

*tasmān na bādhyate addhā na mucyate nāpi saṁsarati kaścit
saṁsarati bādhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ.*

If the soul is not in reality bound, where is the question of its liberation? Actually bondage and liberation of the soul is nothing but delusion.

3.30. *How Far the Supreme Being is Responsible for the different Experiences of All Sentient Beings?*

The creation, sustenance and destruction of the universe consisting of sentients and non-sentients is nothing but sport to the supreme Being — Śrīman

Nārāyaṇa, says the Viśiṣṭādvaitin. As He Himself says in the *Gītā*,: "There is nothing in all the three worlds, that remains to be done nor anything unattained that might be attained,"¹⁸ and explained in the *Brahmasūtra*, "but it is mere sport that will render Him happy, as in the case of an emperor who sometimes engages himself in sport."¹⁹

The Sāṅkhya advances the following arguments against this view of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin regarding Īśvara's sport. For what purpose does Brahman create and destroy the universe? Is it for His selfish ends or for the purpose of the souls? The former would be inconsistent with the nature of Brahman. Lord Nārāyaṇa is regarded as having got everything at His disposal and as capable of getting everything He desires. If it is the latter, creation etc. must be for the good of the souls. Creation from the point of view of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin is living in the mother's womb, being born, suffering from ever so many things during life, pining away in old age, suffering from diseases and sorrows and finally dying. Therefore creation cannot be said to be for the souls' good. Had Brahman intended the creation for the good of the souls, He would have created a world with pleasure and pleasure alone and without a tinge of pain.²⁰ No wonder that a sage and a fool alike seek deliverance from the cycle of birth and death.

If it is contended that these sports are for His pleasure, then it looks like the story of Asamañja who revelled in other people's distress by throwing the children into the river Sarayu and rejoiced at the sight of their struggling in water for life.²¹ Perhaps if this treatment had been given impartially to all, it

would appear more sensible. But some people are found happy revelling in joy, wealth and prosperity, while others suffer from wants and ailments. Why is there such a differential treatment?

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin explains this anomaly by resorting to the *Veda* which states: "He who does meritorious deeds becomes virtuous; he who does sinful deeds becomes a sinner. The former gets happiness and the latter unhappiness." Thus the happiness or misery of a being is absolutely the result of his own past deeds. The Almighty is held as a general cause for all that happens even as water is for all crops, the quality of the harvest being dependent on the fertility of the land and other factors also. In this connection Sage Parāśara says: Īśvara is only a general or common cause for the good or evil deeds of an individual being; the principal cause of his birth and the state of his life are his own past deeds." The diversity in the creation of the universe is due to the diversity in the deeds of the individuals which are beginningless (*anādi*) and, therefore, unquestionable.

But here an objection may be raised: If Brahman has no influence on the pain or pleasure of the individuals for which their own past deeds alone are responsible, and if Brahman does not create the universe of His own will, to call Brahman as the Almighty is meaningless, since He wields no power to change the course pre-determined by the past deeds of the individuals.

3.31. Part Played by the Lord in Connection with the Creation of the Universe

Parāśara Bhaṭṭa gives a satisfactory answer to this objection in the following manner:—

Although a potter in making clay vessels, is in need of clay, water, a stick and a wheel — without any one of which he cannot accomplish his work—still he is considered as the principal, prominent and independent cause of those clay utensils.

All sentient beings experience pain and pleasure through the body endowed with the sense and other organs. The actual experience is felt only by the soul. The soul cannot derive any experience if it is devoid of the body or of the particular organs. But this cannot lower the importance of the soul.

A king is pleased with those who implicitly obey his commands and carry them out to the very letter. He rewards them suitably. Those who transgress his orders are suitably punished. The reward or punishment is in relation to the deeds standing to the credit of the individual; but on that score, can anybody say that the king has no prominence or independence?

If a munificent person lavishly spends his wealth on deserving people only on their coming forth to show their merit, it does not militate against the independence of the generous benefactor. In a similar way, Brahman is independent, self-reliant and all-powerful but He creates this universe and conducts it in accordance with the deeds of individuals, because His volition (*sankalpa*) is 'I shall create the universe according to the past deeds of the individual souls.

In all these instances, the principal persons rely for the execution of their purposes on persons or things entirely dependent on them. Brahman relies only on the past deeds of individuals. To seek the service of

one's dependents over whom one has authority does not take away from one's independence or all-powerfulness. If anything, it only establishes one's omnipotence and one's decision to abide by one's will or volition (*saṅkalpa*).

Hence *prakṛti* is controlled, prompted and supervised by Brahman; it effects the evolution of the universe and later on its dissolution. *Prakṛti* without a controller and prompter is incapable of doing anything as it is insentient. For the various reasons stated above *prakṛti* thus stands in need of a superior sentient agency to assist or to prompt it for any action, much more so for the process of evolution of the universe, and that agency can be no other than Brahman who alone possesses the power that no one else possesses, as the *Vedas* state. "

3.32. The Collective Creation and Individuation

The collective creation (*samaṣṭi-srṣṭi*) ends with the creation of the elements and sense organs. Then follows the individuation (*vyāṣṭi-srṣṭi*). The *sad-vidyā* refers only to tripartition (*trivṛtkaraṇam*) saying "*tāsām tri-vṛtām tri-vṛtām ekaikam*" etc. but it implies quintuplication (*pañcī-karaṇam*) which is explained in the following way. Brahman divides each gross element into two equal halves; one half of each of them is again divided into four equal parts, that is, four 1/8 parts of the whole. Each undivided one-half of each element is mixed with an one-eighth part of the other four elements. Thus after the process of individuation, everything in the universe consists of 50% of one of the elements and twelve and a half percent of each of the other four elements.

The Sāṅkhya statement that *prakṛti* has no parts, is transformative by nature and consequently becomes divisible and therefore has endless parts, is clearly self-contradictory. How can it have no parts and have at the same time endless parts?

NOTES

1. yathā odana-kāma odanāya pāke pravṛttaḥ odana-siddhau nivartate, evam pratyekam puruṣam mocayitum pravṛttā prakṛtir yam puruṣam mocayati, tamprati punarna pravartate. *S.T.K.*, p. 70

2. dṛṣṭam acetanamapi prayojanāya pravartamānam yathā vatsavivṛddhyartham kṣīram acetanam pravartate evam prakṛtiracetanāpi puruṣa-vimokṣanāya pravartīṣyate. *Ibid.*, p. 71

3. karma-vaicitryāt vaicitryam iti cet kṛtam asya prekṣāvataḥ karmādhiṣṭhānam. *Ibid.* p. 71

4. raṅgasya darśayitvā nivartate nartaki yathā nṛtyāt, puruṣasya tatrātmānam prakāśya vinivartate prakṛtiḥ. *S.K.*, 59

5. nānāvidhair upāyaiḥ upakāriṇi anupakāriṇaḥ pumsaḥ, guṇavati aguṇasya sataḥ tasyārtham apārthakam carati. *Ibid.* 60

6. asūryampaśyā hi kulavadhūḥ...ced ālokyate para-puruṣeṇa tadā asau tathā prayatate apramattā yathā eṇam-puruṣāntarāṇi na punaḥ pasyanti, evam prakṛtir api kulavadhūto'pyadhikā dṛṣṭā vivekina na punar dṛśyate. *S.T.K.*, p. 74

7. tasmāt na baddhyate addhā na mucyate nāpi saṁsarati kaścit, saṁsarati baddhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ. *S.K.*, 62

8. ityeṣā sahakāri-śaktir asamā māyā durunnītitāḥ mūlatvāt prakṛtiḥ prabodha-bhayataḥ avidyeti yasyoditā. *N.K.*, p. 90

9. ayam abhisandhiḥ. kāryam hi kāraṇa-guṇātmakam dṛṣṭam yathā tantvādi-guṇātmakam paṭādi tathā mahadādi-lakṣaṇenāpi kāryeṇa sukha-duḥkha-moha rūpeṇa sva-kāraṇa-gata-sukha-duḥkha-mohātmanā bhavitavyam. tathā ca tat-kāraṇam sukha-duḥkha-mohātmakam pradhānam avyaktaṁ siddhyati. *S.T.K.* p. 32

10. tatra paṭādeḥ kim idam kāraṇa-guṇātmakam? kim kāraṇa-guṇātādātmyam? asiddheḥ; na khalu tantvādi-guṇaiḥ śauklyādibhiḥ paṭasya tādātmyam dṛṣṭam, tathā sati guṇavat-tantu--niṣpattimātreṇa paṭa-niṣpatti-prasaṅgāt. ata eva na dravyasya guṇa-tādātmyam; śuklaḥ paṭa iti ca na paryāyaḥ. *S. S.* p. 12

11. M.M. Gangānā th Jhā's Translation of *S.K.* 15.

12. eka-pramāṇa-vedyatve kārya-kāraṇayor mithaḥ, bodhya-bodhakate na staḥ saha-dṛṣṭāgni-dhūmavat. *S. S.* p. 13

13. na hi yad yeṣu anugatam, tat teṣāṁ kāraṇam iṭi niyamah; śauklya-gotvāder anekānugatasyatat-kāraṇatva-abhāvāt. anyathā vyaktāvyakta--sādhāraṇa-dharmānām tad-ubhaya-kāraṇatva-prasaṅgāt. tathā ca tattvādhikya-prasaṅgaḥ. *Ibid.* p. 13

14. etena vigītam svānugata-kāraṇakam, kāryatvāt, ghaṭa-śarāvādivat ityapi nirastam. ghaṭādiṣu anugatasya mṛttvasya tat-kāraṇatvasiddheḥ. mṛd-dravyasya tu ghaṭādy-ātmanā vibhaktasya avibhaktasya vā teṣu anugatativādṛṣṭeḥ. *Ibid.* p. 13

15. traiguṇyonmeṣa-bhedasyāpi atirikta-nirvāhaka traividhyakṣiptau anavasthāprasaṅgāt. *S. S.* p. 14

16. kāryānām satām kvacit kāraṇe vibhāgāvibhāgau niyatau iti kṛtvā vicitrasya kārya-vargasya vibhāgāvibhāga-sthānatayā pradhānam siṣādhāyīṣitam. na tu evam niyamah;

yathā mṛdādiṣu ghaṭādinām etau dṛṣṭau, na tathā tantvādiṣu paṭādinām. na hi tantvekadeśātmakaḥ paṭaḥ, yena ghaṭādi-nyāyaḥ syāt. *Ibid.*

17. yatra kāryānām vibhāgā-vibhāga-dṛṣṭiḥ, na tatra sarvatra upādānatvam; nimitte api kvacit tad-dṛṣṭeḥ, araṇe iva āraṇeyasya. na hi kāṣṭhe pārthivāṁso vahnēr upādānam; na ca vahnyaṁśo dhūmasya. *Ibid.* p. 14.

18. evaṁ ca sati na avyaktasyaiva siddhiḥ. viśva-nimit-tasyāpi kasyacid evaṁ anumāturṁ śakyatvāt, tasya ca vijā-tīyasyāpi sambhavāt. *Ibid.* p. 15

19. ubhayathā vibhāgāvibhāga-darśanāt nimittopādā-nayor ubhayor api anumāna-prasaṅgena tattva-sankhyā-vyāghātaḥ; tat-parihārārtham anyatarānumāne nimitta-mātrasyaiva siddhi-prasaṅgena arthāntaram. arthāntaram-anabhimatārtha-siddhiḥ. *A. D.* Vol. I, p. 145.

20. kūrmāvayava-dṛṣṭāntaśca atra mandaḥ; tatra hi ākuñcana-prasāraṇābhyām avayavāntarāvṛtā-nāvṛtatva-sid-dhyā bhavati avyakta-vyaktatvā-vasthā-bhedaḥ, na tu upādānānopādeya-bhāvāt. na ca tatra kasyacit avayava-nāśotpattivavahāraḥ. *S. S.* 15

21. akṣeṣu vacanādinām anupahataiḥ saha-kārimadbhiḥ tadavayavaviśeṣaireva upapattau na tāvat karmendriya-klptiḥ. rūpādi-jñānādinām ca tattad-adhiṣṭhāna-bhedaireva tad-anuḡaṇa-daśā-viśeṣitaiḥ sambhavāt. tad-atirikta-kal-pane api kāṇādādi-kalpita-nyāyena bhautikatvopappatteḥ āhāṅkārika-indriya-siddhir anāgamato na bhavati. *Ibid.*

22. kālaśca vaiśeṣikābhimateḥ eko na anāgatādi-vyava-hārabhedam pravartayitum arhati. tasmād ayam yair upādhi-bhedair anāgatādibhedam pratipadyate, santu te eva upādhayo ye anāgatādibhedam pratipadyate-vyavahāra-betavaḥ, kṛtam antar-gaḍunā kālena iti sāṅkhyācāryaḥ. tasmāt kāla-rūpa-tattvāntarānabhyupagamaḥ. *S. K.* 50

23. kalpanā-gaurava-bhayāt kalā-kāṣṭhādyakalpayan
aviśeṣāt pradhānādi-kalpanām apy apāsyatu. *S.S.* p. 15

24. taṁ ṣad-vimśakam iti prāhus-sapta-vimśam tathā
apare.

25. tan-matrāṇi bhūtādau liyante

26. śabda-tan-mātrād ākāśam śabdaguṇam, śabda-tan-
mātra-sahitāt sparśa-tanmātrāt vāyuḥ śabda-sparśa-guṇaḥ,
śabda-sparśa-tan-mātra-sahitāt-rūpa-tan-mātrāt tejah, śabda-
sparśa-rūpa-guṇam; śabda-sparśa-rūpa-tanmātra-sahitāt
rasa-tanmātrāt āpaḥ, śabda-sparśa-rūpa-rasa-guṇaḥ; śabda-
sparśa-rūpa-rasa-tanmātra-sahitāt, gandha-tanmātrāt, śabda-
sparśa-rūpa-rasa-gandhaguṇā pṛthivī jāyate. *S.T.K* p. 41

27. ākāśam indriyeṣu, indriyāṇi tan-mātreṣu

28. na me pārthā'sti kartavyam triṣu lokeṣu kiñcana/
nānavāptam avāptavyam varta eva hi karmaṇi ||*B.G.* 3.22

29. lokavattu lilā-kaivalyam, *B.S.* 2.1.33

30. avāpta-kāmasya parārthatā hi parānugraheṇa
bhavati; na ca idṛśagarbha-janma-jarā-maraṇa-narakādi-
nānāvīdhānanta-duḥkha-bahulam jagat karuṇayā sṛjati;
pratyuta sukhaikatānameva janayet karuṇayā sṛjan. *S.B.*
Vol. II, p. 63

31. viśvam duḥkhaikatānam viśamam-api sadā nirmi-
māṇasya lilā

sañjāyeta asamañja-kramata iti bhavet nirdayat-
vādi-doṣaḥ. *A.S.* 173.

32. śādhukāri śādhur bhavati, pāpakāri papo bhavati,
puṇyaḥ puṇyena karmaṇā bhavati, pāpaḥ pāpena karmaṇā.

33. *nimittamātramevāsau sṛjyānām sarga-karmaṇi/
pradhāna-kāraṇi-bhūtaḥ yato vai sṛjya-śaktayaḥ||*
V.P. 1.4.50

34. *svādhīne sahakāri-kāraṇa-gaṇe kartuh śarīre'thavā
bhoktus svānuvidhāparādha-vidhayo rājño yathā śāsituḥ
dāturvārthijane katākṣaṇam iva śrīraṅgasarvasva te
sraṣṭus sṛjya-daśā-vyapekṣaṇam api svātantryam-evāvahet*
— S.R.S. II, 43

35. *parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate svābhāviki jñāna-bala-
kriyā ca* — *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, 2.6.8.

THE SYSTEM OF NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

The Nyāya school derives from Gautama and the Vaiśeṣika from Kaṇāda. There is no much difference between these two schools and so they may be considered as one system. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika accepts the authority of the *Vedas* but are inclined to give preference to inference (*anumāna*) over verbal comprehension (*śabda*). For instance, they attempt to prove the existence of God as the creator of the world by inference. One of their theories is the formation or evolution of the material universe by the conjunction of atoms or infinitely small invisible particles (*aṇu*) of earth, water, fire and air. As against the Vedāntin, he maintains that when certain causes produce an effect, the effect is a new thing or object different from the parts of which it is composed. He is hence called '*asat-kārya-vādin*.'

4.1. *What an Atom is, and How a Triad is Formed*

Taking first his atomic theory of the evolution of the universe, it may be stated as follows. The largeness or smallness we perceive in things must have a limit beyond which there cannot exist larger or smaller objects. Unless we fix such a limit of smallness and largeness, how can we speak of the distinction between a mountain and mustard? The limit to the largeness is supposed to exist in ether, time, space and spirit or soul, and they are therefore held to be omnipresent.

The limit to the smallness obtains in the atom. The size of the atom is described to be one-sixth of that of the small particles that can be seen in the sun-light penetrating through a hole in the roof.' The atom that is the extreme limit of smallness in size is to be conceived as eternal (that is, having no beginning and no end), for otherwise it must have come from a material cause which should necessarily be smaller, thus contradicting the original assumption that the atom has the smallest size. The particle visible to the naked eye in the sun's rays cannot possibly have the limited size, since their visual perceptibility establishes their medium dimension and things possessing the medium dimension must have parts, which play the role of the material cause of those things. Two atoms unite to form a dyad (*dvyanuka*), three dyads unite to give a triad (*tryanuka*). The visible particles in the sun's rays are triads each consisting of six atoms. Four triads unite together yielding a quartet (*caturanuka*) and in this way, bigger things from a jar to a mountain come into being.

4.2. *The Veda is a Higher Authority than Any Other Testimony*

Taking this view for consideration, Veṅkaṭanātha observes that in matters falling within the purview of the *Vedas*, we have to accept implicitly the import of the Vedic texts as is done by all who accept the supreme authority of the *Vedas*. As the *Brahmasūtra* says 'śruteṣu śabda-mūlatvāt' (2-1-27), we have to acknowledge their statement to be final and beyond all question, wherever we have to depend entirely on the *Vedas*. In matters falling within the scope of inference, we have however, to rely upon observed examples.

In view of the fact that the Vedic statements are not the outcome of delusion, carelessness, or desire to deceive others (*bhrama-pramāda-vipralipsā-kāryatva-abhāvāt*) to which human beings are generally liable, they are held as the final and inviolable authority in deciding a fact that is beyond human conception. If some of the texts seem to admit of different interpretations or are obscure in meaning or are apparently contradicting other Vedic statements, then an infallible solution can be arrived at by consulting the *Smṛtis*, *Itihāsas*, *Purāṇas* etc. which have the sole purpose of helping the seeker after truth to comprehend the real meaning of the Vedic statements.

4.3. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika View, Parts could not Produce a Whole with Greater Dimension

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, who holds the theory of the distinct existence of the 'whole' (*avayavī*) apart from its parts, says that the parts join together to form the 'whole'. A difficulty arises when the process of production of a dyad is considered. The two atoms may join their parts by the process of conjunction (*samyoga*) or they may combine in their entirety. If they join in the former manner, the question may be asked as to how the atom which is the limit of smallness can have parts. Then it can only be regarded as a 'whole', resulting in *ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*). If on the other hand, they unite in such a manner that the atom 'A' occupies the space occupied by the atom 'B', the rule of resistance is violated. According to this rule, two substances possetting the quality of touch (*sparsa*) cannot occupy one and the same place without resistance; e.g. a jar cannot be placed in the same place as another of the same size, because both of them are

capable of being perceived by the organ of touch. But the same jar can be placed where the all-pervading ether is present, because ether is not perceived by the organ of touch. Also this would mean that the dyad has the same dimension as that of each of the atoms. At this rate, even the triad would be of the same size as the dyads (and the atoms as well) and the visual perceptibility of the triad in the sun's rays would become inexplicable.

Hence the atomic theory which does not satisfactorily explain the production of things of bigger size, implies the denial of the possibility of larger and different sizes. Thus while seeking to establish the existence of the atom and the dyad, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika fails to establish the known facts concerning different sizes or dimensions.

Each thing possesses, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the contact of ten directions — four main, four minor, one upward, and one downward. If two things join together, the three sides of each are joined with the three sides of the other. This is termed '*ṣaṭ-pārśva-samyoga*'. A yarn when it is joined with another in order to weave a cloth, has conjunction between the three sides of another yarn and the three sides of its own, and thus gradually a cloth which has far greater dimension than the yarn, is evolved. Likewise in the case of the atoms also; if two of them join together, the three sides of each atom are to be conceived as joining and producing a dyad with the attributes of atomicity (*anūtvam*) but with the dimension greater than that of the atom, called by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, '*pārimāṇḍalyam*'. Similarly, when three dyads join

together, a triad is effected with the attributes of the dimension called '*mahattvam*', and '*dirghatvam*' which are greater than the dimensions of the dyad. Unless the condition that the three sides of each atom should join together to form a dyad is granted, neither a dyad nor a triad or any 'whole' can be shown to have a greater dimension than an atom. If, on the other hand, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika accepts this, it would force him to accept also that the atoms have parts on account of their having sides and in consequence of that, atoms would cease to be the final limit of things in regard to smallness of size.

Moreover, the two atoms that combine cannot occupy one and the same place because two substances possessing a form (*dvē mūrta-dravye*) are incapable of occupying one and the same place at the same time. So they should be considered as combining together in such a manner that one is to the east of the other in the west, or one in the south of the other in the north and so on, so that at any rate they may occupy two different places. If atom 'A' unites with atom 'B', then the conjunction can take place at points other than those that have the conjunction with yet other atoms.

4.4. *Vasubandhu's Criticism of Vaibhāṣika is Applicable to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*

In criticising the *Vaibhāṣika* position which is similar to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* view in this respect, Vasubandhu, a follower of the Yogācāra school, rightly argues that since an atom is surrounded on all the six sides (*i.e.* four main directions and one above and the other below) it must have six different conjunctions with six different atoms and it must therefore be

deemed to have six aspects. Should it be contended that they take place at one and the same point, then that collection of seven atoms could not have a greater dimension than that of any one of them singly.³ As already stated, conjunction of various parts on different sides alone can increase the size of a 'whole'.

4.5. Cognition Being Incorporeal Cannot be an Instance for an Atom Having Many Conjunctions

The Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika might argue as follows. Though it may be called by different names, knowledge or cognition which is accepted as being one and partless by all schools, including the Mādhyamika, is able to comprehend at the same time a number of objects. It cannot comprehend an object by its entire form, for in that case, it could not comprehend any other thing. Nor can knowledge comprehend an object by one of its parts, as it is partless by the hypothesis. Yet, surely it does comprehend several objects. Even so, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may argue that an atom can have many conjunctions and grow in size, though it is partless.⁴ But this is a poor reed which he grasps for his support against a flood of objections. A cognition is an entity without form while an atom is a substance with a physical form. What is to be looked for in this connection is not whether a cognition has parts or not, but whether it possesses sensitivity — capacity to apprehend. Invariable and uncontested observation testifies to the fact that cognition, though devoid of parts comprehends one or more objects; likewise a thing which has no parts is comprehended by a larger number of cognitions.⁴

Further according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine the non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi-kāraṇa*) of a substance is the conjunction (*samnyoga*) that takes place within the parts of the material cause. In the case of a dyad, for example, the conjunction that takes place in the material causes namely the atoms, must be the non-inherent cause; but atoms are in their theory, infinitesimal and partless. Hence the formation of dyads cannot be accounted for.

4.6. *The Reply of Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra, and Its Unsoundness*

The contention of Vasubandhu that if the six atoms have a common place, then the whole must have the size of an atom, is questioned by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra. They argue as follows.⁸ In the case of an atom surrounded by six others (four in four directions, one above and the last below) the conjunction that has taken place between the atom of the east end and the central one is different from the one that has taken place between the atom of the west and the central one and so on. Thus the central one has conjunctions with the six atoms surrounding it. These six conjunctions have a common place namely the one central atom. There is nothing impossible in six conjunctions having a common place in the central atom; for what is inconceivable is two or more substances — tangible ones — remaining in one and the same place, by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Qualities can inhere in one and the same substance and conjunctions can be found in the self-same place. Hence atoms by joining together can account for the increase in the magnitude of the 'whole' in spite of their occupying the same place. In strictness, an atom though surrounded on

all the six sides by atoms, must be considered as forming a single conjunction with them rather than six, since in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, there is only one direction, the difference between directions being only imaginary and useful only for practical purposes.

This answer of Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra is not convincing. In the case of an atom surrounded on all the six sides by atoms, though the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika says that there is only one conjunction, it is the six conjunctions of six atoms that establish the distinction of six limiting adjuncts of six directions (*ṣaṭ digupādhayaḥ*). These conjunctions cannot be denied in the place of universal experience. Hence it is that the Viśiṣṭādvaitin points out that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is unable to get over the position that the atom possesses parts as they have six different conjunctions.⁴

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contends that a 'whole' is produced as a result of the conjunctions taking place in the parts of the constituents thereof. For example, a triad is said to result from conjunctions taking place within the parts of the dyads *i.e.* in the atoms. But strangely enough, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is unwilling to extend this to the dyads, on the score that the atoms are partless. No intelligible reason is assigned by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika for exempting atoms from this general rule.⁵

4.7. A Similar Remark Against Conjunction

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may reply that a similar objection may be raised against 'conjunction' itself. Conjunction (*samyoga*) is a quality prevailing in substances, and the question may be asked whether it

exists in its substrata entirely or in parts. If the former, it cannot exist in another substance. In the latter case, the conjunction (*saṃyoga*) must have parts and consequently it ceases to be abstract. But the very existence of conjunction cannot be denied as it is seen to be effected in two substances which existed separately before.

This is met by the argument that like the 'character of revealing the objects, (*viśayitva*), conjunction can exist in more than one thing although it has no parts. Mastership (*svāmitva*), servitude (*dāsatva*) etc. may also be cited as instances and similar arguments put forward; for they too can exist in many persons and still they are considered partless on account of their being abstract.

4.8. A Counter-Objection by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and the Viśiṣṭādvaitin's Reply

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika says that the same argument would apply also to conjunction of all-pervasive substances (*vibhūdravyāni*) with substances limited in size and therefore capable of movement (*mūrtāni ata eva kriyāśrayāni dravyāni*). Do all-pervasive entities have contact with substance of limited size? If the answer is in the negative, there will be a total denial of the possibility of conjunction being by the action of one of the two entities that are to be conjoined (*anyatara-kriyā-janya-saṃyoga*). A vulture for example flies from a tree and rests on the top of a hill. Here the vulture which is the agent in the action of flying is the cause of its conjunction with the hill (*śyena-sailasaṃyoga*), the latter being motionless. Similarly all-pervasive substances, though motionless could have contact with

atoms which are capable of movement. If the answer is in the affirmative (*i.e.*, if the possibility of such contact is admitted), it may be asked: Do all-pervasive things join with another substance in their entirety or in parts? In the former case, the all-pervasive substances cannot join with any other substance, as it has already joined entirely with some other thing. In the latter case, the all-pervasive substances would cease to be partless, because the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika denies parts in all-pervasive substances (*vibhu-dravyāṇi*). Even while being partless, if it is maintained that they can have conjunctions with a large number of limited substances, then why should not partless atoms have conjunctions? Though atoms have no parts, still they can join with a number of substances, say, other atoms. Moreover, the same objection may be raised against the triads also which the Viśiṣṭādvaitin holds as the final limit of small things. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may ask the Viśiṣṭādvaitin: Do the so-called triads join with the other triads in entirety or in parts? In the former case, by the conjunction of a large number of particles which are said to be final limits in size and which have therefore no parts, a bigger thing cannot be produced; for, all the particles assembling together must occupy a space sufficient enough for a single particle. If a good number of particles occupy a space which is enough only for a single particle, then they have no power of resistance. This is against the physical rule, "Two substances cannot occupy one and the same place." In the latter case, that is, if the conjunction is by parts, they must have parts and they would then cease to be final limits. Thus the contention of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin that the particle that is visible in the sun's rays passing through a hole in the roof is the final limit is untenable.

These arguments could not be applied to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic theory according to which the so-called triad is the indivisible '*paramāṇu*' and the final limit of the things of smallest size. In Viśiṣṭādvaita, it is the *prakṛti* — the primordial thing that evolves into the universe and the atoms have nothing to do with evolution. He denies that two atoms join together to evolve a 'whole', but the union of the triad with all-pervasive thing is not denied, lest it should cease to be all-pervasive as it is defined as a thing that has the conjunction of all corporeals (*sarva-mūrta-dravya-samyogi*). The arguments put forth in the previous paragraphs cannot, however, be avoided by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and they will ever remain unanswered. Moreover, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin asks the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika "you have a general rule that those parts which cause a 'whole' to come into existence conjoin with their parts. But you say that this rule applies only to the dyads and that it should not be extended to the atoms as well. How can it be so?" In accordance with this rule, the atoms too, as they cause a dyad to come into being, must have conjunction with their parts; but according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, atoms do not have any parts. That the above rule is applicable only in the case of a triad etc. and not in the case of atoms cannot be accepted. What warrants such an exception? Perception cannot be an authority as atoms are held by them to be imperceptible. Nor is it inference, because there is no reason that would be capable of establishing the necessity for such an exception.

Even in the Sāṅkhya doctrine, dissolution stops above the level of the atoms and the atoms are incapable of dissolution. The atoms are the aggregate

of the three attributes namely *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Unless the dissolution stops above the level of the atoms, there would be a total dissolution and there would only be a void as in the doctrine of Mādhya-mika.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains with the help of inference, that the gradation of atomic dimensions must have its limit somewhere because it is a gradation of dimension just as the gradation of the dimension other than the atomic has its upper limit in ether.

4.9. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin's Stand on Atom

Here Veṅkaṭanātha says: In that case, let the so-called triad be the lowest limit of atomic dimensions. The triad that can be called '*paramāṇu*' may be considered none other than an evolution of *prakṛti* that transforms into or evolves into the universe with the guidance, control and supervision of Brahman.

The so-called triad which might bear the name '*paramāṇu*' need not be invisible. Where is the general rule that whatever is visible should have medium dimension? We do not learn from the authority of perception that all things that are visible have medium dimension (*madhyama-parimāṇa*). Nor can it be established by inference. For, inference — with the help of the five-membered syllogism — would require an instance. The argument that on account of the rule based upon our everyday experience that the greater the dimension of a substance, the higher its visibility and that the visibility of a substance entirely depends upon its degree of medium dimension — has no weight. On the other hand, there is a general rule that those sub-

stances only are visible, the parts of which are visible. And according to this rule, if the so-called triad must be invisible, as it has no visible parts, how could the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika prove the visibility of a triad?

The argument of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that the visibility of a substance depends upon the degree of magnitude it possesses and that if the triad is held by the Viśiṣṭādvaitin as the lowest limit of 'wholes', it cannot have the medium magnitude which can be caused only by a number of parts, viz. not less than six atoms — is brushed aside by a counter-argument. A substance can be visible, if its parts are visible and hence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's triad being held as one that has no visible parts must cease to be visible. If it is still conceived as visible in spite of its having no visible parts, then why not the same triad, although devoid of magnitude, still be visible?

As a matter of fact, it is true that the higher the medium dimension, the greater the visibility of the substance, but on no account should the magnitude be held as solely responsible for the visibility of the substance.

As the so-called triad is regarded as an atom by the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, he considers that the inference that the triad is a product because it possesses motion and a medium dimension is invalid. Nor can its being apprehended by an external sense-organ (*bahir-indriya-grāhyatva*) establish the so-called triad being a product; for a thing may be an external sense-organ and yet it need not be a product. Ether is held perceivable by the Viśiṣṭādvaitin on the authority of perception 'there flies a bird'. Otherwise nothing can invalidate the

argument that like a triad, a dyad also is a product, and thus a series of productive particles still lower than atoms and so on, their transitory nature and medium dimension also cannot be avoided by the advocates of the atomic theory.

Thus the conjunction of the two substances that is regarded as the non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi-kāraṇa*) of a product, can take place in a substance only in a part of the same, and hence a dyad cannot be produced unless the conjunction of the two atoms, the non-inherent cause of the dyad, takes place in a limited part of the atom.

4.10. *How the Difference between a Mountain and a Mustard is Maintained*

Another argument that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika puts forward is the following: There will be no difference between a mustard and a mountain if no limit is set to divisibility. To this, Veṅkaṭanātha's answer is: It must be remembered that a mountain is made of a very large number of parts, while the mustard is made of a very small number of parts, and the difference in the number of parts of these two things—the mountain and the mustard — is responsible for the difference in their dimensions. This is the common point with the support of which, those who deny a limit to gradations of dimension (*Viśiṣṭādvaitin*) and those who fix the one-sixth part of the so-called triad as the final limit of gradation (*Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*) have to give an answer to the question, "What is it that explains the difference in size of the mustard and the mountain?"

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika might bring forward one more argument to prove his contention that the atom is the final limit. If it were not the indivisible final unit, it must be supposed to be made of parts; and the result would be — an atom, on account of its having innumerable and unlimited parts, could not be traversed by any human being like the all-pervasive ether. If an atom is such, then it would be still more difficult in the case of a jar and other similar objects that are comparatively bigger.

To this, Veṅkaṭanātha would reply as follows: The whole range of the parts of an atom is possible of being traversed by a thing that has a very high velocity. Do we not see the sun's rays passing through the sky to the farthest end of the horizon with a baffling quickness at the same moment as the sun appears in the sky?"

To another question, namely, that if a mustard and a mountain have the common feature of possession of innumerable parts, what causes the difference between them, Veṅkaṭanātha gives the following convincing answer: According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the generic attributes, '*sattā*', '*dravyatva*', '*prthivī*' '*ghaṭatva*' etc. are conceived to be prevailing in innumerable things, not only of the present time, but also of the past and future as well. Of the above-mentioned four types of genus (*jāti*), '*sattā*' is a genus that exists in a large number of things while '*dravyatva*' etc. exist in a comparatively small number of things. Likewise '*prthivī*' etc. exist in still smaller number of things and '*ghaṭatva*' etc. are those that exist in the smallest number of things. These attributes are deemed

superior or inferior (*para* or *apara*) according as their applicability is extensive or narrow. Fortnights, months and years have significant differences, a month being made up of two fortnights and a year, of twelve months. Likewise a collection of jars and cloths is greater than a collection of jars alone. The distance between Kanyakumari and Himalayas is larger than that between Kanyakumari and the Vindhya mountain. In all these cases, the innumerability of the parts and the immeasurability of the distance which is found in all things, '*para*' and '*apara*' are approved by all scholars. The difference between the pains of a single soul and that of innumerable souls cannot, in spite of their common feature of incalculability, be denied. Why should not a similar explanation be approved in the case of difference in the dimensions of the mustard and the mountain? Though these two have a common feature, namely, the possession of innumerable parts, the number of parts of the mountain is much larger than the number of parts of a mustard; and though the actual difference in the above two numbers is beyond the comprehension of all human beings, still the difference cannot be denied.

According to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, the primordial thing (*prakṛti*) guided, controlled and supervised by Brahman, is the material cause of the universe. A thing evolved by the changes of *prakṛti* is only a stage (*avasthā*) of the material cause and it is not distinct from the material cause. This theory has the sanction of the *Brahmasūtra* which recognizes the evolution theory in the aphorism '*tad-ananyatvam ārambhaṇaśabdādibhyaḥ*'. This theory of transformation cannot be ruled out by the Purāṇic statements as '*viśṛṣṭi, ullāsa*

and *vikṣepa*." Here *visṛṣṭi* means that the universe is not evolved or produced as such, but that it is contracted at the time of the deluge (*pralayāvasthā*) and expanded in the state of creation even like a tortoise which can contract or spread out its limbs as it pleases. '*Ullāsa*' means that just like a lotus bud blossoming forth by spreading out its petals, the universe spreads itself out. The term '*vikṣepa*' likens creation to the spreading of a fish-net in a tank, and the deluge to the withdrawal of the net. Veṅkaṭanātha says that all these descriptions are meant to apply to the divine form and have nothing to do with the universe. Otherwise the innumerable Vedic statements such as "This existed at the beginning, my friend, as *sat*"¹⁰ would have no meaning. It is evident in the statement of the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* —

*"āvirbhāva-tirobhāva-janma-nāśa-vibhāgavat /
tad-etad akṣayaṁ nityaṁ jagad-munivarākhilam||"*

that the universe has four states, namely, appearance, disappearance, birth and death, of which the first two belong to the divine form of Brahman and the latter two to the universe.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin maintains that what is called the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) at an earlier stage, comes to be called the effect (*kārya*) when it undergoes modification or evolutionary change. This is borne out by scriptural evidence as well as by perception; for instance, the yarns appearing loose in the loom constitute the material cause of the cloth which is the effect, after the completion of the weaving process or the evolution in this instance. We clearly see that the cause and the effect are thus only two stages of one

and the same thing. Scriptural statements such as 'sadeva saumya idam agre āsit' prove the *sat-kārya-vāda*. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that when a cause produces an effect, a new entity, something which did not exist previously, is effected. According to them, a cloth is an absolutely different entity from the threads which are the material cause of the cloth. To prove this, elaborate arguments are put forth by Uddyotakara in his *Nyāya-vārttika*. *Prima facie*, he says that "non-perception of weight (*gurutva*) in an effect like yarns, is enough to prove the non-existence of a 'whole' as a distinct entity from its parts — the material cause."¹

Here Veṅkaṭanātha's arguments are as follows:— As the qualities in a material cause generate respective qualities in its effect, the weight (*gurutva*) also of the material cause must generate weight in its effect. But we do not see in a cloth a colour different from the colour of yarns, or weight in a cloth different from the weight of the yarns. Hence it is to be concluded that an effect is not distinct from its material cause.

It is further argued:— "If the cause and effect are different from each other, as is contended by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, then a cloth placed in a scale of a balance must have two different weights, one belonging to the yarns and the other belonging to the cloth. It is immaterial whether the weight of the effect of the effect (cloth) is equal to, higher than, or less than, the weight of the cause (yarns). In other words, a cloth must have the weight much more increased than the weight of the yarns from which the cloth is evolved."

The above argument is met by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in the following way:— Although the effect

is different from its material cause, their relative weight is not individually known to us. The weight of the cloth that we know is only the weight of the aggregate of the material cause and its effect — from the atom to the finished product. It is beyond the human ability to comprehend the actual weight of the effect and its material cause individually.¹⁴

Here Veṅkaṭanātha puts forth another criticism. He asks: — Does the weight of the material cause like yarn generate weight in its effect like cloth, or not? If it does not, then even that material cause, itself being a product of its own material cause, could not be in possession of a weight. As a result, the atom alone is to be held as possessing weight. But it is against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's contention. In fact, '*gurutva*' being held as beyond our senses (*atīndriya*), is inferred in all the substances belonging to the category of earth and water. If *gurutva* is contended to be existing in atom alone, it could not be inferred in visible substances.

In the latter case, namely, if the effects get *gurutva* generated by their material causes, both the cause and its effect must possess weight individually. That it is against the common experience is proved. Uddyotakara's view on this head is far from convincing. It is evident that the cloth has the same weight of the yarns used therein, and if there is any slight increase in its weight, it is due to the adding of some things in the course of processing of the cloth.

Uddyotakara in his *Nyāya-vārttika* presents some reasons to support the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contention

that the effect is absolutely different from its material cause.

Uddyotakara's reasons may be summed up thus:

1. Cause and effect go by different names; these terms are neither synonyms nor the names of substance and attribute as in the usage 'white cloth'. Both are nouns, meaning different things; that is, yarn and cloth are two different names like cow and horse, and so they must mean two different things.

2. Cause and effect differ in having different numbers, *e.g.* yarns are many while the cloth made out of them is only one in number.

3. Again they serve different purposes: yarns are used to weave a cloth, while cloth is used to cover the body.

4. Their apprehensions are also different. We do not see a cloth in loose unwoven yarns, nor does a cloth appear as yarns.

5. Moreover, cause and effect have different forms. Yarns are long and wire-like with a small diameter, while the cloth has four edges and covers a large area.

6. They also occur at different stages in the time scale: yarns have anterior existence to the cloth.

7. Their own causes are different; cloth has its cause in yarns, while the small fibres are the cause of yarns.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contends that if in spite of these factors of difference, one sticks to the theory of identity of cause and effect, then there will be no need,

so to say in a humorous way, for any operation of looms and the labour of weaver which are found so indispensable.

4.11. *The Satkāryavāda of the Viśiṣṭādvaita and Veṅkaṭanātha's Criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*

To the above contention, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin replies as follows. His doctrine of the identity of cause and effect and the theory of *sat-kārya-vāda* are absolutely different from that of Sāṅkhya. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin explains their identity by saying that one and the same cause undergoes different changes in its form, and in consequence thereof it bears new names, even as the same gold may be made one after another into a variety of jewels which may have different names. We can recognise the gold in all the jewels, the clay in a variety of mud-vessels, the yarns in all the types of cloth which are woven from it, and so on. The different conditions that prevail in a material cause make it assume different names, different appearances and apprehensions and serve different purposes.

Veṅkaṭanātha refutes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory by pointing out also that the various reasons stated above by Uddyotakara cannot establish the difference between a cloth and the yarn, such as is found to exist between a cloth and a jar, for our contention is only that the cause and effect are nothing but two different conditions of one and the same thing. When a palmyra leaf is rolled round for being worn as an ear-ornament (*tāṭaṅka*) or when a lotus bud opens and blossoms, we do not say that a new object has been produced even though there are many clear differences between the two stages. Nor do we say that a new person has come

into being, when one stretches out one's hands. Udayana, in his *Kiraṇāvali*, says that a single part like one 'kapāla' or potsherd cannot bring about an effect like the jar as there is the absence of a non-inherent cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) — a conjunction of two parts (*avayava-dvaya-samyoga*) that constitute a 'whole'. When the palmyra leaf bears the name 'tāṭaṅka' by its being folded round, we do not see the conjunction of two parts to constitute a 'whole'; the conjunction of the parts of the palmyra leaf cannot be said to be the non-inherent cause of the *tāṭaṅka* for it serves some other purpose. Otherwise the fibres of the cotton which are the parts of the yarn, will have to be accepted as the seat of the cloth like the yarns (*paṭādhāraḥ*), and this is a point which goes against the principle propounded by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school that "two parts which by conjunction have produced an effect, are incapable of producing another effect at the same moment," since two objects cannot occupy one and the same place, and fibres (of palmyra-leaf) could not be the seat (*ādhāra*) of both the palmyra leaf and the ear-ornament 'tāṭaṅka'."

If cause and effect are not conceived as merely the two stages of one and the same thing, how could the parts and the whole, conceived as two different entities by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, have conjunction with ether in one and the same place? Ether being a substance having no quality of touch (*sparsa-sūnya*), a jar can occupy a place where the ether is present, but not a place where another jar is kept. Therefore, we say the conjunction of a jar and ether has taken place. The 'whole' and the parts being two different entities both possessing touch (*sparsavad-dravya*) cannot have the con-

junction of a limited portion of ether (*paricchinna ākāśa-pradeśa*). Vācaspati Miśra also denies the existence of two things possessing touch in one place by inherent relation (*samavāya*) and not by conjunction (*saṁyoga*). We would ask whether ether limited by an adjunct and having the contact of yarn, has the contact of cloth in the same point. If it has not, then there will be no contact of corporeal and non-corporeal (*mūrtāmūrta-saṁyogaḥ*). It is against universal experience to hold it possible that two substances possessing touch can exist in one and the same point of ether. The instance of milk and water is in no way favourable to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, for water particles occupy different places and they do not rest in the same place. It can be clearly seen that if one measure of salt is thrown into the water of the same quantity, there will be no increase in the volume of that mixture while in the case of the mixture of water and milk the increase in volume is obvious. It shows that the inter-space in the mass of water can be occupied by the salt, and that milk particles cannot do so. In the case of the Siddhas possessing superhuman power who through their power of penance enter into the earth, the explanation given is that the earth adjusts its form in order to give room for the Siddha to enter into it, just as water does, when one plunges into it.

Hence there is no necessity to exempt the 'whole' and its parts from having conjunction with a limited part of ether without clash. Such difficulties do not creep into the doctrine of the Viśiṣṭādvaita.

Let us now examine the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine from another angle.

Does the 'whole' posited by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as something quite distinct from its parts, exist in entirety or in all the parts taken as a whole or partially in each of its parts? If the former alternative, that is, if entirely — then the 'whole' is to be noticed in each of its parts as a generic attribute like *ghaṭatva*, *paṭatva*, etc. in each of the substrata. In the latter alternative, that is, if only partially in each of the parts, then the whole will be present wholly in each of its parts, in the parts of those parts and so on till the stage of '*paramāṇu*' is reached.

Further it may be asked, when a long cloth, say about nine yards in length is being produced, are there smaller and smaller pieces produced or not? If a negative answer is given, then, during the progress of production of the 'whole' of nine yards, we would say, now a cloth of three yards has been produced, now another of four, now another of five and so on. As these are not different, the reference at different stages to cloths of different lengths and perception of different entities must be said to be merely various states of one and the same product. Then this view would correspond to the doctrine of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin.

If on the other hand, smaller 'wholes' of cloth are produced, let us ask where these pieces were, while the biggest 'whole' was being produced? If they are said to exist in their respective parts, then the largest 'whole' cannot be brought forth while the smaller wholes remain in their respective substrata since that which has produced an effect cannot produce another again. Nor can the statement that the smallest cloth with some more yarns added to it, produces a new cloth bigger

than the previous one, stand scrutiny; since, at a particular stage, say — at a length of nine yards, a 'whole' complete in itself has been produced; further addition of yarns will mean only production of another 'whole'. It cannot be contended that these smaller wholes make up a greater one since our cognition invariably apprehends a whole in parts (for instance a cloth in yarns) but not a whole in smaller wholes. Nor does the following apprehension arise when we observe a loom that is producing a long cloth:— "Here are a number of cloths one being bigger than the other." The theory that the smaller ones or former pieces of cloth are without any cause destroyed, as soon as the longer ones are produced, would be acceptable only to the Buddhists and not to those who conceive things to be existing for a longer time than a moment (*kṣaṇa*).¹⁴

Belief in a series of destructions of previous ones and production of newer ones at every moment during the production of a cloth in a loom is against common experience. Udayana says in his *Kiraṇāvali*: If some yarns are removed from a finished cloth from an end, there is a fragmentary cloth produced. Otherwise, if all the effects up to the stage of a two-yarn cloth are destroyed by the removal of some yarns from one end and no torn cloth is now considered to have been effected in this process, then there will be an apprehension only of a mass of yarns and not of a fragmentary cloth.¹⁵ This is against common experience.

This theory of Udayana is not acceptable to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin; for if from a cloth, yarns are removed one after another, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has to contend at the stage of removal of every yarn, the destruction

of previous fragmentary cloth (*khaṇḍa-paṭa*) and birth of another fragmentary cloth. It is a cumbrous process (*gurubhūta-kalpanā*) and in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic doctrine there are only different stages in a cloth and no production and destruction of fragmentary cloths. Since the Viśiṣṭādvaitin contends that a 'whole' is nothing but a peculiar kind of collection of parts, such cases are explained by the instance of a heap of grains from which some quantity is added to or removed. In this case, a new product is not evolved but only different stages in the production. Simplicity (*lāghava*) is a merit in the system of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, though the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika professes great fondness for simplicity. Unlike the Buddhist, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin does not deny the conjunction of parts which makes the 'whole' and there is no new entity distinct from the parts. Even the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika calls the conjunction of parts as a non-inherent cause of the product and the parts in the state of conjunction are considered by both the schools to be 'wholes'. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin does not accept the view that merely with the addition of new parts the old 'whole' is lost and a fresh one is created.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika too has to accept the view that the all-pervasive entities (*vibhu dravyāṇi*) and infinitesimal atoms (*aṇavaḥ*) have different states. When he speaks of the origination of things or the distinction of objects, what is meant is really different states of substances; e.g. ether has various sounds in it and their possession is nothing but a state of ether. Again, atoms have different states either by conjunction with other atoms or as in the case of earth-atoms (*pārthiva-paramāṇavaḥ*), owing to the contact of heat. When this contact takes place, a new colour, taste, smell and

touch are produced. As a matter of fact, says the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, the substances continue to be eternal, though the different states or modifications undergone by them are not eternal. Their eternity is due to their being liable to assume a different name on account of a new status that has taken place. If the conjunction of a jar has taken place in a limited part of ether, it is only a new condition according to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin.

One and the same substance is said to be eternal if that substance alone is taken into account, even though it may appear non-eternal from the point of view of its having different conditions.¹⁶

4.12. *An Objection to the Vaiśiṣṭādvaitin's Satkāryavāda and his Answer Thereto*

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika objects as follows to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic view of the *satkāryavāda* which holds that the effect is not different from the cause and exists in the (material) cause. In the *Brahmasūtra* 'paṭavacca' (2-1-19) the author takes the example of a cloth and declares that the cloth is simply the yarns with a new shape or condition. But this declaration of Bādarāyaṇa is untenable, says the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Suppose a single long yarn is so woven as to produce a cloth, it could not be called or considered a cloth as there is only one yarn and not a plurality of yarns.¹⁷

To this the Viśiṣṭādvaitin's reply is as follows:— There is no necessity to fix a minimum number for the yarns, so that they may acquire the name, cloth. What is necessary is a peculiar arrangement of one or more yarns to make an observer call it cloth. It is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and not the Viśiṣṭādvaitin who

denies the formation of a 'whole' with a single component for the reason that there is the absence of conjunction of two or more parts. It is only in his (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's) view that conjunction of two or more parts constitutes a non-inherent cause (*asamavāyīkāraṇa*) for producing wholes. The untenability of this view is evident from the instance of an ear-ornament prepared with a single palmyra leaf. Hence it is not Viśiṣṭādvaitin but the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika who is open to the charge that plurality and not arrangement alone that is essential for a non-inherent cause.

4.13. *Criticism of Gautama's View That a 'Whole' Must Exist Apart from Its Parts*

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika raises another objection by the following argument: If the collection of parts itself is said to be the 'whole' and the 'whole' has no individual existence apart from its parts, then even a mountain which is nothing but a collection of atoms with infinitesimal size and consequently beyond human perception, must be imperceptible. This argument is made by Gautama in the aphorism "*sarvāgrahaṇam avayavyasiddheḥ*" (2-1-35)." Thus if substances that are said to possess medium magnitude (*madhyama-parimāṇa*) are invisible, then the eyes would have no function at all.

The reply of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin is:— Although the individual parts possess too small a size to be perceptible, yet the collection of those parts may possess medium magnitude and become visible. Just as contradictory attributes like oneness and duality (*ekatvam* and *dvitvam*) could co-exist in an object through the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) and through the rela-

tion of 'collective extensivity' (*paryāpti sambandhaḥ*) respectively, atomicity and visible magnitude may co-exist in things — atomicity when the individual parts are taken into account and visible magnitude (*madhyama-parimāna*) when their association is taken into account. Individually they may be imperceptible, but they become visible when taken as a collection. For example, a single hair may not be noticed, but a collection of hair becomes easily perceptible. Even so the particles of dew. The triad which is the smallest entity according to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, is perceptible under proper conditions.

4.14. *Further Reasons of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to Establish Distinction between the Whole and Its Parts and their Unsoundness*

A further objection to the *satkūryavāda* is made by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as follows. Unless a whole distinct from its parts is held to exist, there would be no difference between a space occupied by the collection of parts and the place occupied by the individual parts. In the case of a heap of grain, for example, the difference in the size of a space is found due to the difference in the size of the heap. If a whole has its own individual existence different from the individual grains, then it can be said that each part occupies a small place, while the 'whole' occupies a larger space. If the whole is not distinct from its parts, then how could the larger space of the heap be explained, if each part occupies a small place of its own?

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin's answer may be presented as follows. It is unnecessary to posit a whole as a distinct and separate entity quite apart from its parts. It can

be illustrated by the instance of fragrance. We see that the greater the quantity of the perfume, say, musk, the larger the fragrance emitted by it. Similarly the greater the number of parts, the larger the space occupied by the heap. This principle is applicable not only to qualities but to substances as well. Even the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school holds that just before the production of a dyad the two atoms conjoined together must occupy a greater space. If the two atoms conjoined occupied the same space as a single atom, there would be no dyad formation. How could two atoms occupy one and the same space since they have motion and resistance?

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argues further: — A substance that has some size is said to have a *deśa*, small or big, as the case may be, and *deśa*, is said to be one on which a thing rests through the relation of conjunction or inherence (*saṃyoga* or *samavāya*). If a 'whole' distinct from the parts is denied, then how could the place or *deśa*, collection of parts be smaller or larger?

To this the answer of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin is as follows. The parts of ether can serve the purpose of *deśa*. Although ether is usually conceived as devoid of parts, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the portion of ether limited by the exterior portions of ear is the organ of hearing, and thus the innumerable parts of ether have been conceived as the organs of hearing of countless living beings. The air when escaping through the different holes in a flute, gives different notes. Unless limited parts in ether are conceived, these phenomena cannot be explained. Hence the dyads and triads that join together — one never occupying

the place of another — occupy a greater place (*deśa*) and this explains the magnitude of parts.

Thus an individual 'whole' not previously existing (*asat-kārya*) and distinct from the parts is inconceivable and hence does not exist. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the yarns that are joined in a particular manner evolve a new thing 'whole' — a cloth — and the conjunction of the yarns plays the role of a non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi kāraṇa*).

But the Viśiṣṭādvaitin gives an explanation different from the above. The yarns so united assume a different state or condition and consequently bear a different name that is 'cloth' and there is nothing newly evolved. According to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin the birth of a new thing is nothing but a new state of a previously existing thing with a different state (*purvā-vasthasya uttarāvasthā-prāptiḥ utpattiḥ*). A similar explanation is to be given with regard to a flock of cattle or army or forest etc. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika cites the sentence 'the cloth possesses yarns' (*paṭaḥ tantumān*) in support of his view that the cloth is different from the yarns, as indicated by the suffix (*matuḥ pratyaya*) meaning possession. The statement 'the cloth possesses yarns' indicates that there is difference between the possessor and that which is possessed. The verbal usage 'the cloth has yarns' (*paṭaḥ tantumān*) is to be explained as is done in the case of 'the army has valorous men' (*śūravatī senā*) and 'the body of the stone-image' (*śilā-putrakasya-sarīram*). Though in those cases there is no army apart from valorous men, or a body apart from the stone image, such verbal usages are in vogue and they are held to be grammatically correct. Thus it is proved that it is not correct to consider that

the possessive participle is invariably used with the words meaning things which are distinct from that possessor. Though the usages 'the cloth has yarns' and 'the army has valorous men' may be said to mean two distinct entities, yarns are not distinct from the cloth and the heroes are not distinct from the army; still the possessive participle is used.

4.15. *Recognition Proves the Identity of the Whole and Its Parts*

The Buddhist who maintains that every thing in the universe has only a momentary existence is refuted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on the ground of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). But it may be pointed out that the same argument can be used to prove the identity of the 'whole' and its component parts. The recognition that "what was a mere mass of clay before, has now turned into a jar"¹ prove that the two things, namely, what was before and what is now perceived, are identical.

These recognitions are not to be discountenanced nor interpreted as comprehending different things belonging to the same class; that is, they cannot be interpreted as confounding similar things with identical things. If this interpretation were accepted, recognition would not help the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to refute the Buddhist theory of momentariness. Hence on the authority of recognition, things should be considered as persisting or continuing, though in some cases the things may be non-eternal. As in the case of a mass of cotton which we can easily identity in all shapes, we can recognise the identity of the cloth and the ayryn. The difference in the name, number etc. bet-

ween cause and effect do not by any means prove the difference in the parts and the 'whole'. A lotus bud when it blossoms does not bring forth any new thing, so states Uddyotakara in his *Nyāyavārttika*. What is accepted here must apply likewise to other cases as well. These are only changes in the same thing and they do not deserve to be considered as different entities on account of the change in the condition or state.

4.16. *The Conception of the Ultimate Whole Cannot be Sustained*

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains that some substances, like jar, cloth, etc. are called 'ultimate wholes' (*antyāvayavi*) which cannot evolve any other product or 'whole'. Then it may be asked: Can a cloth which is still in the loom and about to be cut and taken out be considered an ultimate whole because it is considered as a finished product or can it be not? It cannot be the former, because with the addition of more yarns, it would cease to be an ultimate whole and would give rise to another. It cannot be the latter, because it may then be asked: What is it that is really wanted to make an ultimate whole? Should it be said that that is an ultimate whole to which no more could be added and that all others are non-ultimate, we say this cannot be an adequate definition because competent craftsmen can add more parts to any object and thereby secure something bigger. A jar, for example, may be provided with a handle made of the same substance.

Let us cite another example: that of a tower which can be considered an ultimate whole. Suppose that after its creation, some additions to it are made,

say, the putting up of a doll thereon. Let us ask whether that tower first erected exists even after the addition of the doll or whether it has perished. If it is the former, it cannot be an ultimate whole. If it is the latter, it would be against all experience. None perceives the disappearance of the former tower; nor can any reason be adduced therefor. It cannot be suggested that as in the case of the burning taper, here also the former tower perishes imperceptibly but that we have illusory perception of identity of the new with the old tower; because in the case of the taper, we perceive the diminution of the candle whereas in the case of the tower we do not perceive the tower perishing and being replaced by a similar one.

Again if a small piece of cotton is taken out from a mass of cotton, we don't see the diminution of the whole mass. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has, in accordance with his theory, to assume the destruction of the former and the production of a new mass of cotton. since the non-inherent cause (*asamavāyī-kāraṇa*), namely, '*amśu-saṁyoga*' is destroyed and the material cause also is removed therefrom. But according to the theory of aggregation (*saṅghātvāda*), when a part is added or removed as in a heap of grain, there is neither production nor destruction of a thing.

In fact the theory that by taking a trivial portion away from an aggregate, the latter is destroyed and a new one produced, is against all reason; for in the different regions of the vast earth, some portions are removed by different human agencies at all times. And on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, destruction should be taking place at all times and in consequence of that

there would be no time for the reformation of the earth at all. Similarly in the vast expanse of the sea where the water is increasing and diminishing constantly, no destruction of the old nor the production of a new is possible. Thus there can be no whole distinct from the parts.

4.17. *The Unsoundness of the Theory of Production of Dyad and Triad*

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of production of all objects between the two extremes of infinitesimal atoms (*paramāṇu*) at one end and all-pervasive substances (*vibhūdravyāṇi*) like ether at the other end, is hardly convincing. According to them the first composite substance (*prathamāḥ avayavī*) to be produced is the dyad; it is composed of two atoms. The conjunction of two atoms is the non-inherent cause of a dyad. Like the atom, the dyad is also imperceptible. Three atoms, it is said, cannot combine because the multiplicity of causes must lead to an object of perceptible magnitude, but the triad is defined as one which is made up of parts which are themselves endowed with parts, whereas the atoms are partless. Hence it is contended that the triad is produced out of three dyads and it is the first composite entity which is a product of visible magnitude (*madhyama-parimāṇa*). The dimension of a dyad, it is said, is not the product of the dimensions of its component parts, namely two atoms; for in that case its size would be larger than that of the atom, whereas, by hypothesis, the atom has a superior dimension (*parimāṇa*) (*utkr̥ṣṭaḥ ca aṇoḥ aṇutaram-eva*). Hence it is maintained by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, that the dimension of the dyad is the pro-

duct of the duality of the atoms composing it (*paramāṇu-dvaya-gata-dvītva-saṅkhyā*). This duality of the two atoms is the result of the notion of addition (*apekṣā-buddhiḥ*, *ayam ekaḥ*, *ayam ekaḥ*; *imau dvau ityākārikā*). Since the atoms are imperceptible, the duality of atoms must be attributed to God's notion of addition, not any man's. But on the ground that God's notion of addition (*apekṣā buddhi*) is eternal it cannot be maintained that duality (*dvītva*) will not perish in accordance with the dictum (duality and other numbers perish in the fourth *kṣaṇa* of its birth, in consequence of the extinction of its cause, namely, the notion of addition; but the God's notion of addition being held eternal, the duality and other numbers being positive productives (*bhāva-kāryāṇi*) are to perish for some other reason),

Three dyads, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, go to make a triad. Two triads are not enough to evolve a perceptible object for want of accumulation of parts (*avayava-pracayaḥ*) and of the acquisition of the medium magnitude. The triad and its colour are perceptible—though its components, the dyads and their colour, are not. The argument that unless the component parts and their colour are perceptible, the composite 'whole' and its colour cannot be, can hardly be sustained. Though the dyads are not perceived and much less their colour, the triad may be perceived yellow with the colour of the sun-light superimposed thereon,⁹⁰ as in the case of a conch appearing yellow to a person with jaundiced eyes. Products bigger in size than the triad are evolved by the combination of parts without any limit being set to their number. While threefold causes (*samavāyi*, *asamavāyi*, and

nimitta-kāraṇāni) are necessary for the production of positive products, for destruction one cause, namely, the instrumental cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) alone is held to be sufficient.

4.18. *Consideration of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika View Regarding the Formation of Human and Other Bodies*

Having no other basis except the imagination of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, these theories are arbitrary and unacceptable to learned people like Vyāsa, who uphold the authority of the *Vedas* as supreme in these matters. It is unequivocally stated in the *Brahma-sūtras* that although the Sāṅkhya doctrine propounded by Kapila goes against some principles enunciated by the *Vedas*, there are some aspects of their theory which are in accordance with them; therefore these are accepted by those taking their stand on the *Vedas*. But the statements of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are thoroughly unacceptable to those who are desirous of eternal bliss in the supreme world."

Let us now examine the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory concerning the human body and other physical objects. On the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory all bodies in the world have earth alone for their material constituent though there is contact of other elements; but the latter do not constitute their component parts, in the sense in which earth is spoken of as the constituent. If we find in the bodies the characteristic qualities of other elements, it may be due to the presence of the contact of other elements with the constituent part of the earth. In the making of a pot from clay, for example, the contact of water is required only in this manner. Likewise in the make up of all bodies the other elements are mixed with only in this manner.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, two atoms of different elements, say, an atom of earth and an atom of water cannot form a dyad; for, these two atoms have three conspicuous common qualities, namely, colour, taste and touch, while one of them alone (the atom of earth) possesses odour. Even with regard to touch, there is similarity only in a broad general sense, since in each case, strictly speaking, there is a special kind of touch — in water, cool touch and in the earth, neither hot, nor cool touch — *jale śīta-sparśaḥ, pṛthivyām-anuṣṇāśīta-sparśaḥ*). The combination of these two atoms cannot produce odour in the resultant. There is a rule that a quality in the composite substance cannot arise, if it were not present in the two component parts." Thus other elements, besides earth, cannot enter into the composition of objects, as their constituents, though their contact cannot be denied.

Thus Vātsyāyana while commenting on *Nyāya-sūtra* "*pārthivam guṇāntaropalabdheḥ*" (3-1-28) meaning "the body must be regarded as composed of the earth; because we find in it the distinctive quality (of the Earth)," says:— "The human body must be regarded as composed of Earth. Why? Because we find in it the distinctive quality of Earth. The Earth is endowed with odour and so is also the body — and inasmuch as water and other material substances are odourless, if the body were composed of them, it would be without odour. But as a matter of fact, the body could not form the receptacle of the soul's activities, if it were built up with earth only, without being mixed with water, etc.; hence the body should be regarded as being built up by the mixture of all the five material

substances; the *sūtra* does not deny the material contact or mixture (in the body) of the five substances.*"

Ganganatha Jha commenting on the above *sūtra* writes:— The contention that the body is composed of earth means that the earth alone is the material cause of the body. It does not deny the conjunction of water and other substances as it is invariably required for its production."

Now let us examine this theory. According to its the whole is just a collection of parts. It is possible for different elements to form a composite, as milk with water is conceived by all as a whole. Even Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika establishes gold as a whole constituted by the parts of earth and fire, since it possesses the qualities of weight, yellow colour etc. of earth which do not belong to the element fire. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, they are superimposed on fire (*tejah*) from earthy parts that lie along with the parts of the element fire (*tejah*). The triple blending (*trivṛt-karaṇa*) referred to in the *Vedās* is for the purpose of making the composite possess a form and a name of its own. This triple blending (*trivṛt-karaṇa*) is based on the principle of constituting a whole (*avayavi*) with different elements. If the production of a dyad from two different elements is denied and consequently the further developments too, then their theory goes against the Vedic statements. The *Garbhopaniṣad* states that the human body is composed of four kinds of food that which can be drunk, licked, sucked and eaten (*peya-lehya-coṣya-khādyaṇi*), and these are composed of earthy and watery parts. The *smṛtis* also refer to the body as composed of five elements. By grafting two

*Ganganatha Jha's translation.

different species of saplings, we often see, a tree is caused to grow.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrine which does not accept the existence of a whole (*avayavi*) distinct from the component parts, is not liable to the following charges that may be made against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

1. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that there is a category (*padārtha*) or predicable entity called 'genus' (*jāti*). The Viśiṣṭādvaitin asks what that genus or generic attribute is in the case of the human body which is a compound of five elements — earth, water, fire, air and ether.

2. Nor can it have a number of generic attributes of equal importance since there would then be 'cross division' (*sāṅkaryam*) of generics which is condemned by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

3. Nor can it be totally devoid of any generic attribute less comprehensive than '*dravyatva*', for such an entity would then cease to be a '*dravya*'.

4. Nor could there be a generic attribute peculiar and different from '*prthivīva*, *jalatva*, *tejaṣṭva* and *vāyutva*' since that would amount to positing a tenth '*dravya*'. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there are only nine kinds of substances (*dravyāṇi*).

As a matter of fact, there is no generic attribute (*jāti*) as a separate category as conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. According to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, a generic attribute is nothing but a configuration (*samsthāna*).

Moreover, though the five elements constitutes the human and other bodies, there will be no 'cross-division' of generic attributes, because the body may be an exceptionally peculiar category even as the body of Lord Narasimha. A similar explanation is given by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with regard to the variegated colour (*citra-rūpa*) of cloth. Different colours in the yarns produce a variegated colour in the whole, namely, a cloth. By the numerous yarns, a cloth, which according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is totally of a different species, is generated and hence the rule that things cannot generate a new thing entirely distinct and different from its material cause, becomes null and void.

Human and other bodies which are constituted of the five elements are said to be earthy by consideration of their being constituted mostly by earthy matter which manifests its characteristic properties such as weight, hardness, etc. in the bones, for example. It is impossible to deny the existence of watery and other elemental parts as well in human and other bodies, since they are made of blood, marrow etc. This contention has the approval of the *Brahma-sūtra* "*vaiśeṣyāttu tadvādastadvādaḥ*" which means that human bodies are said to be constituted of earthy parts because earthy parts form the major portion of the human bodies. It is obvious in the case of a heap of rice mixed with a comparatively small quantity of sesame when the heap is called one of rice ignoring the sesame which is proportionately very little. A cot made of different kinds of wood, a tower built with different kinds of stone etc. are spoken of as made up of one particular material which forms the major part. Why

not give such an explanation in the case of all those which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika denominates as composites?

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin contends that although there is no substance worthy of the name 'composite' and all the so-called composites are nothing but aggregations of similar parts, the thing found in the form of a material from which a product can be evolved in future, is called 'element' (*bhūta*); while a thing evolved from its material cause is called an 'elemental product' (*bhautika*). Or a thing that is found without evolving a product is said to be in its elemental state and the same, when it is in the state of a transformed product, is called an 'elemental product'. The primordial thing (*prakṛti*) when it is not evolving into any product, is said to be in '*samastīyavasthā*', but when it is assuming various forms and names, it is said to be innumerable and in '*vyastīyavasthā*'.

4.19. *The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Criticism of the Satkārya-vāda and the Reply of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin*

Then arises the objection of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that if the material cause — the primordial matter (*prakṛti*) is eternal, and if the various conditions in the same thing alone are said to be its effects, this view cannot be termed the '*satkārya-vāda*'. For, *satkāryavāda* really implies the presence of the effect prior to its production; e.g., oil in sesame seeds, rice in paddy and milk in the udder of the cow. In none of these can it be maintained that what is previously non-existent is brought out afresh. When the Viśiṣṭādvaitin says that a state (*avasthā*) that did not exist before is brought into being at the subsequent stage, how can this view be called '*satkāryavāda*'?

This objection, it is obvious, is due to an ignorance of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic doctrine which in this respect is quite different from the corresponding Sāṅkhya view. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin bases his stand entirely upon the Vedic texts and says that a substance already existing assumes different conditions, and with those new conditions the same substance is termed a product;" as, for example, when a lump of clay is transformed into a jar, surely a shape that did not exist previously is brought about and the pre-existent entity with the new shape it has taken, is known as the effect. This doctrine is also in accord with our everyday experience.

4.20. *Consideration of the Function of the Sense Organs, Eye and Ear*

There are some schools of philosophy which maintain that it is wrong on the part of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to state that the eye proceeds to the object which is seen. They hold (as against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) that the visual sense (*cakṣurindriya*) remains where it is while apprehending a distant object. They argue as follows:— If the eye were to go to the place of the object, the eye would be unable to comprehend anything that is bigger than itself in size. A small knife can cut only small things like nails, but it cannot cut a log of wood which would require an axe. Besides there could, on that view, be no comprehension of a branch of a tree which is nearby and of the moon simultaneously. Against this criticism, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika gives the following answer:— Since there can be no apprehension in the absence of contact with the object apprehended, the eye does go out and that it is specially fitted to cover the distance with remarkable speed. Hence the sense-organs must be assumed to cause their

respective cognitions only by their actually going to those places, the distance being immaterial.

According to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin the sense-organs are the products of the '*sāttvikāhaṅkāra*' and not of the five gross elements, but with their powers heightened by the respective elements that enter upon their functions. While the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika says that the sense of vision is capable of actually travelling long distances in order to have the contact of the objects, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin says that the functioning (*ṛtti*) of the eye goes out to establish contact with the objects in however distant a place it might be. The *ṛtti* is the movement of the elements which infuse heightened power in the senses.

The *ṛtti* of the eye is not obstructed while it passes through a transparent medium like water, crystal or glass and hence the object on the other side of transparent medium becomes perceived. As the smell of musk spreads far and wide even from within a closed box, so the *ṛtti* too can pass through a medium, but like light, this also travels only in straight lines. Moreover, it, like the lustre of light, ceases to travel the moment the eyes are closed. When we look at our face in a mirror, the *ṛtti* of our own eyes turns back and thus causes the contact leading to perception.

In the case of the ears, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would explain that sound travels to the ear in a series in the manner of water-waves or of the buds of the Kadamba tree, until it reaches the ear. But he forgets the fact that sound having no physical frame is incapable of travelling in this way. If the fragrance of a flower from a far-off place pleases our noses, it is due to the

wind that can carry even the smallest particles from the flower. Here the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika himself contends that fragrance with its substratum is carried by the wind. Nor is it possible to say that like the eyes, the ear too goes to the place where the sound is produced; for the sense organ of the ear, is ether limited, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, by the external construction of the ear and if it goes to the place of its objects, it ceases to be ear.

Here Veṅkaṭanātha states briefly the views of some of the followers of the Sāṅkhya school. According to them, the sense-organ of hearing functions in the same way as the other sense-organs through their respective *vr̥ttis*. The ear or the organ of hearing is a product of *sattvikāhaṅkāra* and not of any element. But when it is stimulated to a high degree of activity by ether (*ākāśa*) which has the power (*āpyāyana-śakti*), the sense of hearing acquires its own *vr̥tti* and it is through this *vr̥tti* that sound is perceived. The Sāṅkhya holds that a substance that is capable of being transformed may change either by its very nature or by the element that activates it to a high degree. The sense-organs of sound called the ear comes into contact with its object, namely, sound, through its *vr̥tti* acquired in the manner mentioned before. The Sāṅkhyas proceed further and hold, on the basis of what they call common experience, that the ear, the sense organ of hearing (and not the element, ether) functions in such a manner that its *vr̥tti* or operation goes to the place where the sound is generated and apprehends sound, and along with it, the place or object from which the sound arises. That is why, they state, we feel and say "the sound of the drum," the sound of the bamboo that is split, etc. If

the spreading of *vr̥tti* from the organ of hearing to the place whence the sound arises is not admitted, they ask — how would it be possible to apprehend not only the sound but also the place of its origin, the drum the bamboo and the like? Thus, according to the Sāṅkhyas, the *vr̥tti* of the ear, the organ of hearing, proceeds from the ear and comes into contact with the sound and likewise, the place or object from which it originates. It is in this way that perception is caused of sound and its substratum (the drum, the bamboo etc). The intensity or degree of clearness in hearing or the perception of sound depends upon the degree or intimateness of contact between the *vr̥tti* and the sound.

4.21. *Criticism of the Sāṅkhya Theory*

This theory is not tenable. It is well-known that a person who is near the place of the origin of a sound hears it sooner than one who stands at a great distance from it. When a drum is beaten, Veṅkaṭanātha points out, a person just near it hears the sound almost instantaneously while one standing a furlong off hears it only after the lapse of some seconds. Again if at that time the wind blows from the place of generation of the sound in the direction of the person who hears it, the apprehension of the sound takes place sooner than if the wind blows in the opposite direction. So also when a sound is generated outside the house, the people inside the house do not hear it so distinctly as those who are outside.

4.22. *Viśiṣṭādvaitin's View*

These facts of common experience can be explained satisfactorily only if we admit that the sound itself moves and not the sense-organ or its *vr̥tti*. Like light,

sound, it is true, cannot move from one place to another as it has no physical form. But the Viśiṣṭādvaitin explains the movement of sound as follows:— Just as odour or fragrance moves from one place to another along with the pollen of the flower which is its substratum, sound travels from one place to another along with its substratum, the air. When Yāmunācārya says in his *Ātmasiddhi*, “sound, colour, the light of the sun and the lustre of a gem are different from the objects possessing them as they have movement,” what he means is not that sound and fragrance travel by themselves but that they are borne with their substratum.”

Moreover the phenomenon of echo strengthens this theory of sound movement with its substratum. A loud sound produced in a cave or the wall of a temple strikes against the opposite wall and causes an echo, which may be explained only on the basis of sound having a physical form, because of its being accompanied by its substratum. Echo is caused by the violent contact of sound with its substratum against the wall.

So it is the air that must be held as the substratum of sound. At the time of beginning the chanting of the *Vedas*, the following hymns are prescribed to be chanted and they assert that the sound is of air.” “I bow to Thee, O Air! Thou art the Brahman that is actually perceived (*Veda* is termed as *śabda-brahman*). I am going to chant Thee, the perceptible Brahman.” Here the air itself is conceived to be transformed into *Veda* (sound). The same *Veda* is described as the breath of Brahman.” The air itself is considered *svara*, in a verse of the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*.²¹

4.23. *The Nature of the Soul according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School*

With regard to the soul or spirit (*ātman*), the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains that it is omnipresent (*vibhu*), that it is not self-luminous and that after liberation from the bondage of *samsāra*, it has no knowledge of any kind and remains like a piece of stone. They hold that as it is not self-luminous, it is apprehended with the help of its attribute or quality, *viz.*, knowledge, in the same way as other non-self-luminous objects like a jar are apprehended with the help of their qualities. According to them, pleasure during *samsāra* is invariably accompanied by pain and that after liberation (*mukti*) the soul has neither pain nor pleasure nor any other kind of knowledge.

The soul is omnipresent, here, there and everywhere throughout the universe. The '*adrṣṭa*' otherwise called '*dharma*' and '*adharmā*' — the unseen potentialities remain in the soul; and it being a common auxiliary cause of things, in company with other particular causes, causes things to come into being in places near or remote. Hence a medicine, prepared in America, is a product of the *adrṣṭa-dharma* — of a person who is going to take it to cure his disease; and a knife made in Sheffield is a product of the *adrṣṭa-adharma* — of a person who is going to be injured by the knife.

The Vedic statement, '*satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ brahma*,' or '*vi-jñānaṁ yajñam tanute*' does not mean the identity of knowledge with the soul. The words *jñāna* and *vi-jñāna* mean only the substratum of knowledge. The liberation of a soul takes place at the destruction

of the twentyone pains, and it is a state like that of a stone which is unconscious of any pleasure or pain. As pleasure is invariably accompanied by pain, souls are denied — according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika—all pleasures, even though the scriptures categorically state that souls enjoy transcendental bliss at the time of their emancipation.

4.24. *Viśiṣṭādvaitin's View on the Nature of the Soul in Bondage and the Liberated Soul*

These contentions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not have the Vedic authority. We see the Vedic statements sometimes identifying knowledge with the soul and sometimes ascribing knowledge to the soul as an attribute. As both statements are valid and could not be opposed to each other, we should seek to effect a reconciliation between them. The soul is knowledge as well as the substratum or possessor of knowledge. This is how the Viśiṣṭādvaitins reconcile these two apparently contradictory scriptural statements. To be conscious means to be cognized as 'I' without the help of the attributive knowledge (*dharmabhūta-jñāna*) which comprehends external as well as internal objects and its own self. This attributive knowledge too is eternal but has the potency of contracting and expanding. When the souls are subject to birth and death, attributive knowledge is in a contracted stage and its operation is limited. But when the self is liberated from *samsāra* it becomes capable of comprehending everything as is the knowledge of the supreme Being itself. So long as the souls are bound by *karma*, their knowledge is limited and they cannot have omniscience. Thus the soul

can be identical with knowledge and at the same time be a seat of knowledge in consonance with the Vedic statements of both types. Neither the sentient being nor the attributive knowledge requires any other knowledge for its own comprehension, as both happen to be self-luminous. When we are asleep, the attributive knowledge ceases to operate and hence we are not conscious of anything else. The sentient being on account of its being self-luminous is conscious of its own self as 'I'. This can be proved from the recollection after waking from sleep in the manner 'I had pleasant sleep till I woke up'. This means that 'I'-cognition alone was continuing when it was asleep.

As a matter of fact the soul, at the time when a man is asleep, takes rest in the lap of the supreme Being which dwells in the heart of each individual with the name of 'inner controller' (*antaryāmi*) — one of the five forms of the supreme Being. Just like a treasure below the ground upon which we tread again and again, being unconscious of its presence there, we take rest in the 'inner controller' when we feel very much exhausted, and this (taking rest) is sleep."

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika states that the self or soul possesses knowledge but is not knowledge, that is, they hold that it is not self-luminous. During *saṃsāra*, according to them, the soul is cognised by the knowledge in the same way as other objects, external and internal, are cognised. When liberation (*mukti*) takes place, they maintain that the soul is deprived of knowledge and other such qualities and becomes free of pleasure and pain. The self is, according to them, exactly like non-sentient stone in the state of *mukti*.

This view is against the Vedic statements which unequivocally affirm that souls are self-luminous. The soul is, according to scriptures, like a burning lamp, not in need of something else to prove its own existence. It is ever shining as 'I' and its existence need not be proved by any other illuminating agent such as knowledge. Does any one require his knowledge to cognize other knowledge when it is prevailing? Thus it follows from the *Vedas* that both the soul and its quality, the attributive knowledge, are self-luminous. The nature of comprehension and of self-luminosity are common features of the soul and its quality of attributive knowledge. The soul, however, though it possesses the nature of comprehension, cannot comprehend any other thing than itself while its attributive knowledge can comprehend other things also. Self-luminosity means that it does not require anything else for its own illumination. As a consequence of this fact, the soul is denominated as *jñāna* and *viññāna*. This self-luminosity of the soul does not stand in the way of its having knowledge as its quality. The quality is termed by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins, as an attributive knowledge and it is this knowledge which illumines everything to the soul. On this score, the soul is said to be a '*jñāta*' or '*jñāḥ*'. The attributive knowledge when it is brought about by the function of sense organs makes the soul conscious of the various sense objects, while the knowledge is self-luminous. As this is liable to expansion and contraction due to past *karma*, the bound souls have no omniscience and their knowledge is limited in various degrees in accordance with their past *karma*. The attributive knowledge is said to be a *dravya*, or substance which is defined as one that is liable to chan-

ges in itself. The supreme Being and the liberated souls have their attributive knowledge in all its fullness and are omniscient since they have no *karma* of any kind that can limit the free expansion of attributive knowledge.

The attributive knowledge makes the soul conscious of external and internal objects, prompts the body to act in response to its findings and thus subjects the soul to the experience of pleasure or pain. Inwardness (*pratyaktva*) is a peculiar feature of the soul. It means that the luminosity of the soul is for the sake of its own illumination (*svasmai svayam-prakāśa*), whereas the luminosity of the attributive knowledge results in benefit to the soul which takes necessary action after the above knowledge comes into existence and derive the benefits; and so the attributive knowledge is called '*parāk*' that is luminous for somebody else, since its luminosity benefits others, namely, the soul, its substratum, and never benefits itself (*svāśrayāya bhāsamāna*).

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin upholds the supreme authority of the scriptures and has therefore to confine himself in the course of explaining his doctrine strictly to Vedic statements. His views must never go against the Vedic texts. As a consequence of this he considers the souls to be infinitesimally small (*aṇu*). The size of the soul is described to be as small as one-ten-thousandth part of the sharp edge of the tail of a grain of paddy, but at the same time it can be stated as immeasurable and all-comprehensive with its conspicuous attributive knowledge which spreads like the lustre of a light though it occupies a small place."

Since knowledge is the conspicuous and outstanding quality of the soul, the soul is sometimes called by that quality, the knowledge.

As the invariable experience of all human beings is to the effect 'I do know', the knowledge must be held a quality quite distinct from its substratum the 'I'. The Vedic statements such as "*jānāti eva ayam puruṣaḥ*" correspond to the above experience and confirm the distinction between the self and its attributive knowledge.

As some other Vedic texts identify the soul with knowledge, the soul is to be held to have the nature of knowledge as well in order to maintain the validity of this type of Vedic texts.

NOTES

1. *jāla-sūrya-maricistham yat-sūkṣmaṁ dṛśyate rajah/
pralhamam tatpramāṇānām trasareṇuriti smṛtaḥ*||

2. *ṣaṭkena-yugapad-yogāt paramānoḥ ṣaḍ-amśatā/
ṣaṇṇām samāna-deśatve piṇḍaḥ syād aṇumātrakaḥ*||

3. buddhiśca ekāpi aneka-viśayā dṛṣṭā iṣṭā ca. niraṁśā ca sā pratyekam kārtsnyena amśato vā viśayikuryāt? na ādyaḥ; anyānullekha-prasaṅgāt. na dvitīyaḥ; niraṁśatvādeva tatra cet kaścit samādhīḥ, aṇuṣvapi tathā syāt.

4. viśayitvaṁ hi amśānapekṣatayaiva dṛṣṭam; na hi anyato'pi tasya anyathā dṛṣṭiḥ. ato yathopalambham ekavat aneko'pi viśaya ekasyābuddheḥ. avayavy-ārambhaka-samyogastu tvayā'pi na kvacit amśa-nirapekṣa uktāḥ. kvacit viśe-ṣāṅgikāre niyāmakābhāvaḥ — S. S. p. 19.

5. dravyānām ekatra samavāyena samāna-deśatām vyāsedhāmo na tu samyogena. samavāyena hi samāna-deśatā sthaulya-paripandhini; yathā gandha-rūpa-rasa-sparśāḥ samāna-deśāḥ na sthaulyam ārabhante. tat kasya hetoḥ? eṣām amūrtānām samāna-deśa-samavāyāt. mūrtāstu sparśa-vantaḥ samavāyena asamāna-deśāḥ paraspara-samyogino yadi sthaulyam ārabhante kiṁ bādhyate? — *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā* (Chaukhamba Press) p. 651.

6. niravayaveṣu tu viśva-vyāptaikatattva-vādinaste tannibandhanā bhāga-kṛtir-aśakyā. tad-upādhi-samyogāttu syādapi yadi, tatrāpi aṁśānamśa-vikalpakṣobho'tilānghyeta. atassarve digupādhisamyogānām-paramāṇuṣu khatham-upādhi-bhāgabhedā'pādakatvam? S. S. p. 19.

7. avayavy-ārambhaka-samyogastu na kvacid aṁśa-nirapekṣa uktaḥ; kvacid viśeṣāṅgikāre niyāmakābhāvaḥ. S. S. p. 19.

8. adhikāvayavārabdhatvaṁ nyūnāvayavārabdhatvaṁ ca parimāṇatāratamya-prayojakam.

9. *anvamaṁśānām anantatve gamtrṇām tad atikramah/
kadāpi na syāt kiṁ na syāt vegātīśaya-paibhavāt||
dyumaṇer ātapas sarpaṇ udayādri-śikhāmaṇeḥ/
tat-kṣaṇam kiṁ na nirbhāti paścimādri-śikhaṇḍakāḥ||*
S. S. p. 20.

10. sad-eva saumya idamagre āsīt, *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 6.2.1.

11. na anyo avayavi avayavebhyaḥ, gurutvāntara-kāryāgrahaṇāt, N. V. p. 233.

12. dravya-samāhāra-gurutvādvadhāraṇāt. yadidam bhavatā manyate dvi-palam pañca-palamiti; na atra kārya-kāraṇa-gurutve avadhāryete kintu ācaramād āparamāṇośca dravya-samāhāro unnīyate tatra, manuṣyadharmāṇo na yuktaṁ vaktum-iyat kāraṇa-gurutvamīyat kārya-gurutvam iti. N. V. p. 235.

13. *patrasya hi kuṇḍalitasya nāmāntaram dṛṣṭam. saphalaśca avasthāntareṇa kāraka-vyāpārah. na tu atra avayavy-antarotpattiḥ; ākuñcanaprasāraṇa-padma-saṅkoca-vikāsādiṣu api tat-kalpana-prasaṅgāt. na ca ekena avayavena avayavy-ārambhah; asamavāyikāraṇāsambhavāt. avayavā-yava-saṁyogastatra asamavāyī-kāraṇam iti cet-na, tasya anyārthatvāt. anyathā aṁśūnām tantuvat paṭāśrayatvam-api syāt. S. S. p. 22.*

14. *pūrva-siddha-paṭaissārdham tantubhiḥ paṭa-sambhave/
paṭa-paṅktis samikṣyeta kramād-ādhikya-śālinī||
prāk siddhānām paṭādinām uttarottara-janmani/
ahetuko vināśaśca sthira-pakṣe na yujyate||*

na ced, upalambha-viruddha-vināśa-santati kalpanā-prasaṅgaḥ. evaṁ eka-dvi-try-āditantvapakaṛṣaṇadaśāyām api khaṇḍa-paramparotpatti-nāśaparamparotpatti-kl̥ptiḥ kliṣṭatarā S. S. p. 23.

15. *katham tarhi caramādi-tantvapakaṛṣaṇe alpatara-tamādi-paṭopalambha iti cet; pratibandhaka-vigame avasthita-samyogebhyaḥ khaṇḍa-paṭotpatteḥ. ādyādi-tantvapakaṛṣaṇe tvayā'pi eṣaiva rītir-anusartavyā; anyathā dvi-tantukādi-paṭa-paryanta-samasta-kārya-vināśe khaṇḍa-paṭānūtpattau ca tantvatiriktam na kiñcid upalabhyeta. K. V.*

16. *tvamapi vibhūnām aṇūnām ca nityānām-api hetubhedair avasthāntarāpattiṁ aṅgikaroṣi. sarva-dravyasvarūpanityatvam tad-avasthābedam ca vadatām-api tathā kiṁ na syāt? saṁyuktāvasthāpi hi pariṇāmaḥ. katham tarhi nityānitya-vibhāgaḥ? ittham dravya-tad-avasthayostathābhāvādeva, dravya-vivakṣāyām tu avasthā-viśiṣṭa-veśeṇa anityatva-vyavahāra iti. S. S. p. 23.*

dravye anityatā-vyavahāraḥ śikhi-nyāyena viśiṣṭa-veśeṇa iti arthaḥ. A.D., I. p. 231.

17. tatra ekam anārambhakam; avayava-samyogā-
nupapattau asamavāyī-kāraṇābhāvāt.

18. yadi avayavi na asti, sarvasya grahaṇam na upa-
dyate. kiṁ tat sarvam? dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-
samavāyāḥ. katham kṛtvā? paramāṇu-samavasthānam tāvat
darśana-viśayo na bhavati atindriyatvād aṇūnām. dravyānta-
ram ca avayavibhūtam darśanaviśayo na asti...tena sarvasya
grahaṇāt paśyāmo asti dravyāntarabhūto avayavi iti. *N. B.*
pp. 276-7.

19. sarvam idam ghaṭādikam-pūrvāhṇe mṛttikaiva
āsit.

28. dṛśyameva hi āloka-rūpam āropyapiñjaraḥ trasa-
reṇuḥ avalokyate — Udayana.

21. aparigrahācca atyantam-anapekṣā — *Brahma-sūtra*,
2-2-16.

kapila-pakṣasya śruti-nyāya-virodha-parityaktasyāpi sat-
kārya-vādādinā kvacidamśe vaidikaiḥ parigraho asti; asya tu
kaṇāda-pakṣasya kenāpi amśena aparigrahāt, anupapannat-
vācca anapekṣaiva niḥśreyasārthibhiḥ kāryā — *S. B.* II, p. 87

22. kāraṇa-guṇasya kevalasya na ārambhakatvam
N. V. p. 455.

23. pārthivam guṇāntaropalabdheḥ, *N. S.* (3-1-27)
p. 481.

tatra mānuṣam śarīram pārthivam kasmāt? guṇāntaro-
palabdheḥ. gandhavati pṛthivī, gandhavat ca śarīram.
abādīnām-agandhatvāt tat-prakṛti agandham syāt. na tu
idam-abādibirasam ṛktayā pṛthivyā ārabdham ceṣṭendriyār-
thāśrayabhāvena kalpate ityataḥ pañcānām bhūtānām sam-
yoge sati śarīram bhavati. bhūta-samyogo hi mithaḥ pañcā-
nām na niśiddha iti. *V. B.* p. 482.

24. purvasiddhadravasya sādhyāvasthā-viśeṣa eva
satkāryavādaḥ.

24. śabda-gandha-sūryāloka-ratnaprabhādayo dharmy-
ativartino gatimāntśca ityātmāsiddhi-vākya śabdo gandha-
śabdavat āśraya-lakṣakaḥ. S. S. p. 49

25. *namaste-vāyo; tvamveva pratyakṣam brahma asi;
tvāmeva pratyakṣam brahma vadiṣyāmi.*
26. *tasya ha vā etasya mahato bhūtasya niḥśvasitaṁ
etad yad-rg-vedaḥ...*
27. *venu-randhra-vibhedena bhedaḥ śaḍjādi-samjñitaḥ/
abheda-vyāpino vāyos-tathā'sau paramātmanah||*
28. *tad-yathā hiraṇya-nidhiṁ nihitaṁ akṣetrajñāḥ
upari upari sañcaranto na vindeyurevam-
imāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ aharahar-gacchantyaḥ
etaṁ brahma-lokaṁ na vindante. anṛtena hi
pratyūḍhāḥ. — Ch. Up., 8. 3. 2.*
29. *vālāgra-śatabhāgasya śatadhā kalpitasya ca/
eko bhāgassa vijñeyaḥ sa ca ānantyāya kalpate||*

THE SYSTEM OF ADVAITA

5.1. *The Appearance of the Universe — a Mere Illusion*

5.1.1 *The Vedic Statements and Inference Prove the Reality of Brahman Alone*

On the strength of scriptural statements such as “*sad eva saumya, idamagra āsīt*” “*ekam eva advitīyaṁ brahma*” and “*na iha nānāsti kiñcana*” etc. The Advaitin asserts that there is only one real thing namely, Brahman and that all other things which appear before our eyes, are unreal, being of the nature of transient phenomena. So also by quoting the epithet, “*advitīya*”, that is, that has none as second, applied to Brahman in the *Upaniṣad*, the Advaitin maintains that Brahman is devoid of attributes and in support of his contention, he cites the authority of Vedic texts like “*nirguṇaṁ nirañjanam niṣkalaṁ niṣkriyaṁ śāntam,*” etc. Further he seeks to prove the unreality of the universe by the following inference.¹ All things other than Brahman are unreal because they are different from Brahman, like the shell-silver. The falsity of the silver seen in the shell is obvious. Falsity is defined as “Something that is apprehended as if it were real but is capable of being dispelled by the cognition of the real object.”² When one mistakes a rope for a snake, an inexplicable serpent is, according to the Advaitin, created temporarily and this impression will disappear by the apprehension of the reality of the rope, *i.e.*, that it is a rope and not a snake. The Advaitin states

that in the state of bondage or *samsāra*, the world is perceived illusorily on Brahman, the only Reality and that release from bondage (*mukti*) consists in the right apprehension that Brahman alone is real, and that the universe which we see around us is a false or illusory imposition on Brahman. As a snake is falsely superimposed in a rope, so in Brahman, which alone is real, is superimposed the universe, and this will disappear the moment the nature and reality of Brahman is apprehended even as the snake in the rope disappears, when the reality of the basis, namely the rope is known as rope. It is ignorance that makes one mistake a rope for a snake; so does ignorance (*avidyā*) make one see the universe in Brahman even though the universe has no real existence.

This ignorance (*avidyā*) held by some as a negative entity in the shape of negation of knowledge and by some others as a positive entity has been elaborately discussed in another chapter. The doctrine of *avidyā* or *māyā* is the very life-blood of the Advaita. In fact, far too much prominence is given to this concept of ignorance to establish the doctrine that everything other than Brahman is unreal and has no real existence of its own unlike Brahman. Vedic authority is claimed therefore, as it seems to have been referred to in almost all the *Upaniṣads*. References in the scriptures are with regard to the ignorance that prevails in the shape of the empirical world.

5,1.2 Advaitin's Explanation of How an Illusion Takes Place

The Advaitin holds that in consonance with such Vedic references to Brahman and the universe, the

inevitable conclusion is that Brahman alone is real and that everything else is merely phenomenal. Removal of the products of ignorance is possible only through *tattva-jñāna*. A snake that is falsely apprehended in a rope cannot be killed with a stick, but only by understanding the absence of the real snake by the apprehension of the identity of the base as rope. If there is no snake, it may be asked how we are to account for the illusion for such a sensation? According to the Advaitin, there must be one objective counterpart, transient though it be, with which the eyes attain a contact, when the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) flows to that object, and assumes its form through its *vr̥tti*, even as the water from a tank flows into a field and assumes the same shape as the field, which may be a square or of any other shape.

5.1.3 *Origination or Evolution of Indefinable Things*

This transformation of the inner organ into the shape of the object, called *vr̥tti* causes the perception of an object, when the intelligence qualified by the psychosis (*antaḥkaraṇa-vr̥ttyavacchinna-caitanya*) coincides with the object intelligence (*viśayāvacchinna-caitanya*). This does not, however, provide a convincing solution to the problem because one may ask how the eyes could have contact with a snake, when a snake did not actually exist but only a rope, and how the internal organ could transform itself into the object, namely, the snake, to cause the perception of the snake. The snake in the rope is evolved not by the constituent parts of snake as we see in the empirical world, but by the one indefinable and unique (*anirvacanīya*), neither real because it is capable of being sub-

lated, nor unreal because it is an object of cognition (*sad asad-vilakṣaṇa*). The defect in the eyes, which having the contact of the rope, causes the peculiar *vṛtti* of the internal organ to pass through the defective eyes, to envelop the object before us. In that *vṛtti* which is held to be very near and to have plain and smooth surface, the consciousness limited by the object before (*idam-avacchinna-caitanya*) becomes reflected. By the above process the consciousness limited by the *vṛtti* and the self-same consciousness limited by the internal organ (*pramāṭṛ-caitanya*) become one, and the consciousness that is limited by the object, namely rope which is enveloped by ignorance (*avidyā*) is transformed into snake, and thus an indefinable (*anirvaniya*) snake is effected. As it is the effect of an *avidyā* belonging to a particular person, the snake in the rope cannot be apprehended by others. In the same way, the Advaitin contends, the universe is superimposed on the pure intellect which is identical with the only real absolute Brahman.

5.1.4 Vedic Statements Classified

We will now examine the doctrine and arguments of the above statements of the Advaitin. From certain texts to the scriptures such as "This, my friend, existed only as *sat* in the beginning," "There is Brahman alone without a second," "There is no variety here of any kind."³ To say that Brahman alone is real and that everything else is unreal is unwarranted. Unless one tries to know the spirit and the intention of these sentences one is sure to be confused and to arrive at wrong conclusion. Of course, there are Vedic statements that seem to deny qualities and even the entities themselves other than Brahman; but there are others.

and these in far greater number, which unequivocally proclaim the existence of qualities in Brahman and also of entities other than Brahman.

The statements found in the *Upaniṣads* may be divided into three classes: There are those which assert absolute distinction among sentients, non-sentients and the supreme Being, called *bheda-śrutis*;⁷ There are others speaking of the identity of all things with Brahman called *abheda-śrutis*;⁸ and there are some other texts suggesting that the relationship between the sentients and non-sentients on the one hand and Brahman on the other is that of the body and the soul; these texts are called by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins as *ghaṭaka-śrutis*.⁹

5.1.5 *The Three Types of Vedic Texts Represent the Doctrine of the Three Schools of Vedānta*

If the first group of passages is alone accepted as true, the other two groups will have to be rejected as false. So also if we accept only the second group the other passages will have to be ignored as having no validity. Thus the authority of some passages as against others will have to be overlooked. It may well be asked: "What is your reason for preferring only one group of texts and rejecting the others? Why should not the reverse be done by your opponents?"

Is there no way of interpreting the meaning of these seemingly inconsistent Vedic statements without questioning their validity? The Viśiṣṭādvaitin contends that the third group of passages referred to as *ghaṭaka-śrutis* provide a key for such an interpretation as it will reconcile all the passages and not deny the

validity of any one group. The three types represent the doctrines of the three schools of Vedānta respectively. The first group of Vedic statements is upheld as of paramount validity by the Dvaitins, the second by the Advaitins. Those who rely on the third category and seek to interpret the first two categories in the light of the third are called Viśiṣṭādvaitins. The stand of the Viśiṣṭādvaitins is succinctly brought out in a verse.¹

5.1.6 *Relation between Brahman and Universe Explained*

According to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, the universe is real and the supreme Being is not devoid of qualities, as against Advaitin's view. From the innumerable Vedic statements, supported and elaborated by the *Purāṇas* and other similar literature, Brahman is held to be playing the role of a soul to the universe which is said to be His body. In fact, this body-soul relationship between the universe and Brahman is elaborately set forth in unequivocal terms.

The soul in the bodies of all sentient beings, is the supporter (*ādhāra*) and is the controller (*niyantā*) as also one who uses the body for his own pleasure and satisfaction (*śeṣi*). The body is inseparable from the soul (for it ceases to be a body when it is separated), is completely under the control of the soul, and it stands for the benefit of and entirely dependent on the soul. In the same way, all sentient and non-sentient beings form the body of Brahman, and hence all their activities are for Brahman. This being so, all statements in the scriptures, that seem to speak of a single real being are to be interpreted as referring to Brahman with the universe as His body. As a matter of fact,

nothing else exists apart from this real being, Brahman. The second category of statements which affirm the existence of difference between the supreme Being on the one hand, and the sentient beings and non-sentient matter on the other, refer to the distinction which exists between (i) Brahman as the inner soul of all beings and all things and (ii) these beings and things which are, as it were, His bodies, inseparable from Him, and hence spoken of as being one with Him. It will be observed that in such an interpretation which is reasonable and legitimate, there is no ignoring of any scriptural statements as against others which are held valid.

As Udayana says, any interpretation of a sentence in a passage without reference to the context (that is, without consideration of the previous and later sentences) will lead a person to wrong understanding; the statements favourable to the Advaitin cannot be considered without comprehending the underlying meaning as given expression to in the innumerable Vedic statements which attribute qualities to Brahman.

5.1.7 *Utsargāpavāda-nyāya and Not Apoccheda-nyāya Could be Applied in the Context of Saṅga-Nirguṇa Śrutis*

Then these two descriptions of Brahman, mutually contradictory but occurring in the same *Veda*, require to be interpreted without invalidating one or the other, and without stating that the one sublates the other. As already stated, the Advaitin declares that the passages denying attributes in Brahman sublimate those that affirm the existence of qualities by resorting to the principle of interpretation called *apoccheda-nyāya*.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin and the Dvaitin, as has been pointed out before, state that the principle of *apaccheda* does not apply to this context, and that other principles of interpretation like the *upakrama-nyāya* are alone appropriate. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin's attempt is at reconciliation of these apparently contradicting statements by the rule of "general and exceptional statements" (*utsarga-apavāda-nyāya*). The negative statements that are supposed to deny all *guṇas* in Brahman are the "general" ones, and they are incapable of sublating the positive statements. As an illustration, we may cite the instance of the general ban on injuring to life (*na himsyāt sarvā bhūtāni*) which cannot, however, sublimate the exception to the rule, enjoining the sacrifice of a goat in the sacrifice of *agnīṣomiya*. The consensus of opinion among all schools is that the general statement contrasts itself to the extent necessary to permit the particular prescription of the killing of a goat in *agnīṣomiya* sacrifice, and hence the general ban (on injury to sentient beings) applies to the other injuries alone and not to that at the sacrificial altar. Similarly in the statement '*paśunā yajeta*' the word '*paśu*' does not mean all quadrupeds but a goat in consideration of a subordinate statement '*chāgo vā mantra-varṇāt*' that determines the meaning of the word '*paśu*'. The general term '*paśu*' here means a particular quadruped, the goat in consonance with the other statement, *chāgasya vapāyāḥ*. Moreover the fact that general statements sometimes mean particular objects is known to us in our daily experience. If the master asks his servant, 'Bring the cow' (*gām ānaya*), the latter immediately brings a particular cow from the manger and does not go to the fair to purchase a new one — by the general rule that "Even a general term denoting

substance means the one that is near at hand." The negative statements deny in Brahman the existence of all imperfections that are very often encountered in human beings and sometimes even in celestial beings. The *Veda* first denies all imperfections in Brahman and in the same breath speaks about His exalted qualities e.g., *apahata-pāpmā vijaro vimṛtyuḥ viśokaḥ vijighatsaḥ apipāsaḥ satyakāmaḥ satyasankalpaḥ*. Any dispassionate student will be able to see that there is no contradiction between these two types of statements. As a matter of fact, the word '*nirguṇam*' does not mean total denial of all qualities — virtues and vices alike. It means only the denial of the second, viz. *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in the supreme Being, since in the Vedānta, the word '*guṇa*' mostly means, the above three *guṇas*. Many statements reiterating the non-existence of these three *guṇas* and the existence of six exalted qualities (*jñāna-bala-aśvarya-vīrya-śakti-tejāmsi*) are found in the *Vedas* and the *Smṛtis*.

5.1.8 *Ānandavalli and Other Vedic Sections Prove only the Existence of Qualities in Brahman*

There could be contradiction of statements only if one statement refers to the existence in Brahman of qualities in general, and another which denies the same general qualities. But nowhere do we find a single statement in the *Upaniṣads* expressing at the same time the existence of qualities in general, in Brahman and also the denial of the same as the Advaitin would read from sayings like '*nirguṇam*' etc. Even the *Smṛti* statements like "*varṣāyutair-yasya guṇā na śakyā*," "*na antaṁ guṇānāṁ gacchanti*" etc. do not mean all qualities in general, but only auspicious ones. When

such is the case, how can the application of *apaccheda-nyāya* be made here in order to affirm the sublation of positive statements? On the other hand, if '*apaccheda-nyāya*' is applied here, then it should be applied to the case of '*agnīṣomīyaṁ paśuṁ ālabheta,*' for '*na hiṁsyāt sarvā bhūtāni*' is a statement which would sublate the killing of a goat on account of its being a later one, in the manner held by the Advaitin. Let us take the Vedic text "From Brahman words return along with the mind without reaching Him. The man who knows the bliss of Brahman is afraid of nothing." The first part of this text is interpreted by the Advaitin as meaning that Brahman has no qualities or attributes to be expressed in words or thought or the mind. But the passage does not mean the retreat of the tongue and mind on account of Brahman's being devoid of qualities since *Ānandavallī* of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* aims at driving home the fact that the bliss of Brahman is beyond all comparison with any other bliss. That passage in *ānandavallī* starts with the description of human happiness of several others up to the four-faced Brahmā, beginning with "*saiṣā ānandasya mīmāṃsā bhavati*" in order to describe the transcendental bliss of Brahman which is beyond the power of description of the *Vedas*, and consequently can be given only as a vague idea like the moon which is being pointed at as being at the tree-top. The *Vedas* describe the different degrees of *ānanda*. The bliss of Brahman is said to be far greater than that of the four-faced Brahmā. Even from this, the bliss of Brahman is not to be taken as limited in extent. This is illustrated by the traditional example of the apparent speed of the Sun being compared to that of the discharged arrow where the Sun's speed is not to be considered as small

as that of the arrow.¹⁰ It should be noted here that the *Vedas* do not speak of the gradual diminution of bliss in an order reverse to the one we see in the *ānandavalli*.¹¹ If it had been done as such, that would have been in agreement to the Advaitin's interpretation of the verse of the *Vedas*, '*yato vāco nivartante*'. On the other hand, the gradual increase in the degree of bliss is suggested till it reaches the maximum in the case of Brahman. Hence the bliss of Brahman is said to be beyond the comprehension and description of all sentient beings and not that it is absent in Brahman, as contended by the Advaitin. Moreover, the *Vedas* are more enthusiastic in describing Brahman's bliss than describing Brahman itself for they say "He who knows the bliss of Brahman as such does not fear the cycle of births and deaths. The appreciation of the *Vedas* is not for Brahman said to possess the bliss but rather for the bliss possessed by that Brahman."¹²

Further the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman is said to be the enjoyment of the omniscient Brahman along with its sweet qualities.¹³ In the above statement '*kāmān*' refers to the auspicious qualities of Brahman and they are as sweet to meditate upon as Brahman itself. As it states 'along with its qualities; the distinction between the attributes and the substratum which possesses the attributes, is shown to exist, and this is in complete contradiction of the Advaitin's contention that the qualities are identical with Brahman. That the auspicious qualities of Brahman are referred to by the term '*kāmān*' is proved by other statements such as

- (i) *sa vā eṣa etena divyena cakṣuṣā manasā etān kāmān paśyan ramate ya ete brahma-loke* — Chā. 8.12.5.

- (ii) *ya iha ātmānam anuvidya vrajanti etān ca satyān
kāmaṇ*
- (iii) *ta ime satyāḥ kāmaḥ.*

The company meant by the term '*saha*' is of two kinds:— the company of the articles of enjoyment and the company of enjoyers, *bhogyasāhitya* and *bhoktr-sāhitya* respectively. When it is said "He eats his food along with his son" (*putreṇa saha odanaṁ bhuṅkte*) the company of the son to father is meant, and it is an instance of *bhoktr-sāhitya* or the company of enjoyers, whereas the statement "He eats food together with milk" (*kṣīreṇa saha odanaṁ bhuṅkte*) is an instance of *bhogyasāhitya* or the company of articles of enjoyment. As the statement, 'He enjoys the sweet qualities along with Brahman, the omniscient, is explanatory enough for the word '*param*' in the other text '*brahmavid āpnoti param*', and on account of the word "*saha*" being used together with the words '*sarvān kāmaṇ*' that denotes the object of enjoyment, it is *bhogyasāhitya* that is meant here. That the liberated soul enjoys His sweet auspicious qualities along with Brahman is the purport of the sentence. The qualities referred to here as being with Brahman must be those of the same, Brahman, as in *dahara-vidyā* in which the auspicious qualities are more prominently referred to than their substratum for the purpose of meditation." Here also prominence is given to the qualities instead of to Brahman, which is only of lesser importance as may be guessed from the use of instrumental case, '*brahmaṇā*', the rule in Sanskrit being 'Instrumental in the case of less important' (*saha-yukte apradhāne* — *Pāṇini*, 2.3.19). If Brahman is held as more important than its qualities, the sentence must mean '*bhoktr-sāhitya*' and must

be interpreted as “the liberated soul enjoys Brahman along with its sweet qualities” which is inappropriate. According to *tat-kratu-nyāya*, the *jīva* desirous of liberation meditates upon its auspicious qualities along with Brahman; after liberation and attending Brahman he enjoys Brahman in the same way as he did, when he was in bondage; that is, he enjoys Brahman's qualities even more prominently than he does Brahman.

When all this is taken into account, it would be very difficult to arrive at the Advaitin's conclusion that Brahman is devoid of qualities and that liberation is not a new thing to be attained, it being only removal of ignorance.

5.2. *Do Scriptures State the Identity of Jīva with Brahman?*

5.2.1 *The Identity of Jīva with Brahman is not Really Meant by the Scriptures*

The Vedic statement “He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman itself”¹ seems to be highly in favour of the Advaitin's doctrine which holds that everything in the universe other than Brahman is only empirically real, and that the *jīva* on acquiring the *tattva-jñāna* from an understanding of the Vedic statement ‘*tat tvam asi*’ gets emancipated from the bondage of this empirical world and becomes one with the supreme Being, Brahman. For the Advaitins this unambiguous statement is one of the strongest pillars for the colossal building of their philosophy. It is apparently difficult to give any other interpretation which might be considered favourable to the pluralists. According to the

Advaitin, *jīvas* are not distinct from Brahman. The pure consciousness otherwise called Brahman, becomes limited by ignorance (*avidyā*) and in that state it is referred to as *jīva*. Realisation of the actuality (*tattva-jñāna*) as a result of the study of the great saying (*mahāvākya*), 'That thou art' (*tat tvam asi*) dispels the ignorance that makes all the difference between the *jīva* and Brahman, and hence the *jīva* becomes one with Brahman. Considerable support is lent to this view by the above-mentioned Vedic saying. But when we seek to understand the import of the sentence in the context in which it has been used, it will become clear that it is not so sure a support to Advaitic system as made out by them.

5.2.2 "Brahma Veda Brahmaiva Bhavati" Conveys Similarity and Not Identity

The *mantras* that precede the text '*brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati*' in the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (3.1,2,8) are:

1. *dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā samānam ṛkṣam pariśas-
vajāte/
tayoranyaḥ pippalaṁ svādavatti anaśnannanyo abhicā-
kaśīti//*
2. *samāne ṛkṣe pūruṣo nimagno anīśayā śocati muhya-
mānaḥ/
juṣṭam yadā paśyatyanyam-iśam asya mahimānamiti
vīta-śokaḥ//*
3. *yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudre astam gacchanti
nāmarūpe vihāya/
tathā vidvān nāmarūpādvimuktaḥ parātparam
puruṣamupaiti divyam//*

1. In the first *mantra* the nature of the *jīva* and Brahman is brought out. Two persons like two birds, have the same qualities (like *apahata-pāpmatva* etc.) and on that score they are similar and are companions; both of them take their abode in bodies, human and others, even as birds would do in a tree. But one of them tastes the ripe fruit of his deeds, while the other having nothing to do with those deeds shines brilliantly. Two different positions are occupied by the two, the finite and the infinite.

2. The *jīva* being intoxicated by his association with primordial matter (*prakṛti*) loses his high qualities and succumbs to it; identifies himself with his body which is the transformation of primordial matter and thus reduces himself to the position of a victim to experience the fruits of his deeds. But when he apprehends the supreme Being as distinct from himself by realising that He is the sustainer, controller and master to Himself as well as the Overlord of this whole universe, and that He is magnanimous enough to be pleased by propitiations then the *jīva* becomes free from all types of grief.

3. As many rivers go to the sea, when they abandon their respective names, as well as colours and become lost in the sea, so does the *jīva* who apprehends Brahman become free from name and form and reach the supreme Person.

Here the *jīvas* are said to unite with Brahman in the same way as the waters of the rivers mix with the water of the sea. The union results in indistinguish-

ability but not in identity. The same idea is corroborated in the *Kāthopaniṣad*, IV. 15:

*yathodakam śuddhe śuddhamāsiktaṁ tādṛgeva
bhavati|*

evam munervijānata ātmā bhavati gautama||

“As pure water mixed with another specimen of pure water becomes similar, so the meditative *jīva* becomes pure through the apprehension of the supreme Soul and becomes similar to Him.” There is no statement of its becoming identical with Brahman. If identity were sought to be suggested, as the Advaitin contends, the word ‘*tādṛk*’ meaning ‘similar’ would not have been used in the above *mantra* but only the word “*tat*”.

The next sentence is the famous ‘*brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati.*’ Obviously it cannot be given a meaning which would contradict what is in the context unambiguously expressed in the earlier *mantras*, we have just now discussed. With the context in his mind the author of the *Brahmasūtras* puts forward in *dyubhuvādyadhikaraṇa* the three aphorisms: 1. *mukto-pāsr̥pya-vyapadeśāt ca*, (2) *bhedavyapadeśāt*, and (3) *sthityanābhyaṁ ca*. The first aphorism means: At the time of emancipation the *jīva* is said to approach Brahman after a journey though the *arcirādi* path, and unless a difference between the attainer and that which is to be attained is held to exist, there will be no meanings for such statements. In the second, the author of the *Brahmasūtras* affirm that the difference between *jīva* and Brahman is mentioned by the *Vedas* themselves. In the third, he indicates that the iden-

tity of *jīva* with Brahman is absolutely impossible, as the former is the substratum of any number of imperfections and the latter is absolutely free from them. The author of the *Brahmasūtras* rightly considered the three *mantras* of the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* as the basis respectively for the three aphorisms above-stated.

It may seem, at first sight, to be incompatible with the omnipresence of Brahman to say that He is attained by liberated *jīvas*, since He must already be attained by all things sentient or not, because of His omnipresence. But there is one statement preceding the famous passage '*brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati*' which unambiguously declares that *jīva* attains the Person who is far above all other things and who is in the "*dyu*" world (*parāt param puruṣamupaiti divyam*). The first aphorism also endorses this idea. In the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* itself it is said that the *jīva* who became free of all sins and who got liberated, goes, after piercing through the orb of the sun to the world where Brahman exists with a form. In the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* also, the exit of the *jīva* from the mortal coil, his going to Brahman and enjoying Him in His divine form are described in detail.

5.2.3 Discrepaney in Śaṅkara's Interpretation

While commenting on the *mantra* "*dvā suparṇā*", Śaṅkara contends that *antaḥkaraṇa* and *Īśvara* are meant in this *mantra* and that *Īśvara* is not identical with Brahman, the supreme Being. He says that the consciousness associated with *māyā* is denominated as *Īśvara* in whom *sattva-guṇa* is dominant. *Īśvara* does not experience the fruit of any deed. He remains as a witness to the *jīvas*' experiencing the fruits of their

past deeds. He is the eternal witness and causes *jivas* to experience the pleasure and pain as effects of their past deeds. His witnessing of the *jiva's* experience of pleasure and pain is called causality of prompting *jivas* to experience them as in the case of a king who witnesses his subjects enjoying honours or undergoing punishments as the case may be for their past deeds.¹⁶

Any dispassionate reader who studies this *mantra* along with the others will realize that the stress is on knowing *Īśvara* as distinct from the *jīva*, which will make the *jīva* free from the bondage of the world.¹⁷ It will be clear that the scripture identifies *Īśvara* and Brahman, and does not consider them different. In fact, there is no reference in any scripture to any difference between the two.

In the *mantra* 'yathā nadyaḥ' the Advaitin's stand finds little support. As various rivers joining the sea abandon their former name as well as their form merging in the sea and disappearing in the process, even so the knower of Brahman becomes bereft of name and form when he approaches the supreme Being. This instance illustrates that the association of the *jīva* with the supreme Being takes place as an inseparable union even as the river water unites with that of the sea, the difference between the two things irrevocably existing. With this interpretation in mind, the other statements such as "nirañjanaḥ paramaṁ sāmīyamupaiti," "brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati," should be given suitable explanation. The word 'sāmīya' denotes similarity and not identity. Unless two things are distinct from each other, the one cannot be said to be similar to the other. Moreover,

identity cannot admit any gradation in it as similarity does. We can say that a thing is similar to another, and a second thing is more like the same. Such comparative statement with reference to identity — e.g. more identical, will be meaningless. Although the word 'sama' is used to mean one as in the usage 'imau samakālikau' 'these belong to one and the same period,' the word 'sama' is very rarely used in the sense of 'identical' and 'sāmya' is rarely used in the sense of oneness. Further the superlative degree denoted by the word 'parama' stands in the way of taking 'oneness' as the meaning of the word 'sāmya' in the context. Except for a few points such as the power of creation etc. that are held uncommon and unique to Brahman, the liberated *jīvas* are said to attain similarity with the supreme Being.

While commenting on the aphorism '*jagad-vyāpāra-varjam*' Śaṅkara upholds the equality of *jīvas* with *Īśvara* — Brahman with attributes, whom they meditate. If this view of Śaṅkara is right, in the first aphorism¹⁸ of the first chapter of the *Brahma-sūtras*, it is Brahman that is taken for discussion and in the chapter on fruits (*phalādhyāya*) the attainment of *Īśvara* by *jīvas* as the fruit of their meditation and equality with *Īśvara* are discussed. The discrepancy in the interpretation of these two aphorisms is obvious.

5.2.4 That "Eva" Means Similarity is Agreeable to Śaṅkara

Moreover the word 'eva' in '*brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati*' can have the meaning of 'iva' (like) in accordance with the *Nighaṇṭu* declaration; the suffix *vat*, *vā*, *evam*, *eva*, *va* — these indeclinable words mean 'likeness' and are used as such.¹⁹ In '*viṣṇur eva bhūtva*'

the word *eva* is understood to mean 'likeness' and not 'only'; for the sacrifice '*vaiṣṇava-vāmana*' is enjoined on a jealous person and not on a pious seeker after liberation inasmuch as the above sacrifice cannot be a means to liberation, which can be obtained only by *jñāna* and not by *karma*.¹⁰ As such, the fruit of the sacrifice cannot be the process of becoming one with *Viṣṇu*. Hence 'eva' has to be interpreted as meaning 'likeness'. Besides in other Vedic statements like '*asann-eva sa bhavati asad brahmeti veda cet*' 'eva' has not the meaning of 'only' but 'likeness' which alone can be appropriate in the context. While commenting on '*asadeva idam agre āsīt*', even Śaṅkara takes 'eva' to mean 'likeness'.¹¹

5.2.5 *Jīva, after Liberation, Attains Equality with Brahman in Respect of Bliss and Pleasure Alone*

The author of the *Brahmasūtras* nowhere speaks of the identity of the *jīva* with Brahman. On the other hand he asserts the equality in bliss between the finite and the infinite after liberation (*bhogamātra-sāmyaliṅgācca*). The finite *jīvas* attain equality with Brahman in point of pleasures and transcendental bliss and never in point of the creation, sustenance and destruction of the universe, as they are the unique and characteristic qualities of Brahman, and consequently not shared by the *jīvas*.

It is true that 'eva' is generally used to mean 'only'; but the less-frequent usage of the same word in other meanings does not preclude its being used in this sense in "*brahmaiva bhavati*." And if we take the meaning 'only' in this connection then a very large number of other statements in opposition to this view

become frustrated. In consideration of this fact, we should take a meaning that would be suitable to the context and also in accord with other statements even if this particular meaning is unusual and somewhat less known.

5.3. *Is Brahman Devoid of Attributes? Is the Universe Phenomenal?*

5.3.1 *The Advaitic Conception that Nirguṇaśruti Sublates Sagunaśruti is Explained*

The view of Advaitins is that the supreme Brahman is devoid of any attributes or qualities and that there is nothing else existing in reality but Brahman. The Advaitins maintain that Brahman is without any attributes, auspicious or otherwise. In support of this view, they quote such Vedic statements as appear to deny the existence of qualities in Brahman e.g. “*niṣkalam niṣkriyam śāntam niravadyam nirañjanam.*”¹ When they are confronted with those Vedic statements which affirm the existence in Brahman of innumerable auspicious qualities like *satyakāmatva*, *vaśitva*, *satyasaṅkalpatva*, etc., they reply that these statements have only a relative or lower validity (*vyāvahārika*) than the passages which make a denial of attributes, and that they are sublated or invalidated by Vedic texts which deny qualities in Brahman.

The Advaitins argue as follows: “A denial can emerge only when the existence of some object or quality is sought to be established by some form of testimony (*pramāṇa*). The negative statement which denies is more powerful or valid than the affirmative statements since they come later than the affirmative

statements. So the negative statements cannot be said to be sublated by the affirmative statements as the latter do not require or recognise the existence of the negative statements." Thus they assert that Brahman is nothing but pure consciousness (*cit*), and that there is no other entity but Brahman in reality. Brahman, according to them, does not admit even a quality in itself as, in that case, Brahman will have a second entity other than itself, namely, its quality. They seek support for this assertion in the Vedic statement "*ekameva advitiyam brahma.*" This text according to the Advaitins categorically denies the existence of anything other than Brahman or anything second to it. The words *ekam*, *eva* and *advitiyam* express in the strongest terms possible that there is nothing else but Brahman. The Vedic text quoted above sublates or invalidates the texts which affirm the existence of attributes in Brahman as also the real existence of a universe distinct from Brahman. When the Advaitin is asked why the affirmative statements should not be considered as sublating the negative statements, he seeks to support his contention by resorting to a principle or rule of interpretation and decision called *apaccheda-nyāya* which may be briefly explained here.

5.3.2 The *Apaccheda-Nyāya* Explained

In the sacrifice called *jyotiṣṭoma* the five *ṛtviks* — *Adhvaryu*, *Prastotā*, *Pratihartā*, *Udgātā*, and *Brahmā* as also the *yajamāna* march in the above order one holding the loin of the preceding *ṛtvik* and following him, for *bahiṣpavamāna-stotra*. If any one of the followers leaves his hold of the loin of the preceding person, expiatory

rites are enjoined in the *Veda* for each of the possible cases. If *prastotā* leaves the loin held by him, some presents must be given to *Brahmā* as expiation for the default. If *pratihartā* leaves his hold, the entire wealth of the performer is to be given as gift (*dakṣiṇā*). If *udgātā* leaves his hold, the sacrifice should be abruptly ended without any gifts and the same sacrifice is to be commenced from the very start and the amount that was intended to be distributed as gift in the previous sacrifice should be distributed. If two *ṛtviks* leave their hold, the expiatory ceremonies prescribed in each case should both be performed; if it is impossible as in the case where defaulters are *udgātā* and *pratihartā*, only one of the two expiatory functions must be performed. If, however, the same two leave their respective holds one after the other — *pratihartā* first and then *udgātā* — only one of the two expiatory functions is to be performed. If this case, which of the two is to be done must be decided.

Here the *prima facie* argument is that by the application of *upakrama-nyāya*, the expiation for the leaving of the loin that occurred first should be performed. The final decision is that the expiation for the one that occurred later on is to be performed because the knowledge of the later expiation does not come into being, unless the knowledge of the former expiation is sublated or invalidated. In the present case where the default of *pratihartā* occurs first, followed by that of *udgātā* though the expiation for the former is known first with nothing against it, it is actually the expiation for the latter that is enjoined performance. The *apacchada-nyāya* declares that the later cancels or invalidates the former as being more

powerful in that it arises after a knowledge of the former. By the application of *apaccheda-nyāya*, the *Veda* becomes superior to perception, coming after perception, as illustrated in the following case.

In the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, if both *udgātā* and *pratihartā* leave their hold of loins, two expiations become necessary; that is giving away of the entire wealth (for *pratihartā's* default) and performing the sacrifice a second time with no distribution of gifts (for *udgātā's* fault). The above two expiations cannot both be performed since they are mutually contradictory. Hence one of the two which is more powerful is to be performed. The more powerful is the expiation for the *udgātā's* default that sublates the other expiation, since the later is more powerful. How? Unless the expiation of giving away of the entire wealth as gift is sublated, the later expiation (without giving any gift and end the sacrifice abruptly) cannot emerge. If the latter were in need of the former in any manner, the latter would, not only not sublating the former but would itself become sublated by the former on account of its being placed at the beginning (by *upakrama-nyāya*). If the latter is not in need of the former, then it emerges after sublating the former. Hence the testimony that emerges after sublating another and is not in need of the former is more powerful."

5.3.3 *The Viśiṣṭādvaitin's Reasons to Prove that Apaccheda-nyāya is Not Applicable in This Context*

The followers of Rāmānuja and of Madhvācārya maintain that the *apaccheda* principle of interpretation and decision is not applicable to the matter in dispute,

namely, to decide whether the *nirguṇa* texts cancel the *sagūṇa* statements and to come to the conclusion that the perception of the universe is illusory and invalidated by the text that there is nothing other than Brahman. The sublation of some Vedic texts by other Vedic texts is absolutely different from the sublation of perception of the universe of diverse nature, and of the Vedic texts pointing out the various qualities in the supreme Being and the existence of universe as distinct from the same supreme Being by the Vedic texts that deny the existence of anything other than the supreme Being. In other words, the analogy of *apaccheda* is not considered appropriate to the question under discussion.

In the *apaccheda* rule, that the later text is more powerful than and superior to the former text, is the vital point. Both the Vedic texts — the sublated and the sublater, *bādhita* and *bādhaka* — can have their own validity proved though in different places. But on no account can any Vedic text ever remain sublated and thus be ever invalid.

The Vedic text that enjoins the expiatory function of the *udgātā's* default is latter (*para*) and hence it sublates the other Vedic text enjoining the expiatory function of the *pratihartā's* default, when the *pratihartā* first and then the *udgātā* leave the loin. But this sublated Vedic text does not remain always sublated. It serves its purpose on the three following occasions: (i) when the *pratihartā* alone leaves the loin, (ii) when the *pratihartā* and the *udgātā* both leave their loins simultaneously in consequence of the two defaults having taken place at one and the same time, the two expiatory functions — namely *sarva-vedasa* (giving the

entire property) and *adakṣiṇa* (giving no gifts) — apart from their being mutually opposed to each other, are equal in power and hence neither can sublimate the other. It is why the option to choose any one of the two alternatives is prescribed. Hence in this case, this expiatory function of *sarva-vedasa* has an equal chance of being performed as the other *adakṣiṇa*, and (iii) when the two leave the loins one after the other — first the *udgātā* and then the *pratihartā* (in this case, the leaving of loin by the *pratihartā*, occurring as it does after the leaving by the *udgātā*, is more powerful than its predecessor). If in all these three cases, the prescribed expiatory function of the *pratihartā*'s leaving namely *sarva-vedasa* fails to serve its purpose, then it will remain always sublated, resulting in absolute invalidity of that Vedic statement which would not be acceptable to any of the scholars who uphold the authority of the *Vedas*.

Besides, if the leaving of the loins by the *pratihartā* and the *udgātā*, one after another, occurs, then the sacrifice should be completed with no gift as the expiation of leaving the loin by the *udgātā*. In the second performance of the same *jyotiṣṭoma* the entire wealth should be given as gift, as an expiation of the leaving of the loin by *pratihartā* and not the originally prescribed 112 coins if it went on without any default. Hence the expiatory function of the leaving of loin by the *pratihartā* is sublated, but not absolutely and in every case since it has its own place and validity in the next performance.

In the above instance, the *nitya-śāstra* that prescribes 112 coins as a gift is sublated by the *naimittika-śāstra* that prescribes the entire wealth as a gift as an

expiation for the *pratihartā's* leaving, Though the former *śāstra* is sublated and the latter *śāstra* is sublateral, each of them has its own function in some context or other, and thus both of them maintain their validity.

Hence the expiatory function of the *pratihartā's* leaving (gift of entire wealth) — although to be performed in its proper place of the first performance itself on account of the occurrence of a cause — becomes sublated by the other cause (*udgātā's* leaving that has taken place after *pratihartā's* leaving) in consequence of which the same is to be postponed to the second performance. Thus the rule of *apaccheda* is 'sāvakāśa' — it has its function served elsewhere — but perception, if it is sublated by *abhedaśruti* which is a later authority, would cease to be a testimony anywhere.

Hence it must be admitted that the above rule is not applicable here in connection with the question of proving the absence of attributes in Brahman and the unreality of the universe. Thus perception that proves the reality of everything other than Brahman can be held as powerful as the *abhedaśruti* and there is no question of sublation.

5.3.4 The Advaitin's Rejoinder on the Above Criticism

To the above objection of their opponents, the Advaitins would answer as follows: Though perception is sublated by the *śruti* when the ultimate reality (*pāramārthika*) par excellence is taken into consideration, it (perception) is valid only when empirical reality (*vyāvahārikasattā*) is considered. Perception has therefore its purpose served when the empirical reality is taken into account. But the absolute or ultimate

reality (*pāramārthika-sattā*) which the scripture declares as existing in Brahman alone is denied to perception as well as its validity. As in the cases (i) when the *pratihartā* alone left the loin he was holding, (ii) when the *udgātā* and the *pratihartā* both left the loins simultaneously, and (iii) when the *udgātā* defaulted first and then *pratihartā* did so afterwards, the expiatory function of giving away all the wealth as gift in the sacrifice, has its scope or application (*sāvakāśa*) and the same becomes sublated when the conflict arises between the two — giving away of all the wealth and ending the sacrifice without any gift; and so long as the question of absolute or ultimate reality does not arise, perception reigns supreme and can have its own validity. But the moment the question of absolute reality is taken into consideration, perception ceases to be even a testimony and falls into the abyss of unreality along with many other things of empirical reality. In the same way, the Vedic statements of the two different types — those which speak of the ultimate reality of the universe and those which categorically deny it — are in conflict, and the former statements share the same fate of sublation by the other type of statements, together with perception itself. Then Brahman alone which is beyond speech and mind has absolute reality. So all testimonies or *pramāṇas* have only empirical reality and hence perception and *saguṇa-saprapaṇcaśrutis* are invalidated by the verbal testimony that deny attributes in Brahman and the reality of the universe.

5.3.5 The Viśiṣṭādvaitin Refutes the Above Arguments of the Advaitin

Here the (Bhedavādins) who maintain the doctrine of variety point out a discrepancy between the original

point of issue and the analogy. With regard to the expiations of various defaults, in respect of which the *apaccheda* rule has been postulated, we see Vedic statements sublating each other in accordance with the faults committed by the *ṛtviks*, and the sublated statement also serves a purpose in some other cases. But in no case do we see any statement absolutely sublated in consequence of which it serves no purpose at all. In the case of perception there is no Vedic statement anywhere saying that the purpose of perception is only with regard to the empirically real objects (*vyāvahārika*) and that it is sublated by the Vedic statement. Moreover if perception is considered unreal, how can it be a testimony (*pramāṇa*) at all to be ruled out by a real better testimony (*pramāṇa*). It is equally absurd to say that the universe is only empirically real. Perception could be a testimony only if it is held real. If perception is denied reality, then it ceases to be a testimony and the objects perceived also cease to be real. The variety in reality as absolute and empirical is nowhere mentioned in the *Vedas* or elsewhere. The rule of *apaccheda* can emerge only in a context where the order of things or affairs is not fixed or settled once for all, and it is not applicable in a context where one is ever held the sublating and the other is ever sublated. With regard to the Vedic statements denying the existence of a real universe and that of attributes in Brahman, they are held to be ever superior to and sublating of other Vedic statements that speak of a variety of things in the universe, of the presence of attributes in Brahman and perception that apprehends the variety of things. This being the position, how could the *apaccheda* rule be applicable in this context?

Moreover the Advaitin's contention that *saguṇaśruti*, *bhedaśruti* and perception can have their purposes served elsewhere through their empirical validity (*vyāvahārika prāmāṇyam*) is unsound, says the Viśiṣṭ-ādvaitin. If two *pramāṇas* that have mutually contradicting contents are taken for scrutiny in order to decide which is superior and sublatter, both of them must have one and the same kind of validity. But according to the Advaitin, these two types of the Vedic statements are held to have different types of validity — one having ultimate validity (*pāramārthikapramāṇya*) and another empirical reality.

If and only if the *bhedaśruti*, *saguṇaśruti* and perception are conceded as of ultimate validity, just like the *nirguṇaśruti* and *abhedaśruti* are also regarded as having some scope of applicability (*sīvakāśatva*), any sublation of the former by the latter will be permissible.

5.3.6 Kumārila's View is only in Favour of the Viśiṣṭ-ādvaitin's Upakrama-nyāya and Not for Apaccheda-nyāya

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, while speaking about the case in which the *apaccheda* rule can be applied, says the latter statement can be superior to the former one, if the apprehensions of both of them take place without the one depending upon the other.¹⁴ The Bheda-vādin's state further that the principle of interpretation applicable to the present issue concerning *saguṇa* texts and *nirguṇa* texts is the *nyāya* called *upakrama-nyāya* and not *apaccheda-nyāya*. In the rule of *apaccheda* the Vedic texts that enjoin the expiatory functions for the defaults of *pratihartā* and *udgātā*, are independent of each other. But in the rule of *upakrama*, the latter

Vedic text is always dependent upon the former. The explanation of this *upakrama* rule is as follows.

In the Vedic text prescribing the rules for the performance of *jyotiṣṭoma*, there is a passage to this effect:- “Therefore the *ṛk* should be uttered in high pitch, the *yajus* in low whisper, and the *sāma* in high pitch.”” The question arises as to whether the words *Ṛk*, *Yajus* and *Sāman* in this passage mean only the *ṛk-mantra*, the *yajurmantra* and the *sāma-mantra*, or all the passages in the respective *veda* or as a whole including *mantra* (hymns), *brāhmaṇas* (prose exposition) and the *arthavādas* (passages of praise or explanation of the purpose) which occur in connection with *jyotiṣṭoma*. At the beginning of the discourse there is an *arthavāda* which says:- “The three *Vedas* were created — *R̥g-veda* from *Agni*, *Yajur-veda* from *Vāyu* and the *Sāma-veda* from *Āditya*.”” Here the words used are the respective *Vedas* and not the *mantras*. But later in the discourse about the words *Ṛk*, *Yajur* and *Sāma*, when the question arises as to which interpretation is to be the final conclusion, the Mīmāṃsaka — whose authority as an interpreter of the *Veda* is unquestioned — declares that what occurs at the beginning (*upakrama*) should determine the meaning of the words that occur later, that is, the Vedic passages in general including *mantra*, *brāhmaṇa* and *arthavāda* and not the *mantras* alone.

5.3.7 *Upakrama-nyāya Explained*

The following is the decision arrived at:- When one hears the above *arthavāda* statement there is nothing conflicting in our taking the primary meaning of the word *Veda*. Hence one gets a definite idea of the

above *arthavāda* sentence. But having the latter *vidhi* sentence, which enjoins the manner of utterance containing the words *Ṛk*, *Yajur* and *Sāma* that denote *mantra* alone we fail to get a concurrent idea consistent with both the statements of *arthavāda* and *vidhi*. Although *vidhi* is independent in regard to its own meaning while *arthavāda* is dependent upon *vidhi* in the praise of which *arthavāda* is employed, their position here is absolutely different — *arthavāda* having secured its status on account of its having given its own meaning without any impediment, and *vidhi* failing to get its own status on account of its having its meaning contradicted by *arthavāda*. Though the *vidhi* enjoining the utterance is in the concluding part (*upasaṁhāra*) still it has to depend upon the *arthavāda* which is in the beginning (*upakrama*) and it could not perform its function without the help of the *arthavāda*. Thus the words in the *vidhi* namely *Ṛk*, *Yajus* and *Sāma* are to lose their primary meaning (that is, *mantra*) and to acquire the secondary meaning namely the *Ṛgveda*, *Yajurveda* and *Sāmaveda* in order to avoid discrepancy with the *arthavāda* statement.

But the *apaccheda* rule is in direct opposition to this rule. The statement that enjoins the expiation of the release of loin by *pratihartā* engenders its own meaning without relying on the statement that enjoins the expiation of the default by *udgātā* as in the case of 'pade juhoti' and 'āhavanīye juhoti'. Thus in the case of losing hold of the loin by one of the *ṛtviks*, whichever similar default came later, the *śāstra* connected with it is to be considered superior to one connected with the former.

5.3.8 Reasons to Prove that Upakrama-nyāya Is to be Applied

Here we should study the context and decide which rule — *apaccheda-nyāya* or *upakrama-nyāya* — deserves to be applied here. As stated by Kumārila, *apaccheda-nyāya* serves its purpose where the prescriptions are not dependent on one another, and *upakrama-nyāya* becomes applicable where the latter statement depends entirely on the former one. But according to the Advaitins, perception and a good number of Vedic statements that present the universe as quite distinct from Brahman are sublated by the Vedic statements themselves owing to the application of the *apaccheda-nyāya*. In accordance with the contentions of the author of the *Advaitasiddhi*, Vedic statements denying the existence of everything other than Brahman have to depend upon the testimonies or *pramāṇas* that mention or present the counter-entity which is said to be denied.¹⁷ They are: (1) perception which apprehends things that do not seem to be identical with Brahman, (2) Vedic statements that acclaim Brahman to be in possession of incalculable auspicious qualities, and (3) Vedic portions that deal with sacrifices and other meritorious deeds with their ways of performance and their fruits. Unless the universe is presented by means of some testimony how can it be denied by Vedic statements? A negation indispensably requires the presentation of its counter-entity by a recognised testimony or *pramāṇa*. Otherwise the negation ceases to have any meaning. Thus the negative Vedic statements, being in need of the former affirmative statements and of perception, admit only of the application of *upakrama-nyāya*; and *apaccheda-nyāya* cannot therefore, function here in defiance of the

specific ruling of an authority in Mīmāṃsā, of the stature of Kumārila.”

Nor do the negative Vedic statements that are held by the Advaitins as favourable to their doctrine be later, simply for the reason that they require their counter-entity to emerge before its negation. To be in requirement of some other cannot make one later; for that very reason no one expiation enjoining the *apaccheda nyāya* can be later in that sense, since it does not require any other; therefore ‘later’ means ‘to be known later on.’

It is true that the perceptual apprehension that “This is not silver” requires the pre-apprehension of silver but there is no necessity that the pre-apprehension of silver must be a valid knowledge. In that case, the valid apprehension “this pearl is not silver” should not occur to a person who has no delusion regarding the pearl previously. Moreover if a person apprehends silver as silver, but later on has a delusion in perceiving silver that “it is not silver”, then the former apprehension of silver as silver would have to be regarded as a delusion; for, on the Advaitin’s reasoning it becomes sublated by the later apprehension “it is not silver” simply for the reason that it occurs later on. Hence the moment of birth of an apprehension is immaterial with regard to its validity. It is the causes that determine the validity or otherwise of apprehensions generated by themselves (causes) and further experiences of the apprehender confirm their validity or invalidity.

The perceptual apprehension of a thing — if it is not generated by the contact of one of the five sense

organs (*laukikasannikarṣājanya*), and if it is not caused by some defects of the sense organs like the excess of bile to the eyes which make white things appear yellow (*doṣaviśeṣājanya*) — is invalidated or sublated by the apprehension of the negation of the same thing. That is why when we have the perception that the fire is hot, we do not have an inference that fire is not hot. There the perception caused by the contact of the sense of touch with fire takes place although one has arrived at an erroneous inference that 'fire is not hot'. There the later perception is able to sublate the former erroneous inference. The apprehension that 'the conch is yellow' caused by the defect in the eye (due to excess of bile) is not, in spite of its coming into being later than the valid apprehension that "the conch is white," for the reason that the later apprehension is caused by the defect in the eyes.

Let us suppose we have acquired the perception of an object by the group of causes necessary for it. If later, on account of another group of causes, we apparently get a perceptual apprehension contrary to the former and tending to invalidate it, it is accepted by all thinkers that in case this second group of causes is not more powerful than the former, and if it is equal to or inferior in strength to the former, then the former group of causes will alone prevail. The second group of causes will not then generate their effect.

In the case where the two groups of causes are not in total opposition to each other, both of them can have their own respective effects. With regard to *apaccheda-nyāya* and *padāhavanīyanyāya*, the statements

do not oppose each other. The two expiations enjoined in *apaccheda-nyāya* have their own validity when each one of them becomes applicable. In the second case, the offerings are enjoined in the *āhavanīya* fire but some other offerings are directed to be offered in the hoof-print of the horse in supercession of *āhavanīya* fire. Here the *utsargāpavāda* rule becomes applicable. In both the above instances one statement is not by nature opposed to the other. In the rule of *apaccheda* each one of them has its own validity when each one is to be applied separately but when the two expiatory functions happen to be performed in one and the same sacrifice, it becomes a matter for decision which one is to be performed. In fact both or even more of them become presented and each one of them becomes an alternative for performance. But as there is nothing to prevent the application of the latter expiatory statement, it emerges unobstructed and as it comes afterwards, it becomes superior to the former and supercedes it. The apprehension of the latter expiatory statement which does not require anything with regard to its coming into being, emerges only subsuming the former, and as it has no other statement that can sublate this, it becomes powerful and thus it becomes not only superior to, but also sublates the former."

It cannot be denied that unless the group of causes consists of some peculiar cause, the perceptual apprehension that "it is not silver" does not come into being seen after the apprehension that 'it is silver'. In the same way, the statements that are interpreted by the Advaitin to mean the reality of Brahman alone

are not capable of bringing about the above *advaita-jñāna* denying duality as it is confronted by the *bheda-jñāna* of the existance of difference — the universe is as real as Brahman and is quite distinct from the same — generated by the perception of various things apprehended as distinct from one another, and the *bhedaśrutis* declaring variety causing apprehension similar to the above perception and not less numerous than the statements believed by the Advaitins to be causing *advaita-jñāna*; for the Vedic statements of distinction are equal, in point of number and validity, to the Vedic statements of non-distinction. Perception has superiority over Vedic statements of non-distinction or the absence of variety which consequently become less powerful than perception.

Hence how can the Vedic statements of non-distinction engender *advaita-jñāna* as Advaitins contend, while perception and Vedic statements of distinction have already generated their own effect of *bheda-jñāna*?²⁰ Does *advaita-jñāna* have any special and extraordinary cause among the assemblage of its own causes that it comes into being even in the presence of *bheda-jñāna* that is brought out by its own assemblage of causes? What special feature do the *advaitaśrutis* possess that it can sublimate perception and *bhedaśrutis*?

Thus the testimonies that bring about the knowledge of variety of things and presumed by the Advaitins as a former testimony, are far from being sublated by the *advaitaśrutis*. *Apaccheda* rule has nothing to do with this context and it is *upakrama-nyāya* alone which is applicable to this context, and this disproves the contention of the Advaitin that Brahman is *nirguṇa* and that there is nothing but Brahman.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin's view on this point can be summed up as follows: The contention of the Advaitin that *saguṇaśruti*, *bhedaśruti* and perception remain sublated by *nirguṇaśruti* and *abhedaśruti* by the application of the rule of *apaccheda* cannot stand the test of scrutiny. As *saguṇaśruti* presents the auspicious qualities in Brahman and *nirguṇaśruti* states the absence of vices, evils and imperfections in the same Brahman, there is no conflict between those two types of the Vedic statements, on the basis of which sublation of *saguṇaśruti* by *nirguṇaśruti* is postulated by the Advaitin. Similarly *bhedaśruti* means the distinction of things among themselves and from Brahman, while *abhedaśruti* contends the identity of the universe with Brahman for the reason that it (the universe) is created, sustained and absorbed by Brahman;" and for the reason that the universe, as it is an inseparable attribute of Brahman, is His body" as human and other bodies are to the souls with which they are invested. Hence there is no conflict or inconsistency between those two types of *śrutis*, so much so, there is no need for the application of the rule of *apaccheda*.

Even granting that there is conflict, it is *upakrama-nyāya* that is more appropriate in this context. The rule of *apaccheda* could emerge where there is the conflict in the order of matters or affairs which is not settled, when the performance of a deed depends upon the occurrence of one or more causes and the conflict is evanescent since it can prevail only when the performance of a deed is proceeding on. Hence the application of *apaccheda-nyāya* in this context is not only inappropriate but also impossible. It is in the rule of *upakrama* that we find two statements of conflicting

nature the order of which does not admit alteration. The application of this rule (*upakramanyāya*) in this context will prove adverse to the Advaita view as both the *saguṇaśruti* and *bhedaśruti* being the former ones prevent the emergence of the latter (*nirguṇaśruti* and *abhedaśruti*).

5.4. *Is Nescience a Positive Entity?*

5.4.1 *The Cognition 'I do not Know' Does not Mean the Absence of Knowledge*

What is the cause of illusory experiences? It is invariably held by all, that it is *ajñāna* — ignorance or nescience (absence of knowledge) which is a negative entity. The existence of such a thing is experienced by the common apprehension of all people, learned or unlearned in such statements as 'I am ignorant', and 'I do not know'. That '*ajñāna*' is the object of the above apprehension is contested by none. But whether this '*ajñāna*' is a positive entity or a negative one, is a question to be decided by a careful scrutiny of the arguments based upon the apprehensions of contestants. Let us examine the arguments of the Advaitin on this head.

From Vedic texts such as '*ekam eva advītiyam, brahma*', '*neha nānāsti kiñcana*' etc., the Advaitin argues that one arrives at a conclusion that the supreme Brahman is the only reality, and that there is nothing distinct from Brahman. When the above conclusion is shaken to the very root by the perception of the world of diverse nature, the Advaitin relies on other Vedic texts like '*māyām tu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt māyinaṃ tu mahēśvaram*' and states that everything other than the

supreme Brahman is a product of *māyā*, and as such all of them are as unreal as its material cause namely *māyā*. Just as diverse jewels made of gold, in spite of their various forms and shapes, have gold as their material cause and possess the characteristics of gold, so must all things in the universe being the transformation of unreal *māyā* have the characteristic unreality of *māyā*. The words *māyā*, *avidyā* and *ajñāna* are synonymous denoting one and the same nescience.

Though the Advaitin posits it (*ajñāna*) as a positive entity (*bhāvapadārtha*), he contends that it is distinct from positive and negative entities for the reason that it is dispelled by *brahmajñāna* and that it is apprehended by all. If it is real, it cannot be sublated by later knowledge; if it did not exist, it could not be perceived (*sat cet na bādhyeta, asat cet na pratiyeta*).

Other Vedāntins contend that *ajñāna* is only the non-existence of *jñāna*. But their view is sought to be disproved by the Advaitin on the basis of the following arguments:

The cognition 'I do not know' cannot apprehend the non-existence of any knowledge since it itself being a knowledge cannot deny the prevalence of a knowledge just at the time of its coming into being. In a place where there is a white jar, how can a person deny the presence of all jars by saying 'here is no jar'? Nor can the same cognition 'I do not know' deny the knowledge of a particular thing, quality or aspect; for knowledge being one and eternal in itself as maintained by the Advaitin," how can there be a denial of the existence of a particular knowledge? The common usage 'I do not know what an elephant is' means that the

objectivity (*viśayatā*) of a cognition of that particular person does not exist in an elephant. In the same way all cognitions such as, 'I do not know a jar' are to be explained so as to mean that the objectivity (*viśayatā*) of the cognition does not exist in a jar. Moreover in all such cognitions, the negation is to be apprehended only by non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) and not by perception or any other *pramāṇa*. And before the cognition of a negation, the knowledge of the substrate where the negation is to be cognised and the cognition of the counter-positive (*pratiyogi*) are two pre-requisites. For example, when we make the negative statement 'There is no jar on the ground,' there should be a knowledge of the substrate, namely, the ground and likewise of the counter-positive that whose existence is denied, namely, the jar. In the absence of their cognitions, there can be no cognition of a negation. Under such circumstances, the cognition 'I do not know' cannot mean the non-existence of a cognition for there is neither the cognition of a substrate nor the counter-positive. If the cognitions of substrate and counter-positive prevail, then there will be no such cognition as 'I do not know'. If they do not, then there will be no cognition of a negation owing to the absence of causes. Hence the cognition 'I do not know' and the like must mean nescience or ignorance or *avidyā* that is not of a negative nature. It really means not that 'There is no knowledge in me' but that I possess *avidyā* or *ajñāna* as an attribute.

The recollective cognition, "All this time, I slept so soundly that I was not aware of what happened" is an evidence, according to the Advaitin, to prove that it is only nescience of positive nature (*bhāvarūpājñāna*)

and not the non-existence of a cognition. At the time of sound sleep, external as well as internal organs having ceased to operate, no cognition can occur. The witness (*sākṣi*) — the pure intelligence accompanied by *avidyā* — can apprehend the nescience in the same way as it is capable of apprehending desire, pleasure etc. In the recollective cognition, “I am ignorant” the ‘I’ appears to be the seat of nescience but, says the Advaitin, it is not so. The ‘I’ being a product of nescience (*avidyā*) cannot be the seat of the same nescience. On the pure intelligence (*śuddhacaitanya*) the identity of ‘I’ is superimposed, and it is why the ‘I’ instead of the intelligence (*śuddhacaitanya*) appears to be the seat of nescience. Moreover, the happiness that seems to synchronise with the sound sleep cannot be cognised by the ‘I’ which is at that time merged or sunk as it were in *avidyā*.

5.4.2 Difference in Advaitin's Explanation of Two Perceptions

It is true that the cognition “a jar does not know” means the negation or absence of cognition in a jar; still the cognition “I do not know” which resemble it in form may mean nescience. Although there is a close similarity in the form of expression of the above two cognitions, their difference in meaning cannot be gainsaid. When we say ‘*idaṁ asuraṁ*’, ‘*balirasuraḥ*’ in spite of their close similarity in form, the two sentences have two different meanings; ‘*idaṁ asuraṁ*’ means “this (city) is devoid of celestial beings”; “*balirasuraḥ*” means, on the other hand, “Bali was a demon”. “Similarly,” says the Advaitin “I do not know” means “I possess *ajñāna*.””

To the question — in the vicinity of the eternal omnipresent and self-luminous Ātman, how can nescience exist or prevail? — the Advaitin's answer runs as follows:— Everything cognised by *pramāṇavṛttijñāna* non-cognised by the same becomes known to the witness (*sākṣi*) — the intelligence (*śuddhacaitanya*) in company with *avidyā*, as cognised or non-cognised respectively." By the cognition "I know this," the particular thing becomes known as known to the witness, whereas by the cognition "I do not know this," the particular thing becomes known as unknown to the same witness. Thus a cognition caused by a *pramāṇa* can alone be capable of dispelling or of being dispelled and the *śuddhacaitanya* will never be capable of dispelling any delusion or nescience."

Let us now examine the arguments of the Advaitin. The apprehension 'I am ignorant' (*aham ajñah*) (that is put forth as a proof to establish nescience of positive nature) does not at all mean what the Advaitin considers it to mean. How can such an apprehension prevail at all times? It is against the common experience of men. Nor can it prevail at times; if a person returning from a town is asked by another, whether the former knows any news of the town, his reply may be 'I do not know'. By this reply, he means that he does not know any news that would be interesting to the enquirer. How can that person returning from the town be ignorant of everything concerning the town? If common experience or usage is taken into consideration, the above apprehension cannot but mean the ignorance of a particular object or a particular feature. If it is contended to mean absolute ignorance of everything, it is far from common or human experience.

With regard to the other statement, namely, "I do not know myself," it cannot but be of a stupefied person and his nescience too cannot be absolutely devoid of all objects or features.

Moreover nescience must be held to be associated with objects in the same way as *pramāṇajanya-jñāna*, its counterpart is. A cognition owes its existence to its object in the absence of which it will cease to be a cognition. The physical body, happiness and the 'I' are considered to be the objects of nescience. As such, how can the cognition "I am ignorant of all" take place?

On the assumption that there could be no cognition of any kind when the cognition 'I do not know' prevails, the Advaitin interprets the cognition ('I am ignorant', 'I do not know anything') in a way quite different from that usually adopted by all others in respect of such negative sentences like "there is no jar on the ground," "the ground is devoid of a jar." But as argued above, such cognitions with no definite objects have been proved to be absolutely impossible. So there is no necessity to give a peculiar interpretation to those sentences that seem to favour a positive nescience. Moreover, the cognitions 'I do not go', 'I am not happy', 'I am happy' are interpreted even by the Advaitin in conformity with the common understanding. There are no two opinions among the followers of different schools of philosophical thought with regard to a negative sentence. They all agree in holding that it purports a negative meaning of what is presented by the same sentence when the negative particle is removed from that sentence. If the statement 'I know an elephant' means the know-

ledge of an elephant, certainly the statement 'I do not know an elephant' means the absence of the knowledge of an elephant.

If the cognition 'I do not know' means ignorance of positive nature (*bhāvarūpājñāna*) for the reason that it cannot — in case, it is held as a negative entity — be cognised by any testimony other than *anupalabdhi*, and if for another reason that the denial of a cognition is impossible since the self-luminous cognition cannot deny its own existence, then how can the self-same cognition prove ignorance of the self while the self is being cognised by the self-same cognition? How can the cognition "I do not know an elephant" prove the ignorance of an elephant while the same is an object of cognition? If the elephant is denied to be an object then it will cease to be a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) for unless a cognition has an object as its attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) it would be no longer a "qualified cognition" (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) for it would then violate the general rule, "the cognition of negation does not fail to satisfy the conditions of a qualified cognition that is of apprehending an entity and its attribute or quality."¹

5.4.3 *There is No Word in the Usage 'I do not Know' Which Could Denote a Positive Ajñāna*

As a matter of fact, the cognition "I do not know an elephant" can be satisfactorily explained only as the Viśiṣṭādvaitin does. The word 'know' with 'do not' means the non-existence of the knowledge of an elephant. The word 'knowledge' though a general term means here a particular form of knowledge namely perception. A person who has had a knowledge of an elephant from the speech of others but has not

got an opportunity to see it personally with his own eyes. can have the remembrance of the elephant and so he says "I do not know an elephant" meaning "I have not seen an elephant." When a man says "I do not know an elephant" the elephant, the knowledge of which is denied is said to be the object of the counter-positive of the negation. The negation of the knowledge of the elephant requires a knowledge of the elephant — its counter-positive. So the man could have the knowledge of an elephant in the shape of remembrance as he had already heard of it from others. In some cases, a thing may have been known with some qualities; still it may be spoken of as unknown in view of other unknown qualities. But such an explanation could not be given by the Advaitin in the case of "I do not know Brahman" (*aham brahma na jñāmi*), since the self-luminous Brahman held by him as devoid of all qualities cannot be said to have been known with some qualities, and at the same time unknown with some others.

According to all thinkers other than the Advaitin there is no difference in the way of interpretation of the two negative sentences namely 'He does not know a jar' (*ghaṭam na jñānāti*) and 'He does not cook rice' (*taṇḍulam na pacati*). The meaning of the accusative case on the words *ghaṭa* and *taṇḍula* go to the meaning of their respective roots 'jñā' and 'pac' and the meaning of the roots to the meanings of the negative particle. The Advaitin holds that ignorance of positive nature is the purport of the sentences like 'he does not know a jar' 'I am ignorant' consisting of negative particles. If he does so, he has to state the words by which the nescience is denoted. Neither the root 'jñā' nor the

negative particle 'na' can individually denote the nescience of a positive nature, for neither of them has the power to denote it. The secondary power (*lakṣaṇā*) of the root or negative particle based on the intention of people from time immemorial" cannot be resorted to as an explanation as this nescience has the approval of none other than the Advaitin. With regard to the secondary power of another type called *svārasika-lakṣaṇā* which is based on appropriateness to the context the secondary meaning must be related to the primary meaning. When a man says "A hamlet of cowherds in the river Gaṅgā" (*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*) the flood — the meaning of the word 'Gaṅgā' is related to the secondary meaning namely "the bank of the river" of the same word. Further the listener must be aware of both the meanings, as then only he will take the secondary meaning in preference to the primary meaning which he finds to be incompatible in the context as it is in disagreement with the intention of the speaker." If such is the case, how can nescience be even the secondary meaning?

Apart from all these considerations, the nescience which is neither positive nor negative must, as stated before,⁴⁰ have a counter-positive and a substrate as every non-existence should have. If it does not have them, then it is as good as a positive thing. If it has, it is no other than non-existence. Which else can have the two characteristics of non-existence?

Another contention of the Advaitin that like *adharma* which denotes a positive thing *pāpa* or *ajñāna* also may denote a positive entity, is also untenable. Sin is conceived as a positive entity as it is denoted by the

words - *pañka* - *pāpma* - *pāpa* - *kilbiṣa* - *kalmaṣa* - *kaluṣa* *vrjina*-*enaḥ*-*agha*-*amhaḥ*-*durita*-*duṣkṛta*, although it is also denoted by a negative word *adharma*. Similarly demons are denoted by the words *daitya*-*daiteya*-*danuja*-*indrāri*-*dānava*-*śukraśiṣya* and also by the negative term *asura*. But neither of them — sin or demon — can be denoted by the same negative term namely *adharma* and *asura* if they are split as ‘*na dharmah*’ and ‘*na suraḥ*’ since they mean only ‘one other than *dharma*’ and ‘one other than *sura*’ respectively. Moreover whereas ‘sin’ and ‘demon’ are well-known to all as positive entities, since they are very frequently denoted by words like *pāpa*, *durita*, etc. and *dānava*, *daitya* etc.; the ignorance (*ajñāna*) which is conceived by the Advaitin as neither a positive nor a negative entity, is a strange thing inconceivable to everyone other than Advaitins.

5.4.4 According to the Advaitasiddhi ‘Aham’ Does not Point out Antaḥkaraṇa

The *Advaitasiddhi* says:- the cognition ‘*aham na jñāmi*’ cannot comprehend the ‘I’ — the inner organ as the substrate of *ajñāna*, since the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) a product of the same *ajñāna*, cannot be the seat of its own material cause. To the darkness or ignorance which has already arisen and is a material cause, the later *ahamārtha* cannot be said to be the seat or resting place.” Hence it is only the pure intelligence (*śuddhacaitanya*) which can be the seat of *ajñāna*. Owing to the superimposition of the identity of the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) on the pure intelligence which is the real seat of *ajñāna*, the inner organ is mistaken for the substrate of nescience, by the relation of co-existence. If two things rest in the same place

or on the same thing, the one is often mistaken for the other."

On this contention, one is inclined to put the following question to the Advaitin. If for the above stated reason, the inner organ cannot be the substrate of *ajñāna*, what is the proof, evidence or argument that can establish the pure intelligence as the seat of *ajñāna*? The cognition 'I am ignorant' can prove the inner organ as the seat of *ajñāna*, but this is against the Advaitin's contention. According to the *Advaitasiddhi*, the 'I' is the knot by which the inner organ and the pure intelligence are united." Here also the Advaitin does not present any authority in support of his contention. What does the word 'knot' mean? If both — the inner organ and the pure intelligence — are meant, then what is the attribute through which the word 'I' can denote both of them. Their "being two" or "twoness" (*dviṭva*) cannot be the attribute. In that case, their difference from each other being understood, there is no possibility of superimposition of the identity of the one on the other. If the 'knot' means "one united with another" then there would arise the difficulty culminating in making one *viśeṣaṇa* to the other by turns, as *caitanya* in association with *antaḥkāraṇa*, or *antaḥkāraṇa* in association with *caitanya*. Apart from this let us ask — "Is the union effected by the relation of difference or identity (*bhedasambandha* or *abhedasambandha*)?" The former cannot be the case; since difference is cognised, the superimposition of one on the other cannot take place. In the latter case, (if by the relation of identity), it must be, as the red colour of the china-rose is superimposed on the crystal, either an attribute of the inner organ superimposed on

the pure intelligence or the latter's attribute superimposed on the former. The pure intelligence has, according to the Advaitin, no attribute of its own and hence the latter alternative being an impossibility, the attribute of the inner organ alone can be said to be superimposed on the pure intelligence. But it is against the common experience which prevails to this effect, "I the intelligent do this" superimposing only intelligence on the 'I'.

5.4.5 the Advaitin's Difficulty in Explaining a Recollective Apprehension

The recollective apprehension or remembrance, "All this time I have been comfortably sleeping" should be interpreted in conformity with a similar apprehension namely "All this time I have been only awake." There is no difference of opinion with regard to the second apprehension, namely, that it is as recollective as the first. Even according to the Advaitin, the second apprehension is recollective with regard to the 'I' as it exists in its full stature during the waking state. The 'I' being identified with the inner organ which is maintained as being in a subtle state during the sleep beyond the zone of apprehension, the Advaitin is compelled to experience the difficulty of explaining the recollective apprehension, "All the time I have been comfortably sleeping." He has to state that it is recollective with regard to the comfort, sleep and ignorance, and perceptive with regard to the 'I' since the 'I' is in the subtle state without its *vytti*, whereas the other recollective apprehension "All this time I have been awake" is held as recollective in all aspects. This difficulty is due to the Advaitin's holding the inner organ as the object of the cognition 'I'. Moreover the

apprehension, the impression caused thereby, and the remembrance — all the three must be held to remain in one and the same substrate. Otherwise it would be impossible to answer the question why B could not remember what A apprehended. Against this contention upheld by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and others, the Advaitin holds that the comfort, sleep and ignorance are apprehended by the witness during the sleep and that they are being remembered in the waking state by the function of the inner organ. If the 'I' does not continue to exist at the time of sleep, then it cannot remember what is experienced during the sleep. What was experienced by one 'I' cannot be remembered by another 'I'. In that case B should be able to remember what was experienced only by A."

According to the Advaitin, the 'I' — the inner organ remains in a subtle state during the sleep. As it is transformative, it grows again and expands into its former state, when the person is awake. It corresponds to a plant, hair, and nail which when nipped grow again to a state in which they are mistaken for the pruned and removed one, on account of close similarity. As such is the fact, the recollective perception "I who had perceived a jar last week, now remember it" would be far from valid in consequence of the lack of identity of the perceiver and the one who remembers. Hence the inner organ which is considered transformative cannot be held as the object of the cognition 'I'.

The *Advaitasiddhi* contends that though the pure intelligence is really the substrate of the nescience yet owing to the superimposition of the identity of the inner organ in the pure intelligence, the inner organ is

cognised as the substrate of the nescience. This contention is untenable. Does the pure intelligence, which illumines the inner organ, superimpose on itself the identity of the inner organ? This is absolutely impossible; for the pure intelligence can never be a delusion. Nor can the pure intelligence cognise itself as the substrate of the inner organ's identity, as the tip of the finger cannot touch itself. Nor can a *ṛtti-jñāna* of the inner organ cognise the above identity in the pure intelligence, since the inner organ is conceived as being illumined only by the witness and never by its own *ṛtti-jñāna*. To conceive a *ṛtti-jñāna* for the illumination of the inner organ — while the witness is held to illumine the pleasure, nescience and the inner organ — is inconsistent with the doctrine of the Advaitin.

Thus, as there is no possibility of any superimposition on the witness, the above cognition "I am ignorant" should be accepted as proving that the 'I' — which is neither the inner organ nor the witness nor their union as the Advaitin holds (but) — points the self (*ātman*).

Hence the word *ajñāna* used in all schools of philosophy as the non-existence of *jñāna* can only mean either antecedent negation of *jñāna* or a cognition that apprehends what is diametrically opposite to the reality of an object or on occasions the actions too. But nowhere can the word be considered as used in the sense in which the Advaitin seeks to interpret it.

5.5. *Anirovacanīya Khyāti*

5.5.1 *Three Kinds of Existence of Things Held by the Advaitin*

The central doctrine of the Advaitic system of philosophy is that (i) there is only one thing that is

absolutely and ultimately real, namely, Brahman, and that (ii) the world around us with all the infinite variety of objects in it is merely an illusory appearance without reality. As exponents of this theory which is opposed to the common-sense of the majority of men, the Advaitins are obliged, even more than the thinkers of other schools, to explain what exactly is meant by the term delusion or illusory appearance (*bhrama*), how it takes place, and what are the mental and other factors involved. Every system of Indian Philosophy has its own view concerning this phenomenon of illusory perception. Let us first examine the Advaitic theory concerning *bhrama*, before we proceed to study what other schools have got to say on the question.

The Advaitins hold that existence (*sattā*) may be one of three kinds. The first kind of existence is called pure or real existence (*pāramārthika-sattā*). According to the Advaitin, Brahman — the supreme Being alone is real and all else have no real existence. The second kind of existence called empirical existence (*vyāvahārika-sattā*) is true for all worldly purposes or practical life. This kind of existence is seen in the appearance of the world around us. Since Brahman alone has real existence, this, too, is unreal but the existence of the world continues until Brahman is realised, and it is also perceived by all men except the man who realised Brahman. This existence of the world is not transient and not subjective to the individual alone as hallucinatory perception is where the rope is mistaken for snake. The third kind of existence may be of the nature of hallucination (*prātibhāsika-sattā*) as for instance, when a serpent is perceived as existing while only a piece of rope lies before the individual. This is a transient or

temporary delusion and the serpent's delusive appearance or existence is called by the Advaitin "*prātibhāsika-sattā*."

5.5.2 *How the Illusory Objects are Evolved*

How can a 'snake' or 'silver' come into being in the absence of its respective material cause? The Advaitin's explanation is as follows. It is the nescience (*avidyā*) present in the intelligence limited by the rope with its auxiliaries — the fear of snake (or the desire for silver) in the self, the close resemblance between the rope and the snake, some defect in the eye, etc. which becomes the material cause and it evolves those hallucinatory things.

There are two kinds of nescience, one residing in the pure intelligence (*caitanya*), as proved by the common experience "I am ignorant" (*aham ajñāḥ*), and another remaining in the intelligence limited by object of perception as proved by another universal experience 'I do not know what this is' (*aham idaṁ na jānāmi*). The former is called 'root nescience' (*mūlāvidyā*) which evolves the empirical universe and which is dispelled by the indeterminate cognition or realisation of Brahman. The latter form of nescience (*tūlāvidyā*) resides in the "intelligence conditioned or limited by an object" (*viśayāvachchinnā-caitanya*). It evolves hallucinatory objects like the rope-snake, nacre-silver, etc. and is dispelled by the apprehension of the reality of the basis (*adhiṣṭhānayāthātmya-jñāna*). This latter "nescience" — in association with the residual impression (*samskāra*) of snake, silver, etc, kindled by the close resemblance of the basis that is before the person, and with the defect in the eye — becomes transformed into

hallucinatory 'snake', 'silver', etc. and also into the apprehension of those objects simultaneously.

The defect in the eye together with the impression of the 'snake' or 'silver' etc. is the instrumental cause of both the hallucinatory objects and their perceptual apprehension. These hallucinatory objects remain in their material cause, namely nescience (which resides in the intelligence limited by the object), as all products do in their respective material causes like the pot in the mud of which it is made. The inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) that can function only through the sense-organs is incapable of enabling these hallucinatory objects to be apprehended by its '*vr̥tti*' of *antaḥkaraṇa* as they are beyond the sense-organs. Of course, the eye is in contact with the object lying before the person, viz rope, nacre, etc., but its function is limited to the basis namely rope, nacre, etc., with its characteristic feature and not with the hallucinatory serpent or silver. Unless it is postulated that a '*vr̥tti*' of *antaḥkaraṇa* or of something else occurs, illusory objects cannot be apprehended. Therefore in the absence of '*vr̥tti*' of the inner organ, it is the '*vr̥tti*' of nescience (*avidyā*) that generates the illusory objects and they are apprehended by the witness (*sākṣin*).

"The witness self is explained by its comparison with a lamp on the stage which illumines equally the stage manager, the actress and the audience, and shines of itself even in their absence." This simile is designed to point out that the witness self illumines equally the empirical *jīva*, the inner organ and the objects and shines of its own accord in sound sleep when all these are absent."

5.5.3 *How the Illusory Objects are Indefinable*

The appearance and disappearance of these illusory or hallucinatory objects cannot be perceived even by the person concerned as he is identifying them with their respective basis, namely, rope or shell. "When the person becomes aware of the true identity of the basis, these illusory or hallucinatory objects together with their perception, disappear at the same time in the same way as they were generated together in their material cause, namely nescience (*avidyā*). The nescience which is also the material cause of the empirical universe will disappear in its own material cause namely Brahman by the apprehension of the real Brahman.

The illusory objects are not real since they are ablated when the true identity of the basis is known; nor are they absolutely unreal like the 'son of a barren woman' or the 'hare's horn', since they are apprehended unlike these latter cases. Hence they are distinct from the real and from the unreal; that is, they are neither real nor unreal" (*sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa*).

5.5.4 *The Reason to Contend the Origin of Illusory Objects*

We have to postulate, the Advaitin says, the origination of the illusory or hallucinatory objects for without such an object arising there, the apprehension of the 'serpent' in the rope or 'silver' in the nacre would be impossible and could not be explained. If these illusory objects are not conceded as existing for the time being, how could one have the apprehension of the snake in the rope and silver in nacre? It is an

uncontested dictum that the contact of the eye with the object is an indispensable cause of the perceptual apprehension of the same object by the same sense organ. Unless the illusory snake or silver is held to have been actually originated in the rope or the nacre, how could the eye have had the contact with the object so essential for the generation of the apprehension of snake or silver?

5.5.5 *Things Belonging to Different Kinds of Existence Cannot have Mutual Contact*

By the arguments stated above, the apprehension of snake in the rope is contended by the Advaitin to be a perception which must take place in the following order. By the perception of the basis, namely rope (*adhiṣṭhāna*) as "this", the residual impression (*samskāra*) of the snake which the person has got already, becomes kindled by the sight of the characteristic feature he finds in the basis; that is the resemblance between the snake and the rope; then the origination of the hallucinatory object, subsequently the contact of eye with that object, and finally the apprehension of the illusory object. The Advaitin maintains that the snake appearing in the rope which emerges and is perceived at the same time has only hallucinatory (*prātibhāsika*) existence whereas the eye has, according to him, empirical reality (*vyāvahārika-sattā*). These two are, as already stated, two entirely different kinds of existence. There cannot be any contact between the eye which has empirical existence and the hallucinatory snake which has, according to the Advaitin, a different kind of existence, namely *prātibhāsika*.

5.5.6 *The Advaitic Conception of Perception of Illusory Object is by the Operation of Two Vṛttis*

To avoid this difficulty, the Advaitin gives a different explanation of the cognition "this is a snake." In this cognition the rope is cognized as 'this' by the contact of the *vṛtti* of the inner organ and thus it is perception in its true sense. But the illusory snake being the product of nescience (*avidyā*) is beyond the purview of the external sense organs, and hence it is apprehended by the witness himself (*sākṣi-bhāṣya*). Of these two *vṛttis*, the former (*antahkaraṇa-vṛtti*) alone is capable of dispelling a branch nescience (*tūlājñāna*) that conceals the basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*), that is, rope, nacre, etc. and the intelligence limited by the same (basis) (*idam-avacchinna-caitanya*) becomes manifested by the *vṛtti* of the inner organ. The intelligence (*sākṣi-caitanya*) by the *vṛtti* of nescience (*avidyā*) manifests the illusory snake. But intelligence (*caitanya*) in spite of its being limited by the various limiting agents is one and the same like ether (*ākāśa*), be it in a pot or outside it. Thus the two parts in the above cognition, namely 'this' and 'snake' though manifested by two different kinds of *vṛttis*, are, in fact, manifested by one and the same intelligence, namely *caitanya*. This is why we consider the above cognition as one, and not distinct ones."

5.5.7 *Viśiṣṭādvaitin's Criticism against the Above View*

Let us now examine the stand of the Advaitin with regard to the illusory object. The contention that the illusory or hallucinatory object is neither real nor unreal (*sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa*) is untenable. In the case of two alternatives which are mutually opposed to

each other, one or the other of them must be true and there is no possibility of a third alternative." A thing can be X or non-X but it can never be neither X nor non-X. This is the statement made by no less a logician than the great Udayana.¹⁰ This is the conception held by all thinkers belonging to diverse '*darśanas*'. A peculiar indefinable object which is neither real nor unreal, and a cognition apprehending the above will not be accepted by any one, other than the Advaitin.

In the apprehension 'this is snake' two kinds of *vr̥tti*s are held to be functioning — 'thisness' perceived by the *vr̥tti* of the inner organ and 'snakehood' by the *vr̥tti* of nescience (*avidyā*). If this be the case, how can 'the perception of another perception' (*anuvyavasāya*) as when we say "I see a snake with my eye" (*aham sarpaṁ cakṣuṣā paśyāmi*) be explained? Only the apprehension by the *vr̥tti* of the inner organ can be the perception as is held by the Advaitin and snake is not an object contacted by the inner organ's *vr̥tti*.

5.5.8 Advaitin's Rejoinder and Viśiṣṭādvaitin's Criticism thereof

To this the Advaitin's answer runs along these lines. There are two superimpositions: one is the identity of the indefinable snake superimposed on the substrate - rope, - and the other is on the *vr̥tti* of the inner organ, the identity of the *vr̥tti* of nescience is superimposed. Hence we feel 'I do perceive a silver.'¹¹

The postulation of the origination of an illusory object is for the purpose of proving that the apprehen-

sion of a snake in a rope as "this is a snake" is a perception, since the contact of the object with the eyes is indispensable for perception. This very purpose is defeated since even after holding the birth of a disputed thing as it is, being a product of the *vr̥tti* of nescience beyond the reach of the eye, and the cognition of the hallucinatory thing is only by the *vr̥tti* of nescience, and not of the inner organ (*antahkaraṇa*). Thus the cognition of a snake cannot itself be the perception, and the cognition of 'this' alone is perception as it is cognised by the *vr̥tti* of inner organ due to the contact of a rope with the eye. The Advaitin, having postulated that the birth of the illusory object synchronises with its apprehension, cannot contend that this apprehension is itself perception which requires the existence of its object, and its contact with the sense organ concerned.

5.5.9 *Appearance and Disappearance of Illusory Things Are not Cognised even by the Perceiver*

The *Advaitasiddhi* raises a question. If a new hallucinatory thing is considered to take its birth in cases of illusory perception, how is it that no one becomes aware of the birth of this new thing? How can a thing that is visible after its coming into being remain unseen just at the time of its birth, although the person who sees it is watching the substrate with his eyes wide open? The answer of the *Advaitasiddhi* to this runs as follows: The illusory silver is apprehended as identical with its substrate namely nacre has not perished. The apprehension of identity is an impediment to the apprehension of the origin of the illusory silver."

5.5.10 *Viśiṣṭādvaitin's Question*

But here another question may be raised by one who declines to accept the creation of an illusory product. The Advaitin contends that the illusory silver is born out of the *vr̥tti* of nescience (*avidyā-vr̥tti*) and that it has nothing to do with the *vr̥tti* of the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). So there is nothing to prevent the cognition of silver together with its origination by the same *vr̥tti* of nescience. The non-occurrence of such a cognition is a proof of the fact that there is no creation of an illusory or hallucinatory thing. One should, therefore, be surprised at hearing the Advaitin speak of the creation of an illusory object.

5.5.11 *The Citsukhī's Clarification*

A further question arises against the Advaitin's view. It is this:— How can the apprehension of the illusory silver, which, according to the Advaitin, has originated, be called perception at all when it is not apprehended by the *vr̥tti* of the inner organ? The *Citsukhī* seeks to answer this question by saying that the apprehension of a superimposed object does not need the contact of the sense-organ with the superimposed." It is perception, says the *Citsukhī*, since the substrate of the superimposed is apprehended by the *vr̥tti* of the inner organ even though the superimposed illusory object itself is not apprehended by the *vr̥tti* of the *antaḥkaraṇa*.

5.5.12 *Viśiṣṭādvaitin's Objection to The Above View*

This answer is far from convincing. When we make the inference, "the mountain has fire," the minor

term (mountain) is apprehended by perception and the major term (fire) is an object of inference. Though perception and inference have equal part to play in this respect, this apprehension — namely the mountain has fire, is called 'inference' and not perception, since the fire is prominent in view of its being sought in the mountain. That is why the fire is named as the major term. It is an undisputed fact that in the apprehension "this is silver" in the nacre, it is the 'silver' that has the prominent role and despite its being cognised by the operation of nescience (*avidyāvṛtti*) and not the *antaḥkaraṇāvṛtti*, the apprehension of silver is called the perception of silver — a misnomer. Besides, the Advaitin has to subject himself to the task of explaining the perception of a perception (*anuvyavasāya*) "I am seeing silver with my eyes" (*cakṣuṣā rajatam paśyāmi*). The *vṛtti* of the inner organ which flows through the eye into the object lying before *viz.* rope or nacre, bears the reflection of intelligence (*caitanya*) limited by the object (rope, nacre, etc.) and this reflection is held as perception by the eye and its form is as "this". The nescience (*avidyā*) resides in the same intelligence (*viśayāvācchinna-caitanya*) which is identical with the intelligence limited by the knower (*pramāṭṛ-caitanya*) for *caitanya* is only one. The *vṛtti* of nescience is transformed into the hallucinatory object like snake and silver and its cognition simultaneously. The reflection of hallucinatory things that fall on this *vṛtti* has the form of 'snake' or 'silver'. If such is the position, how could the substrate and the superimposed object be cognised by a single cognition the form of which is held by all thinkers including the Advaitin as 'this is silver'? This would be possible only if the *vṛttis* become identical.

5.5.13 *The Impossibility of a Single Cognition to Apprehend Both the Basis and the Superimposed*

The explanation of the perception of a perception "I see silver with my eyes" (*rajalatam cakṣuṣā paśyāmi*) given by the *Advaitasiddhi* is that there are two superimpositions, one identifying the cognition of silver with the perception of its basis, namely nacre, and another identifying the silver with the basis, nacre. This explanation is far from satisfactory. As explained in the previous paragraph, the two *vr̥ttis* have nothing to do with each other with regard to their objects (nacre and silver). To say that there is no actual superimposition but only the non-cognition of the difference between the perception (of the basis, nacre) and the cognition (of silver) as well as the non-cognition of difference between nacre and silver is an argument which could be adopted only by the Akhyātivādin and not by the Anirvacanīyakhyāti-vādin who postulates the origin of an indefinable object. Moreover how can the identity of the illusory thing (silver) with the basis (nacre) be superimposed? Is the identity empirically real? Then it cannot have any connection with the hallucinatory silver. If it has only hallucinatory reality, then it cannot be in connection with the basis that has the empirical reality. Besides the identity of the silver being hallucinatory can be apprehended only by the *vr̥tti* of nescience. Is it the intelligence (*caitanya*) reflected in the same *vr̥tti* of nescience that produces and cognises the hallucinatory silver or is it different? In the former case, the intelligence reflected in the *vr̥tti* can manifest only what the object of the *vr̥tti* is. That *vr̥tti* having only the hallucinatory silver as its object, the intelligence reflected in it cannot manifest the

identity of the silver. If it is some other *vr̥tti*, then there must be conceived another *vr̥tti* of nescience, having the hallucinatory silver, its identity and the basis nacre as its object leading to infinite regress (*anavasthā*).

5.5.14 The Theory of Two Superimpositions

Another contention of the Advaitin that it is one and the same intelligence which becomes reflected in both the *vr̥ttis* as a consequence of which (i) the identity of the cognition of the hallucinatory silver in the perception of the basis as “this” and (ii) the identity of the hallucinatory silver on the nacre are superimposed and these superimpositions invalidate the cognition. This view expressed in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*“ is also untenable. If by intelligence, its reflection is meant, it cannot be one but two as the *vr̥ttis* are two different entities. If the intelligence itself is meant, then another question arises whether it is “the pure intelligence” or intelligence limited by some attribute (*śuddha-caitanyam uta avacchinna-caitanyam*). The former cannot be the case, as pure intelligence is conceived by the Advaitin as incapable of comprehending any object, much less identity of the hallucinatory silver. As for the limited intelligence it differs from one limiting agent to another, and consequently is unable to comprehend the identity of two hallucinatory things with two empirically real ones namely the cognition of silver with the perception of nacre and silver with nacre. (Here cognition of silver and silver are hallucinatory things and the perception of nacre and nacre are empirically real ones).

5.5.15 *The Untenability of the Theory of Two Superimpositions*

The Advaitin's conception of the origination of hallucinatory silver in order to prove that its apprehension is a case of perception is futile; for, he is constrained to postulate two *ṛttis* due to which the cognition "this is silver" is to be contended as a collection of two different cognitions as in the case of an inference "the mountain is fiery."⁶³

5.5.16 *Anyathākhyāti Cannot be Completely Dispensed with by the Advaitin*

In fact, it is better to have delusion (*anyathākhyāti*) in place of *anirvacanīya-khyāti* as the latter does not serve the purpose for which it is imagined. Nor can delusion be totally dispensed with by the Advaitin on the strength of *anirvacanīyakhyāti*. In the case of the cognition "the crystal is red" when the red colour of the china-rose is superimposed in the crystal placed nearby, the birth of a hallucinatory red colour is not conceived in the crystal. The birth of hallucinatory object is postulated only where there cannot be any contact of the sense-organ with the object. In the case of the crystal appearing red with the red colour of the china-rose, the eye is in contact with the red colour of the china-rose and consequently there is no necessity for postulating hallucinatory red colour. It is an instance of delusion (*anyathākhyāti*) with the nature of perception."

5.5.17 *Advaitin's Explanation of Two Perceptions*

In an inference "the lake has fire because there is smoke seen on its surface," water vapour is mistaken

for smoke. The Advaitin calls this inference as delusios (*anyathākhyāti*). Why not call the hallucinatory silver also an instance of (*anyathākhyāti*)? For he cannot do without that explanation. Hence it is a suggestion worth consideration that it is better to have delusion (*anyathākhyāti*) in all cases whether the eye has the contact of the object or not, than to postulate the origination of a hallucinatory object, which even after conceding such a peculiar creation does not serve the purpose.

If the identity of the hallucinatory silver is apprehended in nacre, as is held by the author of the *Advaitasiddhi* and if it prevents the cognition of the hallucinatory silver, then the cognition "this is not silver" cannot be the sublater of the hallucinatory silver; for, the sublating cognition apprehends the absolute non-existence of silver in the nacre, which is against the statement of the *Advaitasiddhi*. There are no two opinions in regard to the two cognitions — the sublated cognition and its sublating cognition — that the later cognition denies what is cognised by the former. Unless such consistency is maintained, they would cease to be related to each other as sublated and sublating. The inconsistency is obvious in the statements. In the cognition of nacre, "this is silver" as hallucinatory silver is the object; and in the cognition of the same nacre as "this is not silver," only the empirically real silver is denied there at all the three times of past, present and future.¹⁷ This is worth scrutiny. If the counter-positive of the negation, cognised by the sublating apprehension, is not the object of the sublated cognition, how could there be a relation between the one as sublated and the other as sublating?

Moreover unless the silverhood is considered to be common to the hallucieatory and the empirical silver, one would not stoop down to pick the nacre under the mistaken notion that it is silver.⁵¹

To say that the non-existence of the empirically real silver with the determinant (*avacchedaka*, here *rajatatva*) which is common to real and unreal in nacre as to be meant by the cognition "this is not silver" would not be acceptable to any school. It is an accepted fact that in all cognitions of negation, the non-existence of the counter-positive (*pratiyogi*) qualified by the determinant (*avacchedaka*) is the object and such non-existence would be possible only where no one of the counter-positives remains. To say that the cognition "this is not silver" means the non-existence of a particular counter-positive with the determinant and it is possible in nacre as there is no empirically real silver—is absurd and against the accepted canons of all schools.

5.5.18 Advaitin's Different Explanations of the Same Type of Statements

In this connection it may be added that on the basis of the principle that the repudiating or sublating passage or cognition denies the absolute non-existence of all previous cognitions or statements; it is only on the basis of this principle that the Advaitin interprets such Vedic texts as *nirguṇam niṣkriyam* .. as denying all qualities and actions of any kind in Brahman. He seeks to refute the Viśiṣṭādvaitin where the latter states that these texts deny only the existence of evil qualities and actions in Brahman and not good qualities and actions. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin contends that

since there are a large number of other Vedic texts which unequivocally affirm the existence of hosts of auspicious qualities in Brahman, the *nirguṇa* texts have to be interpreted in consonance with them so that none of the Vedic texts may be ignored.

Nor can the silver be denied "in the form of reality" as contended by the *Advaitasiddhi*." How can the cognition of a non-existence of a counter-positive qualified by an attribute that does not reside in the same counter-positive, sublate or deny the existence of all silver? The above cognition can deny silver only in the form of reality and never the hallucinatory silver. Thus it is not sublated so as to make the hallucinatory silver as distinct from *sat* and *asat*.

If, on the other hand, delusion (*anyathākhyāti*) is accepted and the theory of the birth of hallucinatory silver is completely abandoned, no such difficulties will confront the Advaitin except one that as there is no contact of silver or snake with the eyes, there could be no perception of it. But it is an irony of fate that even after postulating the birth of a hallucinatory object, the cognition of that object cannot be proved as a perception. If the hallucinatory object and its cognition synchronise by the *vṛtti* or flow of nescience, and since contact of the eyes with the object is indispensable for producing the effect namely, its perception, how could it be said that this contact precedes the perception? Further, the eye has empirical or *vyāvahārika* reality and the snake, silver, etc. have only hallucinatory (*prātibhāsika*) reality. How could there be any contact between two entities whose reality is different in kind from each other? To

avoid this difficulty, the Advaitin (cleverly) contends that with regard to the hallucination, it is not perception. Nor can a hallucinatory entity have the contact of an entity of empirical reality. Moreover, the very birth of hallucinatory object is inconceivable. The "coming into being" is defined as the first contact of an entity with the time.⁴⁰ There are no two opinions among the Advaitins with regard to time, for they all admit that it is empirically real. As such, how can a hallucinatory entity (silver, snake, etc). have contact with time which is an empirical reality?

5.5.19 *Prabhākara's Explanation of Illusion*

Prabhākara, the Mīmāṃsaka, a commentator on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* of Jaimini differs from his fellow-commentator, Kumarila Bhaṭṭa with regard to delusion (*anyathākhyāti*). If a person mistakes a nacre for silver or a rope for a snake, Prabhākara says, it is not a delusion (*anyathākhyāti*) as there is no possibility of delusion at all.⁴¹ All cognitions are valid. A thing becomes an object of cognition because it is being manifested by that cognition. How can silver be an object of the cognition of nacre? It is a cognition of silver if it comprehendssilver, and it cannot comprehend nacre which is not its object. Otherwise we can have no faith in any of our cognitions, in view of the cognitions being capable of comprehending things beyond their purview.⁴² If things that are not before us, in contact with our eyes, are held as objects of our perception, then this view would be as absurd as the conception of the Buddhists' '*asat-khyāti*.' What are those causes that make things objects of our perception despite their absence before us?

Defects in our eyes cannot generate a perception since defects are held only as being capable of preventing something from coming into being. A sense-organ with some defect can prevent a perception. Defects are so called since they prevent the effect from coming into being." If a person stoops to pick up nacre thinking that it is a piece of silver or runs away at seeing a rope which he mistakes for a snake, it is only due to his not having the cognition that it is different from silver or snake (*rajatabheda-grahābhāvaḥ* or *sarṣabheda-grahābhāvaḥ*). The perception of "this" on a thing lying before us and the recollection of silver or snake constitute the supposed cognition, "this is silver or snake". The cognition of silver or snake is not perception as there is no silver/snake before us and consequently the eye has no contact with it; nor is it inference, for there are no causes necessarily required for the generation of an inference. Hence it is remembrance or recollection which requires only 'reaidual' impression (*samskāraḥ*). Due to the absence of impressinn, one does not have such a cognition of an object not previously apprehended by him. The perception of the thing before us as 'this' and the remembrance of silver as 'silver' are two different cognitions and they do not have any connection with each other. The close succession of their emerging is beyond the power of human apprehension in consequence of which some scholars hold it even as one and the same cognition. These two cognitions, though individually valid, somehow cause the person to stoop to pick it up. Individually each of the two cognitions is valid but they result in tempting the person to make it his own. Thus the non-apprehension of difference from siluer (*rajatabhedagrahābhāva*) the perception of the thing lying pre-

sent, and the remembrance of silver in the shop and other places — these three joining together cause the person to pick it up.”

5.5.20 *Viśiṣṭādvaitin's View is Akin to That of Prābhākara*

In this respect the Viśiṣṭādvaitin's view does not differ very much from that of Prabhākara. He too declines to accept delusion (*anyathākhyāti*) as an entity as held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Following Yāmūnācārya's view and stating it *verbatim*, Rāmānuja asserts the statement of Yāmūnācārya⁴ that all cognitions are valid in the view of the scholars who know the spirit of the Vedic statements. Upholding the same view, Veṅkaṭanātha puts forth the following arguments in support of the view of Prabhākara. Consequently the opponents call the Viśiṣṭādvaitin 'disguised Prabhākara'.

5.5.21 *Viśiṣṭādvaitin's Stand on Illusion*

It is an uncontested fact that the absence of apprehension of difference from what is desired (*iṣṭābhedāgraha*) is an invariable forerunner of inclination (*pravṛtti*) and the absence of apprehension of difference from what is disliked is an antecedent to abstention (*nivṛtti*). But one may put the following question. As the absence of apprehension that it is not silver, makes the person take the object that glitters on the ground, so the absence of the apprehension that it is not identical with snake is the cause of abstention and running away from the object lying on the ground. Thus the absence of apprehension that “It is not silver” (*rajatābhedagrahābhāva*) is the cause of an inclination to act and the

absence of apprehension that it is identical with the silver (*rajaṭābhedagrahābhāva*) is the cause of abstention from action. If a person, in the absence of an apprehension, in nacre, that 'it is not silver' seems to be inclined to take the bright object, then the same person due to his not having got the apprehension that it is identical with silver, should abstain from taking the same object, and thus there might be a clash between inclination and abstention.⁶⁶ So both the inclination to take it and abstention from taking it might take place at the same time.

The answer to this question runs as follows: The absence of the apprehension of the difference from the desired object is the cause of the inclination to take it, and the absence of the apprehension of difference from the disliked one is the cause of disinclination or aversion to it.⁶⁷ For example, the absence of the apprehension of difference from the desired object, namely, silver, makes a person inclined to pick up the shell from the ground. The absence of the apprehension of difference from the object of dislike, like the snake which is by illusion thought of in a rope lying before the person causes dislike or fear of the illusory snake from which he runs away.

5.5.22 *Trivṛtkaraṇa and Pañcikaraṇa Explained*

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, there is no cognition worthy of the name error or delusion as Prābhākaraś hold; that is, there is no such thing as error or delusion. The only difference between these two (Prābhākara and the Viśiṣṭādvaitin) is that the former holds the absence of the apprehension — that it is different from what is desired (*iṣṭābhedagrahābhāva*) in

association with the remembrance of the desired object — is the cause of one's mistaking a thing for another, whereas the Viśiṣṭādvaitin postulates that this absence of the apprehension — that it is different from the desired object in company with the perception of something else (and not remembrance)— is the cause for such a mistaking. The perception of a desired object or hated object in the thing lying before him makes a person stoop to pick it up or run away from it.

Triple-blending (*trivṛt-karaṇa*) referred to in the Vedic texts, and quintuplication (*pañcīkaraṇa*) referred to in the *Smṛtis*⁶⁶ explain the cognition of mistaking one for another. In the *śruti* text Brahman itself says "I shall, in order to give name and form to all things in the universe, make the process of tripling on account of which all things, constituted of some elements, have the qualities found in other elements," (Triple-blending, *trivṛtkaraṇam* means the following process: the three elements earth, water and light are each divided into two equal parts. One half of each element is again divided into two equal parts. One quarter of each element is mixed with the two halves of the other elements. Thus each element has one quarter part of each of the two other elements added to one half of its own.) This amalgamation explains why one element possesses the qualities of the two other elements, for that element has in it, parts of the two other elements. If nacre is mistaken for a piece of silver, it is because of its (nacre) having certain parts of silver. In the cognition, though nacre consists of silver parts as well as its own parts in accordance with the process of triple-blending, the parts of

silver alone, separated from the co-existing nacre-parts are taken notice of by the person looking at it. The apprehension of the feature common to silver and nacre, the absence of the apprehension that the thing is different from what it appears, the defects in the sense organ, and the merit or demerit (*punya* and *pāpa*) of the individual person — these four are held by all schools to be the cause of the so-called delusion. Desire for silver or fear of the snake that besets one's mind, even in a sub-conscious state, makes a person at the sight of a bright object like nacre stoop down to pick it up, or makes the person run away from the supposed snake.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin holds that the collection of the afore-mentioned causes is responsible for a person's action out of desire or fear. But the action by the mere "absence of apprehension that it is different from the desired" as stated by Prābhākara, cannot take place. The Prābhākaras deny that the portions of *mantra* and *arthavāda* in the *Vedas* mean what they seem to impart; they overlook the *trivṛt-karaṇa* statements in the *Vedas* and the *pañcī-karaṇa* process described in the *Smṛtis*. So they have to depend only upon '*bhedāgraha*'. (non apprehension of difference). But the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, who upholds the unquestionable and absolute authority of the *Vedas* in all their entirety including the *arthavādas*, seeks the help of (1) the triple-blending statements which ultimately mean quintuplication, the creation of the Almighty, (2) the rule of the substitute, and (3) *bhedāgraha*, for his explanation to prove that all cognitions are valid.

1. By the process of quintriplication elaborated in *Smṛtis*, one element has other elements in its constitution, and the nacre has a few properties or aspects of silver in its structure. It does not mean that the silver parts are actually existing in nacre with its (nacre's) own parts, but some parts of nacre very closely resemble silver parts. By quintuplication there are in nacre some parts of fire (*tejas*), and these parts have their own quality of "glittering whiteness" (*bhāsvara-śukla*); and these silver-like parts that are responsible for nacre are mistaken for silver. In nacre, a large number of parts are recognised as belonging to nacre, they serve their purpose in its being thought of as nacre and the object bears the name "nacre". The smaller number of those parts which look like the parts of silver are not taken notice of as they are overpowered by the larger number of nacre parts in consequence of which the object is not called silver.

2. The rule of the substitute: In regard to the *soma* sacrifice, if the creeper *soma* is not available for use, it is enjoined that another creeper *pūtika* by name may be used as a substitute of the Soma creeper. Here the *pūtika* does not really contain the parts of *soma*, but some of the parts of these two creepers very closely resemble each other. Owing to the profusion of the dissimilar parts that do not have the resemblance, the other parts in the same *pūtika*, being fewer, are unfit for any use in that capacity, just like the small proportion of water mixed in milk. Because of higher proportion of the milk parts, the liquid is deservedly called milk. Thus a thing is in general named after the part which is present in large proportion.

In the *soma* sacrifice, *pūtika* is allowed to be used as a substitute for *soma* in case the latter is not available. The *soma* parts are denoted by the word *soma* and limited by the genus *soma*. Some parts of *pūtika* closely resemble those of *soma*. Hence *pūtika* is suggested for use in place of *soma*. By using *pūtika*, there could be no violation of Vedic enjoinderment as it becomes partially followed though not fully. There would be a total violation of Vedic enjoinderment, if some other creeper is made the substitute for *soma* as those parts have no resemblance to *soma* parts. So only *pūtika* is suggested as a worthy substitute of *soma*."

Usually these silver-like aspects in nacre being over-powered by the numerous dissimilar parts in nacre, are not taken notice of. But when owing to some defect in the eye, if the silver-like parts appear prominently, their cognition alone prevails. When the same person realises that it is not silver, the difference from silver (*rajatabheda*) is nothing but nacrehood *suktitva*; for the Viśiṣṭādvaitin contends that all negations are only positive entities in another sense. *Abhāva* (non-existence) is cited as a separate and distinct entity by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. When it is said, "There is no pot on the ground," the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would state that there are meant two entities (i) the pot, and (ii) its non-existence (on the ground). The Viśiṣṭādvaitin says that there is no need to postulate a separate entity called '*abhāva*'; for, the non-existence of the pot (*ghaṭāhhāva*) on the ground is nothing but the existence of the ground.

To a person ailing from jaundice a white object like 'conch' appears yellow. The apprehension 'the

conch is yellow' is not delusion (*anyathākhyāti*) as held by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The small yellow particles of bile pass from the eye along with the 'eye rays' and have contact with the conch the white colour of which is overpowered by the yellow colour of the bile. Thus in this apprehension, the conch does not appear with its own colour of whiteness, but as if it is electroplated with gold. The bile and its yellow colour being very near to the person because of their having passed from his eyes are apprehended by that person alone. Just as a bird flying far above in the sky is perceived by a person who has been watching it from the very moment it set out from ground and not by others, even so the conch appears yellow to him alone from whose eye the yellow bile passed to the conch.

Whereas the Prābhākara's explanation on this head is the yellow colour of bile and the conch are being closely perceived by the person with jaundiced eye, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin's contention is that the bile substance (*pittadravya*) that passes to the thing placed before the eyes is apprehended, and that because the bile substance and conch are in fact in the relation of substance and attribute (*ādhār-ādheyabhāva*) the apprehension 'the conch is yellow' is justifiably valid.

5.5.23 *The Cognition of Red Colour in China-rose, etc.*

In the case of the red colour of the china-rose that appears in a crystal placed near that flower, the Advaitins hold, as already stated, that it is a case of error or delusion. But the Viśiṣṭādvaitin's explanation in this regard is as follows: The lustre of china-rose, like that of a gem, spreads in all directions nearby

and the crystal being a transparent thing, could receive the lustre. That is why a stone (*ratna*) placed nearby does not appear red, like a crystal. The white colour of the crystal itself is overpowered by the spreading red colour of the china-rose, and hence we perceive only the red colour in the crystal. It is the contact of lustre in transparent substances like crystal that makes them appear red. On the other hand, opaque things like mud or stone do not receive the spreading lustre. Unless the spreading lustre is held responsible, it would be difficult to give a satisfactory answer to the question "Why does the crystal not appear red even when there is no china-rose?" Thus the apprehension 'the crystal is red' is, in fact, a collection of two perceptions — the perception of lustre with the red colour and the perception of the crystal. The colour of the crystal, being overpowered by the red colour of the flower, is not perceived.

According to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, the cognition of mirage as water is also a valid perception in the same way as many other cognitions have already been proved to be. Owing to the triple-blending or quintuplication, the mirage consists of all the gross elements, of which water alone is apprehended, because the thirsty person's invisible result of *karma* (*adṛṣṭa*) prompts him to go to the place where he hopes to get water. In his unsuccessful attempt, he is destined to suffer as a result of past *karma* (*adṛṣṭa*) which is identified with the Lord's displeasure with the suffering person. Those who know the mirage as mirage do not apprehend water alone in it, as those who mistake mirage for water do. The cognition of it as mirage is an impediment standing in the way of cognitions that it is water. The invisible result of *karma* (*adṛṣṭa*) must be accepted

by all schools who recognise the authority of the *Vedas*, as the general cause of all effects. Those effects directly or indirectly become the objects connected with the joyous or grievous experiences of persons. If the invisible result of *karma* is not conceived as such, then there must be either a series of delusions of all people at all times with regard to all objects, or there must be no delusion at all.¹⁰

Nor is the cognition of a circle made by the brandishing of a firebrand a delusion, according to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin. The firebrand has the contact of all eight directions successively though not simultaneously, we do perceive its contact with one direction after another, and the residual impressions (*samskāra*) caused by those perceptions of the contacts of the seven former directions — generate the remembrance just at the moment before the perception of the contact with the eighth direction takes place. Thus it is a close succession of two cognitions, one of remembrance and the other of perception.

For the cognition 'my face is in the mirror' which is characterised as delusion or *anyathākhyāti*, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin gives the following explanation to prove that it is not a delusion. The 'eye-rays' pass to the mirror and come back to the face, as a result of their contact with a polished surface like the mirror. All things with a polished surface are capable of forcing the rays that fall upon them to go back. That is why the rays falling upon a stone do not rebound. The contact of the eye being both on the mirror and on the face, there emerge two perceptions — one cognising the contact of the mirror, and another the face. As these two perceptions occur in close succession, it appears as if the face itself is on the mirror.

According to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, there is no distinct entity worth the name 'direction'. With the help of the limiting adjuncts of direction, all practical purposes are served. Those who deny the existence of direction and those also who reiterate its existence have to stick to these indispensable adjuncts. When a person mistakes the east for the west, it is not a case of delusion. It is also a twin cognition — one comprehending the adjunct of the east as 'this', and another comprehending the adjunct of west as 'west'. This is possible, since directions are relative terms, and one and the same substance can be the adjuncts of all directions also with regard to the position of different things. So the east mistaken for the west, is also in fact west with regard to some other thing placed farther east.

So also the Viśiṣṭādvaitin states that the cognition 'there are two moons' need not be considered as delusion when the eye is pressed by the finger, the rays of the eye travel by either side of the finger. Thus two collections of the causes of the moon's perception begin to function. One causes the perception of the moon in its own place while another passing slightly bent, generates another cognition — one perceiving a place removed from its own place. The two perceptions having emerged in close succession appear to be together apprehending the moon connected with the place near the moon's. This is the process by which the two moons are apprehended.¹¹

Thus in cases of delusion, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin's explanation is called the *yathārtha-khyāti*. By quintuplication one element has one-eighth of the whole, and

when due to some defect in the eyes, the one element alone which forms only one-eighth part is cognised, the so-called delusion occur. In some other cases where quintuplication cannot give a satisfactory explanation, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin resorts to *bhedāgraha asamsārgāgraha* — the absence of apprehension of distinction from, or of non-contact of what is desired, in the same manner as Prābhākara does.

5.5.24 *The Indeterminate Cognition and the Akhaṇḍārthabodha of Advaita*

The self-luminous Brahman which has no second is considered by the Advaitin to be apprehended by the indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka-jñāna*) and that this apprehension will lead to final liberation from the cycle of birth and death. Though the name 'Indeterminate Cognition' reminds us of its counterpart in the school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and though the Advaitin's definition of the same is also akin to that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it has nothing to do with that.

5.5.25 *The Indeterminate Cognition According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the indeterminate cognition belongs to the class of perceptions generated by any one of the five sense-organs or the mind. It is an invariable forerunner or antecedent of determinate and distinctive perception (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*). Before we have this determinate and distinctive perception, we have the cognition of jar, jariness (the genus of jar), and the inherence (*samavāya*) of the genus of the jar in the jar as objects (*ghaṭa-ghaṭatva-tat-samavāyāḥ*). But these three are not correlated with one another but are cognized in isolation. Without this previous

indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*), determinate perception would be impossible, for the cognition of attribute or attributes alone leads to determinate perception (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*). The knowledge of the attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) is the cause of the knowledge of the object having that attribute (*viśiṣṭa*). Though the indeterminate is beyond the apprehension of the senses (*atīndriya*), it is logically indispensable. Since (i) the jar (ii) the genus of the jar, and (iii) the inherence of the latter in the former are not perceived as (i) substance (*viśeṣya*) having attribute, (ii) attribute qualifying a substance, and (iii) their relation to each other respectively in the *nirvikalpaka* cognition, it cannot be said to have these three 'awarenesses' (*viśayitāḥ*). In spite of this, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that there is in *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*, a peculiar or fourth kind of 'awareness' different from these three 'awarenesses.' This is accepted by the school for there could be no knowledge without awareness (*viśayitā*). This form of perception is neither valid knowledge (*pramā*) nor an invalid knowledge (*bhrama*), for the definitions of valid and invalid knowledge require the statement of a substantive (*viśeṣya*) and of its attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*). In *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*, there is no perception of these two as one substantive and another as its attribute.

5.5.26 The *Nirvikalpakapratyakṣa* According to the *Sāṅkhya*

The Sāṅkhya view regarding *nirvikalpaka* is quite different. While commenting on Verse 27 of the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, Vācaspatimisra quotes some verses from the *Śloka-vārttika* of Kumārila in support of the Sāṅkhya view.¹ They mean: 'At first one apprehends an object

vaguely as a thing and then thinking people observe (cognise it definitely as belonging to a certain genus and possessing certain well-defined properties). Again it is a well-known fact that on the first apprehension of an object, the first notion is indeterminate and vague like the notion in the mind of an infant or others of arrested mental development; after this, the thing comes to be cognised as possessing certain properties and belonging to a certain genus; the cognition that observes and apprehends all this has been regarded as '*savikalpaka*.'

From the above statements, it is obvious that Vācaspatimisra has, while expounding the Sāṅkhya doctrine, a view with regard to *nirvikalpaka*, which is different from that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. According to the Sāṅkhya, *nirvikalpaka* is not beyond apprehension (*atindriya*) as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds it to be.

5.5.27 Pārthasārathi Miśra's Interpretation of Kumārila's Verses

But Pārthasārathi Miśra gives a different interpretation to the same verses of Kumārila. A person beholding an object before him, remembers his having a former cognition of the same object and identifies it with what he has already seen and this cognition is a determinate one.⁷³

While commenting on another verse beginning with '*nirvikalpakabodhe'pi*' Pārthasārathi Miśra writes: "No recognition can take place unless one has the apprehension of the same thing with its characteristic attribute. Hence even in an indeterminate cognition, a thing is cognised with its general and particular attri-

butes.⁷⁴ Thus the determinate cognition (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*) is invariably a recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) of what has already been apprehended in the indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*).

5.5.28 *The Viśiṣṭādvaitin's View Corresponds with That of Pārthasārathi Miśra*

The view of Viśiṣṭādvaitin with regard to indeterminate perception does not differ from that of Pārthasārathi Miśra. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin holds that there can be no cognition that could cognise an object without comprehending its characteristic attribute. Whereas in determinate cognition (*savikalpaka*), the continuity (*anuvṛtti*) is cognised as the characteristic attribute of a genus; in indeterminate cognition, the continuity is not cognised as it is to be cognised only in succeeding cognitions, and not in the first one of its kind. Moreover 'savikalpaka' is a product of past impression (*saṁsāra*) as well as of the collection of the different causes of perception (*pratyakṣa-sāmagrī*). *Nirvikalpaka* is never in need of a past impression (*saṁskāra*).

When a boy beholds a cow for the first time, and perceives the cow with its own unique configuration (*saṁsthāna*), it is an indeterminate cognition of the cow. In his succeeding perception of the same and other cows, the boy has not only a perception of the cow but also the recollection of a unique configuration (*saṁsthāna*) as he has the impression in his mind caused by his first perception of the cow. The unique configuration becomes cognised as a common feature of all cows. Hence the unique configuration and its possessor are together cognised by the indeterminate cognition as well as by the determinate one. The cog-

nition of continuity of the unique configuration (*samsthānānuvrtti-pratītiḥ*) is a peculiar feature of the determinate cognition not to be found in the indeterminate cognition. The nature and distinctive feature of these two cognitions are given below.

(i) The contact with the sense organs exists with the genus (*jāti*), the particular object and the inherence of the two. Therefore *nirvikalpaka*, too apprehends all these three. (ii) In the *savikalpaka*, there is the additional apprehension of continuity or repetition of similar attributes and distinction from those of other race. In *nirvikalpaka*, the object, its attributes and the relation between the two appear just as they are. In *savikalpaka*, since the genus is perceived in later perception, continuity is an additional feature of the cognition. (iii) So, *nirvikalpaka* too is the cognition of an object with its distinguishing features or qualities.¹³

A cognition worth the name is experienced by one and all as in the shape of 'this is such' (*idaṁ ittham iti*). The cognition, 'this is a cow,' cognises a thing before the person and cowhood in it. This 'cowhood' (*gotva*) is not a distinct category (*prthak-padārtha*) as is held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Cowhood and similar genus (*gotvādi-jātaḥ*) are nothing but the unique, peculiar and defining feature of things. A cow, a jar, a horse, etc. have their own respective and unique configurations beholding which one easily recognises as to which genus that thing belongs.

5.5.29 Advaitin's View

The Advaitin uses the word '*nirvikalpaka*' in a different sense and for a different purpose. According

to him, the indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*) need not be of the nature of perception as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds. It is generated by the words and unlike in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine, it (*nirvikalpa*) succeeds a determinate cognition (*savikalpa*) and never precedes it. The Advaitin defines it as a valid cognition on the ground that it is a cognition which does not cognise an attribute which does not exist in the substantive (*tad-avṛtṭyaprakāraṁ jñānaṁ pramā*). He contends that the indeterminate cognition is a valid one while according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, it is neither valid nor invalid.¹⁰ This verbal indeterminate cognition is denominated as the knowledge of the indeterminate whole (*akhaṇḍārthabodha*) by the Advaitin; and the *Cit-sukhī* defines it as a cognition generated by two or more non-synonymous words by which only one thing is meant.¹¹ The *Advaita-siddhi* defines any statement that would generate *akhaṇḍārtha-bodha* as "one that generates a valid cognition which does not cognise what is not to be remembered by the denotative power of the words."¹²

5.5.30 A Detailed Account of the Above View

In this connection Sures'varācārya writes: Hearing the Vedic statements as '*satyam jñānam anantaṁ brahma*' etc. one understands Brahman as 'reality, intelligence and infiniteness,' but immediately recollecting other Vedic statements that deny the existence of qualities in Brahman, gives the explanation that these words do not mean the existence of any positive quality in Brahman but by the authority of '*arthāpatti*' these three words must mean the distinction from the three negations of those denoted by the words '*satyam, jñānam* and *anantaṁ*' (*asatyād-vyāvṛttiḥ, jadād-vyāvṛttiḥ,*

paricchinād-vyāvṛttiḥ.)” To drive home this explanation, he gives the instance of a house in which the absence of a cat is apprehended by the ravage caused by the rats.⁸⁰

Whereas words — conveying a positive meaning like *satyam*, *jñānam*, etc., through the medium of their primary meaning (*śakyārtha*) real and intelligent — bring out the secondary meaning (*lakṣyārtha*) the distinction from what is unreal (*asatyātd-vyāvṛttiḥ*) and “the distinction from the non-intelligent” (*jaḍād-vyāvṛttiḥ*), the negative words like ‘*anantam*’ directly denote the distinction from the nature of limited things.” As soon as a ‘*samānādhikaraṇa*’ sentence — a sentence having a number of words in grammatical apposition with one another’ — is heard, the verbal apprehension is caused by the words and it is in the form such as is described by the Naiyāyika and some other schools; and hence, it is *sakhaṇḍārtha-bodha* — an apprehension cognising substantives, attributes and their relations. The cognition that succeeds it, is *akhaṇḍārtha-bodha* — a cognition which cognises the substantive alone and it is this cognition that satisfies the inquiry of the learner who asks, “what is Brahman like?” In the first knowledge which leads latter to another kind of knowledge, there is of course the cognition of substance and its attributes (in apposition) but this does not prevent the later rise of the knowledge of the ‘indeterminate whole’ (*akhaṇḍārtha-bodha*) which is the ultimate and supreme purport intended to be conveyed by the sentence.”

5.5.31 Patañjali's Definition of Sāmānādhikaranyā

The eminent grammarian Pratañjali defines *sāmānādhikaranyā* (the grammatical co-ordination) as cul-

mination in presenting a single substantive by words with different denotative attributes." E.g., '*satyam jñānam anantam brahma*,' '*tat tvam asi*,' '*so'yaṁ devadattaḥ*,' are some '*sāmānādhikaraṇa*' sentences, where there is grammatical co-ordination or apposition. There are three possible ways of interpreting such sentences:

1. The words are to mean the attributes alone without their substantive; that is: the words are to be taken as meaning reality (*satyam*) intelligence (*jñānam*) and infiniteness (*anantam*) and not as referring to an object or substantive possessing these attributes.

2. Words to mean one substantive with attributes.

3. Words to mean substantives alone.

The first possibility is ruled out. According to the definition of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* given above, a sentence with *sāmānādhikaraṇya* must mean only one thing and not many attributes, as denoted by all the words in the sentence. Therefore, the attributes, viz. reality, intelligence and unlimitedness — which are distinct and different from one another — cannot be identical, and hence presentation of a single thing — the very vital point of a *sāmānādhikaraṇa* sentence — would be absolutely impossible.

With regard to the second possible interpretation, it is obvious that it, too, is untenable. For, taking the sentence '*tat tvam asi*' (that thou art), the two substantives are '*tat*' and '*tvam*' with their respective attributes; '*tat*' (that) denotes Brahman which is described in the *Upaniṣads* as possessing omniscience, omnipresence, etc. and '*tvam*' (thou) denotes the disciple

Śvetaketu to whom this instruction is imparted and whose intelligence and other attributes are extremely limited. If Brahman and the disciple — ‘*tat*’ and ‘*tvam*’ — are to be interpreted as identical, how could the omniscient Brahman and the person with very limited knowledge become identical, when they have diametrically opposite natures? The definition of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* requires that there should be a single object or substantive. Taking the sentence ‘*so’yaṁ devadattaḥ*’ the grammatical co-ordination (*sāmānādhikarāṇya*) would require a single substantive which must possess the attributes implied by ‘*sah*’ (that) and those implied in ‘*ayam*’ (this). But this would be absurd and impossible. ‘*Sah*’ denotes a person with the contact of past and ‘*ayam*’ denotes the contact of present time. How could a person be having the contacts of both the past and present?

5.5.32 *The Advaitin's Explanation of How ‘Akhaṇḍārthabodha’ is Generated by a ‘Sāmānādhikarāṇa’ Sentence*

Moreover, the Advaitin argues: if the words in ‘*satyaṁ jñānam anantam brahma*’ are interpreted as denoting things with different attributes as their ‘*viśeṣaṇa*’ they are far from meaning the identity of those substantives denoted by them as the attributes could never become identical. Apart from the above reasons, the *sāmānādhikarāṇa* sentences like ‘*satyaṁ jñānam-anantam*’ etc., are not to be interpreted in the light of sentences like ‘*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*’ (a black jar); for the identity of the jar (with jariness) and the possessor of black colour is cognisable by perception while the identity of those denoted by ‘*satyaṁ jñānam*

anantam' is doubtful. These words may denote things different from one another as words in the sentence, "*khaṇḍo muṇḍaḥ pūrṇa-śṛṅgo gauḥ.*" (*khaṇḍaḥ* — a cow with a broken horn; *muṇḍaḥ* — with no horn; *pūrṇa-śṛṅgaḥ* — a cow with both horns.) Here three types of cows are meant, since one and the same cow cannot be in possession of the three attributes denoted by those three adjectives, as they have meanings opposed to one another. The attributes — reality, knowledge and unlimitedness, denoted by the words, *satyam*, *jñānam* and *anantam* respectively may, by nature, not co-exist because of the possibility of their being opposed to one another, though one may not be certain of their mutual opposition as in the case of "*khaṇḍatva*, *muṇḍatva* and *pūrṇa-śṛṅgatva.*"

Hence the Advaitin contends that '*satyam jñānam-anantam brahma*' and such other Vedic statements deserve an explanation that is consistent with the purport of other Vedic texts like '*ekam-evādvitīyam brahma*' denying the existence of any quality in Brahman.

The Advaitin also says: Moreover after the study of the Vedic texts which (according to the Advaitin) deny qualities in Brahman and learning that the apprehension of such a Brahman alone could lead to emancipation from the cycle of births and deaths, the apprehension of pure Brahman without any quality is to be secured for obtaining release from bondage. That can be achieved, if the attributes are ignored and the substantives alone are taken into account in Vedic texts such as '*satyam jñānam anantam brahma*' '*tat tvam asi*' etc. Though the word '*satyam*' means

possessor of reality, 'jñānam' possessor of knowledge and 'anantam' possessor of unlimitedness, the attributes are to be discarded, and Brahman alone is to be taken notice of as the meaning intended to be conveyed. This apprehension having Brahman alone as its object can well be denominated as 'nirvikalpaka' since there is no *vikalpa* — different things as objects of that apprehension. In this way, the Advaitin holds that the third possibility of explanation namely to take the substantive alone (without attributes) is to be resorted to."

In this connection, the *Advaitasiddhi* raises another question: Why should in the case of the usage 'so'yaṁ devadattaḥ,' the contact of the past (denoted by 'saḥ'), the contact of the present (denoted by 'ayaṁ') be discarded in Devadatta as their existence in him at different periods is not impossible? To this the answer given in the *Advaitasiddhi* runs as follows: The sentence being the *samānādhikaraṇa* one, is capable of effecting a verbal apprehension cognising the identity of the two persons denoted by 'saḥ' and 'ayaṁ', but the identity of the two attributes, namely, the contact of the past and present which has inevitably to be cognised, is impossible. So the substantive without the attributes is to be taken as meant by the sentence."

The author of the *Advaita-siddhi* adds further that in the sentence 'daṇḍī kuṇḍalī devadattaḥ', the identity of the holder of a stick with the wearer of ear-rings cannot be cognised although there is no incompatibility in the co-existence of the stick and the ear-rings in Devadatta even at one and the same time; for in that case the identity of the stick and the ear-rings (the attributes) which is impossible, would have to be

cognised. In the same way the identity of the person who was seen in the past (denoted by 'ayam') could not be cognised for the same reason, namely the impossibility of the identity of the two attributes viz. the past and the present."

To retain one part of the meaning and discard another part, the Advaitin contends, is not a fault in the explanation of a *samānādhikaraṇa* sentence, since it has to present a single substantive as its purport. It is only in 'vyādhikaraṇa' sentence like '*ghaṭasya suklaḥ*' meaning 'the white colour of a jar' that the meanings of the two words are to be taken in entirety without discarding either.

5.5.33 *Import (Tātparya) is Determinant of Secondary Meaning (Lakṣaṇa) of One or More Words in a Sentence*

Even if we take the meaning of '*satyam*' and other words in a negative way by implication (*lakṣaṇā*) as '*satyam*' to mean not 'real' but 'difference from the unreal' (*asatyād-vyāvṛttiḥ*), '*jñānam*' not 'intelligence' but 'difference from non-intelligence' (*jaḍād-vyāvṛttiḥ*) and '*anantam*' 'other than limited', it is not a wrong explanation since it is accordance with the 'intention' of the *śruti*. In '*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*' the secondary meaning 'bank' is taken in preference to the meaning 'flood' since the former alone is appropriate to convey the speaker's intention.

As the implication depends entirely upon the 'intention' in consequence of which the implication is considered on a par with 'denotation' (*abhidhā*) it is immaterial whether it (implication - *lakṣaṇā*) is applied

to only one word or to all in a sentence. In 'gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ' the word 'gaṅgā' alone has the implication or *lakṣaṇā*, while in 'viṣaṁ bhuṅkṣva' (take poison) spoken in the context of condemning a person who is willing to take food in his enemy's house, one means "do not take food in your enemy's house," both the words namely 'viṣaṁ' and 'bhuṅkṣva' by the the power of implication convey the above idea. Thus all words in a *samānādhikaraṇa* sentence can give a secondary meaning.

5.5.34 *Usefulness of Many Words in a Samānādhikaraṇa Sentence*

As a matter of fact, there is no necessity at all to resort to implication as the word or words themselves can denote their meaning positively and negatively as well. Blackness is identical with 'being other than whiteness' and so is it comprehended. So, Brahman being the only real existent it is identical with the distinction from everything else in the universe. Thus two words in a *samānādhikaraṇa* sentence by presenting different denotative attributes (*paraspara-vilakṣaṇa-śakyatāvachchedakapratipādanena*) can retain their definition, *i.e.* culmination in presenting a single thing by the words with different denotative attributes." Moreover, to use a number of words is useful in making the substantive distinct from those with which people are apt to identify it. One comes to know definitely after learning 'satyaṁ jñānam-anantam' etc., that Brahman is not unreal, not non-intelligence and not limited, as things are in the universe. When a child is taught to know the moon by saying "it is the moon that possesses the greatest brilliance" the word 'greatest' distinguishes the moon from less brilliant

objects like glow-worm and star, and the word 'lustre' distinguishes the same from darkness. Thus the moon that is desired to be taught to the child is made known to it. Thus the 'great sentences' (*mahā-vākyaṇi*) culminate in presenting the pure Brahman, the apprehension of which leads to final emancipation from this worldly life. This is the conclusion arrived at by the Advaitin by these arguments.

The Advaitin assumes that the intention of *śruti* is to present Brahman without attributes. It is this very intention of the *śruti* that is the point at issue. The Advaitin seems to be begging the question by assuming as true what has to be proved as true. He takes it for granted that the *nirguṇa* texts speak of Brahman as being absolutely without any attribute or quality. It is this very contention that is challenged by Rāmānuja, Veṅkaṭanātha and others.

5.5.35 *Viśiṣṭādvaitin's Reasons for the Non-Occurrence of Such an Akhaṇḍārthabodha*

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin makes the following observations against the above arguments of the Advaitin. That from sentences such as '*satyaṁ jñānam anantam brahma*', '*tat tvam asi*', '*so'yaṁ devadattaḥ*', '*prakṛṣṭa-prakāśaś-candraḥ*', the substantives alone are cognised without their denotative attributes, is against the common experience. Verbal cognitions caused by *satyaṁ jñānam* etc., cognise real with reality, knowledge with knowledge-hood and so on. The contention that it (the verbal apprehension) is only an intermediary, and that the succeeding cognition which alone is intended to be conveyed cognises the substantive alone in consequence of which it is an '*akhaṇḍārtha-bodha*,' is

not acceptable to those whose systems differ from that of the Advaitin. When the *akhaṇḍārtha-bodha* occurs, is there any relationship between the meanings of the the different words cognised or not? If it is not cognised, then this cognition (*akhaṇḍārtha-bodha*) could be no other than the remembrance of meanings (*padārthopasthitiḥ*) produced at first by the knowledge of the words (*pada-jñānam*), that is, it could be merely the remembrance of the words. The relation between the meanings of the words is comprehended when the words are uttered in juxtaposition with one another (*ākāṅkṣā*). According to the rule accepted by all thinkers, there cannot be a repetition of cognitions unless there is a desire for it. So, this *akhaṇḍārtha-bodha* of the Advaitin, after the remembrance of the meanings of the words uttered (*padajanya-padārthopasthiti*), is superfluous and serves no purpose. Thus the first alternative also is ruled out.

That in view of the intention — '*tātparya*' the knowledge of which is bound to prevail after the study of Vedic texts such as '*ekamevādviṭīyaṁ brahma*' '*neha nānāsti kiñcana*' which mean unreality of everything other than Brahman, "the 'great sentences' (*mahāvākyas*) are to be understood to mean the *brahma-svarūpa* alone," as stated by the Advaitin — is unwarranted. In sentences like '*saindhavam-ānaya*' which might mean 'bring a horse' or 'bring salt', the intention that the word '*saindhava*' (born of the country of *sindhu* or born of ocean) is uttered to mean 'horse' or 'salt' becomes responsible for the verbal cognition. In accordance with the statements made in the *Advaita-siddhi*,¹⁰ intention is to be inserted along with *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *sannidhi* — the three causes of verbal apprehension,

and the removal of any one word from the sentence concerned must result in the failure of the generation of the desired verbal apprehension. But the great sentences like '*satyaṁ jñānam ...*' do not fall in this line, since even if we remove '*satyaṁ*' the desired *akhaṇḍārthabodha* of *brahmasvarūpa* can be achieved in the definition of 'intention' (*tātparyajñāna-ghaṭitā-kāṅkṣāvirahe'pi*). This is just what takes place in the case of another sentence '*viññānam brahma*'. Moreover, *akhaṇḍārtha-bodha* cannot be a product of words, as the Advaitin holds it to be. If a person who desires to express the existence of fire says 'here is smoke', the listener infers fire. The cognition of fire is only inference and not verbal apprehension. In the same way, even the 'great sentences' could have their function as verbal expressions only up to the verbal comprehension. *Sakhaṇḍārtha-bodha*, and the ultimate *akhaṇḍārtha-bodha* of the invention of the Advaitin have nothing to do with the verbal expression as in the case of inference of fire resulting from the word 'smoke', after the apprehension of smoke.

According to the Advaitin, all *samānādhikaraṇa* sentences, do not cause *akhaṇḍārthabodha*; for the sentence '*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*' (a black jar) in spite of its being a sentence with '*samānādhikaranyā*', causes a cognition in which the identity of a jar with the black-coloured object, and there is no *akhaṇḍārtha-bodha* to succeed to.

It is the contention of the Advaitin that the words in '*satyaṁ jñānam-anantam*', with the power of implication (*lakṣaṇā*) make us know the distinction from 'unreal', 'non-intelligent' and 'limited' in the Brahman and that they are identical with Brahman. This contention does not serve the professed purpose. Though the

above-mentioned distinctions appear as negatives, they are not really negative in their meanings. The Advaitin as well as the Viśiṣṭādvaitin and many other scholars of diverse schools of thought, do not hold negation (*abhāva*) as a distinct category as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds it to be. The distinction or difference from a black-coloured thing (*nila-rūpābhāva*) in a white thing is to be conceived as white colour itself (*śukle nila-rūpābhāvaḥ sauklyameva*). Even the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds the second negation as identical either with the counter-entity of the first negation or the substratum as the case may be (*ghaṭābhāvābhāvaḥ ghaṭasvarūpaḥ; ghaṭa-bhedaḥ ghaṭābhedaādīkaraṇa-svarūpaḥ*). Such an explanation being possible, the distinctions from the unreal in Brahman cannot be held as proving identity with the substratum namely the Brahman. If in accordance with the Vedic texts that seem to deny the existence of any quality in Brahman they are held as such, then there should be no doubt regarding the reality etc. which are known in the ever-luminous Brahman to the disciple.

5.5.36 *Plurality of Attributes cannot Establish Plurality of Substantives*

In fact, the words in great sentences (*mahāvākyas*) '*satyaṁ jñānaṁ anantaṁ*' mean the substantives with their respective denotations 'real' or 'one with reality' in consonance of their being '*samānādīkaraṇa*' in nature. The plurality of attributes like reality, intelligence and unlimitedness need not and will not result in the plurality of the substantives. This would be the case only if the attributes were opposed in meaning to one another. Reality and other attributes are not such as incapable of co-existence. Attributes that cannot co-

exist can make their respective substratum different among themselves as in the case of *khaṇḍatva*, *muṇḍatva* and *pūrṇa-śṛṅgatva*. But it would be ridiculous to hold that a person with a staff in his hand is different from the same person with ear-rings in his ears on account of the difference between the two attributes namely the staff and the ear-rings. Creation, sustenance and destruction of the universe are conceded as the definition (*lakṣaṇā*) of Brahman. These three attributes do not make their substantive Brahman different, as the three attributes can exist in Him at different periods. Even when Devadatta is not before us, we comprehend by the sentence, '*devadattaḥ śyāmo yuvā kuṇḍalī*' that the substantive Devadatta is only one. So, the contention that the plurality of attributes must necessarily present the plurality of substantives, is untenable. On the other hand, a single substantive can exist with a number of attributes that are not proved to be such as could not exist together. Valid testimony generates the cognition that there is only one substantive with numerous attributes.

The sentence 'that (object) with supreme brilliance is the moon' (*prakṛṣṭa-prakāśaś-candraḥ*) is an answer to a little boy who is seeing the brilliant moon as well as the less brilliant stars and desires to know which the moon is and puts the question 'which is the moon?'.
 5.5.37 Substantive Alone with No Characteristic Attributes can Never be Comprehended

Hearing the above answer, the questioner becomes aware of the moon with its characteristic brilliance. How can the question and the answer be only with regard to the moon's *svarūpa* without its attribute? If

something at a distance is seen and a doubt arises as to whether it is a human form or the trunk of a tree, it is due to the fact that the thing at distance is found to possess some features that are common to the human body and a tree's trunk. This doubt is dispelled when the man becomes aware of the distinctive features of the thing at a distance. Thus both the question and the answer are not of the moon's form (*svarūpa*) alone. Moreover, the question 'which is the moon' means which is denominated as the 'moon'. The answer makes the boy understand that the most brilliant thing in the sky is the moon. How can it be a cognition of the moon's form (*svarūpa*) alone without the attributes? If in all these cases, a cognition of '*dharmisvarūpa*' alone succeeding the verbal cognition is upheld and if this is to be denominated as '*akhaṇḍārtha-bodha*', one cannot fail to note its purposelessness for the obvious reason that the preceding verbal cognition itself is capable of discharging this function of the succeeding '*akhaṇḍārtha-bodha*.'

5.5.38 *Celestial Beings too Possess a Form of Their Own*

Further, sentences in ordinary worldly usages as distinguished from Vedic usage, 'that object with supreme brilliance is the moon' (*prakṛṣṭa-prakāśaścandraḥ*) should not be treated as on a par with Vedic statements, like '*satyaṁ jñānam ...*' The moon is not devoid of qualities as Brahman is held to be by the Advaitin while interpreting Vedic statements like '*ekameva advitīyam brahma*' which appear to mean the absence of all qualities in Brahman. Hence there is no need at all of 'intention' (*tātparya*) with regard to '*prakṛṣṭa-prakāśaścandraḥ*'; and so, on the ground of

tātparya-jñāna, no *akhaṇḍārtha-bodha* of the substantive alone is to be sought in the case of '*prakṛṣṭa-prakāśaś-candraḥ*,' as in the Vedic sentences of '*satyaṁ jñānam ...*' The moon and other celestial beings are regarded to be in possession of physical forms. In the *devattā-dhikaraṇa* Śaṅkara writes: "Possessed of power and ability, the celestial beings could remain with the form of lustre alone and take bodies with limbs like hands legs etc. as and when they desire." Appayya Dīkṣita says in the *Parimala* in the same context "like an artisan who learns from the science of arts, Hiraṇyagarbha remembers the name and form of celestial beings from the *Vedas* and then creates them."

Whenever we hear the name of a person or a city, we remember them only with their respective forms, if we have already seen them; and in the case of unseen objects, they appear in our mind's eye only with the forms given by our imagination. In no case are these forms apprehended without any of their characteristic attributes. This being the fact of experience, how can the moon's form alone be maintained as cognized in *akhaṇḍārtha-bodha*?

What does the word '*svarūpa*' denote? '*Svarūpa*' is an uncommon feature that is inseparably united." In the case of those objects which have physical forms, the configuration — the peculiar arrangements or formation of parts or limbs, is the *svarūpa*; in the case of those objects which have no physical forms like the soul, colour etc., consciousness, close resemblance etc. are considered '*svarūpa*.' The moon is never apprehended without its disc which is its '*svarūpa*'. How can an *akhaṇḍārtha-bodha* of the moon arise without any attribute?

5.5,39 *Plurality of Attributes cannot be Held to be Proving the Plurality of Substantives*

It is recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) that is used as an infallible weapon in refuting the Buddhists theory of the momentariness (*kṣaṇikatvas*) of all things. If the contact of the past and present denoted by the words 'saḥ' and 'ayam' respectively is found incompatible on account of their being mutually contradictory, as the Advaitin contends, then we must bow to the theory of momentariness since recognition is proved meaningless and hence ineffective in refuting the Buddhists' theory. It is the contact of two different times in one and the same thing experienced invariably by all that can establish a longer life of things. If this be denied, how could the Advaitin hope to prove the non-momentariness of things with the arguments based on recognition? A thing of limited size can remain in two different places at different times. Hence, 'having been in a different place in the past' (*tattva*) and 'being before the speaker at the present time' (*idantva*) are not contradictory attributes which cannot exist together and so these attributes should not be abandoned by resorting to '*jahad-ajahal-lakṣaṇā*' on the plea of their supposed mutual opposition. The contact of the past is not stated to be existing at the time of the speech. In the usage 'a jar is non-eternal' (*ghaṭo anityaḥ*), although the jar is presented with jarhood, the non-eternality is applicable only to the substantive 'jar' and not to jarhood. Similarly in the case of the usage 'he is the same Devadatta' (*so'yaṁ deva-dattaḥ*) the contact of the present time is cognised only in the substantive Devadatta and not in the adjective, past time also."

We come across many a statement presenting a number of attributes which are meant to be expressed as existing at one and the same time in a substance like “*chatrī kuṇḍalī vāsasvī devadattaḥ*.” In such cases, the incompatible identity of two or more attributes cannot be stated to be inevitable; a similar explanation would be satisfactory even in the case of Vedic staten ents like ‘*satyaṁ jñānam-anantam-brahma*’.

In an inference (*anumāna*), when we infer the existence of fire by observing smoke on the mountain, the mountain is first seen with the attribute smoke, and then when the inference has taken place, the mountain is believed to have the attribute ‘fire’ also and we are used to say ‘the smoky mountain is fiery’. To hold that these two attributes — smoke and fire should be identical and mean the same on the analogy of ‘*so’yaṁ devadattaḥ*’ would be against all experience and reason.

Hence the theory of indeterminate cognition of a whole without a cognition of its parts or attributes (*akhaṇḍārthabodha*) is without any foundation and is a mere mirage of the Advaitin.

NOTES

1. brahmabhinnam sarvaṁ mithyā, brahmabhinnatvāt yathā śukti-rajatam

2. pratiyamānatve sati yathāvasthitavastujñāna-nivartyatvaṁ mithyātvam

3. sad eva somya idam agre āsit, ekam eva advitiyam brahma. *Chā. Up.* 6.2.1. na iha nānā asti kiñcana. *Bṛ. Up.* 6 14. 19

4. pṛthag ātmānam preritāram ca mattvā juṣṭastatas-
tena amṛtatvameti. *Śve. Up.* 1.6

jñājnau dvau ajau īśa-nīśau.

nityo nityānām cetanaḥ cetanānām eko bahūnām yo
vidadhāti kāmān, *Kaṭha Up.* 5.13.

dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā samānam vṛkṣṇm pariśasva-
jāte. *Muṇḍaka Up.* 2.1.1.

5. sad eva somya idam agre āsit, ekam eva advitīyam
brahma *Chā Up.* 6.2.1.

sarvam khalu idam brahma. *Ibid.* 3.14.1.

aitadātmyamidam sarvam. *Ibid.* 6.8.7.

6. yasya ātmā śarīram yasya pṛthivi śarīram. *Br. Up.*
5.7.7.

ya ātmani tiṣṭhan. *Ibid.* 5.7.22.

antaḥ praviṣṭaśśāstā janānām sarvātmā. *Tai. Āra.* 3.11

7. mitho bhedaṁ tattveṣv-abhilāpati bhedaśrutir-asau
viśiṣṭaikyād aikya-śrutir-āpi ca sārthā bhagavati/
imau arthau goptum nikhila-jagad-antaryamayitā
nirīśo lakṣmīśaḥ śrutibhir-āparābhiḥ prānidadhe||

8. pūrvāparāparāmṛtāḥ śabdo'nyam kurute matim. *N.K.*

9. yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha/
ānandaṁ brahmaṇo vidvān na bibhēti kutaścana|| *Tai.*
Āra. 9.

10. bhagavad-ānandasya paricchinna-tvam-ekakṣa-
nārdhe bahūni yojanāni gacchato raveḥ 'kṣipteśur-iva gacchati'
iti iṣu-sāmya-kathanam yathā gati-māndya-nivṛtti-param, na
tu pariccheda-param, tadvat. *Ś.P.* p. 128

11. na hi krameṇa apakarṣaḥ uktaḥ, kintu guṇānām
prakarṣa eva uktaḥ. ato guṇa-prakarṣasya niratīśayatvāt vān
manaso nivṛtti-iti bhāvah. *Ibid.*

12. brahma-svarūpād api tad-guṇeṣu ādarātīśaya uktaḥ.
Ibid.

13. so'snute sarvān kāmān saha brahmaṇā vipaścitā
T.Ā. 1.

14. tasmin yadantastadupāsitaavyam — *Taitt. Up. IV, 10.23.*

15. brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati, *Mu. 3.2.9.*

16. iśvaraḥ nityaśuddhabuddhamuktasvabhāvaḥ sarva-
vajñaḥ sattvopadhiḥ na aśnāti. prerayitā hi ayam ubhaya-
bhogyabhoktroḥ nitya-sākṣitvasattāmātrena. sa tu anaśnan
anyaḥ abhicākaśīti paśyati eva kevalam. darśanamātram tu
tasya prerayitṛtvam rājavat. *Śaṅ. B. on Mu. 2.*

17. tarati śokaṁ ātmavit

18. athāto brahmajijñāsā, *B.S. 1.1.1*

19. sāmye vadvaivameva-vā

20. evaśabdaḥ sāmyavācī 'vaiṣṇavam vāmanam ālab-
heta spardhamāno viṣṇureva bhūtvā imaṁ lokam abhijayati'
iti sāmye śrautaprayoga-darśanācca 'viṣṇureva' viṣṇuriva
ityarthaḥ. na hi atra viṣṇureva bhavati iti vivakṣitam; spar-
dhamānasya pasuyāgena tad-ayogāt. ahiakaphalaṁ hi śatru-
jayādi. *N. S. p. 215*

21. katham tarhi idaṁ asad eva iti? nanu avocāma
avyākṛta-nāmarūpatvāt asadiva asaditi. Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on
Chā. Up., 3.19.1, p. 198

22. *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad, 6. 19*

23. yadi hi virodhi pūrvapramāṇam na bādhyate, tadā
uttarasya utpattireva na sambhavati. yadi ca uttarapramā-
ṇam pūrvapramāṇa-sāpekṣam, tadā tadbādhakatvasambhavāt
upakramanyāyena pūrva-pramāṇānusāritayā tena bādhyam-
eva syāt. tadanapekṣam tu tadbādhitvaiva utpadyate; tasmāt
nirapekṣottarapramāṇatvameva pūrvapramāṇabādhakatve
prayojakamiti bhāvaḥ. *A.S.B. p. 382*

24. *pūrvāt parabalīyastvaṁ tatra nāma pratiyatām/
anyonyanirapekṣāṇām yatra janma dhiyām bhavet||*
25. uccaiḥ ṛcā kriyate, upāṁśu yajuṣā, uccaiḥ sāmṇā
26. trayo vedā asṛjyanta. agneḥ ṛgvedaḥ, vāyor yajur-vedaḥ, ādityāt sāmavedaḥ.
27. nanu saprapaṇcādi-śruteḥ prapañca-prasakti-
hetutvena advaita-śrutyapekṣaṇīyatvena na tad-bādhyate,
tatra āha-‘nāyamiti.’ tathā ca niṣedhadhīr-niṣedhadharmini
pratiyogimattva-jñānarūpām prasaktimapekṣate, na tu tasyāḥ
pramātvamiti bhāvaḥ. *A.S.B* p. 384
28. parasya pūrvanirapekṣatve apacchedanyāyaḥ,
pūrvasāpekṣatve upakramanyāya ityeva niṣkarṣalābī āt apac-
chedanyāyasya atra na avasaro’sti. dvaitaniṣedhaśrutinām
dvaitagrāhaka-pratyakṣa-karmakāūḍa-saguṇasāstra-sāpekṣat-
vāt. anyathā pratiyogi-jñānābhāvena niṣedhasyaiva ayogāt.
P. B. p. 944
29. *nirapekṣottara-jñānam jāyate pūrvabādhayā/
na bādhakāntaram tasya tena prabalamuttaram||*
N.M. p. 503 in *S D.*
30. na hi prabala-sāmagrīrūpa-viśeṣābhāve ‘idaṁ raja-
tam’ iti buddhikāle ‘na idaṁ rajatam’ iti dhīrloke’pi avata-
rati. na ca iha pratipakṣadvaitaśāstrādhīnādvaitajñāne sati
pratipakṣato nyūnabalena dvaitaśāstra-tulyabalena ca ata eva
aprabalena advaitaśāstreṇa pūrvapramāṇātyantaviruddha-
dvaitābhāvarūpārtha-viśayakajñānotpādana-sambhavaḥ. *P.B.*
p. 947
31. ataḥ (jagataḥ) para-brahmaṇo jātātāt tasmin
pralīnatvāt, tena prāṇanāt tad-ātmakatayā tādātmyam upa-
pannam. *S. B.* Vol. I, p. 233
32. ataḥ cidacidātmakasya sarvasya vastujātasya
brahma-tādātmyam ātmaśarīrabhāvādeva ityavagamyate.
Ibid. I. p. 96
33. jñānasya nityatvena tadabhāvānupapatter uktātāt.
Śāṅkara Bhāṣya, p. 36

34. na ca 'ghaṭo na jñāti' 'aham na jñāmi' iti jñānāyor-viṣayavairūpyam doṣa iti vācyam; 'idam asuram, balir-asura' iti jñānāyoriva tasya adoṣatvāt. *A. S. B.* p. 549

35. sarvaṁ vastu jñātatayā ajñātatayā vā sākṣicaitanyasya viṣaya eva. *A. S.* p. 550

36. pramāṇajanyavṛttijñānameva tādṛśajñānāntara-bādhakam bādhyam vā bhavati; na tu śuddhacaitanyam. tasmāt śuddhacaitanye ajñānam sthātumarhati

37. abhāvabuddhiḥ viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi-maryādām na atisete

38. anāditātparyaviṣayībhūtā lakṣaṇā nirūḍhalakṣaṇā

39. tātparyānupapattinibandhanā svārasikalakṣaṇā

40. bhāvābhāvavilakṣaṇasya ajñānasya abhāvavilakṣaṇatvamātreṇa bhāvatvopacārāt. *C. S.* p. 57

41. āśrayatvaṇi nirviśeṣacitireva kevalā/
pūrvasiddhatamaso hi paścimo nāśrayo bhavati

nāpi gocaraḥ// *A. S.*

42. na ca aham-arthasya ajñānāśrayatvena katham-ayam pratyayo bhāvarūpājñānapakṣe upapadyate iti vācyam; ajñānāśrayībhūta-caitanye antaḥ-karaṇatādātmyādhyāsenā ekāśrayatva-sambandhena upapatteḥ. *A. S.* p. 548.

43. cidacidgranthirahanākāraḥ; acinmātram antaḥkaraṇam. *A. S.* p. 604.

44. suṣuptau tāvat ahamarthānanuvṛttau punaranu-sandhānānupapatti-prasaṅgaḥ. na hi ahamarthāntareṇa anubhūtam ahamarthāntaram smartumalam; atiprasaṅgāt. *Sās. D.* p. 121

45. nṛtaśālāstṛhito dīpaḥ prabhum saḥyāmśca nartakīm/
dīpayedaviśeṣeṇa tadabhāve'pi dīpyate//

46. śuktirūpyasthale bhrāntisamaye pūrvotpannavina-ṣṭaśuktyabhinnatayā tadrajatasya gṛhītatvāt tasya pratibandhakatvena rūpyam utpannam naṣṭam ityādipratītyanudayaḥ. *A. S.* p. 648

47. *sattve na bhrāntibādhau stām nāsattve khyātibādhakau/
sadasadbhūyāmauīrvācyā'vidyā vedyaissaha bhramah||*
I.S. p. 47

48. *vṛttibhede'pi idamrūpyayor idamamśāvacchinna-
caitanyaprakāśyatvena phalaikyāt jñānaikyadhīḥ. A.S. p. 654*

49. *avidyāvṛttistāvat na ajñānanāśikā; kintu antaḥ-
karaṇavṛttiridamākārā. tathā ca tadabhivyaktacaitanyam
eva rūpyam abhivyanakti iti phalaikyasambhavāt. na hi
avacchedakabhedena phalabhedah; kintu vyañjakabhedena.
A.S. p. 655*

50. *parasparavirodhe hi na prakārāntarā sthitiḥ. N.K.*

51. *tathā ca bhramātmakavṛtteścākṣuṣādirūpatve
mānābhāvaḥ adhiṣṭhanacākṣuṣe bhramasya tādātmyādhyāśāt
cākṣuṣādi-viśayadhiṣṭhāne rajatādeḥ tādātmyādhyāśacca
rajatam paśyāmi ityādipratyayaḥ. A.S.B. p. 647*

52. *śuktirūpyasthale bhrāntisamayapūrvotpannavina-
śṭaśuktyabhinnatayā tadrajatasya gṛhītatvāt tasya pratiban-
dhakatvena rūpyam utpannam naṣṭam ityādipratītyanu-
dayaḥ A.S. p. 648*

53. *na ca samprayogābhāvād aparokṣatvānupapattiḥ.
adhyastasya aparokṣatāyām samprayogānapekṣatvāt. C.S.
p. 83*

54. *vṛttidvayapratibimbitacaitanyasya ekasya satya-
mithyāvastu-tādātmyāvagāhitvena bhramatvasvikāāt. A.P.
p. 153*

55. *parvato vahnimān ityātau parvatāmśe vahn-
yāmśe ca antaḥkaraṇavṛttibhedāṅgikāreṇa tattadvṛttyavac-
chedakabhedena parokṣatvāparokṣatvayorekatra caitanye
vṛttau na kaścid virodhaḥ. A.P. p. 72*

56. *yatra āropyam asannikṣṭam, tatraiva prātibhāsika-
vastūtpatteraṅgikāāt. ata eva indriyasannikṣṭatayā
japākusumagatalauhityasya sphaṭke bhānasambhavāt na
sphaṭike anirvacanīyalauhityotpattiḥ. A.P. p. 175*

57. *yadvā laukikaparamārtharajatasyaiva tatra trai-
kālikaniṣedhaḥ. A.S. p. 648*

58. śuktirūpyasya āpaṇarūpyena prāṭitikasya sāmānyasya abhāve tadarthapravṛtṭyanupapattiyā tadubhaya-sāmānyasya ekasya āvaśyakatvāt. *A. S.* p. 649

59. yadvā na svarūpeṇa traikālikaniṣedhapratiyogitvam; kintu pāramārthikatvākāreṇa. vyadhikaraṇa-dharmāvacchinnapratiyogitāko hyayam abhāvaḥ. *A. S.* p. 648

60. ādyakṣaṇasambandha utpattiḥ

61. *ayathārthasya bodhasya notpattau asti kāraṇam.*
P. P. N. V. 73

62. *yadi svārtham parityajya kācid buddhiḥ pravartate/
vyabhicāravatī svārthe katham viśvāsakāraṇam||*
P. P. N. V. 66

63. doṣāṇām ca svārasikakāryaprasavaśaktipratirodhamaṭra-hetutvāt. doṣāṇām viparītakāraṇatām prati anudāharaṇatvāt. *C.S.* pp. 61-62

64. *sannihitarajataśakale rajatamatirbhavati yādṛśi satyā/
bhedānadhyavasāyāt, iyamapī tādṛk parisphurati||
sādhāraṇam hi rūpaṁ tasyāścāsyā vidyate tena/
tanmātrapratibhānāt samānatāmteva manyate||
tattulyavyavahārapravṛttirapi yujyate cātaḥ ||*
P.P.N.V. 41-42

65. *yathārtham sarvavijñānamiti vedavidām matam/
śrutismṛtibhyaḥ sarvasya sarvātmavapratītitah|*
Śrībhāṣya, I, p. p. 132 (Madras, 1963)

66. yathā bhedagrahasya nivṛtti-kāraṇatvaṁ 'nedaṁ rajatam' ityatra dṛśyate, evam abhedagrahasya pravṛttikāraṇatvaṁ 'idaṁ rajatam' iti abhīāntabuddhau dṛṣṭam eva. tataśca abhedagraharūpapravṛtti-kāraṇābhi-āntaḥ pravṛtti-pratipakṣabhūtā nivṛtṭiḥ katham na syāditi bhāvaḥ *S. S.* p. 181

67. iṣṭabhedāgrahāt pravṛtṭiḥ; anīṣṭabhedāgrahāt nivṛttiriti — *Ibid.*

68. *nānā-vīryāḥ prthagbhūtāstataste samhatim vinā/
nāśaknuvan prajāḥ sraṣṭum asamāgamyā kṛtsnaśaḥ||
sametyānyonya samyogam paraspara-samāśrayāḥ/
ekasaṅghātalakṣyastu samprāpyaikyamaśeṣataḥ||
mahadādyāḥ viśeṣāntāḥ yadaṇḍam utpādayanti te||*

S. P. 1.2.52

69. sampratipannarajatādyavayavasya susadṛśākāratvameva teṣāṃ rajatādyavayavatvam evameva pūṭikādiṣu pratiyamānānām somalatādyavayavānāmapi somādyavayavatvaṃ nāma sampratipanna-somalatādyavayavasya susadṛśātvameva. tacca sphuṭatara-pratītisiddham abādhitāṇca. na hi śūktikā-śakalapūṭikādiṣu rajata-somalatādi-sādṛśyaṃ na asti iti bhādhaka-pratyayaḥ udeti. S. P. p. 185

70. adṛṣṭasya niyāmakatvaṃ sarvairapi khyātyantara-vādidbhir-abhyupetyam. anyathā sarvadā sarveṣāṃ sarvatra sarvaviṣayabhramaprasaṅgāt. kadāpi bhramābhāvaprasaṅgācca. S. P. p. 187

71. (i) cākṣuṣatejogatibhedarūpa-sāmagrīdvayajanyam atīṣaighryāt agrhītakramam agrhītabhedam ca jñānadvayam agrhītaikatvaṃ candram agrhītāntarālam deśāntaram ca nirantaram gṛhṇāti. tato dvicandravyavahāra ityārthaḥ. S. P. p. 188

(ii) cakṣurmadhyadeśasamyuktena aṅgulīnā timirādinā vā madhye cakṣurvṛttech prasaraṇapratibandhe tadaṅgulipārśvadvaye cākṣuṣatejasah prasaraṇāt cakṣuso vṛttidvayaṃ jāyate. tatra ekayā candra-taddeśobhayasamyuktayā ekatva-viśiṣṭataddeśe candra ityekaṃ jñānaṃ janyate. dvitīyayā tu kiñcidvakragatyā vṛtṭyā ekatvaviśiṣṭa-candrasamīpadeśaviṣayakapratyakṣam candraviṣayakam aparaṃ ca pratyakṣam janyate. deśadvayaviṣayakajñānadvayarūpāpekṣābuddhyā dvitvaprakāraka-deśapratyakṣa-candrapratyakṣātmakajñānadvayaṃ nirantaram jāyate. A. V. — J. Y. V.

72. *sammugdham vastumātram tu prāg-grhṇantyaavikalpitam/
tat-sāmānyaviśeṣābhyām kalpayanti maṇiṣinah||
asti hi jālocitajñānam prathamam nirvikalpakam/
bālamūkādīvijñāna-sadrśam mugdhavastujam||
tataḥ param punarvastudharmair jātyādibhirjyā|
buddhyāvasīyate sāpi pratyakṣatvena sammatā||*

73. puruṣo hi pūrvadṛṣṭam jātyādi kālāntare cakṣurā-
dibhirgrhītvā tasya pūrvadarśanam manasā smṛtvā tad idam
ityanusandhāya anuparatendriyavyāpāraḥ purataḥ sthitam
artham vikalpayan pratyakṣavāneva; tadānīmapi indriya-
vyāpārasya aviramāt *N. R. p. 173*

74. na vā agṛhīte sāmānye vyaktyantare pratyabhiññā
sambhavati tasmāt sāmānyam viśeṣaśca nirvikalpake'pi
prakāśata eva. *N. R. p. 174*

75. indriyasannikarṣaśca sāmānye viśeṣe tatsambandhe
ca vartate; anuvṛttivyāvṛttyavagāhi savikalpakam; nirvikalpa-
ke viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-sambandhānām tādrūpyenaiva bhānam.
savikalpake ca vyaktyantare'pi sāmānyajñānādanuvṛttir-
adhikatayā bhāśata iti nirvikalpakam-api saviśeṣaviśayameva
G. S. p. 279

76. tat pramā nāpramā nāpi bhramaḥ syānnirvikal-
pakam.

77. aparyāyaśabdānām ekaprātipadikārthaparyavasā-
yitvam akhaṇḍārthatvam. *C. S. p. 111*

78. padavṛtti-smāritārthātirikṭāgocarapramā-janakat-
vam akhaṇḍārthabodhakatvam, *A. S. p. 663*

79. *pratipadya padārtham hi virodhāttadvirodhinah/
paścād abhāvam jñāti vadhya ghātakavatpadāt||
śabdāt pratiyate tāvat saṅgatiṛ-dharma-dharmiṇoh/
mānāntarādapohastu na śabdastena sa smṛtaḥ||
tatṛānanto'ntavadvastu-vyāvṛttyaiva viśeṣaṇam/
svārthārpanapranadyā ca pariśiṣṭam viśeṣaṇam||
tadvirodhyarthasantyāgaḥ sāmārthyāt syānna śabdataḥ||*

T. V.

80. yathā khalu ākṣudūṣitām bhūmiṃ dṛṣṭvā arthāt mārjarābhāvo'vagamyate, evam. C. S. p. 112

81. vidhipadānām svārthārpaṇa pranādikayā'rthād-itaranivṛtti-bodhakatvam; niṣedhapadānām tu sākṣāditi sthitam. A. S. p. 696

82. dvārabbhūte jñāne sakhaṇḍārthatve'pi parama-tāt-paryaviṣayajñāne na akhaṇḍārthatvavyāghātaḥ. A. S. p. 696

83. bhinna-pravṛttinimittānām śabdānāmekasminnarthe vṛttiḥ (paryavasānam) sāmānādhikarāṇyamiti hi tadvidāḥ *Vedārthasaṅgraha*, p. 86 (Poona, 1956)

84. samanādhikaraṇavākyānām tattadvastusvarūpa-mātrabodhakatvam

85. na ca 'so'yam devadatta' ityatra tattedantayoḥ na tyāgaḥ. krameṇa ekatra tayloravirodhāt iti vācyam; abhedapare'smin viśeṣaṇayoraikyāpattyā krameṇa ekatra tat-sattve'pi tat-tyāgasya āvaśyakatvāt. A. S. p. 830

86. yadā hi daṇḍī kuṇḍalī ityātau daṇḍakuṇḍalayor-ekakālasthitatvena avirodhe'pi na tadviśiṣṭayoraikyam; viśeṣaṇayorapi aikyāpatteḥ tadā kaiva kathā 'so'yam' ityatra; tatte-dantayor ekakālānavasthānāniyamena paraspara-viruddhatvāt tadviśiṣṭayoraikyasya. A. S. p. 705

87. See note 83 above.

88. prakṛṣṭaparakāśapadayoriva satyādipadānāmapi kumati-prāptādivyāptinivṛttiyartham samuccayā'pekṣaṇāt. na hi anṛtavavyāvṛtti-bodhanam vinā 'vijñānamānandaṃ brahma' ityatra śūnyavādvavyāvṛtta-brahmasiddhiḥ. evamekaikapadābhāve sarvatra ativyāptirūhaniyā. tathā ca satyatvādikam-anṛtādivyāvṛttidvārā śūnyavāda-vyāvṛtta-brahma-siddheḥ upāyaḥ.

*lakṣyārthabhedābhāve'pi vyavacchedya-vibhedataḥ/
vijñānānandapadayoḥ paryāyaanyarthateha hi||*

A. S. p. 696

89. dvārabhūtajñāne sakhaṇḍārthatve'pi parama-tāt-paryaviṣayajñāne na akhaṇḍārthatvavyāghātaḥ. *A. S.* p. 696

90. *Advaita-siddhi*, p. 689

91. asti hi aiśvaryayogāt devatānām jyotirādyātma-bhīṣca avasthātum yatheṣṭam ca tam tam vigrahaṁ grahītum sāmartyam. *Saṁ. B.* p. 341

92. śilpi śilpaśāstrebhyo devādīnām nāmarūpāṇi vijñāya pratimādikaṁ nirminoti iti loka dṛṣṭam. tathaiva hiraṇya-garbho vedebhyastam vijñāya devādīn sṛjati. tasya deva-sṛṣṭyupayogi nāmarūpajñānārthameva hi sṛṣṭāya tasmai vedapradānamapi śrūyate. *P.* p. 322

93. svarūpaṁ nāma svāsādhāraṇaṁ rūpaṁ

94. sāvayaveṣu avayavasanniveśaḥ, ātmasu jñānam-taditareṣu niravayaveṣu tattallakṣaṇaṁ ca saṁsthānaṁ rūpasya cakṣurmātragrāhyaguṇatvam, rasasya rasanāmātra-grāhya-guṇatvam, *G. S.* p. 352

95. ghaṭo anitya ityatra anityatvasya veśeṣye ghaṭa-mātre iva 'so'yam' ityatrāpi vartamānakālasambandhasya, devadattamātre anvayādvirodhaḥ.

THE SYSTEM OF VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA

In the previous sections we considered the criticisms made by the Viśiṣṭādvaitin against other systems of philosophy. Let us now furnish a detailed exposition of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic doctrine on the different problems of religion and philosophy.

6.1 *Origin and Development of the School*

As a matter of fact, religion and philosophy, though they have different objects and purposes, are interdependent and go hand in hand. The philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita is said to have been preached and taught to disciples by Bodhāyana, Ṭaṅka, Dramiḍa, Guhadeva Kapardi, Bhāruci, and others, but it had to remain in obscurity until it was revived and brought to light first by Nāthamuni (around 9th-10th century A.D.) and then by his grandson Yāmunācārya. It was given a full and perfect shape by Rāmānuja (1017-1137 A.D.) who was a younger contemporary of Yāmunācārya. In the course of commenting upon the *Brahmasūtras*, Rāmānuja gave a detailed interpretation of important Vedic texts and maintained that they were in support of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic contentions. Veṅkaṭanātha, popularly known as Vedānta-desika, a versatile genius and an unexcelled writer of polemic works (numbering more than fifty in Sanskrit) as well as of a large volume of devotional litera-

ture in Sanskrit and in Tamil, has left almost nothing to be explained or interpreted in defence of Rāmānuja's school of philosophy and theology.

Viśiṣṭādvaita as systematised by Rāmānuja and Veṅkaṭanātha (otherwise known as Vedāntadeśika) holds that the main sources of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) are: perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*) which is based on perception, and scriptural testimony (*śabda*) especially the Vedic texts. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin considers the *smṛtis* of Manu and others also as authorities (*pramāṇa*) provided they are not inconsistent with what is stated in the Vedic texts. To the class of *smṛtis* belong the *Mahābhārata* (with its inset, the *Bhagavadgītā*), the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa* and the Vaiṣṇavite Āgama called the *Pāñcarātra* and the *Vaikhānasa*.

6.2 Different Opinions on the Superiority of One Pramāṇa over Another

The Advaitin holds that perception as given by the senses is not always to be relied upon because illusions and hallucinations (*bhrama*) are not uncommon in perception. He points to the case of a mirage and that of the shell (often mistaken for silver as examples of the unreliability of sense-perception as a valid source of knowledge. Hence the Advaitin considers Vedic texts to be superior to sense-perception as a *pramāṇa*. Against this, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin maintains that the sense-perception is as valid as the *śruti* itself so long as what is perceived is not sublated or shown to be false by a later perception. Further, he states that if in any context the text in *śruti* seems to contradict what is perceived by *pratyakṣa*, the *śruti* text has to be interpreted in a way that will not be in con-

flict with what is actually perceived by the senses. This is one of the cardinal points of difference between the Advaitin and the Viśiṣṭādvaitin.

6.3 Three Aspects — *Tattva, Hita and Puruṣārtha*

The three aspects — *tattva*, *hita* and *puruṣārtha* are the principal features dealt with in all non-athiest philosophies. In the system of Viśiṣṭādvaita, there are three *tattvas* — the sentient, the non-sentient and God. The very name 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' is indicative of the chief tenet of that philosophy. In this school of thought, Brahman the supreme Being — that has the universe consisting of sentients and non-sentients, as its body, *prakāra* or part — is the only real thing, and there is nothing which is not the body of Brahman and which is independent of the same supreme Being. Whereas in the doctrine of Advaita, the supreme Being — Brahman alone is real, and everything else, sentient or non-sentient, is false; the Viśiṣṭādvaita while presenting the view that Brahman alone is real explains that Brahman includes sentients and non-sentients which are proved as inseparable attributes and body of Brahman. This interpretation reveals a vast gulf of difference between these two doctrines.

Hita means the 'means' (*upāya*) by which the 'goal of life' (*puruṣārtha*) can be attained. According to the Viśiṣṭādvaita doctrine, there are two 'means' to attain *Parama-pada* or *Śrī Vaikuṇṭha* after getting the final liberation from the worldly ties — *bhakti* and *śaraṇāgati*. The former (*bhakti*) means meditation upon the supreme Being in accordance with any one of the 32 *vidyās* stated in the *Upaniṣads*, which could lead the meditator to the desired liberation from the

bonds of the cycle of births and deaths. *Śaraṇāgati* means 'surrender' of the self and its deliverance or 'taking refuge' under the supreme Being who is identical with Nārāyaṇa.

Puruṣārtha is the fruit longed for through the performance of either *bhakti* or *śaraṇāgati* by the aspirant. It is defined as a transcendental enjoyment of the supreme Being with all His auspicious qualities in the other world called by various names as *Nitya-vibhūti*, *Śrī vaikunṭha*, *Paramapada* etc., far beyond universe.

We will now proceed to explain these aspects in detail.

6.4 *Tattva*

Vedavyāsa, the author of the *Mahābhārata*, whom Rāmānuja and his followers regard as the author of the *Brahmasūtras*, introduces the discussion about Brahman in his first aphorism '*athāto brahma-jijñāsā*'. Then he defines Brahman in the second aphorism, '*janmādi asya yataḥ*' by which the definition of Brahman is given as follows: "By whom the creation, sustenance and the destruction of this universe is made, it is Brahman." The *Veda* singles out the cause of the universe as 'that which is meditated upon' (*kāraṇam tu dhyeyaḥ*). Then there arises a doubt 'who could be the cause?'. There are many diverse Vedic statements, regarding Brahman. It is rather a difficult task to ascertain the exact import from the Vedic statements for they happen to be ambiguous and not completely consistent.

There are some Vedic statements speaking of the cause of the universe (*kāraṇavākyāni*) which can be understood only with the guidance of some other Vedic statements which clearly express their real meaning. For instance, the Vedic statements like '*sadeva saumya idam agre āsīt, ekam eva advitīyam brahma, seyam devatā aikṣata*' etc., present the cause of the universe by the word '*sat*'. '*Sat*' is a word too general to point out anything specifically. Hence it requires some other Vedic statements that would clearly make out who or what the '*sat*' is.

In the *ikṣatyadhikaraṇa*, discussions are set forth on the point whether the primordial insentient thing called *prakṛti* or *pradhāna* could be the cause of the universe and be denoted by the word '*sat*'. In the course of refutation of the theory of the primordial thing being the cause, one of the reasons put forth is that the cause can only be one—the knowledge of which must lead the aspirant to eternal emancipation (*tan-niṣṭhasya mokṣopadeśat*). If we search for a Vedic statement in which the meditation of one is stated to be leading the meditator to final and absolute emancipation, we come across such a statement in the *Puruṣa-sūkta*. It runs as follows — '*tamevaṁ vidvān amṛta iha bhavati; nānyaḥ panthāḥ ayanāya vidyate*,' which means 'one attains eternal bliss through the knowledge of Him (whose description has been given already in the same text); but for this, there is no other means to attain the final release (from the bondage of this worldly life).' Elsewhere in the same text we notice a similar statement, '*nānyaḥ panthāḥ vidyate ayanāya*.'

The significance of the above statements lies in its double nature of being a positive and negative sentence (*anvayarūpaṁ vyatirekarūpaṁ ca vākyaṁ*). It is evident that there could not be a more convincing way of expressing an idea than this way of expressing it, first by a positive sentence and by then a negative sentence. These sentences occur in the *Puruṣasūkta*, the sole purpose of which, it is agreed on all hands, is to extol Śrīman Nārāyaṇa. So it undoubtedly means that it is Śrīman Nārāyaṇa whose knowledge (meditation) alone could be the means of attaining the final liberation. Hence 'sat' in *sad-vidyā*, though a general term, decisively declares that it is Śrīman Nārāyaṇa, who alone existed at the time of the creation of the universe. Moreover in the same context of '*sad-vidyā*', the following sentences occur: '*ācāryavān puruṣo veda, tasya tāvad eva ciraṁ yāvat na vimokṣye atha sampatsye.*' They mean: "He who has a preceptor (to teach him) knows (that '*tat*' in the text '*tat tvam asi*' means the same as '*sat*'). To him (who definitely knows that the '*sat*' is identical with what is meant by the '*tat*' in '*tat tvam asi*') the delay in attaining the release extends only up to the time of his casting off his mortal coil. Soon after his leaving the body, he attains liberation."

There are some other causal statements (*kāraṇa-vākyas*) which refer to what is stated in some other parts of the *Veda*. They are such as the following: '*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante yena jātāni jīvanti, yat prayanti abhisamviśanti.*' Here the relative pronouns '*yataḥ*, *yena* and *yat*' refer to something already mentioned. So such sentences have to depend upon some other statements for their clarification.

There are other statements (*kāraṇa-vākyas*) the meaning of which at first sight appears to be inconsistent with what has been said above. '*sarvāṇi ha vā imāni bhūtāni ākāśād eva samutpadyante*' is such a one. It is obvious that ether (*ākāśa*) cannot be the originator of all beings. How could the universe consisting of sentients and non-sentients be originated by ether which itself is proved to be a product?

Statements like that of Indra "*māmupāsya 'etad eva aham manuṣyāya hitatamamanyā'*" require the help of some other statements to get themselves explained for Indra who is after all a person holding an office (*ādhi-kārika-puruṣa*) and liable to suffer at the hands of demons (*asuras*) owing to the possession of some imperfections like many other *jīvas*, these sentences cannot really mean that Indra ordains meditation on himself as a person worthy of meditation by those who are desirous of liberation. Here the interpretation is that Indra refers to the inner soul or supreme Being within himself as a fit subject for meditation.

All these above-quoted statements and the like have to depend upon other statements to be properly understood. '*eko ha vai nārāyaṇa āsit, na brahmā na īśānaḥ*' and other similar statements present unambiguously that it is Nārāyaṇa who alone is and could be the cause of the universe.

The person who is denoted as '*sat*' in the *sad-vidyā* is said in the same context, as giving a name and a form to all things in the universe, after their creation.¹ The same divine being is identified with Śrīman Nārāyaṇa in whose praise *Puruṣasūkta* has the existence.² Thus it is evident that it is Śrīman Nārāyaṇa who after the

creation of the universe gives names and forms to all things in consequence of which He is proved to be the cause of the universe.

6.5 *Brahman is Both the Material and Efficient Cause*

In Viśiṣṭādvaita, the supreme Being which is identical with Nārāyaṇa is not merely an instrumental cause but is also the material cause of the universe. It is in view of certain Vedic statements that He is held as the instrumental as well as the material cause, though we generally see in the world the two causes — instrumental and material causes — to be different from each other and mutually independent whenever their effects are considered. To illustrate how in a few instances we do find the instrumental cause and the material cause as identical, the *śruti* itself points out the case of the spider weaving its web out of materials within itself. The spider in so far as it weaves the web could be regarded as causal agent (*nimittakāraṇa*) and in so far as it draws from its own body the materials of the web, it could be regarded as the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) (i) *tad ātmānam svayam akuruta* (ii) *yad bhūtayonim paripaśyanti dhīrūḥ* (iii) *yathā ūrṇanābhiḥ sṛjate grhṇate ca*, (iv) *brahma vanam brahma sa vṛkṣa āsit*” and such other Vedic statements prove that He is both the material and the instrumental cause of the universe.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system advocates absolute distinction between the material cause and its effect and argues that if they are held identical, then there will be no necessity for the function of an agent (*nimittakāraṇa*). While discussing this argument, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin points out that in no case does the material

cause differ from its effect. A jar is not different from clay: a cloth is not different from yarns. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin's contention on this head differs from even that of the Sāṅkhya. The Sāṅkhya explanation of recognition of clay in a jar and of yarn in a cloth is based upon the identity of the material cause and its effect, that is, clay and jar and yarn and cloth. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin says that one and the same thing undergoes many a change in its form and in these many changes, it may assume different names.¹ When it is in the state of clay, it is the causal state of the jar but when the jar is effected out of the same clay it is in its state as effect. One and the same lump of gold undergoes ever so many changes in its form and in all these changes it assumes different names successively. Such changes can take place in a lump of material only by the efforts of an agent and hence his service, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and others, cannot be dispensed with. Thus effects invariably in all cases are nothing but a new state of their respective material cause, and consequently the uniform recognition of the material cause in its effect becomes universal.

6.6 *Sadvidyā Proves that Brahman is the Material Cause*

In this context let us remind ourselves of the context in which '*sad-vidyā*' occurs.

When Śvetaketu returned home after his study of the *śāstras* for 12 years at the residence of his *guru*, his father Uddālaka found him somewhat proud and haughty on account of his scholarship which he (Uddālaka) did not relish. So the father said to his son: "You appear proud of your mastery over the lore of the *Vedas*. Did you ever enquire of your *guru* with

regard to the paramount Ruler of the universe, by hearing whom everything becomes heard, by the scrutiny of the nature of whom, the nature of everything else becomes scrutinised, and by the knowledge of whom everything becomes known?" The father implies that the knowledge of Brahman would lead to the knowledge of everything in the universe. As by the knowledge of a lump of clay, all the transformations of the same material become known, so does everything become known by the knowledge of Brahman. Likewise by the knowledge of a mass of gold all the transformations of the same metal become known and we recognise the gold in all those forms. In the same way, by the knowledge of a block of iron all its transformed forms are known, and all of them are recognised as iron. In all these three cases — clay, gold and iron — in spite of the diverse changes they assume in their forms, they are recognised, and this is due to the identity of the material cause and its states as effects.

Śvetaketu replies that his *guru* (preceptor) could not have known the '*ādeśa*' or the supreme Ruler for if he had known, he would not have failed to teach him about the '*ādeśa*'. On his request the father teaches him '*sad-vidyā*'.

This world which consists of sentients and non-sentients of diverse nature, name and form, was at the time before creation in the state of 'being' (*sat*) with no other thing as its second; then the 'Being' (*sat*) thought and had the 'will' — 'I shall become many'. Some say that it was 'non-being which did not exist before the creation and had the 'will' — 'I shall become the many', and thus 'Being' (*sat*) came into existence from 'Non-

being' (*asat*). (It means: the universe — which has merged in Brahman at the time of deluge as a drop of water would on a red hot iron — becomes afterwards separated from Brahman and then it gets a name and shape of its own.)

From the above statements relating to clay, gold and iron, the father wants his son to know that the above three materials leaving their former state of being a mass, assume in their forms a different state on account of the work of an agent, in consequence of which each of those materials bears a different name. The former state is called causal state (*kāraṇāvasthā*) and the latter one as effectual state (*kāryāvasthā*). In their later states, they serve different purposes as they bear different names and shapes. It is evident that one and the same thing undergoes diverse changes in its form followed by a new name and new use. Such being the case, it does not require any high intelligence to recognise the material in all its changed conditions, nor is it difficult to any person to know all the effects if he knows the material in its causal state.

6.7 *Objection Regarding the Statement that the Knowledge of Universe Could be Got by the Knowledge of Brahman*

A doubt is commonly raised by some students of philosophy. There is no close analogy between the two cases compared. Clay, gold and iron on the one side and their effects on the other have many a feature common to them, and thus the knowledge of the material cause can be identical with the knowledge of the later changes of the same material. But in the case of Brahman and the universe, there is no feature common

to them both so much so the knowledge of Brahman can never be the knowledge of the universe; nor can there be relation of material cause and effect between Brahman and the universe as the former is very far away from all imperfections including changes (*vikāras*) in its form. It is a gross violation of many a Vedic statement which denies any change (*vikāra*) in Brahman. Hence the three instances pointed out by Uddālaka to drive home the identity of the knowledge of the universe with the knowledge of Brahman cannot serve the desired purpose.

6.8 The Relation between Brahman and the Universe Explained

The answer of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin runs as follows: That by the knowledge of Brahman the knowledge of the universe is obtained, is the purport of the Vedic statements which are unambiguous and unmistakable. Unless there subsists the relation as material cause and its effect between Brahman and the universe, all these utterances of Uddālaka become meaningless. So a convincing explanation must be given to substantiate the above contention without violation of any accepted canons based on Vedic statements. Brahman could be the material cause of the universe not directly but through its body namely the universe — the sentient and non-sentients which admit of change or modification in their forms. We come across many a verbal usage like 'the boy has become a youth and then an old man' (*bālo yuvā vṛddho jātah*). Here the words 'boy, youth, and old man' do not denote the body alone but the soul together with the body that can have the above three changes. Though the soul which appears

to have been the substratum of these changes of boyhood, youth and old age, it is only the body that could have these changes. The body with boyhood is the material cause of 'youth' which also becomes the material cause of old age. Though it is the body which is liable to have these changes, the soul is spoken of as the seat of these changes. In the same way Brahman to whom the universe consisting of sentient and non-sentient is the body, is spoken of as the material cause. After stating that by the knowledge of Brahman together with sentient and non-sentient as His body, the entire universe becomes known as in the case of the three instances quoted above.

Brahman, Uddālaka says, wills to become numerous and as per the volition, the same Brahman has transformed itself into sentient and non-sentient (*tad-aiśata bahu syām prajāyeyeti, sat ca tyacca abhavat*). From the assertion (*pratiṣṭhā*) and from the three instances, it is evident that Brahman is the material cause and that as such the same Brahman transforms itself into the universe of diverse nature. But Brahman represented (in numerous Vedic texts) as free from all changes, imperfections or evils, cannot actually be subject to transformation. Hence in view of the two types of Vedic statements — one asserting Brahman as the material cause and another denying any kind of change or transformation in the form of Brahman, an explanation which is agreeable to both types of Vedic statements and in which one statement does not supercede another is to be given. That could be done by ascribing the transformation that is inevitable to a material cause to the sentient and non-sentient which constitute the body of Brahman and not actually in Brahman itself.

This explanation gets the support, as already stated, from a common verbal usage 'the boy has become a youth and then an old man' (*bālo yuvā vṛddho jātah*). There could be no two opinions with regard to the relation of body and inner soul between the universe and Brahman, as it is repeatedly reiterated in the *antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa* of the *Bṛhadāranyaka-upaniṣad*. The sole purpose of the reiteration is to drive home the fact that such and such alone is the relation that subsists between the universe and Brahman.

By the avowal that by the knowledge of Brahman the knowledge of the universe is attained, the possibility of Brahman's material causality is substantiated and justified. It is further explained by the sentence '*sad eva saumya idam agre āsīt*' and the identity of the two, namely, the person who is meant by the word '*yena*' in the sentence '*yena aśrutam śrutam bhavati*' and the person denoted by the word '*sat*' in '*sadeva saumya idam agre āsīt*' is brought about. Then that the material cause of the universe is not a non-sentient is proved by the sentence occurring next and meaning that Brahman had the volition that He should become numerous (*tad mano akuruta bahu syām prajāyeya iti*). In the succeeding sentence the Brahman is said to have translated its will into action by becoming sentients and non-sentients (*sat ca tyat ca abhavat*). From all these statements occurring in this context, Brahman is to be understood as 'the material cause with the nature of transformation' (*pariṇāmi-upādāna*) through its body which consists of sentients and non-sentients.

That which admits a change in its form is a material. It is only a substance (*dravya*) which is liable to

have a change in its form, At the time of deluge all non-sentients merge into their respective material cause whence they emerged, and the primordial thing (*prakṛti*) which alone remains (as it is eternal), consequent on the merger of all non-sentient things in it, disappears in Brahman as a drop of water does when it falls on a red hot iron (*tamaḥ pare deve ekibhavati*).

Souls which are eternal, being deprived of their bodies at the time of deluge disappear in Brahman just as Prakṛti does. Thus both sentient and non-sentient remain in a state in which they could not be distinguished as they have neither form nor name of their own. Such a state has to continue until Brahman becomes many in pursuance of His volition 'I will become many' (*so'kāmayata bahu syām prajāyeya iti*). Thus the universe of sentients and non-sentients exists in a very subtle state with no name or form completely merged into insignificance in Brahman. Still it is the body in a subtle state of Brahman for it answers the definition of the body namely that which remains as controlled, supported by and inseparably subordinate to the other until it perishes.⁴ From the study of the *Subālopaniṣad*, *antaryāmi-brāhmaṇam* in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* and *sad-cidyā* in the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*, one could well arrive at a definite conclusion that just as the *jīva* has a body of his own, remaining himself as the soul (*antaryāmi*), one who has a control over and support of it, so is Brahman an inner soul (*antaryāmi*) to all sentients and non-sentients, in consequence of which they are considered to be the Brahman's body.

The definition of a material cause (which admits a change or a new state in its form as the material cause) is applicable to Brahman since He has a change

or a new state in His form namely *cit* and *acit*. When they are in a subtle state, Brahman with them is said to be in the causal state (*kāraṇāvasthā*), and Brahman with the same *cit* and *acit* in gross and distinguishable state is said to be in effective state (*kāryāvasthā*); the subtle and gross states are two phases at different times that prevail in *cit* and *acit*, the association of which in their two different states are attributed as two different phases in Brahman Itself. The material causality is not directly applicable to the pure or unqualified Brahman or Brahman with no universe, but by the association of *cit* and *acit*, the same Brahman is said to be the material cause. In this explanation, no violation of any Vedic text such as '*niṣkalam nir-anjanam*' etc. which deny any change in the form of Brahman could be pointed out with regard to its efficient or instrumental causality; the pure Brahman—Brahman with no association of *cit* and *acit* could be held as the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*).

'*Cit*' and '*acit*' are stated to be the 'part' (*aṁśa*) of Brahman. '*Aṁśa*' or 'part' is defined as that which is an inseparable attribute to a substance. *Gotva* or cowhood which is nothing but the configuration of the cow, as the Viśiṣṭādvaitin contends, is a part, since it is an inseparable attribute of the cow. '*Cit*' and '*acit*' being inseparable ones from Brahman on account of their being the body of the same Brahman are parts of the Brahman. In pursuance of the decision arrived at in the *ākṛtyadhikaraṇam*, words like cow, jar, etc. denote the configuration (*saṁsthāna*) of the respective things; still the configuration being a part (*aṁśa*) with the nature of inseparability from its possessor, the word denotes something more than the configuration.

Its denotation extends to the substance, namely, the soul of the cow or the possessor of that inseparable attribute. In a similar way, 'tvam' in 'tat-tvam-asi' does not stop simply at denoting 'jīva' standing before the speaker, the soul with the body before the speaker—but goes further and denotes the inner soul that controls, supports and sustains its body namely the *jīva*.

6.9 *Though the Universe is a Part of Brahman, Yet the Latter is Not Affected by the Former*

As the soul (*jīvātmā*) is free from imperfections, defects or other attributes that pertain to the body like childhood, youth, old age etc. so is the inner soul (*antaryāmin*) the supreme Being free from the results or the effects of the sinful or meritorious deeds performed by the *jīva*. Although the soul (*jīva*) experiences pleasures and pains as the effects of its deeds through the medium of a body endowed with sense organs, the supreme Being in spite of His having the soul (*jīva*) as His body is absolutely free from the stains of the pleasures and pains. No *jīva* can escape the experience of the effects of its deeds (*na abhuktān kṣīyate karma kalpa-koṭi-satair api*) unless they are made ineffective by expiation. Although the supreme Being has no 'karma', it is He who gives the fruits of the deeds to the performer, in accordance with the divine rule. A visitor to the jail, though he remains there for some time in order to make enquiries regarding the criminals' 'behaviour' is not at all affected by the inconveniences to which the criminal is subject. In the same way, while the soul is experiencing the pleasures and pains due to his past deeds, the supreme Being — whose presence within the body is inevitable on account of His

being the inner soul — is not at all affected by the effects of the soul's deeds. The soul (*jīva*) experiences happiness or misery in the form of pleasures or pains not because he has a body but because he has performed deeds (*karma*) which bear fruit as pleasures and pains.

The contact of the body, though common to *jīva* and to the inner soul — the supreme Being, the *jīva* alone is destined to reap the consequences of his deeds and not the other. The very purpose of the body is for the *jīva's* experience of '*karma-phala*' for it cannot be experienced by the *jīva* without the medium of a body. Even in hell it is contended, the *jīva* has to cover himself with a large number of bodies one after another as they become decayed by the hellish tortures and badly require replacement by a new one for the experience of further tortures. So long as a *jīva* lives in this world, of course with a body of his own, he cannot remain without doing a deed good or sinful. The earth is called '*karma-bhūmi*' a world of deeds, because it is here that beings do the deeds sinful or otherwise. The earth's counterparts are heaven and hell where the doer of deeds has to experience the effects of his deeds good or evil. Hence they are called '*bhogabhūmi*' — the world of experience, and there too, the *jīva* is in possession of a body. It is impossible for the *jīva* to remain in this world without a body and so long as he has a body he cannot avoid doing deeds. The experience of pleasure and pain can take place only when the *jīva* is in possession of a body. So, the *jīva* experiences the effects of his deeds partly in this world and partly in others. The moment the *jīva* sheds off the body either for the time being or forever, the happiness and misery do not touch him.'

But to the supreme Being, the contact of the human and other bodies in consequence of His being the inner soul of them all is not due to any '*karma*'. It is self-imposed on account of His immeasurable mercy for all *jīvas* whom He enables to pursue one of the means to get a total liberation from the bondage of the cycle of births and deaths.

A clear distinction between the *jīva* and the supreme Being who also lives in the body is brought about by a Vedic text. There are two birds with fine feathers, living together as close associates in one and the same tree; one of them eats the fruits of the tree and finds the pleasure in the taste, while the other does not eat it (fruit) but shines with much effulgence.' So goes another Vedic text: "The omnipotent supreme Being has the unique power of guarding Himself from the contact of the dirt in the body of the *jīva*."

6.10 *Absolute Distinction between Brahman and Jīvas*

Here an objection is raised against the Viśiṣṭādvaitin's contention. If the supreme Being is held as the inner soul of the *jīva* whom He rules, controls and directs, then the *jīva* cannot be held accountable for his evil and sinful deeds. Moreover, another Vedic text unambiguously attributes the authorship of good and evil deeds to Brahman alone. "It is He who causes the *jīva* to perform good deeds whom He wants to elevate; it is the same He who causes the *jīva* to perform sinful deeds also when He wants to ruin him through his evil deeds." Such being the fact how can the innocent *jīva* be contended to be a victim to experience the consequences of the deeds which he had been

forced to do by the inner ruler? How can the Vedic text enjoin the *jīva* to perform some rites and prevent him from doing sinful deeds in spite of his being a person not accountable for the deeds that he performs?

6.11 *Brahman's Role in the Deeds of the Souls*

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin will answer this criticism as follows: With regards to the deeds of the *jīva*, Brahman has to assume one of the three states, namely (1) indifference (*audāsīnya*) (2) permissiveness (*anumantr̥tva*), and (3) causing agency (*prerakatva*). When a *jīva* does a deed good or evil for the first time, the supreme Being is indifferent and does not take any interest either to encourage or dissuade or prevent him from doing the deed. When the same *jīva* does similar deeds again, Brahman permits him. But if the same *jīva* is inclined to repeat the same deed again and again, He encourages him in furtherance of similar deeds in future. In this context, it must be borne in mind that all *jīvas* remain at the time of creation as insensitive as the non-sentient, because they have no senses and body at that time. Taking pity on them the supreme Being bestows on them sense organs, the power to control them, a body, the intellect to understand what is good and what is bad from a reading of the *śāstras*, and remains there in the same body as inner self to see how *jīva* reacts and makes use of those sense organs.' In the process of bestowing such things as the body and sense organs even the supreme Being is not free and independent but has to consult the past deeds of the concerned *jīva*. The creation, sustenance and destruction of the universe are ascribed as a sport of the supreme Ruler.'

Sportsmen nowadays frame rules in accordance with which the sports are being conducted and any violation of the rules of sport by one of the parties is considered very seriously as ruining the spirit or pleasure of sport. Even so are the births, pleasures and miseries experienced by the *jīva* strictly in accordance with the past deeds of the same *jīva* and these experiences of the *jīvas* constitute the sport and amusement of the supreme Being. This amusement of the supreme Lord should not be equated with that of Asamañja who enjoyed the scene of the struggling children thrown by him in the flood of the Sarayu river. Out of immeasurable compassion for the suffering sentient beings, He has given them the *Vedas*, the other *śāstras* etc., the intellect to understand those *Vedas* and *śāstras* in which the code of conduct to be pursued by the human beings is stated, and a body with sense organs.¹⁰ Now the *jīva* is in a position very similar to that of a minister to whom a king has delegated certain powers for the proper administration of his kingdom. The minister is obviously an independent agent but this independence is given by his master. Any misuse of that power would entail punishment in proportion to the magnitude of his offence. With all these gifts, the human beings are expected to perform only the righteous deeds and refrain from doing prohibited deeds. This generous offer by the Lord is with no prejudice or passion, but it is just like the act of bestowing of a property by a father on his sons. One of the sons may spend his portion of the property got by the right of inheritance in a just and righteous way helping the poor and the needy, digging wells and tanks, building choultries for destitutes, starting academic institutions to spread knowledge; while the other son may squan-

der his portion of the property in iniquitous ways to the disgust and agony of his father who could by no means be held responsible for the deeds of his son who spent his wealth in evil ways. The father did what he felt his duty like many other fathers. He, the earthly father could do nothing but turn his face away out of a version to his son's misuse of his wealth.

The position of the divine parent of the universe does not much differ from that of the earthly parent. With the gifts vouchsafed by the Lord, namely the body with the sense organs, intellect etc., the *jīva* indulges in evil deeds and thus a gross misuse of the Lord's gift results. Hence the Lord assumes three attitudes with regard to the *jīvas* — indifference (*audāstnya*), giving permission or allowing the *jīva* to pursue his own course (*anumanṛtva*) and prompting or inducing (*prerakatva*). After the gift of the body and other tools to him the *jīva* can perform deeds that are beneficial to his life in this world and in the other world, or do evil deeds most disastrous to his life in this world and afterwards in hell. The Lord is watching the *jīva* while using the tools He himself bestowed on him. At the early utilisation of those tools, the Lord is indifferent and disinterested. In his second operation — no matter whether it is favourable to his earthly or heavenly well-being, He assumes the permitting attitude. In his third and further operations He becomes the prompter or inducer of furtherance of those deeds by the *jīva*. During the *jīva*'s first attempt fully equipped as the *jīva* is with all necessary auxiliaries, the *jīva* is given a long rope with full freedom to make full use of his own choice of the functioning of those tools and the Lord is passive and watching all his

movements. As the *jīva*'s second operations are the result of his first performances, the Lord allows him to pursue his own course and this type of allowance is conceived as letting the *jīva* continue what he has begun (*pravṛtta-pravartanam*).

The Lord can prevent the *jīva* from indulging in doing prohibited/sinful deeds but He does not do so and that itself is contended as inducement to the *jīva* who is about to perform a deed, just or unjust. If the same *jīva* continues to do good deeds for the third and succeeding times, the Lord encourages him to perform it as He becomes very much pleased with the *jīva*'s interest in doing good deeds perpetually. In the same way, if a *jīva* is bent upon doing evil and sinful deeds for the third and succeeding times, the Lord becomes vindictive and in order to push him down and down, further prompts and encourages him in his perpetration of evil deeds. The Vedic text meaning 'It is He who causes him (a *jīva*) to do good deeds when He desires to lift him up — to elevate to a high position and it is He who causes him (a *jīva*) to perpetrate deeds when He desires to push him further and further downward'¹¹ — refer to those who pursue the righteous course and those who perpetrate heinous sins for the third and succeeding times respectively. In the case of a perpetual offender, even the Lord who is an inexhaustible storehouse of mercy and compassion is compelled to become vindictive and revengeful and hence He prompts him to do more and more the most sinful deeds by which he is depraved irretrievably and thus takes his birth in the race of Asura, Rākṣasa etc. This is meant by the Lord Kṛṣṇa in a verse in the *Gītā* — "these haters, evil, cruel and vilest among men,

I repeatedly throw into demoniacal wombs in this world. Oh son of Kuntī! cast into demoniacal wombs birth after birth, these fools without attaining me, sink into still lower depths.”¹³

6.12 *The Lord's Mercy*

In this connection the following anecdote is worth referring to for pointing out the Lord's great mercy. When Vibhīṣaṇa found all his persuasive entreaties to Rāvaṇa to return Sītā to Śrī Rāma, of no avail, he went to the other shore of the sea where the huge army of monkees was ready to cross the ocean, besiege Laṅkā and rescue Sītā. The reported arrival of Vibhīṣaṇa as a refugee to surrender at the feet of Śrī Rāma, caused much commotion among the monkey leaders with regard to Vibhīṣaṇa's being accepted. Śrī Rāma's firm resolve was as follows: — “I would never deny an asylum to anybody who has come in a friendly manner as a refugee to me; whether he is Vibhīṣaṇa or even Rāvaṇa himself, it is immaterial to me.”¹⁴

On another occasion, when a severe battle was going on, Rāvaṇa stood crestfallen and deprived of his diadem by Śrī Rāma, Śrī Rāma speaks to him with uncommon generosity, “Rāvaṇa, you have done a great and dreadful deed and killed many a hero on my side. I am not going to send you to the god of Death by taking advantage of your being in a state of exhaustion. O King of demons! go back to Laṅkā. I shall allow you. Take rest and then return to the battlefield with a bow and in a chariot (of which you have now been deprived), and then you will see my heroism while seated in the chariot.”¹⁵ This generous attitude is not to be taken in the light of generosity found

common in all true heroes of all time and clime. But Śrī Rāma was still hoping that Rāvaṇa would change his attitude, regret his past misdeeds, and come to apologise after surrendering Sītā. Such is the compassion of the impartial Lord. It is not His fault if we human beings, fail to avail ourselves of the opportunity of utilising the treasure of compassion of our Lord.

When Śrī Rāma was living in Daṇḍaka forest, Jayanta, the son of Indra assuming the form of a crow tore and lacerated with his claws the breast of Sītā. To punish the criminal, Śrī Rāma issued the *brahmāstra* through a *darbha* grass which pursued the crow until it came to know that there was no person who could save him from Śrī Rāma's infallible arrow. The *brahmāstra* could in a moment have killed the poor crow but the crow was given enough time to repent and then surrender at Śrī Rāma's feet as a helpless refugee. It is evident that but for Śrī Rāma's immeasurable compassion, the *brahmāstra* would not have been slowly pursuing the worst of all birds till it was seeking the help of all celestial beings who could not help. After its surrender, the punishment that was meted out was almost nothing: Though the crow was deprived of one eye as a punishment, it did not fail to get the benefit of possessing both the eyes.

Durvāsa's case is again appropriate. King Ambarīṣa was defended by Lord Nārāyaṇa with His disc (*cakrāyudha*) against the spirit that was created by Durvāsa to punish Ambarīṣa. Like the crow, Durvāsa also wandered through all worlds, being pursued by the disc (*cakrāyudha*). At last Durvāsa surrendered and was forgiven by Ambarīṣa whom he had offended.

Thus in all cases, Lord Nārāyaṇa patiently waits to see whether the offender repents, and only in cases of incorrigible nature the Lord inflicts punishment in proportion to the offence. These and such other stories disclose the immeasurable depth of the compassion while dealing even with great sinners and His readiness to forgive them. If even such sinners, the perpetual offenders were left unpunished, it would be highly demoralising. So as rules passed in the legislatures become laws, and the transgressors of those laws are punished according to the law, and even the framers of those laws are incapable of undoing those laws except by an amendment, moderation, alteration or reversal of the same; so is the Lord who must also abide by the same laws. As a law could be changed by an amendment of the constitution by the same body which is empowered to do so, so could the Lord condone or exonerate a person who pleased the Lord and endeared himself to Him by his devotion.

6.13 *Cetanas or Sentients — Liberated and Bound*

Excluding the Supreme Sentient (*paramacetana - Brahman*) other sentients are classified as eternal ones (*nityas*), liberated ones (*muktas*) and bound ones (*baddhas*). The eternal sentients (*nityas*) are those who remain forever in Śrīvaikuṇṭha attending upon the Lord and His consort. They are Garuḍa, Śeṣa, Viṣvakesna and others. Garuḍa serves Him as an attendant, companion, a vehicle to carry Him, a seat to sit on, a banner, a canopy and a fan for generating breeze.¹⁵ Śeṣa serves Him as an umbrella while He is moving, a sofa to take rest on, footwear when He is about to walk, a bed to lie upon, a light to illuminate (with gems in his hoods)

a silken garment and a pillow.¹⁴ Viṣvaksena has to look after the administration. Such attendants and their respective duties are not the products of imagination of Rāmānuja as we find many references to them in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata*, *Viṣṇupurāṇa* and other *Purāṇas*.

The conception of such a '*loka*' much far above the earth cannot be questioned as there are Vedic statements unequivocally reiterating its existence. The following texts are some of them:— "His one-fourth part represents the whole world of beings; His three-fourth parts represent the immortal world and have their manifestation in the supreme Heaven".¹⁵ I know this highest Person shining like the sun beyond the material world.¹⁶ That is the supreme Abode of Viṣṇu where the *sūris* are always gazing.¹⁷ In the imperishable Supreme Ether¹⁸ where there is a class of gods called *sādhya*s,¹⁹ where there are ancient seers from the earliest times.²⁰ In Viṣṇu's supreme abode there are wise seers whose wisdom never fails and who shine radiantly always singing the praise of Viṣṇu's supreme abode. His raiment is coloured with saffron.²¹ The spouse of Viṣṇu is the queen of the world.²² The Goddess of earth and the Goddess of wealth (*Lakṣmī*) are His wives.²³

In conclusion it may be stated that the Viśiṣṭādvaitin denies emphatically the truth of the Advaitic contention that the *śrutis* speak of two Brahmanas '*saguṇa* and *nirguṇa*', and the world called Śrī Vaikuṇṭha described by the above Vedic texts as the abode of *saguṇa-brahman* alone who has no absolute reality (*pāramārthika-satyatva*) as is His abode, Śrī Vaikuṇṭha. According to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin the *śrutis*

speak of *saguṇa-brahman* only and there is nothing worthy of the name '*nirguṇa-brahman*'. In reply to the Advaitin who might quote the texts containing the word '*nirguṇa*,' the Viśiṣṭādvaitin states that '*nirguṇa*' should be interpreted in such passages so as not to conflict with the '*saguṇa*' texts. *Nirguṇa* means, according to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, either without defects, blemishes or imperfections, or without the qualities of *prakṛti*.

6.14 *Liberated Sentients (Muktas)*

The bound selves could get release from the bondage of *samsāra* by resorting to one of the two means prescribed as such — *bhakti* and *prapatti* — as enjoined in the *Upaniṣads*. In fact, these two are not really the means — *upāyas* — to lead the bound soul to the supreme Heaven, but they are performed to please the Lord, and being so pleased, He releases the soul from the bondage of the cycle of births and deaths. The finite selves so liberated are called '*muktas*.' Though they suffered from the bondage, still once they reach *Vaikuṇṭha* by the Lord's grace, they do not and cannot come back to this world of bondage.

6.15 *The Bound Selves (Baddha-Jīvas)*

It is the bound selves who wallow in this world with births and deaths which are caused by the beginningless flood of their deeds (*karma*). It is due to one's deeds — it is immaterial whether they are good or evil (*punya-pāpa*) — one is deprived of one's noble nature and virtues like '*āpahata-pāpmatva*' etc., and one's intellect becomes limited and contracted in proportion to the nature of the deeds. But the moment

he becomes free from deeds, he becomes fit to reach the supreme Heaven, regains his real nature and virtues, and his intellect or attributive knowledge (*dharma-bhūta-jñāna*) expands to the maximum extent, and so his intellect is no longer limited but becomes comparable in point of nature with the intellect of the other selves — *nityas* and the previously liberated, why, even with the intellect of the supreme Being. The only difference between the intellect of the newly liberated and that of the supreme Being, is that the former has liability to contraction and expansion during the state of bondage, while the latter has no such change in its nature.

The sentient is self-luminous as also is the seat of knowledge. If we refer to the Vedic texts, they unmistakably state the twofold nature of selves. “*Jānāti eva ayam puruṣaḥ*” (he is the knower) means that the self is the seat of knowledge and at the same time, the *Veda* says ‘*vi-jñānam yajñam tanute*’ that is: the self is knowledge. In accordance with the two types of Vedic statements the self is to be understood as ‘knower’ and as ‘knowledge’. As the self is self-luminous (*svayam-prakāśa*) like a light that requires nothing else for its own manifestation, the self cognises its own self and nothing else. Hence it is called ‘*pratyak*.’ The attributive knowledge can manifest its own self, its substratum namely the self, the qualities of self, like happiness, sorrow, desire etc. and likewise external objects. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system fails to take note of the Vedic statement identifying the self with knowledge “*vi-jñānam yajñam tanute*” etc. The Advaitin pays no heed to the other type of Vedic statements that describe the self as the seat of knowledge. To neglect or ignore one type of Vedic

texts is as unjustified and unwise as to discord or overlook the other types of texts. It is the Viśiṣṭādvaitin who gives equal weight to both types of Vedic statements which have also the support of common experience and achieves a reconciliation between them.¹⁶ The self or soul being self-luminous shines even in sleep, but at that time its cognition is dim on account of the almost complete contraction of attributive knowledge which only can manifest the self clearly.

6.16 *Non-sentient (Acetana): Prakṛti, Kāla and Śuddha-sattva*

It is divided into three kinds as the primordial thing (*prakṛti*), time (*kāla*) and pure *Sattvam* (*śuddha-sattvam*). *Prakṛti* with three qualities — *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* — is ever changing or transforming when it is not merged in Brahman as it does at the time of the deluge. When the three qualities are at equipoise, the deluge or the total destruction of all non-eternals takes place. When those are in unequal proportion, the process of creation prevails. The detailed statement of *prakṛti*'s process of transformation has been given already in the chapter dealing with the System of *Sāṅkhya*.

6.17 *Time (Kāla)*

It is due to the existence of Time that all the verbal usages connecting things with the past, present or future are possible. It does not possess any one of the three qualities. It is not self-luminous and is considered non-sentient or '*jada*'.

6.18 *Pure Sattva (Śuddha-sattva)*

Pure *sattva* is a substance (*dravya*) where *sattva* is not tarnished by the contact with the other two qualities — *rajas* and *tamas*. *Śuddhasattva* does not prevail anywhere else than in *Śrī Vaikuṇṭhaloka*. The halls, towers, etc., the bodies of *nityas*, *muktās* and others are constituted of this substance. It is self-luminous and non-sentient like the attributive knowledge (*dharma-bhūta-jñāna*).

6.19 *The Supreme Being (Param Brahman, Lord Nārāyaṇa) — His Five Forms*

God has five forms — *Para*, *Vyūha*, *Vibhava*, *Arcā* and *Antaryāmi* and they are for different purposes.

Para: God in this form is called '*Para-Vāsudeva*,' the eternal and unchanging form of the Lord. It is being seen, enjoyed, worshipped and served by *nityas* and *muktas* (released from the bondage of this worldly life and who have attained the Supreme world by one of the two means, namely *bhakti-yoga* and *saraṇāgati*) in the Supreme world (*Śrī Vaikuṇṭha*). This Supreme Form possesses all the six prime qualities namely *jñāna*, *bala*, *aīśvarya*, *vīrya*, *śakti* and *tejas*, and all of them are in a manifested state.

Vyūha: This form is of three types — *Saṅkarṣaṇa*, *Pradyumna* and *Aniruddha*. In the *Saṅkarṣaṇa* form, only two prime qualities — *jñāna* and *bala* are in manifested state. It is this form that presides over all *jīvas*, distinguishing them from *prakṛti* and becomes responsible for the spread of Śāstraic lore in the universe.

In the *Pradyumna* form, the two other qualities — *aīśvarya* and *vīrya* are in the manifested state. It presides over mind (*manastattva*), creates Manu and other similar persons to whom it teaches Dharma.

In the *Aniruddha* form, the remaining two qualities — *śakti* and *tejas* become manifested. This form is in charge of guarding the universe, of imparting the knowledge of *tattvas*, and of creation of time and other mixed products.

Though all the three *Vyūha* forms indeed possess all the six prime qualities, only a pair of qualities is manifested in each of them, and each form is to be meditated upon, and enjoyed with the respective pair of qualities.

Vibhava: It is a form taken by the supreme Being on occasions that require the presence of the Lord in the *līlā-vibhūti* within the *brahmāṇḍa*. Śrī Kṛṣṇa mentions those occasions in the *Gītā* — “Whenever there is decline of *dharma* and rise of *adharma*, I shall take my birth. I take my birth in every age for the protection of the virtuous, for the destruction of evil-doers and for the firm establishment of *dharma*. But my birth and deeds are divine. He who knows this fact, reaches me, and after leaving this body he will not have further birth.” The ten principal Advents (*avatāras*) of the Lord like Matsya, Kūrma etc. and others are called ‘*vibhava*’ forms of the Lord.

Arcā: It is the form we see in temples and in houses in the shape of idols which are made the objects of worship by all people. This form is easily accessible to the devotees who could not see the Lord’s form by

meditation. It is the form that attracted the ten Ālvārs. They got intuition and inspiration from a worship of these idols in temples and poured forth their mystic experiences in the form of Tamil verses which stand today as one of the best works in devotional literature.

Antaryāmi: This form of the Lord prevails in the hearts of all the sentients which He rules, controls and guides as is stated in the Vedic texts "He has entered into the heart and rules the *jīvas*, Himself being the inner soul." This form of the Lord could be seen by the Yogins through meditation. Notwithstanding this kind of presence in all sentients, the Lord pervades the whole universe within and without all beings — sentients and non-sentients — (*antar-vyāpti* and *bahir-vyāpti*). Thus He is said to co-exist with all things (*sarva-vastu-sāmūnādhikarānya*). 'That is why He is said to be beyond the limitation by other things (*vastupariccheda-rahita*). We say A is not B, and B is not C; but the Lord being present in all things, such a distinction is impossible; that is, He is A, B, C etc. In the *Nārāyaṇānuvāka*, His immanence (being present inseparably connected with all things and beings in such a way that it cannot be said that He is not present where they are) and transcendence (*bahirvyāpti* — being in places where they are not present) are declared."

But, of all the five forms, it is the *Arcā* form which is easily accessible, enjoyable and capable of instilling abiding love in the minds of even a common layman. The differences and degrees of enjoyableness of the above five forms of Lord Nārāyaṇa are illustrated in the following manner. A devotee whose love amounted to a degree in which he could no longer

live without attaining the Lord, is likened to a person who is badly in need of water to quench his thirst with which he is almost dying. To him the water beyond the globe — beyond *Brahmāṇḍa* — is of no use as it is inaccessible to him. So is the *para* form of the Lord to a bound *jīva* who has a strong desire and impatience to see the form of the Lord. The *vyūha* form also, though within *Brahmāṇḍa* is beyond his reach, as the milky ocean is to a thirsty person. The *vibhava* form is indeed unlike the two forms above referred to. Śrī Rāma, Śrī Kṛṣṇa and such other *avatāras* of the Supreme Being, were easily accessible and enjoyed by the ardent devotees like Śabarī, Hanumān, Akrūra and others, who were contemporaries of those *avatāras*. This form of the Lord is compared with the flood water of a river in spate. When the flood subsides and the river becomes dry during the summer season, the river is of no use to the thirsty person. The *antaryāmi* form, in spite of the fact that it is always present very near, that is, in his heart, is as inaccessible as the three other forms are. This form may be enjoyable only to those who get themselves well trained in the *yoga* form of meditation. To experience God by this means is analogous to digging a well for getting water to quench one's thirst when one is almost at the point of death.

6.20 The Means of Liberation

There is no other means to attain total liberation from the bondage of the cycle of births and deaths, than the meditation (*bhaktiyoga*) and surrender (*śaraṇāgati*) oneself to the Lord as a refugee expressing his helplessness. *Bhaktiyoga* which is the practice of one of the 32 *vidyās* referred to in the *Upaniṣads*, is enjoined

as a means to attain the Lord. The Vedic assertion that "Through the knowledge of the Lord alone one could get liberation from this horrible worldly life and that there is no other means than this"¹⁰ means not the mere knowledge of the Lord; for in other contexts the words '*dhyāna*', '*upāsana*' and the like — meaning 'concentrated meditation', series of thoughts, uninterrupted by other thoughts — are used. It is described as being like the stream of oil (*taila-dhārāvad avicchinna-smṛti-santati-rūpa*). This type of meditation is stated to enable the meditator to attain the Lord, after breaking the bondage of *samsāra*. Such a meditation upon the Lord must be continued until the meditator throws away his mortal coil and perhaps in more than one birth until all the *karma* that has begun to give its fruit (*prārabdhakarma*) becomes exhausted.

There are four general pre-requisites for a person who desires to pursue one of the above two means — *bhaktiyoga* and *śaraṇāgati*. They are — (1) a desire to get the fruit of the above two means, (2) a good knowledge of *jīva*, of the Lord and of the relation that subsists between the *jīva* and the Lord, (3) a sound knowledge of the means of liberation that he is going to pursue, and (4) the ability to follow the adopted means. Those who adopt the *bhaktiyoga* must be born in a caste in which the initiation to the study of the *Vedas* is possible. In the case of those who resort to surrender (*śaraṇāgati*), inability to pursue any other means than surrender, aversion for any other interests than liberation and aversion to resort to any other refuge than the Lord, are required.

Although *karmayoga*, *jñānayoga* and *bhaktiyoga* are presented in the *Gītā* as the means to attain liberation,

it is only *bhaktiyoga* that could get him liberation and the other two are indispensable auxiliaries to it. *Karmayoga* is performance of rites prescribed by *Sāstras* by a person who has got the true knowledge of the nature of the *jīva* and the supreme Being. The rites are of three types, regular ones (*nitya-karmāṇi*), those compulsorily to be performed on certain occasions (*naimittika-karmāṇi*) and optional ones (*kāmya-karmāṇi*). If performed with no desire for any reward thereof and having His pleasure alone its goal, the *karma* enables a person to see his own self. *Jñānayoga* is the practice of contemplation of the self, resulting in the sight of it. Helped by *karmayoga* which enables the person to control his senses, *jñānayoga* is the uninterrupted contemplation of his own self (*jīva-svarūpa*) as distinct from matter (*prakṛti*) and as His body, since it (the self) is ruled, controlled and guided by Him. By a practice of these two—*karmayoga* and *jñānayoga*—the sight of *jīva-svarūpa* can be achieved, and this will help the person practise *bhaktiyoga* even as the scrutiny of the outer cover is helpful to see the thing kept within. *Bhaktiyoga* is contemplation on the Lord who is not dependent upon others (*ananya-niṣṭhaḥ*) who is not at the disposal of others (*ananyādhinaḥ*) and who is not to serve for the fulfilment of others' purposes (*ananya-śeṣaḥ*). By practising *bhaktiyoga* adopting one of the 32 *vidyās* prescribed in the *Upaniṣads*, a meditator can secure the intuition of the Lord's form.

At first by the close association with His devotees, a person acquires some devotion and love for the Lord, which makes him eager to know the Lord better. This love is called '*Bhakti*'. Out of his love for Him, the man learns much more of Him from *Sāstras*, prac-

tises *karmayoga* and then *jñānayoga*. By such means, he becomes capable of seeing his self (*jīvātmā*) as the body of the Lord and gradually he becomes very eager to enjoy the sight of the Lord. Then he practises *bhaktiyoga* otherwise called '*Para-bhakti*' in the manner prescribed in *yoga śāstra*. The more he meditates upon Him, the greater becomes his thirst to see Him in person with his very eyes. The desire becomes deeper and stronger, results in restlessness and uneasiness without that sight, and culminates in lamentations as if in madness and an impatience to see Him. Hearing his cries for attaining the Lord, the Lord takes pity on him and shows His form for his enjoyment for the time being. The perception of His form is called '*Para-jñāna*'. The delight at the sight of His form is likened to the delight at the sight of a tank with clear and delicious water felt by a person who was dying of thirst and heat after wandering a long time in a desert in the scorching summer sun. This delight is called '*Parama-bhakti*'. This will lead to a still stronger desire to enjoy the Lord forever which could be fulfilled after reaching *Vaikuṇṭha* where he could enjoy the Lord with all His auspicious qualities in company with the other residents of that place.

The practice of *bhaktiyoga* is more difficult than *saraṇāgati*. First of all, it could be adopted only by a person born of a caste in which initiation to the study of the *Vedas* (*Upanayana*) is allowed. A sound knowledge of *Veda-śāstra*, control of the senses, the practice of *karmayoga* and *jñānayoga* and patience in the inevitable delay in attaining the fruit of *bhaktiyoga*, namely the liberation from worldly life which could be got only after the 'former deed' (*prārabdha karma*),

which has begun to give its effects, becomes exhausted by the experience of pleasure or pain by the same person, are indispensably required. *Śaraṇāgati*, on the other hand, could be performed by all sentient beings, either personally, by himself or through a person competent and fit to perform it on his or its behalf. Inability to resort to other means (*ananyopāyatva*) is a pre-requisite. In addition to this, one must be indifferent to other fruits than the one for which *śaraṇāgati* is performed (*phalāntara-vaimukhya*). He must as well turn away from any other refuge with regard to his getting the desired object (*ananya-gatitva*).

Śaraṇāgati is performed even for purposes other than the final liberation as was done by Draupadī. When she was dragged to the court hall by Dussāsana in the presence of her valiant husbands, she resorted to Lord Kṛṣṇa with all her mind to save her from the predicament in which she was placed. Her prayer was immediately crowned with a miraculous success.

Moreover, the surrender (*śaraṇāgati*) consists of three parts. They are: (1) the surrender of the self (*svarūpa-samarpaṇa*), (2) the surrender of the responsibility of protection (*bharasamarpaṇa*), and (3) the surrender of even the fruit of protection (*phala-samarpaṇa*). The first and third, namely the surrender of self and the surrender of the fruit of *śaraṇāgati* are common to both the means — *Bhaktiyoga* and *Śaraṇāgati* — performed for total liberation, while the second, the surrender of the responsibility of protection is an additional feature in the path of *śaraṇāgati*. In the case of *śaraṇāgati* performed for attaining some other fruit than complete liberation from *samsāra*, the

surrender of the responsibility of protection alone is performed."

6.21 *Bhaktiyoga and Śaraṇāgati — Their Common Features and Peculiar Aspects*

Thus according to Rāmānuja, total liberation can be attained either by the practice of *Bhaktiyoga* or by *Śaraṇāgati*, by a refuge of the Lord and there is no other means than the above two. The distinct features of the two paths are presented below:

Bhaktiyoga

Śaraṇāgati

- | | |
|---|--|
| a. Total liberation can be secured by the completion of <i>bhaktiyoga</i> . This can be got in the same birth or after one or more births as the case may be. The time of liberation would depend on the result of <i>prārabdha-karma</i> having been completely experienced. | It can win total liberation immediately or in the natural course after death. Total liberation can be secured when the desire is cherished as originally expressed at the time of the performance of <i>Śaraṇāgati</i> . |
| b. It is to be performed to the last breath. | It is performed only once in one's life. |
| c. It can bear its fruit only after the exhaustion of <i>karma</i> which has begun to give its effects. | It is capable of destroying even the deed which has begun to give its effects (<i>prārabdha-karma</i>). |

- | | | |
|----|---|---|
| d. | At the time of death, the last remembrance of the Lord is necessary. | It is not necessary that a refugee should have the last remembrance of the Lord. |
| e. | It can secure whatever is desired. | <i>Saraṇāgati</i> also can win all the desired things. |
| f. | It can be practised only by those who are born in one of the first three Varṇas as they alone are permitted the study of the <i>Vedas</i> . | It can be performed by all sentient beings irrespective of their birth. |
| g. | As it may extend to more than one birth, the bliss derived by the meditation of the Lord's form is large (<i>vilambena prāptir bhajana-sukhaṁ vipulam</i>). | As one gets the total liberation as a result of his surrender even immediately or soon after the extinction of that life, the bliss of meditation is next to nil or very little. (<i>āśu prāptiḥ parimita-rasā jīvita-daśā</i>) |

6.22 The State of Liberation

As a result of the adoption of one of the two means — *bhaktiyoga* and *saraṇāgati* — a *jīva* may proceed to the eternal world better known as *Śrī Vaikuṇṭha* where the *jīva* enjoys the Lord with all His sweet qualities and serves Him with no time limit, in company with *Nityas* and *Muktas*. There is no necessity or possibility of the liberated *jīvas* coming back to this world (*karmabhūmi*). In that world, there is no distinction among *Nityas*, *Muktas* and the Lord Himself in point of the enjoyment of bliss and knowledge. Excepting

the creation, protection and destruction of the universe and such other activities as they rest only with the Lord, absolute equality prevails among the residents of *Śrī Vaikuṇṭha*.

As the chief member of a family shoulders the responsibility of maintaining the family in comfort for which purpose he has to attend to some special duties in which the other members do not take any part, still enjoy the pleasures derived by the efforts of the principal member, so do the residents of *Śrī Vaikuṇṭha* enjoy all kinds of pleasures with no difference among the residents on the one hand and the Lord on the other and much less among themselves. Vedic statements like “he gets supreme equality (*nirañjanaḥ paramaṁ sām्यamupaiti*) and he gets equality of enjoyment with the Supreme Being (*brahmaṇaḥ sāyujyaṁ gacchati*)” prove the above statement of equality for all.

NOTES

1. *seyaṁ devatā aikṣata, hantāham imāḥ tisro devatāḥ, anena jīvena ātmanā anupraviśya nāma-rūpe vyākaravāṇi. Chā. Up., 6.3.2*

2. *sarvāṇi rūpāṇi vicitya dhīraḥ, nāmāni kṛtvā abhivadan yadāste. Puruṣasūkta, 16*

3. *tattad dravyeṣu nāmāntara-bhajana-sahā'vasthayā sṛṣṭivādaḥ. A S, 223*

4. *yasya cetanasya yad dravyam sarvātmanā svārthe niyantum dhārayitum ca śīkyaṁ, taccēṣataikasvarūpaṁ ca, tat tasya śarīram — Śrībhāṣya, II, p. 15 (2.1.9)*

5. *na ha vai saśarīrasya sataḥ priya apriyayor apahatirasti, aśarīraṁ vāva santam na priya apriye sprśataḥ, Chā. Up.*

8.12.1

6. *dvā suparnā sayujā sakhāyā samānam vṛkṣam pariśasvajāte,*
tayoranyaḥ pippalam svādvatti anaśnannanyo abhicāśati,
M U. 3.1.1
7. *eṣa eva sādhu karma kārayati tam yamunniniṣati,*
eṣa eva asādhu karma kārayati tam yamadho niniṣati.
8. *acidaviśiṣṭān pralaye jantūnavalokya jātānirvedā*
kaṛaṇa-kalebara-yogam vitarasi vṛṣaśailanātha-karuṇe
tvam. Dayāśatakam, 17
9. *tvam nyañcadbhirudañcadbhiḥ karma-sūtropapāditaiḥ*
hare viharasi kṛiḍā-kandukairiva jantubhiḥ. V D.
10. *datte dehādiyogaṁ diśati ca nigamaṁ vakti vedāntasāram*
nissimānandayogaṁ nirupadhi samaye soutu pumsām
tayaiva A.S., 238
11. *eṣa eva sādhu karma kārayati tam yamunniniṣati,*
eṣa eva asādhu karma kārayati tam yamadho niniṣati.
Kauṣītaki Up., 3, 64-65
12. *tān aham dviṣataḥ krūrān saṁsāreṣu narādhamān*
kṣipāmi ajasram aśubhān āsurīṣveva yoniṣu
āsuriṁ yonim āpannāḥ mūḍhaḥ janmani janmani
mām aprāpyaiva kaunteya tato yānti adhamām gatim
Gītā, xvi, 19-20
13. *mitra-bhāvena samprāptam na tyajeyam kathñchana,*
Rāmāyaṇa, Yuddhakāṇḍa, 18.3
vibhiṣaṇo vā sugrīva yadi vā rāvaṇaḥ svayam.
Ibid, 18.34
14. *gataśriyaṁ kṛtta-kiriṭa-kūtamuvāca rāmo yudhi*
rākṣasendram
kṛtam tvayā karma mahatsubhīmam hata-praviraśca
kṛtastvayāham
tasmāt pariśrānta iva vyavasya na tvām śarair
mṛtyuvaśam nayāmi
gacchānujñāmi raṇārditastvam-praviśya rātriñcararāja,
laṅkā
āśvāsya niryāhi rathī ca dhanvī tadā balaṁ draakṣyasi me
rathasthaḥ. Ibid, 59, 141-143

15. *dāsaḥ sakhā vāhanamāsanam dhvajah yaste vitānam
vyajanam trayimayah-S. R. 41*
16. *nivāsa-sayyā āsana pādukā amśukopadhāna-
varṣātapavāraṇādibhiḥ — Ibid. 40*
17. *pādo'sya viśvā bhūtāni, tripād asyāmṛtam divi —
Puruṣasūkta, 3*
18. *veda ahametampuruṣam mahāntam ādityavarṇam
tamasastu pāre. Ibid. 16*
19. *tad viṣṇoḥ paramampadam sadā paśyanti sūrayah,
Subāla Up, 6.1*
20. *tad akṣare paramo vyoman, Taittirīya Up, IV, 1, 2*
21. *yatra pūrve sādhyāḥ santi devaḥ. Puruṣasūkta, 18*
22. *yatra ṛṣayah prathamajā ye purāṇāḥ*
23. *māhārajanam vāsaḥ, Br Up., II, iii, 6.*
24. *asyeśānā jagato viṣṇupatnī, Nīlā Sūkta*
25. *hriṣca te laksmīṣca patnyau, Taittirīya Āraṇyaka 3 13.2*
26. *jñāṇtvam jñānatā ca śrutibhir abhidadhe nātra
pakṣe patāmah. A.S, 230*
27. *yadā yadā hi dharmasya glānir bhavati bhārata
abhyutthānamadharwasya tadmtmānam sṛjāmyaham.
paritrāṇāya sādhnām vināśāya ca duṣkṛtām
dharma-samsthāpanārthāya sambhavāmi yuge yuge.
janma karma ca me divyam evam yo vetti tattvataḥ
tyaktvā dehum punarjanma naiti m.meti so' rjuna.
— Gītā, iv, 7-9*
28. *antaḥ praviṣṭaḥ śāstā janānām sarvātmā — Taittirīya
Āraṇyaka, 3.11*
29. *antarbahiṣca tatsarvam vyāpya nārāyaṇaḥ sthitaḥ —
Taittirīyopaniṣad, IV. 94*

30. *tam eva viditvā ati mṛtyumeti, nānyaḥ panthāḥ vidyate
ayanāya* — *Svetāvatara Up*, 3.8; 6-15.

31. *mumukṣumātra-sāmānyam svarūpādi-samarpaṇam
akiñcane bharanyāsastu adhiko'ṅgitayā sthitaḥ
atra rakṣā-bharanyāsassamaḥ sarvaphalārthinām
svarūpa-phalanikṣepas tvadhiko makṣa-kāñkṣiṇām.*

— *Vedāntadeśika's Śrīmad Rahasya-trayaśāra*
[*Sāṅgoprapadana Adhikāra*]

CONCLUSION

Viśiṣṭādvaita does not reject the validity of sense perception (*pratyakṣa*) so long as the senses are not affected by blemishes or ailment, and so long as what is given by sense perception is not shown to be illusory by a later perception or by any other testimony. In this, it differs from Advaita which rejects the worth of perception as a testimony (*pramāṇa*), on the ground that occasionally perception is subject to illusion (*bhrama*). Viśiṣṭādvaita accepts the reality of the world of sentients and non-sentients that we see around us and has, therefore, a greater appeal to common sense and universal experience. Advaita on the other hand maintains that Brahman alone is real, and that there are besides Brahman two kinds of illusory experiences or existents: *Prātibhāsika* — temporary and transient illusion as when mirage is perceived or the shell is mistaken for silver, and *Vyāvahārika* existence in which the world experienced by all of us is said to be valid and real until Brahman is realised by the self. Advaita holds that the *śrutis* speak of two kinds of Brahman — an *apara* Brahman or lower Brahman with attributes and qualities — *saguṇa* Brahman which is affected by *māyā* and which would disappear when the *jīva* realises his identity with Para Brahman. It permits the worship of this *saguṇa* Brahman only as a means or stage in spiritual progress. While doing so, Advaita has to state that the texts which describe the qualities and attributes of Brahman are sublated by other texts in

the *śruti* itself. It provokes the question — Why should the *śruti* first state what is not true and what is not known by perception or other *pramāṇas*, and then declare it to be false? Viśiṣṭādvaita denies that the *śrutis* reveal the doctrine of two Brahman and holds that the purport of all the *śrutis* is to reveal only *Saguṇa* Brahman and enjoin His *upāsana*.

Viśiṣṭādvaita maintains that those texts which at first sight seem to deny attributes in Brahman should be so interpreted as not to be in conflict with the Vedic texts that ascribe attributes in Brahman. It is only by doing so that the authority of all the *śrutis* as a whole could be upheld. It would seem arbitrary otherwise to reject the validity of certain *śrutis* and accept the validity only of certain others. In regard to the means of attaining liberation, other Vedic systems enjoin only *bhakti* as it is understood in the *Upaniṣads*, as the sole means. As has been already pointed out, this would exclude women and those who are not permitted to have initiation to the study of the *Vedas*. Viśiṣṭādvaita declares that in addition to *bhakti*, there is another means open to women and to all castes by which they can attain liberation at the end of the present life. This is *saraṇāgati* and its auxiliaries as stated in the *sāstras** are accepted as necessary. In this enjoining *saraṇāgati*, Viśiṣṭādvaita seems to extend its sympathy to a far wider circle of sentient and does not deny the possibility of liberation to any sentient being.

* (a) *mumukṣurvai saraṇam-aham prapadye*

— *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*, 6, 18

(b) *tasmān-nyāsameṣām tapasām atiriktam āhuḥ*

— *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, 4, 147

1. *Padāhavanīyanyāya*

A special text predominates over a general text. 'By whatever he offers in *āhavanīya* fire' is a general text. There are some special texts. (1) he offers on a step, he offers in the way in the *jyotiṣṭoma*. (2) Somewhere it is laid down "he makes *patnisannyāsa* offerings in *gārhapatya* fire." In this state of conflict between the general and the special texts, the special texts prevail over the general text. This *nyāya* is also called *utsargāpavādanyāya*.

2. *Ākrtyadhikaraṇanyāya*

Do the words denoting substances like '*gauḥ*' etc. express the configuration or the individual possessing the configuration? In '*gām ānaya*' and such other verbal usages, the word '*gām*' could not mean the cows's configuration alone, since it, being incorporeal, could not be taken from one place to another. Hence it is the individual possessing the configuration which must be meant by the word '*gām*'. This is the *prima facie* argument.

The final decision is that the individual could not be meant, as the individuals are innumerable in consequence of which the denotative functions also would be infinite in number. Moreover, the word '*gauḥ*' cannot denote merely the possessor without denoting the configuration; for by the utterance of the word '*gauḥ*', the common experience is to remember the individual, only with the configuration. If the possessor in association with the configuration is held to be denoted by the denotative power of the word '*gauḥ*',

then it is better to hold that the denotative power rests in the configuration alone, and as it is an inseparable attribute, and as it cannot be known apart from its possessor, it forces the knowledge of its possessor together with its own. Thus it is in conformity with the common convention, "that which could not be understood by any other means is the meaning of a word" (*ananyalabhyaś-śabdārthaḥ*). Thus the denotative power of a word (meaning a substance) remains only in the configuration.

3. *Chāgapaśunyāya*

In the sacrifice called *agniṣomīya*, a *paśu* (quadruped) has been ordained as to be sacrificed in the holy alter. As there is no specific mention of a particular quadruped, the *prima facie* argument is, any quadruped may be sacrificed. The final decision is that as there is a *mantra varṇa* "*chāgasya napāyāḥ*" in the same context, in consultation of this, the quadruped mentioned in the enjoining hymn is to be known as goat. Thus a general term in an enjoining hymn is to be understood to be denoting a particular one in consultation of another hymn which is subordinate to the former.

4. *Apaccheda-nyāya*

In a *jyotiṣtoma* sacrifice, *bahiṣpavamāna* hymn is sung. The priests walk out of the sacrificial ground and there they sing the Vedic songs. While going out of the sacrificial ground, first the *adhvaryu* goes out; then *prastota* holding the tucked up clothes of the *adhvaryu*; then the *udgātā*, holding the tucked up clothes behind the *prastotā*, follows him; then the *pratihartā* holding up the tucked up clothes behind the *udgātā* goes; then *brahmā* follows *udgātā*. The procession of the singing priests continues in the above order from the sacrificial

ground to some place outside of it. If by chance, they let go the tucked up clothes in the procession it is called *kacchavimocana*. There are three priests — the *prastotā*, *udgātā* and *pratihartā* — who hold the tucked up clothes in their hands. There are five possible accidents: (1) The *prastotā* alone may lose the hold of the tucked up clothes; (2) the *udgātā* alone may lose the hold of the tucked up clothes; (3) the *pratihartā* alone may lose the *kaccha*; (4) they may simultaneously lose the hold; (5) they may successively lose their hold of it.

The general proposition is that a penalty should have to be paid. If *pratihartā* leaves his hold, the entire wealth of the sacrificer is to be given as gift. If the *udgātā* leaves his hold, the sacrifice should be abruptly ended and the same sacrifice is to be recommenced and the amount that was intended to be distributed in the first sacrifice should be distributed in the recommenced sacrifice. If two *ṛtviks* leave their hold, both the expiatory ceremonies should be performed. If it is impossible one of the two must be performed. If the *pratihartā* leaves his hold first and then the *udgātā*, which of the two is to be performed is to be decided. Here the *prima facie* argument is that by the application of *upakramānyāya* the expiation for the first leaving (*Pratihartā's* leaving) should be performed. The final decision is that the expiation for the second leaving is to be performed because the latter expiation does not come into being, unless the knowledge of the former expiation is sublated. The latter has no one as its sublatter. Hence the latter is more powerful.

5. *Pāśa-nyāya*

In the *agniṣomiya* sacrifice, there are two hymns to be chanted at the time of releasing the goat from the

noose "*aditiḥ pāśam pramumoktu*" and "*aditiḥ pāśān pramumoktu*". The word denoting the noose is in singular in the former hymn, and in the latter hymn it is in plural. Here is a doubt. Whether the second hymn with the word (denoting noose) in plural is to be used in its own context or it is to be taken to a context where there are more than two nooses. The *prima facie* argument is that as there is only one noose, the hymn with the word *pāśān* in plural number is not applicable in the context and hence it is to be taken to other context. The final decision is as follows. The meaning of the stem is more prominent than the meanings of termination (gender, number etc.). It is not proper to take the prominent one to another context in view of the inapplicability of the less prominent. Hence the plural is construed to mean singular number as its secondary meaning, abandoning its primary meaning, namely plurality (of the noose).

6. *Upakrama-nyāya*

There is a passage "The *ṛk* should be uttered in high pitch, the *yajus* in low whisper and the *sāman* in high pitch (*uccaiḥ ṛcā kriyate, upāṁśu yajuṣā, uccaiḥ sāmṇā*). There arises a question as to whether the words *ṛk*, *yajus* and *sāma* mean only the *ṛk-mantra*, *yajur-mantra* and *sāma-mantra* or the words *ṛk*, *yajur* and *sāma* mean *Ṛgveda*, *Yajurveda*, and *Sāmaveda*. In the former case a hymn irrespective of its position in the three Vedas is to be chanted in high pitch or in low pitch as the case may be; that is, *ṛk-mantra* occurring in *Yajurveda* is to be chanted in high pitch in spite of its position in *Yajurveda*, since it belongs to *Ṛg-veda*; similarly a *yajur-mantra* occurring in *Sāma veda* is to be chanted in low waisper, despite its being placed in

Sāmaveda. In the latter case, namely *ṛk*, *yajur* and *sāma* denoting the respective Veda, a hymn, irrespective of its relation to a particular Veda, is to be chanted in accordance with its position in a Veda. For example, a *ṛk mantra* occurring in Yajurveda is to be chanted in low whisper and not in high pitch and similarly a *yajur-mantra* occurring in Sāmaveda is to be chanted only in high pitch because of its position.

The *prima facie* argument is as follows — since in the enjoining sentence, there are words *ṛk*, *yajus* and *sāma*, the words “*ṛgveda*, *yajurveda* and *sāmaveda*” in *arthavāda* (*trayo vedā ajāyanta agneḥ ṛgvedaḥ, vāyor yajurvedaḥ, ādityāt sāmavedaḥ*) are to be taken to mean in accordance with the enjoining sentence, that is the three words *ṛgveda*, etc. in *arthavāda* mean only *ṛk*, *yajus* and *sāma* by implication and thus they are to abandon their primary meaning. Thus the high pitch and low whisper are meant only for *mantras* and not for the whole Veda. The final decision is this. *Ṛgveda* *Yajurveda* and *Sāmaveda*, though these occur in *arthavāda* which is less prominent than *vidhi* or enjoining sentence, are in the beginning of the discourse in consequence of which the word ‘Veda’ has no opponent to oppose its having its own meaning; but the words *ṛk*, *yajus* and *sāma*, though they happen in *vidhi* sentence come late, and they have opponents in words of Veda, in *arthavāda* to oppose in their having their own meaning namely *mantras*.

Hence the statements found at the conclusion is to be interpreted in accordance with the statement found at the beginning.

7 *Sāṅkaryam or Cross-division*

Bhūtatva (materiality) and *Mūrtatva* (being the seat of motion) both cannot be generic attributes (*jāti*) for the reason of *sāṅkaryam* or Cross-division. 'Being partially exclusive of each other and partly co-existent' — is cross-division. *Bhūtatva* and *mūrtatva* frustrate each other's being a generic attribute, because *bhūtatva* in the first four *bhūtas* is co-existent with *mūrtatva* and both of them are exclusive of each other in ether and mind.

Similarly *śarīratvam* — bodyhood is not a generic attribute; for it would involve a cross-division with *pṛthvitva*, etherhood. The watery body, for instance, is a body but not earthy. Jars etc. are earthy but not bodies while human and other bodies are earthy and bodies.

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